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The thesis studies critical factors affecting the efficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure to support trade and economic development. In striving for that goal, 
the study reviewed the literature on construction and economic development, 
international trade theories, and infrastructure development. The literature review 
provided an understanding of the linkages between the economy, infrastructure and 
trade growth. The literature has shown a positive relationship between trade and 
economic development. Stimulating trade has been one of the major policies in 
developing countries. However, the under-performance of the infrastructure systems 
that links these countries with their international markets is considered one of the 
major concerns. Investments in infrastructure have increasingly been used to improve 
the infrastructure quality, thus stimulating trade and economic growth in developing 
countries. Nevertheless, a number of infrastructure challenges faced by developing 
countries remain. This raises the question about the efficiency in the use of public 
investments in infrastructure. 
 Examining how to use public investments in infrastructure more efficiently to 
support trade and economic development, this study found the answer in the way 
infrastructure of a country is planned and built. This study also attempts to isolate key 
factors in the process that could limit the efficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure. From the literature review, these factors could be categorized into two 
groups: factors in the planning process and factors in the implementation process. In 
the planning process, these factors include inadequate capacity for estimating and 
monitoring of rates of return of infrastructure projects; politicized decision making; 
transparency and accountability problems; and institutional weaknesses in decision-
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making. In the implementation process, these factors include lack of political 
commitment in the implementation of infrastructure development plans; problems in 
land acquisition; corruption in infrastructure construction; shortages of local 
construction firms’ capabilities and resources; and institutional and legal weaknesses 
in infrastructure construction. 
 The thesis discusses these factors in the case of Vietnam. A longitudinal 
survey was carried out to examine the developmental trends of the efficiency of 
public investments in infrastructure construction to support trade and economic 
growth over time. A questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews with respondents 
from both government agencies and non-government agencies were conducted to 
identify key factors affecting the efficient use of the public investments. Respondents 
from the government sector were selected from relevant government agencies 
involved in policy making as well as planning for construction, infrastructure and 
trade of Vietnam. Respondents from non-government agencies included financial 
institutions, traders, developers, consultants and contractors involved in investing and 
delivering infrastructure, as well as in utilizing infrastructure services for trading 
activities. There are four major factors that the thesis found critical to the current use 
of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam including institutional capacity of 
the government, transparency and accountability in infrastructure development, land 
acquisition and building capacity of local firms. A model of the impacts of these 
factors on the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure was examined and 
validated. Among these factors, poor institutional capacity of the government lies at 
the root of the inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure. The current 
fragmented way of planning and implementing infrastructure policies requires better 
coordination across sectors and levels. 
ix 
 
Findings of the study supplement the understanding of the role of government 
in the theory of coordination failure in economic development. Major theoretical 
implication of the findings is that there is a strong need for the government to take the 
lead in ensuring that public investments in infrastructure lead to long-term and 
sustainable growth. Practical contributions of the study are also achieved by more 
precisely pinning down constraints on state capacities across infrastructure planning 
and delivery, explaining the effects of these constraints, and illuminating the potential 





Figure 2.1 The evolution of development thoughts ...................................................... 30 
Figure 3.1 Effect of increases in capital stock on the production possibility frontier .. 46 
Figure 3.2 Share of construction in GNP and per capita GNP ..................................... 51 
Figure 4.1 Time-line of major theoretical viewpoints on the role of international trade 
in economic development ............................................................................................. 80 
Figure 5.1 Factors affecting the efficient use of infrastructure investments for trade 
and economic development from the literature review ................................................. 95 
Figure 6.1 Geographical map of Vietnam ..................................................................... 97 
Figure 6.2 Vietnam’s GDP growth (at constant 1990 prices US$)............................. 103 
Figure 6.3 Structure of Vietnam’s GDP at 1994 prices by economic activities ......... 104 
Figure 6.4 Structure of Vietnam’s GDP at current prices by ownership (%) ............. 104 
Figure 6.5 Vietnam’s GNI per capita, Atlas method (current prices US$) ................. 105 
Figure 6.6 Contribution of foreign trade to Vietnam’s GDP ...................................... 112 
Figure 6.7 Contribution of FIEs in Vietnam’s total export value of goods (%) ......... 113 
Figure 6.8 Costs to export in Vietnam and some neighboring countries .................... 117 
Figure 6.9 Costs to import in Vietnam and some neighboring countries ................... 118 
Figure 6.10 Supply and demand at Ho Chi Minh City ports ...................................... 119 
Figure 6.11 Global competitiveness score of Vietnam ............................................... 120 
Figure 6.12 Photos of the poor infrastructure of Vietnam .......................................... 122 
Figure 6.13 Vietnam’s growth by economic activities ............................................... 125 
Figure 6.14 Contribution of Vietnam’s construction industry to GDP ....................... 125 
Figure 6.15 Vietnam’s GFCF in GDP ........................................................................ 126 
Figure 6.16 Vietnam’s labour productivity in construction industry .......................... 130 
Figure 6.17 Labour productivity and average income of labour in the construction 
industry of Vietnam .................................................................................................... 131 
Figure 6.18 Average price index for housing and material construction in Vietnam . 132 
Figure 6.19 Vietnam’s national planning system ....................................................... 150 
Figure 6.20 Vietnam’s planning process at central level ............................................ 151 
Figure 6.21 Time-line of major economic policies, significant infrastructure 
development events and related institutional changes ................................................ 163 
Figure 7.1 Path model example .................................................................................. 181 
Figure 7.2 Research design ......................................................................................... 189 
xi 
 
Figure 8.1 Marginal effect of public investments in infrastructure for supporting trade 
and economic growth in Vietnam ............................................................................... 193 
Figure 8.2 Model of the inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure in 
Vietnam ....................................................................................................................... 222 
Figure 8.3 Estimated structural equation model of factors affecting the use of public 
investments in infrastructure ....................................................................................... 230 
Figure 9.1 Major factors affecting the efficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure in Vietnam ............................................................................................ 268 
Figure 9.2 Framework for developing capacities for the efficient use of public 
investments in infrastructure in Vietnam .................................................................... 285 





List of Tables 
Table 6.1 Significant changes in legal and institutional framework for trading 
activities and related policies of Vietnam since Doi Moi ........................................... 109 
Table 6.2 Comparison of quality of overall infrastructure of Vietnam and some 
neighboring countries .................................................................................................. 116 
Table 6.3 Rankings of infrastructure quality of Vietnam ........................................... 116 
Table 6.4 Time to export and to import of Vietnam and some neighboring countries117 
Table 6.5 Total outputs of major building materials in Vietnam from 2000 to 2007 . 128 
Table 6.6 Forecasts of capacities and outputs of key building materials in Vietnam 
from 2010 to 2020 ....................................................................................................... 128 
Table 6.7 Member national associations of VFCEA .................................................. 140 
Table 6.8 Major factors explaining the poor performance of large construction 
projects in Vietnam ..................................................................................................... 146 
Table 6.9 Ministries responsible for trade, infrastructure and construction sectors ... 153 
Table 7.1 Number of divisions and units under relevant ministerial departments ..... 174 
Table 8.1 Efficiency of public investments in infrastructure construction to support 
trade and economic growth ......................................................................................... 191 
Table 8.2 Questionnaire return rate ............................................................................ 194 
Table 8.3 Type of management levels ........................................................................ 194 
Table 8.4 List of variables affecting the efficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure ............................................................................................................... 195 
Table 8.5 Median occurrence rating of problems ....................................................... 197 
Table 8.6 Median criticality rating of problems ......................................................... 198 
Table 8.7 Hypothesis test on the median of criticality ratings .................................... 201 
Table 8.8 Correlation matrix ....................................................................................... 205 
Table 8.9 Anti-image correlation ................................................................................ 207 
Table 8.10 Component analysis .................................................................................. 208 
Table 8.11 Factor matrix ............................................................................................. 210 
Table 8.12 Rotated factor-loading matrix ................................................................... 211 
Table 8.13 Rearrangement of rotated factor matrix .................................................... 212 
Table 8.14 Ranking of the outcomes of the inefficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure ............................................................................................................... 219 
Table 8.15 Measured indicator loadings ..................................................................... 225 
Table 8.16 Squared correlations of constructs ............................................................ 225 
Table 8.17 Indicators’ cross loadings ......................................................................... 226 
xiii 
 
Table 8.18 Estimated path coefficients and t-value .................................................... 228 
Table 8.19 Endogenous constructs’ cross validated redundancy ................................ 229 





List of Abbreviations 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
APEC   Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AVE   Average Variance Extracted 
CB-SEM  Covariance-based SEM 
ECE  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
EVN   Electricity of Vietnam 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
FIEs  Foreign-Invested Enterprises 
GATS   General Agreement for Trade in Services 
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GCI   Global Competitiveness Index 
GCR   Global Competitiveness Report 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GFCF   Gross fixed capital formation 
GNI   Gross National Income 
GNP   Gross National Product 
GSO  General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
HDI   Human Development Index 
HÐBT  Ministers’ Committee 
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals 
MoC  Ministry of Construction 
MoF  Ministry of Finance 
MoIC   Ministry of Information and Communications 
MoIT  Ministry of Industry and Trade 
MoT   Ministry of Transport 
MPI  Ministry of Planning and Investment 
MSA   Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
NICs  Newly Industrializing Countries 
ODA   Official Development Assistance 
PIP   Public Investment Program 
xv 
 
PLS-SEM  Partial Least Squares SEM 
PMU  Project Management Unit 
PNTR   Permanent Normal Trade Relations 
PPP   Public Private Partnership 
SEDP   Socio-Economic Development Plan 
SEDS   Socio-Economic Development Strategy 
SEM   Structural Equation Modeling 
SOEs   State-Owned Enterprises 
SPS   Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards 
SPSS  Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
TEC & QMB  Transport Engineering Construction and Quality Management Bureau 
TRIPS  Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
UNIDO  United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
UNSD  United Nations Statistics Division 
VACC  Vietnam Association of Construction Contractors 
VBRA  Vietnam Bridge and Road Association 
VEC   Vietnam Expressway Corporation 
VFCEA  Vietnam Federation of Civil Engineering Associations 
VNPT   Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group 
VNR   Vietnam Railways Corporation 
VUSTA  Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations 
WEF   World Economic Forum 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research problem 
International trade today stands as a focus of the development agenda in many 
countries of the world. Notably, international trade in developing countries has 
recently grown faster than in developed ones (World Trade Organization, 2010). In 
2010, the growth rates of exports in developed countries and developing countries 
were 13% and 17% respectively. Likewise, the 2010 growth rate of imports in 
developing countries (18%) was higher than that in developed countries (11%) 
(World Trade Organization, 2010). However, integrating into the world trade system 
is still a challenging task for developing countries. Traditional trade issues are barriers 
to trade (tariffs and quotas), which remain high in many developing countries. As 
developing countries increase their integration into the world economy, these 
countries are facing new issues. They are “behind-the-borders” issues, including the 
role of infrastructure and governance (Hoekman et al., 2002). 
The role of infrastructure in supporting trade as well as infrastructure issues in 
the developing countries have been addressed in a number of empirical studies. In 
these studies, infrastructure is regarded as one of the determinants of international 
competitiveness, which directly impact the ability of countries to engage in 
international trade, and to compete for foreign direct investments (APEC Economic 
Committee, 1997; Nwankwo, 2000; Kohsaka, 2007). The poor quality and inadequacy 
of infrastructure are therefore considered one of the major marketing issues and 
challenges in many developing countries (Batra, 1997). As a result, attention has 
increasingly been given to strategic infrastructure development in the developing 
countries. Most studies on strategic infrastructure development for developing 
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countries examined issues related to financing issues for infrastructure development, 
including under-investment in infrastructure, allocations of public capital, public 
resource constraints and private financing (Mundial, 1994; Venables, 2004; 
Demetriades, 2007; Kohsaka, 2007; Flanagan and Jewell, 2009).  
Similarly, the strong correlation between construction (including infrastructure) 
and economic development in the developing countries has long been studied (Turin, 
1969; World Bank, 1984). Tan (2002) has summarized the implications of the early 
studies of the relation between construction and economic development in the less 
developed countries and noted that construction is a “potential” agent of economic 
development. 
There are, however, other concerns about the infrastructure development in 
developing countries, including waste, cost overruns and benefit shortfalls, or 
corruption in large infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg, 2007; Sohail and Cavill, 2008). 
These concerns suggest that there are more major management issues with 
infrastructure development than just project financing issues. Several studies focus on 
the planning aspect of infrastructure development (Hossain, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2007; 
Mustajab, 2009; Marshall, 2011). However, little is known about how the entire 
management system (including planning and delivery) of the government can use 
public investments in infrastructure more efficiently to support trade and economic 
development. To this end, it is pertinent to examine how infrastructure is planned and 
built in a typical developing country, and what key variables are there in the system 
limiting the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure. 
Vietnam has shown constant efforts and commitments to stimulate the 
integration into the world trading systems and heavy investments in infrastructure for 
economic development over the past decades (see Chapter 6). However, compared to 
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other regional countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, Vietnam’s GNI per capita is the lowest (World Bank, 2010). Similarly, 
there is a large gap in infrastructure between Vietnam and these neighbouring 
countries. According to the World Economic Forum (Schwab, 2008, 2009, 2010), 
infrastructure quality in Vietnam was ranked the poorest compared to that of 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines (more details in Chapter 
6). The weaknesses of infrastructure in Vietnam have been identified as the biggest 
hindrance for doing business in the country (Nguyen and Dapice, 2009). It is therefore 
critical for Vietnam to develop plans and policies to overcome these challenges. As 
the country continues to rely on government planning to foster economic development, 
which is common in developing economies (Todaro and Smith, 2009), the case of 
Vietnam could bring out key insights that go beyond the case under study. 
 
1.2 Research scope 
In examining the main research question of what factors limit the efficient use of 
public investments in infrastructure to support trade and economic development in 
Vietnam, the approach taken in this study has several features: 
- The research focuses on macro-level or statewide variables rather than micro- or 
agency-level variables. The approach is needed since public investments in 
infrastructure (national infrastructure investment and policy) are initially 
determined at macro-level in response to or stimulate changes in the economic 
environment. 
- Trade in this study is referred to as trade between nations or international trade, 
since this study focuses on a country’s perspective on trade rather than on an 
individual’s or firm’s perspective. 
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- There are two main types of infrastructure, economic infrastructure supporting 
economic activities of the national economy and social infrastructure supporting 
social development. Since the study focuses on infrastructure built to support 
economic development and trade, the scope of this study is restricted to economic 
infrastructure (as defined by World Bank (1994)), including power, 
telecommunications and transportation.  
- Infrastructure construction in this study is referred to as the production process of 
the built environment, including various activities from conception through 
design to execution that transforms various resources into constructed facilities 
(Ive and Gruneberg, 2000). 
-  In economics, efficiency is defined as the use of resources for maximizing the 
production of goods and services (O'Sullivan and Sheffrin, 2004). In this study, 
the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure refers to the use of public 
investments in infrastructure so as to maximize the competitiveness of a nation in 
terms of infrastructure development. According to the World Economic Forum, 
the competitiveness of a nation in terms of infrastructure development is reflected 
in the quality and extensiveness of infrastructure networks that integrate the 
national market and connecting it at low cost to markets in other countries and 
regions (Schwab, 2009). 
- Developing countries in this study are referred to as low-income and middle-
income economies as classified by the World Bank (2011a). The other group 
includes developed countries, which have high incomes and high-living standards 





1.3 Research aim and objectives  
The main aim of this study is to analyse the use of public investments in infrastructure 
to support trade and economic development in Vietnam. The objectives of this study 
are: 
- To review how public investments in infrastructure are used to support trade and 
economic growth in the literature; 
- To examine how infrastructure is planned and built in Vietnam; 
- To evaluate the level of efficiency of public investments in infrastructure in 
supporting trade and economic growth in Vietnam; 
- To explore the key variables in the process of planning and plan implementation 
that limit the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam; and 
- To make recommendations on capacity building to address issues that critically 
limit the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure to support trade and 
economic growth in Vietnam. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
The research methodology for this study is discussed in Chapter 7. However, it is 
useful to identify some features of the methodology at the beginning of this study: 
 A longitudinal survey of public investments in infrastructure was used to explore 
the extent to which public investments in infrastructure was efficiently used in 
Vietnam; 
 A questionnaire survey was adopted in this study to explore the key variables 
limiting the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure perceived by 
concerned parties. The sample included government officials, developers, 
bankers, traders, consultants and contractors involved in policy making and 
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planning, and delivering as well as in utilizing infrastructure. A five-point Likert 
scale was applied for questions relating to the degree of occurrence and influence 
of factors; 
 In-depth interviews were carried out to explore the ways to address key factors 
identified from the questionnaire survey. In addition, strategic planning 
documents, programme-related documents including final reports, evaluation 
reports and other documents were collected as alternative sources for cross-
checking. Information collected from the interviews formed the main basis for the 
study to make recommendations to improve the efficient use of public 
investments in infrastructure.  
 Data analysis included both quantitative (factor analysis and structural equation 
modeling) and qualitative (thematic content analysis) methods as explained in 
Chapter 7. 
 A two-stage (quantitative and qualitative) validation was conducted to validate the 
results. 
 
1.5 Research significance 
Economists have long agreed that the productive capacity of an economy depends on 
an adequate level of capital formation (Harrod, 1948; Rostow, 1960). Investments in 
infrastructure are expected to promote trade and other economic activities. 
Considerable financing is required as demand for infrastructure in developing 
countries to support trade and economic growth is increasing rapidly. The question of 
project financing is thus the major subject discussed in the literature on infrastructure 
development (Fay and Yepes, 2003; Davis, 2008; Arnold, 2011). However, as 
important as the question of project financing, developing countries are facing the 
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question of efficiency. The poor performance of infrastructure investments (cost 
overruns, benefit shortfalls and waste) can have negative impacts on the economy and 
be costly to fix (Burns and Grebler, 1984; Devarajan et al., 1996; Flyvbjerg, 2008). 
Therefore, how efficiently public investments in infrastructure can be used should be 
considered. More importantly, what factors are limiting the efficient use of public 
investments in infrastructure should be explored. The research is thus needed to 
provide knowledge on how to better use public investments in infrastructure to benefit 
the economy. 
 The research explored the use of public investments in infrastructure at the 
macro-level in order to identify constraints across government departments and policy 
spheres. Although development economists have long been debating the role of 
markets over government (Meier, 2000), infrastructure investment is provided 
principally by the public sector worldwide (Estache, 2006). Besides providing 
infrastructure to promote private economic activities, governments also often use 
infrastructure spending as a counter-cycle tool for macroeconomic stabilization 
(Gruneberg, 1997; Hillebrandt, 2000). Therefore, examining constraints across 
government departments and policy spheres, thus assisting government to put in place 
required capacities to improve the public sector performance is critical for developing 
countries. These insights are also valuable for policy makers to develop better 
infrastructure policies when financial resources are tight. 
In addition, the study explored the use of public investments in infrastructure 
by employing a macro-level approach in Vietnam that covers planning, budgeting, 
inter-ministry and inter-local government cooperation, and delivery. Several studies 
on infrastructure development in Vietnam (Long et al., 2004; Nguyen and Dapice, 
2009) focus on one or two aspects of infrastructure development, rather than on an 
8 
 
entire management system. The challenges of managing more extensive infrastructure 
networks require such an approach to focus the central government on planning, 
regulation, and policy elaboration and implementation; and to balance the roles of 
national, sectoral and local stakeholders. 
 
1.6 Organization of the thesis 
Major contents of this report are organized in the following chapters: 
Chapter 2 starts with a description of different goals of development. It is 
followed by an overview of some of the most prominent theories of economic 
development. These theories are categorized into three main clusters: early views, 
classical theories and contemporary theories. A number of economic development 
models are suggested by these theories. The most prominent models reviewed in the 
chapter are linear-stages-of-growth models, structural-change models, international-
dependence models, neoclassical counterrevolution models, new growth theory, and 
theory of coordination failure. Each model is reviewed with its tools and strategies as 
well as its major weaknesses. Among these models, implications of the theory of 
coordination failure for this study are highlighted and are further discussed in Chapter 
5 of this report. 
A review of the literature on construction and development is presented in 
Chapter 3. The relationship between infrastructure construction and economic 
development is reviewed through the contributions of construction to the economy as 
a whole, the contributions of construction to other sectors in the economy, and the use 
of construction for macroeconomic stabilization. The chapter also discusses current 
concerns of the industry’s performance, especially the infrastructure sector as an 
economic activity to stimulate economic growth in developing countries. 
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Chapter 4 provides an overview of different perspectives on the connection 
between international trade and economic development. The chapter focuses on the 
debate between neoclassical trade theory and dependency theory. Finally, the chapter 
highlights the importance of the integration of developing countries into the 
international trading system and related policies and challenges, including 
infrastructure development and renovation. 
Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the inter-section between trade, 
infrastructure construction and economic development.  The chapter focuses on the 
theory of coordination failure and the role of government in infrastructure 
development for trade and economic growth. Consequently, the chapter discusses 
current issues in using public investments in infrastructure and the knowledge gap. 
The chapter also reviews the literature to identify major issues that could affect the 
efficiency of government funded infrastructure in supporting trade and economic 
growth. Concerns discussed in the chapter are the basis for the formulation of the 
research hypotheses. 
Chapter 6 provides an overview of economic development in Vietnam over 
the past decades. It is followed by a summary of the integration of Vietnam into the 
world economy. The contributions and development of the construction sector in 
Vietnam are also discussed. The next part of the chapter illustrates the inefficient use 
of public investments in infrastructure in planning and delivery in Vietnam. In 
addition, the chapter provides an understanding of the planning process at the national 
level, and major tasks of government agencies related to trade and infrastructure 
construction planning and development. 
Chapter 7 discusses the research methodology adopted in this study. The 
chapter starts with a review of the use of qualitative and quantitative research 
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strategies within the literature of public administration. This section is followed by a 
brief description of the research design selected for research in infrastructure planning. 
Details of approaches used for data analysis and data collection for this study are then 
discussed. 
Chapter 8 focuses on data analysis and discussion. A model of the critical 
factors affecting the current use of public investments in infrastructure to support 
trade and economic growth in Vietnam is examined and validated. Results from both 
quantitative and qualitative data analyses are used to enrich the research findings. 
Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the subject matters of this study and major 
research findings. The chapter also presents research recommendations and validation. 





CHAPTER 2 THEORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The problems of economic development, which are complex and multidimensional, 
have resulted in the development of a number of theories, explanations, arguments, 
and assertions (World Bank, 2000). The purpose of this chapter is to review some of 
the most prominent theories of economic development. These theories describe tools 
and strategies for making development goals achievable. The chapter starts with early 
views about the nature of economic prosperity. The chapter then reviews classical 
theories with four main clusters: linear-stages-of-growth models; structural-change 
models; international-dependence models; neoclassical counter-revolution models. 
Subsequently, contemporary theories of economic development, including new 
growth theory and theory of coordination failure, are reviewed. Finally, implications 
of the changes in the development thoughts and their importance in studying 
development problems in the developing countries conclude the chapter. 
 
2.2 Goals of economic development 
2.2.1 Growth of gross national product 
The goal of economic development in its simplest form is to create the wealth of a 
nation. Prior to the 1970s, rapid economic growth has been considered a good proxy 
for other attributes of development (Todaro and Smith, 2009). Economic performance 
is measured by an annual increase in gross national product (GNP1) (an alternative 
measure is gross domestic product (GDP)). For the purpose of comparability, GNP is 
expressed in a common currency, usually U.S. dollars, and reported in per capita 
                                                            
1 GNP is gross domestic product (GDP) plus incomes received by residents from abroad minus 
incomes claimed by nonresidents. GDP is calculated as the value of the total final output of all goods 
and services produced in a single year within a country’s boundaries (Soubbotina, 2004). 
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terms to take into account the size of a nation’s population (Jaffee, 1998). The World 
Bank now replace GNP per capita with gross national income (GNI) per capita to 
compare wealth among countries. The World Bank defines GNI as the sum of value 
added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in 
the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of 
employees and property income) from abroad. Meanwhile, the World Bank still uses 
GDP in many other featured economic indicators (World Bank, 2011b). 
However, the indicator is a measure of well-being and development 
exclusively based on material wealth. Improvements in welfare such as better health 
care, education and more housing for large parts of the poor population have not been 
captured. The experience of the 1950s and 1960s has shown that GNP growth would 
not necessarily result in a better life for a nation’s population. The narrow goal of 
development (economic growth) induced nations to focus their energies narrowly on 
the rapid growth of national incomes (Todaro and Smith, 2003). “To maximize 
income growth, environmental considerations were left to languish on the sidelines; 
the standard of living was often allowed to slide; large inequalities between classes, 
regions, and genders were ignored; and poverty was tolerated more than it should 
have been in the rush to generate maximum growth” (Basu, 2000, p. 64). It was then 
scholars and policymakers in most developing countries realized that income growth 
was only one dimension of development; a new economic view of development has 
arrived. 
 
2.2.2 Quality of life 
During the 1970s, the concern of millions of people living subsistence lives in poverty 
turned the attention of development economists to people’s lives rather than their 
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incomes. Many developing countries have experienced high growth rates of per capita 
income but little change in the living conditions of a large part of the population. By 
questioning if it is the goal of development that per capita income increases but 
poverty, inequality, and unemployment are growing worse, Seers (1969) marked the 
change needed in setting development objectives. The goal of development during the 
period was thus not limited to economic growth but to concentrate on the reduction of 
poverty, inequality, and unemployment (Seers, 1979). 
In the 1990s, economists increasingly recognized that it was the quality of life 
that determines if people are from developing countries or not. Diseases, 
malnourishment and death that happen in the everyday lives of those from the 
developing countries changed the view of development goals dramatically. By then, 
like many scholars around the world, Stiglitz (1998) contributed to shift the 
development goals set by governments in developing countries to wider objectives, 
including improvements in income distribution, environment, health and education. A 
broader perspective of development goals is hence necessary as reflected in the World 
Bank’s Development Report (1991, p. 4) as “to improve the quality of life. Especially, 
in the world’s poor countries, a better quality of life generally calls for higher incomes 
– but it involves much more. It encompasses as ends in themselves better education, 
higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more 
equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom, and a richer cultural life.” 
Sen’s (1985, 1992, 1999) work perhaps has brought about the broadest 
perspective of development goals. According to Sen (1985), the ultimate goal of 
development is to enhance human capabilities, which is defined as “the freedom that a 
person has in terms of the choice of functionings, given his personal features 
(conversion of characteristics into functionings) and his command over 
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commodities…” (Sen, 1985, p. 13). Higher income is necessary but not sufficient in 
terms of quality of life. Under his approach, goals of economic development change 
from promotion of growth to promotion of well-being.  
These changes in the definition of development goals posed the need to 
construct alternative composite indices to reflect quality of life. These indices should 
take into account not only money indicators but also non-monetary indicators to 
reflect the development levels achieved. There have been attempts to build indicators 
that measure the standard of living and quality of life, which focus on the quantitative 
and qualitative aspects: health, education, environment and material well-being 
(Berenger and Verdier-Chouchane, 2007). Using Sen’s (1985) approach, the Human 
Development Index (HDI) has been published annually since 1990 by the United 
Nations Development Programme as an attempt to provide an aggregate measure of 
life expectancy, education, and income (Elkan, 1995). 
 
2.2.3 Sustainable development 
Increasingly, academics and societies realize the effects of human actions on the 
environment. On the way to achieve rapid economic growth, countries around the 
world have been exploiting their natural resource reserves at alarming rates. Although 
early economists included the natural environment in their economic analysis, 
environmentalism only drew international attention in the 1960s (Pearce and Turner, 
1990). The relationship between development and environment has given birth to the 
sustainable development concept. The central idea of sustainable development is that 




Environmental economists are concerned that the long-term neglect of the 
environmental assets is likely to jeopardize the durability of economic growth 
(Thampapillai, 2002). Sustainable development therefore “involves maximizing the 
net benefits of economic development, subject to maintaining the services and quality 
of natural resources over time” (Pearce and Turner, 1990, p. 24). Its concern is about 
balancing the objectives of economic growth and attending to environmental 
considerations. 
In a broader sense, sustainable development is defined by the Brundtland 
Commission, formally the World Commission on Environment and Development, as 
“progress that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987, p. 8). Although this standard definition brings the term 
“sustainable development” into common use, it has created ambiguity in application 
(Redclift, 1992; Daly, 1996; Payne and Raiborn, 2001). Much of the debate around 
the definition seeks to answer the two questions “What should be sustained” and 
“What should be developed” (Kates et al., 2008). 
Today sustainable development aims to improve the quality of life in a 
comprehensive manner, including economic prosperity, social equity, and 
environmental protection. Economic, social, environmental and cultural aspects must 
be integrated in a harmonious manner to enhance the intergenerational well-being 
(World Bank, 2003). 
 
2.2.4 The millennium development goals 
Eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted by member countries of 
the United Nations in September 2000. The MDGs were developed to address the 
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most pressing problems in developing countries, including poverty and hunger; 
primary universal education, gender equality, child health, maternal health, 
HIV/AIDS, environmental sustainability and global partnership. Member countries of 
the United Nations have committed themselves to end poverty and achieve other 
development goals by 2015. Quantitative targets of these goals were then assigned 
based on the past rates of international development achievements (United Nations, 
2011). 
 However, the MDGs were criticized for failing to include other critical 
objectives of development, such as improving legal and human rights of the poor, 
slowing global warming, and leveraging the contributions of the private sector. Critics 
also argued that the MDG targets were not ambitious enough and were not prioritized 
(Todaro and Smith, 2009). 
The latest 2012 report showed a remarkable progress made by countries, 
including those in sub-Saharan Africa. The review maintained that the MDGs are still 
achievable. Increased supports from national governments, the international 
community, civil society and the private sector are considered necessary to meet the 
MDGs (United Nations, 2012). 
   
2.3 The evolution of economic development thoughts  
2.3.1 Early views about the nature of economic society and prosperity 
Although development economics became established as a discipline within 
economics only in the 1950s, several early economists had written extensively about 
the nature of economic society and prosperity. Among them, Adam Smith and Karl 
Marx are the two most famous thinkers for their two opposite views on the nation’s 
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system of economic arrangements, one called capitalism, and the other called 
socialism. 
On the one hand, Adam Smith’s (1976) (original work published in 1776) 
“The Wealth of Nations” focuses on the market. Adam Smith saw that division of 
labour could create more productive processes. The mechanism for enhancing the 
nation’s wealth therefore is through specialization and exchange. Adam Smith argued 
that under competition, private investors while pursuing their own interests guided by 
the “invisible hand” would maximize national output, and thus promote public 
interests. The “invisible hand” doctrine has become the foundation for the working of 
the market economy or capitalism (Skousen, 2007). In the system, government 
interference is seen as inefficient in looking after economic activities. Meanwhile, 
free trade, private property, and competition are seen as the foundations that would 
spur economic development, reduce poverty, and bring on social and moral 
improvements of humankind. However, freewheeling capitalism is often criticized for 
bringing wealth only to the rich, whereas the poor get poorer. 
On the other hand, Karl Marx in “Capital” (Marx, 1933) (original work 
published in 1867) argued that the feasible system should be based on social or public 
ownership of property. Karl Marx emphasized that the wealth of the capitalists comes 
from the exploitation of the surplus value created by the workers. Hence, private 
property and free market were seen as causes of poverty for the many millions of 
workers. Therefore, private property should be completely abolished. A nation’s 
economy should be planned and managed by the state to serve the interests of the 
masses. Marx believed that a revolution would be inevitable to break down the 
increasing concentration of the capitalists, and to establish socialism (Roemer, 1988; 
Skousen, 2007). But the socialism philosophy was not viable either. The historical 
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experience of socialist economies showed little or even no improvement in the living 
conditions of the poor. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the central-
planning paradigm appeared to demonstrate that the model would not provide the 
solution to poverty and inequality seen in human society (Meier, 2000). 
 
2.3.2 Classical theories of economic development 
2.3.2.1 The linear-stages-of-growth models 
The first generation of economic development models was formulated in the early 
years after the World War II. These early models focused on the utility of massive 
injections of capital to achieve rapid GDP growth rates. The two famous models are 
Rostow’s stages-growth model and the Harrod-Domar model (Todaro and Smith, 
2009). 
Theorists of the 1950s and early 1960s viewed the process of development as 
a sequence of historical stages. This view was popularized by Rostow (Ingham, 1995). 
Building on the historical pattern of the then developed countries, Rostow (1960) 
claimed that the transition from underdevelopment to development would pass 
through five stages: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, 
the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. The decisive stage is the 
take-off, through which developing countries are expected to transit from an 
underdeveloped to a developed state. Increasing rate of investments is considered to 
be necessary to induce per capita growth. Like Rostow’s stages-growth model, the 
Harrod-Domar model emphasized that the prime mover of the economy is 
investments (Ghatak, 2003). Every country therefore needs capital to generate 
investments. The principal strategies of development from the stage approach were 
commonly used by developing countries in the early postwar years. With a target 
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growth rate, the required saving rate can then be known. If domestic savings were not 
sufficient, foreign savings would be mobilized. 
Although Rostow (1960), Harrod (1948) and Domar (1947) were right about 
the important role of investments that is most closely correlated with the economic 
growth rate, this is not the only condition for a country to develop. The key weakness 
of these models lies in their simplifying assumptions. A single production function is 
simply assumed for all countries (Adelman, 2000). Every economy is assumed to 
have the same necessary conditions and would pass through the same phasing, stage 
by stage. But that economic growth path, which historically had been followed by the 
more developed countries, is not the only one pathway. The development process is 
actually highly nonlinear (Chenery, 1960; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975). Countries 
may pursue distinct development paths (Morris and Adelman, 1988). Economies may 
miss stages, or become locked in one particular stage, or even regress depending on 
many other complementary factors such as managerial capacities, and the availability 
of skilled labor for a wide range of development projects (Todaro and Smith, 2009). 
 
2.3.2.2 Structural-change models 
During most of the 1960s and early 1970s, economists generally described the 
development process as structural change by which the reallocation of labor from the 
agricultural sector to the industrial sector is considered the key source for economic 
growth. Two well-known representatives of this approach are Lewis’ (1954) two-
sector model, and the structural change and patterns of development. 
In Lewis’ (1954) two-sector model or theory of surplus labour, labour 
increasingly moves away from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. However, 
with unlimited supply of labour from the traditional sector, these transferred workers 
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continually received only subsistence wages. The excess of modern-sector profits 
over wages and hence investments in the modern sector continued to expand and 
generate further economic growth on the assumption that all profits would be 
reinvested. Both labour transfer and modern-sector employment growth were in turn 
brought about by output expansion in that sector. This process of modern-sector self-
sustaining growth and employment expansion facilitated the structural transformation 
from a traditional subsistence economy to a more modern developed economy to take 
place. Like the Harrod-Domar model, the Lewis model considered savings and 
investments to be the driving forces of economic development but in the context of 
the less-developed countries. However, several Lewis’ assumptions are not valid such 
as those relating to rural surplus labour, and the proportional rate of expansion in 
capital accumulation in the modern-sector (Todaro and Smith, 2009).  
Although promoting the roles of savings and investments, the structural 
change and patterns-of-development analysis extended in comparison with the Lewis 
model. The analysis identified that the steady accumulation of physical and human 
capital is among conditions necessary for economic growth, apart from savings and 
investments. Moreover, the structural changes occurred not only in the two sectors but 
also in all economic functions, including the change in consumer demand from an 
emphasis on food and basic necessities to desires for diverse manufactured goods and 
services, international trade, and resource use as well as changes in socioeconomic 
factors such as urbanization and the growth and distribution of a country’s population. 
The most significant explanation of this approach were provided by Chenery (1960), 
Chenery and Taylor (1968), Kuznets (1971), and Chenery and Syrquin (1975). 
By focusing on the pattern of development rather than theory, the structural 
change models may mislead policymakers. Since the reallocation of labor from the 
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agricultural sector to the industrial sector is considered the engine of economic growth, 
many developing countries implemented policies that often promote the industry and 
neglect agriculture. But the negative effects of policies that turned against that vital 
sector have come to be widely recognized (World Bank, 2000). Criticisms of these 
models were reinforced by the fact that in many developing countries, poverty was 
prevalent. Following the pattern recommended by structural-change economists, in 
the late 1960s, the attention of policymakers began to shift toward an emphasis on 
human capital, i.e. education and health (Meier, 2000). Then again, investments in 
health and education alone do not guarantee development. “In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
for example, life expectancy and school enrolment rates have increased dramatically 
in recent decades, but as a group the economies in the region have had slow and even 
negative growth since the early 1970s” (World Bank, 2000, p. 16). 
The structural change models focused on the pattern of development and 
hypothesized that the pattern was similar in all countries and was identifiable. 
However, empirical works, such as Chenery (1960), Chenery and Taylor (1968), and 
Chenery and Syrquin (1975), on the process of structural change does recognize that 
pattern of development can be different among countries, which is dependent on the 
countries’ particular set of factors including “a country’s resource endowment and 
size, its government’s policies and objectives, the availability of external capital and 
technology, and the international trade environment” (Todaro and Smith, 2009, p. 
120). 
 
2.3.2.3 International-dependence models 
The international-dependence theory was very popular in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
The dependence theorists argued that underdevelopment exists because of the 
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dominance of developed countries and multinational corporations over developing 
countries. The theory is considered an extension of Marxist theory (Hein, 1992). 
 The poor countries are said to be dependent on the developed countries for 
market and capital. However, developing countries received a very small portion of 
the benefits that the dependent relationship brought about. The unequal exchange, in 
terms of trade against poor countries, made free trade a convenient vehicle of 
“exploitation” for the developed countries. Developed countries can exploit national 
resources of developing countries through getting cheap supply of food and raw 
materials. Meanwhile, poor countries are unable to control the distribution of the 
value added to the products traded between themselves and the developed countries 
(Cohen, 1973; Dos Santos, 1973). The growth of international capitalism and 
multinational corporations caused poor countries to be further exploited and more 
dependent on the developed countries. Poor countries therefore could not expect 
sustained growth from that dependence. Following the international-dependence 
theory, developing countries should therefore end the dependence by breaking up 
their relationships with the developed world, as well as by closing their doors on the 
developed countries (Elkan, 1995; Ghatak, 2003; Ferraro, 2008). 
  The models gained increasing support among the developing countries 
because of the limited results of the stages and structural-change models. However, 
the failures of the model were clearly reflected in the developing countries that 
followed the autarky policy. These countries often experienced stagnant growth and 
finally decided to open their economies once again such as China, Tanzania and India 
(Ferraro, 2008; Todaro and Smith, 2009). Meanwhile, the experience of the newly 
industrialized economies of East Asia, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and 
South Korea, during the 1970s and 1980s showed that their success had been the 
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result of emphasizing trade with the advanced industrial countries. The negative 
impacts of the policy of autarky rendered the theory out of favor in the 1980s (Hein, 
1992; Ferraro, 2008). 
 
2.3.2.4 Neoclassical counter-revolution models 
In the 1980s, neoclassical counter-revolution economists used three approaches, 
namely, the free-market approach, the new political economy approach, and the 
market-friendly approach, to counter the international-dependence model. In contrast 
with the international-dependence model, these approaches mainly argued that 
underdevelopment is not the result of the predatory activities of the developed 
countries and the international agencies but was rather caused by the domestic issues 
arising from heavy state intervention such as poor resource allocation, government-
induced price distortions, and corruption (Meier, 2000). As a response to public sector 
inefficiency, economists of the counter-revolution thinking, for example Bauer (1984), 
Lal (1983), Johnson (1971), and Little (1982), focused on promoting free markets, 
eliminating government-imposed distortions associated with protectionism, subsidies, 
and public ownership. 
Another strand of neoclassical free-market thoughts called the traditional 
neoclassical growth theory actually originated from the Harrod-Domar and Solow 
models. Expanding the Harrod-Domar formulation, Solow neoclassical growth model 
stresses the importance of three factors of output growth: increases in labor quantity 
and quality (through population growth and education), increases in capital (through 
savings and investments), and improvements in technology (Solow, 1956). 
Technological change in Solow’s model is provided exogenously. Thus, with the 
same provided rate of technological progress, the growth rate would be expected to 
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converge across countries. By opening up national markets, developing countries can 
draw additional domestic and foreign investments, thus increasing the rate of capital 
accumulation and returns on investments. Consequently, developing countries tend to 
converge to higher per capita income levels (World Bank, 2000). 
Neoclassical economists focused on the market to find a way out for the 
developing countries. Policies of liberalization, stabilization, and privatization 
therefore become the central elements of the national development agenda. Foreign 
trade, private international investments and foreign aid flowing into the developing 
countries are expected to accelerate economic efficiency and economic growth of 
these countries. Empirically, the models, however, did not bring about the expected 
results. The growth rates per capita have diverged among countries (Azariadis and 
Drazen, 1990). Several African countries focusing on these issues achieved an 
average growth rate of only 0.5% per year. With weak and inadequate legal and 
regulatory framework, not to mention the different institutional, cultural and historical 
context of the developing countries, free market in these countries fails to stimulate 
economic development (World Bank, 2000).  
 
2.3.3 Contemporary theories of economic development 
2.3.3.1 New growth theory 
Endogenous growth or the new growth theory emerged in the 1990s to explain the 
poor performance of many less developed countries, which have implemented 
policies as prescribed in neoclassical theories. Unlike the Solow model that considers 
technological change as an exogenous factor, the new growth model notes that 
technological change has not been equal nor has it been exogenously transmitted in 
most developing countries (World Bank, 2000). 
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New-growth theorists (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) 
linked the technological change to the production of knowledge. The new growth 
theory emphasizes that economic growth results from increasing returns to the use of 
knowledge rather than labour and capital. The theory argues that the higher rate of 
returns as expected in the Solow model is greatly eroded by lower levels of 
complementary investments in human capital (education), infrastructure, or research 
and development (R&D). Meanwhile, knowledge is different from other economic 
goods because of its possibility to grow boundlessly. Knowledge or innovation can be 
reused at zero additional cost. Investments in knowledge creation therefore can bring 
about sustained growth. Moreover, the knowledge could create the spillover benefits 
to other firms once they obtained the knowledge.  However, markets failed to produce 
enough knowledge because individuals cannot capture all of the gains associated with 
creating new knowledge by their own investments. Policy intervention is thus 
considered necessary to influence growth in the long term. The new growth models 
therefore promote the role of government and public policies in complementary 
investments in human capital formation and the encouragement of foreign private 
investments in knowledge-intensive industries such as computer software and 
telecommunications (Meier, 2000). 
Although the new-growth theory helps to explain the divergence in growth 
rates across economies, it was criticized for overlooking the importance of social and 
institutional structures (Skott and Auerbach, 1995). Its limited applicability lies in its 
assumptions. For example, it treats the economy as a single firm that does not permit 
the crucial growth-generating reallocation of labor and capital within the economy 
during the process of structural change. Moreover, there are many other factors which 
provide the incentives for economic growth that developing countries lack such as 
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poor infrastructure, inadequate institutional structures, and imperfect capital and 
goods markets (Cornwall and Cornwall, 1994). Policy makers will therefore need to 
pay careful attention to all of the factors that determine the changes and their impacts 
on the aggregate growth rate. 
 
2.3.3.2 Theory of coordination failure 
The foundation of the theory of coordination failure is the idea that the market may 
fail to achieve coordination among complementary activities. When complementaries 
exist, that is, when returns of one investment depend on the presence or extent of 
other investments, there exists two scenarios. On the one hand, optimally, all investors 
as a whole are better off with all investments to be achieved at the same time. On the 
other hand, it would not make sense for an investor to take similar actions when he 
believes that others may not do the same as well. The market is said to have failed to 
coordinate investors’ actions in this way. Coordination failure therefore leads the 
market to an (equilibrium) outcome inferior to a potential situation in which resources 
would be optimally allocated and all agents would be better off. As a result, 
underdevelopment equilibrium is possible (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2000). 
The theory of coordination failure became influential in the 1990s. However, 
it has a history of more than half a century. Coordination issues among 
complementary industries were first raised by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). Like 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), early coordination-failures economists Nurkse (1953) and 
Hirschman (1957)  emphasized the role of the government to solve the problem.  In 
order to reach an optimal level of coordination, the policy they recommended was a 
“big push” – a public-led massive investment program – which can cause 
complementarities to take place in the rest of the economy. 
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Like other early development models, “big push” strategies ran out of favour 
when the world witnessed the collapse of centrally planned economies and the slow 
growth, stagnation, or worst results of state-led industrialization in the 
underdeveloped countries (Meier, 2000). However, development economists have 
recently returned to emphasize the problem of complementarities between several 
conditions necessary for successful development to take place (Glăvan, 2008). Hoff 
(2000), and Bowles, Durlauf and Hoff (2006) described the economy as an ecosystem 
where the behavior of one can affect the others’. The coordination failure among 
many different individuals lead the economy to multiple equilibria, but not all of them 
are good for every member of the economy, and some in fact are very undesirable. As 
a result, the market fails to coordinate everyone to achieve the optimal equilibrium. In 
other words, "A firm's productivity depends not only on its own efforts, and abilities, 
and on general economic conditions (for example, the macroeconomic environment 
and the legal system), but also on the actions of other firms, infrastructure, regulation 
and other public goods" (Rodriguez-Clare, 2005, p. 3). In a similar vein, Rodrik (2004) 
also indicated that success or failure of an action could depend on its milieu. 
In a market mechanism, there are uncertainties that a good equilibrium can be 
obtained. A bad equilibrium can exist when firms have pessimistic expectations and 
thus show their reluctance to invest, and consequently fail to coordinate their 
businesses. “And whereas in the past we thought the implication was that the 
economy would be slightly distorted, we now understand that the interaction of these 
slightly distorted behaviors may produce very large distortions. The consequence is 
that there may be multiple equilibria and that each may be inefficient” (Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 2000, p. 390). The existence of coordination failure cannot therefore be 
disputed and has become important. When the market mechanism does not work, the 
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active roles of the government need to be highlighted. According to coordination-
failure economists, in the multiple equilibria circumstances described above, the 
government can coordinate firms to move them into the domain of good equilibrium. 
The theory of coordination failures offers some important overall lessons for 
policy-makers. The theory often highlights the problems of market failure that require 
selective government intervention to ensure that several things work well together at 
the same time. However, to get sustainable development underway is obviously not an 
easy task. The “big push” strategy is recommended recently by United Nations 
Development Programme (2005).  The Programme suggests that for developing 
countries to break out of  the poverty trap, a big push of basic investments between 
now and 2015 in public administration, human capital, and key infrastructure is 
necessary (United Nations Development Programme, 2005). 
However, the theory of coordination failure has been criticized for its 
overemphasis on the roles of government. Critics have asserted that the government is 
ineffective and could choose a bad policy (Killick, 1976; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2000). If a 
bad policy is implemented, it can push an economy into a bad equilibrium for years to 
come and even into a worse equilibrium than the one with which the country began 
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 2000). Moreover, the policies recommended by coordination-
failure models lacked details of how the government can coordinate the economy. 
Policy-makers therefore need to be more cautious of these strategies to address 
coordination-failures issues. The theory is further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
2.4 Summary 
The review of the literature shows that there is increasingly a consensus that 
economic development is a multidimensional process that involves interactions 
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among different goals of development and therefore would require systematically 
designed policies and strategies. Development issues are complex and multifaceted. 
There is no one single pathway for economic development that all countries can 
pursue. In the long term, the economic development process requires changes in 
policies to account for new emerging factors and trends. Designing these economic 
development policies also need to take into consideration the social, cultural, political 
systems and institutions as well as their changing interaction over time in a country.  
Development strategies have changed remarkably over the past half century. 
Classical development economists often see underdevelopment as having a single 
cause. But history has demonstrated that focusing on one single factor alone cannot 
guarantee success in the development process. Capital formation (as emphasized in 
the linear-stage-growth models) is necessary but not sufficient. Structural change 
models that promoted industry but neglected agriculture also did not bring about the 
expected results. The international-dependence models pursued an inward-looking 
model of development that promoted state-run production. On the contrary, the 
neoclassical free-market counter-revolution is a different strand of thought that 
supported the role of the free market, privatization and export expansion. However, 
the contemporary models of development see the government and the market as 
complements, in which a certain extent of government intervention is required to 
ensure that desirable outcomes can be achieved in the presence of related market 
failures. These changes in development thoughts are shown in Figure 2.1. 
Although the ultimate goal of economic development goes beyond the growth 
of gross income (GDP, GNP or GNI) per capita, an understanding of the sources of 
growth is essential to achieve other objectives. Economic development is about 
growth plus organizational change (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2000). Without growth, the 
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change is unlikely to occur, since a country needs resources to realize other long-term 















Figure 2.1 The evolution of development thoughts 
The critical knowledge in finding the source of growth has been closely 
related to capital formation. However, as reviewed previously , the major weakness of 
the early theories is that they focused on finding the constraints in capital formation of 
one factor, such as physical capital or human capital, that limit economic growth. 
Hence, their solution is simply to increase investments in the factor identified. History 
has shown that the solution to a single cause does not always guarantee successful 
economic development. The solution is not simply an increase in that capital. More 
importantly, the focus should be on how to use the capital in an economy that consists 
Goals of development: 
- Growth (of gross income per capita); 
- Improvement in quality of life; 
- Sustainable development; 
- The Millennium Development Goals. 
 
Development thoughts (prime movers of economic development): 
- Early views: 
o Capitalism: free trade, private property and competition (Smith, 1776); and 
o Communism: social or public ownership of property, and independence of foreign 
capital and goods (Marx, 1933). 
- Classical theories: 
o The linear-stages-of-growth models: savings and investments (Rostow, 1960; 
Harrod, 1948; Domar, 1947); 
o Structural-change models: transferring resources from low to high-productivity 
activities (from traditional/agricultural to modern /industrial sector) (Lewis, 1954; 
Chenery, 1960); 
o International-dependence models: withdrawal from the international economy and 
pursuit of self-sufficiency or autarky; and 
o Neoclassical counter-revolution models: liberalization, stabilization, and 
privatization. 
- Contemporary theories: 
o New growth theory: knowledge or innovation; 
o Theory of coordination failure: 
 Underdevelopment as a coordination failure among complementary activities; and 
 Government intervention to move the economy to a preferred equilibrium. 
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of a combination of interrelated production processes. As recently realized by the 
contemporary development economists, especially by the theorists of coordination 
failures, the solution to obtain sustainable development underway is to make sure that 
several things work well simultaneously. Economic development is a complex 
process which involves causal relationships. One cannot risk overlooking these 
relationships as they lie at the center of the development process. The theory of 
coordination failure thus served as a theoretical basis for connecting growth, trade and 





CHAPTER 3 CONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the studies which evaluated the role of the construction sector, 
especially infrastructure, in the process of economic development. The chapter first 
describes some basic concepts and characteristics of the construction industry. The 
remaining parts of the chapter will demonstrate the critical contributions of 
construction to the economy. Contributions of the construction industry come from 
the linkages between the construction sector and the economy as a whole, and the 
intersectoral linkages between construction and other sectors as well. The use of 
infrastructure investments as a tool for the government to stabilize the economy also 
shows the sector’s key position in the national development strategy. Despite these 
prominent roles, some current concerns of the sector’s performance as an economic 
activity to stimulate economic growth will also be reviewed in the chapter. 
 
3.2 Some basic concepts of the construction industry  
3.2.1 Construction as an economic activity 
Generally, there are three levels to define construction within the literature. At one 
extreme, construction is referred to as an economic activity that involves the entire 
construction process from producing raw and manufactured building materials and 
components, and providing professional services such as design and project 
management, to executing the physical work on site. In this view, construction is an 
economic activity that crosses over all three economic sectors: primary sector that 
involves the extraction of natural resources; secondary sector that involves the 
manufacture of building materials and components, and the transformation of these 
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materials into finished buildings; and tertiary sector that involves the provision of 
consultancy services such as project management, design and structural engineering 
(Gruneberg, 1997). From this angle of approach, the construction process actually 
starts long before the physical work on site that transforms materials and design into 
the complete buildings, structures and facilities. 
At the other extreme, construction is conceived as an economic activity that 
focuses only on the last stage of the construction process which is the physical work 
carried out on the production site. From this perspective, all services such as project 
management, planning and design as well as the offsite manufacture and supply of 
building materials are excluded. One typical example of this kind of definition is the 
one provided in the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic 
Activities (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008). According to this 
classification, project management for construction, architectural and engineering 
activities, and the manufacture of building materials are listed under different 
categories other than construction. This manner of classification is considered 
convenient for statistical purposes (Ofori, 1990). Following this classification, 
construction is perceived as an economic activity directed to the new work, 
renovation, repair or extension of buildings, structures and other heavy constructions 
such as roads, bridges, dams and so forth (Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 2008). Accordingly, only the work force working on the construction site is 
defined as the labour force of the construction industry (Ive and Gruneberg, 2000). 
There is one more way of defining the construction industry, which is 
somewhat in between the two above mentioned extremes. In this context, construction 
is referred to as the production process of the built environment including various 
activities from conception through design to execution. The objects of the built 
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environment include buildings and other fixed structures (Ive and Gruneberg, 2000). 
In other words, the construction industry is “a sector of the economy which, through 
planning, design, construction, maintenance and repair, and operation, transforms 
various resources into constructed facilities” (Moavenzadeh, 1978, p. 98). As such, 
the construction industry encompasses all firms or organizations, who professionally 
engage in the construction process, from those providing consultancy services in the 
planning, design, supervisory and managerial services to those carrying out execution 
work on site such as the general contractors and builders (Colean and Newcomb, 1952; 
Ofori, 1990). These aspects are directly related to the capacity of infrastructure 
delivery. This definition is thus more relevant to this study. 
   
3.2.2 Construction products 
This section looks at the classification of the construction industry’s products and 
their characteristics. The classification of products is necessary as each type of output 
represents different kinds of supply and demand, which will be affected by different 
factors in the market (Ofori, 1990). According to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of all Economic Activities (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
2008), complete products of the construction industry consist of dwellings, office 
buildings, stores and other public and utility buildings, farm buildings and so on, or 
heavy constructions such as highways, streets, bridges, tunnels, railways, airfields, 
harbors and other water projects, irrigation systems, sewerage systems, industrial 
facilities, pipelines and electric lines, sports facilities and so on. More generally, final 
outputs of the construction industry are grouped into housing, infrastructure, industrial 
and commercial buildings, and repair and maintenance (Wells, 1984; Gruneberg, 
1997). Another way to classify construction outputs is to group them into civil-
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engineering work, buildings, and repairs and maintenance. Civil-engineering work 
includes transport facilities, telecommunication and power networks, water-supplies 
and so on. Buildings include housing and the remainder (hospitals, schools, offices, 
factories, hotels and agricultural buildings) (Wells, 1985). 
Construction’s final outputs share certain common characteristics with each 
other, such as their custom-built nature, immobility, complexity, durability and 
costliness (Colean and Newcomb, 1952; Moavenzadeh, 1978). These products are 
also often distinguished from others in terms of time lag, labour intensive operations, 
site production and temporary organizations (Ofori, 1990; Koskela, 2003). It is not 
difficult to envisage products of the construction industry in these terms. Construction 
products are not mass produced commonly. Each construction product is only 
constructed after the client decides to procure it. Custom-built nature or the one-of-a-
kind nature of construction outputs is featured by different clients with different needs 
and priorities, by different sites, and by different views of designers (Warszawski, 
1990). Products of the construction industry are immobile; they are fixed to the site 
where they will be used. The products are constructed on site as well. As a result, the 
construction process depends not only on the natural conditions of the site but also on 
the local resources such as the local labour force, local subcontractors, local building 
materials suppliers and local regulations. Complexity of construction products follows 
from their custom-built nature and site production. The high diversity of customers’ 
requirements and site conditions result in a wide range of materials, technological 
requirements, design solutions and construction methods of varying degrees of 
complexity. Another reason for the complexity is the number of different teams from 
different parties involved in the construction works (Ofori, 1990). Each team with 
different professional practices, specializing in different operations often leads to a 
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complicated organization in the construction process. The organization is only 
temporary for a particular product. 
Construction products are durable. They are built to generate a flow of 
services for a very long time. Civil engineering works and buildings thus often last for 
generations. Except for catastrophes caused by human or nature, a construction 
product is only demolished when it becomes obsolete and no one wants to use it, 
which means it is no longer economical to maintain (Colean and Newcomb, 1952; 
Gruneberg, 1997). Durability and complexity are the main reasons why the 
construction of civil engineering works and buildings is capital-intensive, involves a 
large number of labour, and takes a long time to complete. Delays are also often 
unavoidable. Delays can be caused by unexpected natural events, technical, financial, 
procedural, and contractual problems (Ofori, 1990). 
 
3.2.3 Structure of the construction industry 
By nature of the work, the structure of the construction industry can be characterized 
by type of product, size of contract, complexity and geographical location of finished 
products (World Bank, 1984). By type of product, the construction industry consists 
of construction firms specializing in residential, industrial and commercial buildings, 
and infrastructure or civil engineering works. The construction industry can also be 
structured by size of contract and degree of complexity. Large construction firms 
usually undertake large contracts with high degree of complexity. The technical as 
well as managerial skills are the two major advantages that large construction firms 
have over the small firms. This explains that the potential competitors for large civil 
engineering works are often large construction firms. Geographical location is also an 
important determinant of the structure of the construction industry. Construction firms 
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are usually market-located (Gruneberg, 1997). Because construction product is 
characterized by site-production, most construction firms need to consider the 
transportation costs of materials, equipment and labour to the production site. Beyond 
a certain geographical area, these costs become excessive in relation to other costs, 
thus rendering the project’s profitability unattractive. Only for large contracts would 
the proportion of transportation costs in total costs become small enough, so that it is 
still profitable for firms to undertake the jobs farther afield. For very large projects, 
firms might set up a local office to reduce transportation costs, but then these firms 
will need to consider the attendant overheads associated (Hillebrandt, 2000).  
By pattern of production organization, this study focuses on the formal sector 
rather than the informal one. Within the formal sector, the structure of the 
construction industry can be classified into public and private firms, and domestic and 
foreign firms. Public firms are state-owned enterprises, which are often protected by 
the government. The establishment of these public enterprises is essential to take on 
works which are unattractive to private firms or as required by the government, or 
perform as a source of providing the necessary trained labour for the development of 
the construction industry. Meanwhile, private contractors contribute to the 
development of the construction industry by their competitiveness, efficiency and 
flexibility. One more noticeable point in the structure of the construction industry is 
the participation of international contractors. Their presence can make the competition 
more difficult for domestic firms. However domestic firms could become stronger in 
the process. The structure of the construction industry can be quite different among 
countries depending on the social and economic environments such as the 
development state of the economy, government policies, and the traditions of doing 
business (World Bank, 1984). 
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3.3 Major economic factors influencing construction activity 
3.3.1 Instability of demand 
Construction demand is inherently volatile. Wide fluctuations in construction outputs 
are common. Studying a number of countries with different income from various parts 
of the world, the World Bank (1984) indicated that the fluctuation of construction 
outputs was more than half of the manufacturing sector and the economy as a whole. 
A study of the European region by the United Nations (1976) came to the same 
conclusion that the construction industry experienced stronger movements of business 
cycle than other economic sectors. These fluctuations are partly due to the nature of 
construction demand and partly due to the nature of construction products. Demand 
for construction outputs is considered derived demand from other economic activities 
(United Nations, 1976; Hillebrandt, 2000). Outputs of the construction industry are 
investment-goods, which are produced to facilitate the creation of other consumption-
goods and services. In other words, the construction industry itself cannot create the 
demand for its outputs (Nam and Tatum, 1988). Demand for construction is therefore 
largely dependent on the business activities of other goods and services that the 
construction products help create. Following the ups and downs of the economy, the 
demand for construction can go through the movement of a business cycle earlier and 
more strongly than other sectors because of the nature of its products (Riggleman, 
1933; United Nations, 1976). A construction product is immobile and is often 
constructed only after the client realizes the demand. This nature of construction 
products make the industry unable to stock up products for sale. Hence, when there is 
a sudden increase in demand, the industry cannot respond to the demand quickly 
(United Nations, 1976; Nam and Tatum, 1988). The fluctuations of construction 
demand can be very large, thus affecting the economy considerably. The immobility 
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and the durability properties also make construction demand geographically 
dependent. Demand for construction within a geographical area will at some time in 
the future experience a substantial fall and suffer saturation when much of the demand 
in the area is met and the existing facilities are still economical to maintain (Colean 
and Newcomb, 1952; Hillebrandt, 2000).  
Apart from the above mentioned factors, the stages of economic development 
as well as the structural changes also have significant influences on the growth rate of 
demand for construction as well as the compositions of demand for construction over 
time. A study by the United Nations (1976) pointed out that the fluctuations in 
construction activity, with reference to those of other economic sectors, tend to be 
greater in developing than in developed countries. In developing countries, the 
demand for infrastructural facilities is of the greatest proportion compared with 
demand for other types of facilities. Since in the initial stages of development, 
infrastructure is of great importance in creating the framework for the economy, 
spending on building new infrastructure in these stages is relatively heavy. As a result, 
the share of construction expenditure on public works and public utilities such as 
harbors, railways, roads, electricity, etc in the less developed countries are often 
higher than that in the more developed countries (Lewis, 1955). Structural changes 
such as changes in development goals, priorities of economic growth among sectors, 
and changes in demographics can also impact the demand for construction (United 
Nations, 1976). The World Bank (World Bank, 1994) observed that as countries 




3.3.2 Main construction inputs 
Main inputs in construction include labour, equipment and materials. The 
characteristics of each component are discussed further below. 
 
3.3.2.1 Labour 
Since construction products are frequently labour-intensive, labour is one of the major 
cost components in construction (Ive and Gruneberg, 2000). The construction labour 
force can be divided into the major categories of: administrative, managerial, 
professional and technical staff, and workers. Demand for labour is directly affected 
by the characteristics of demand for construction. In line with the cyclical fluctuations 
in construction outputs, the level of employment in the industry can vary noticeably 
(United Nations, 1976). As a result, a large proportion of construction labour force is 
paid on a project-by-project basis, rather than on a permanent basis, except for a small 
number of administrative and managerial staff. Furthermore, outsourcing labour 
through subcontractors also make the employment in construction increasingly 
temporary and insecure (International Labour Office, 2001). At the bottom of the 
supply chain, construction workers have low job security and need for mobility 
(Moavenzadeh, 1978). Careers in construction are also less attractive because of the 
high rate of accidents (Jensen, 1983). The industry therefore has to compete with 
other sectors of the economy for manpower by increasing wage level (Ofori, 1990). 
Labour can also be imported if the wages of the imported labour plus transport costs 
can be less than the local wages (Gruneberg, 1997). In addition, the price of 
construction labour is affected by minimum wage laws and union agreements, which 
would raise the costs of hiring unskilled labour substantially (World Bank, 1984).  
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The labour market of the construction industry is characterized by the shortage 
of skilled labour, especially in the developing countries. In the developed countries, 
the skilled workers account for about 50% of the total labour force (Moavenzadeh, 
1978). However, the construction industry in these countries has apparently been 
experiencing a shrinking workforce, thus a reduction in the number of the skilled 
labour (Ofori, 1990).  Meanwhile in the developing countries, the shortage of skilled 
labour is more serious. The labour markets in these countries are largely unstructured 
and relatively unorganized, which rely heavily on a relatively untrained workforce 
(Gruneberg, 1997). In public works construction, the shortage of skilled labour occurs 
at both levels, the supervisory personnel and skilled workers (Moavenzadeh, 1978). 
The inability of the industry to attract workers and to invest in training them has 
seriously affected the productivity and quality of construction products and hence the 
ability of contractors to satisfy the clients’ needs (International Labour Office, 2001). 
One of the solutions to the problem is to improve vocational training in the domestic 
construction industry. While this solution has proved to be successful in the 
developed countries, the non-availability or inadequacy of educational and training 
facilities is still a problem in the developing countries (Rao, 1983; Edmonds and 
Miles, 1984). Another way to reduce the dependence on labour is through the use of 
labour-saving construction technology (i.e. through the use of equipment-intensive 
technology). However, this solution has proved to be inappropriate in the developing 
countries as will be illustrated in the next section. 
 
3.3.2.2 Equipment and construction technology 
The intensity of equipment used in construction projects depends on construction 
technology. Construction technology reflects the level of mechanization used in the 
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method of construction. The use of construction technology can vary across projects. 
This is because there is a certain degree of technological flexibility for the same 
construction work. For the same construction work, designers and contractors can 
choose between the two construction methods: one that is highly mechanized; and the 
other that is fully manual (Moavenzadeh, 1978). The choice of the contractor depends 
on the constraints of time and budget. If time is of the essence, then the highly 
mechanized method may be used. However, if the total cost of using plant and 
equipment plus wages for technical personnel and semi-skilled workers is much 
higher than the total labour cost of minimally-trained unskilled workers used in the 
fully manual method, the latter may be used when the budget is limited (Ofori, 1990). 
In developed countries where labour has become more costly compared to other 
inputs, the use of equipment-intensive technology has been more common than in 
developing countries where the cost of plant and equipment is high and labour is still 
cheap and abundant (International Labour Office, 2001). In other words, the choice of 
technology is predominately affected by the prevailing prices of labour and equipment 
(World Bank, 1984). 
In a research study by the World Bank in 1971 (as cited by World Bank, 1984), 
the role of labour-intensive technology in the development of infrastructure in 
developing countries has proved to be important. The results of the study showed that 
labour-intensive technology in capital-scarce, labour-abundant economies were 
technically and economically feasible for government-run labour-intensive civil 
construction programs. With improvements at the managerial and technical level, 
labour-intensive methods could be fully competitive with equipment-intensive 
methods in terms of quality and productivity (World Bank, 1984). Since labour 
continues to be abundant in developing countries, more serious efforts from the 
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government will be essential to make the labour-intensive option more attractive for a 
wide range of construction activities. 
 
3.3.2.3 Building materials 
Building materials make up a major component of total construction costs (Ive and 
Gruneberg, 2000). The price level of building materials thus directly affects the 
construction output value. The price of a particular type of materials depends on the 
market forces, demand and supply of that building material. Demand for a particular 
building material in turn depends on client’s tastes and preferences, and level of 
income; local building standards and codes; and the choices made by designers and 
contractors. The choices made by designers and contractors vary according to the 
experience of the designers, the familiarity of contractors with the technology 
involved in the use of the materials and the availability of human resource with the 
required skills (Ofori, 1990). 
The supply of a particular building material is affected by: the availability of 
raw materials; the technology for extracting and processing raw materials; the 
environmental impacts related to the production process; and the government policy. 
The availability of raw materials directly determines the supply level of building 
materials. Some countries that lack raw materials have to import them. Apart from the 
lack of raw materials, building materials supply may be unable to meet local demand 
because of the low production capacity and low quality, especially in the developing 
countries.  Production capacity and quality of building materials in turn depends on 
the technology of extracting and processing the raw materials used (Ofori, 1990). The 
technology used in the developing countries is generally older than in the developed 
countries. In line with older technology, environmental impacts in the developing 
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countries are also more serious than that in the developed countries. A growing 
awareness of these environmental impacts has made governments in the developing 
countries restrict the production of low-grade materials that uses the old technology, 
and support the import of more modern technology from the developed countries 
(International Cement Review Research, 2007, 2008). 
Apart from market forces, the price of building materials may also be 
controlled by the government. To facilitate the local construction industry, the 
government can fix the price levels, and provide subsidies for some materials, 
especially for the materials that are used in public sector projects. The government 
can encourage or discourage the import of some building materials by changing 
import duties, and taxes, or quotas on them (World Bank, 1984; International Cement 
Review Research, 2007, 2008). 
 
3.3.3 Sources of finance 
Financing production in construction is quite different from that in manufacturing. 
The production in construction is financed largely by clients, rather than the 
contractors, the producers of construction products. At the top of the payment chain in 
the construction industry are the contractors and at the bottom are the subcontractors 
and the suppliers. Contractors receive advance payments and periodic payments to 
mobilize resources (labour, equipment and materials) necessary for the construction 
projects. Cashflow of subcontractors and suppliers are therefore also affected by the 
payment procedure. The source of client’s finance is often in the form of bank loans 
backed by the constructed facility itself. Although the major source of finance comes 
from clients, the contractors in some countries can obtain bank loans from special 
banks, which are established to assist the financing of construction works and 
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investments in the construction industry. Other forms of financial assistance that help 
contractors get started in heavy construction works can include supplier credit, direct 
loans from commercial banks, and the establishment of companies that lease and hire 
equipment (World Bank, 1984). 
Contractors’ financial concerns can be different across the construction phases 
and the technology employed. The initial stages of mobilization require a large 
amount of cash, especially for contractors using the equipment-intensive construction 
technology to purchase the equipment. Meanwhile, cashflow at the later stages of an 
uneventful construction operation is generally more stable. Delayed payments and 
uncertainty of cashflow are common in the construction industry (World Bank, 1984). 
The problem has continually raised concerns in construction industries throughout the 
world, although the problem can be more serious in the developing countries. 
Payment problems were considered a factor that can hamper the healthy development 
of the construction industry (Wu et al., 2008). 
 
3.4 Construction and aggregate output 
3.4.1 Capital formation 
The productive capacity of an economy is usually described in terms of the complete 
utilization of factors of production; that is the full employment of the factors of 
production (labour and capital). Hence, the productive capacity determines the 
aggregate supply or national output of an economy in the long run. If there are 
changes in the total capital stock, the fixed amount of national output will change 
accordingly. One way for an economy to expand production or grow is to invest in 
capital stocks (human and physical resources). The relationship has long been 
recognized in economic theory. According to the Harrod-Domar model briefly 
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reviewed in Chapter 2, net investment (I), which is defined as the change in the 
capital stock (K), is necessary for the economy to grow. Besides investments in new 
factories, machinery, equipment, and materials, investments in economic 
infrastructure – roads, electricity, communication and the like – also increase the 
physical capital stock of a nation, thus expanding national output level. Investments in 
economic infrastructure are considered a supplement to other physical capital. For 
example, a farmer may increase the total output of the crops by an investment in a 
new tractor, but without adequate transport facilities, this extra product cannot be 
available in local commercial markets, and thus his investment may not add anything 
to national food production. As a result, assuming there were only two products, 
products 1 and 2, produced by the economy at a given technology level, increases in 
capital stock (human and physical resources) would make it possible to shift the 
production possibility curve outward uniformly from PP to P’P’ as shown in Figure 









Figure 3.1 Effect of increases in capital stock on the production possibility frontier 
Infrastructure can also raise productivity of other factors of production. For 













land, thus raising productivity per hectare and shifting the production possibility curve 
outward (Todaro and Smith, 2009). The higher productivity in turn attracts more 
resources (private investments) into production, which further contribute to higher 
levels of output, profitability of production, income and employment in these sectors. 
The process of investing in the physical capital stocks of an economy, including 
infrastructure is measured by the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). 
There has been a huge amount of literature analyzing the positive correlation 
between aggregate output growth and investments in infrastructure. In the end 1980s 
and early 1990s, many empirical studies on the returns on total infrastructure 
investments indicated high rates of returns in developed countries such as the US 
(Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1990), Sweden (Berndt and Hansson, 1991), and Canada 
(Wylie, 1996). There have also been studies focusing on a specific type of 
infrastructure. In Baum and Korte (2002), transport was demonstrated to foster 
economic development by enhancing the efficiency of the economic system in both 
the goods and employment markets. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) studied historical 
time series and cross-country data of 28 developed countries. The study showed a 
highly and consistently positive correlation between transport and communication 
investments, and economic growth rate. Studies aimed at the developing countries 
have also been conducted by Canning and Fay (1993), and Canning (1998). 
Throughout these studies, transportation and telephone systems appears to promote 
economic growth. For example, Canning and Fay (1993) examined the rates of returns 
of the transportation (road and rail) infrastructure and telephone systems from 1960 to 
1980 in 104 countries at different income levels. The cross section analysis showed 
that both transportation and telephone systems had large effects on growth rates, with 
high rates of returns; especially for countries with lower ratios of infrastructure to 
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output, the rates of returns were higher than 40%. Many studies addressed the impacts 
of inadequate infrastructure on economic development as well. For example, in a 
study of economic development in Africa by Mountjoy and Hilling (1988), low rate of 
capital formation was argued to have a clear link with poverty in this continent. The 
study by the United Nations (1990) indicated that infrastructural development was an 
essential part of economic development in Asia and the Pacific region. As a result, 
this has been interpreted as a causal linkage, suggesting that infrastructure investment 
does appear to lead economic growth by improving the capacity as well as the 
efficiency of the economy. 
As an industry supplying the physical infrastructure facilities, construction 
thus has a profound impact on economic development. GFCF by construction is the 
total value of all additions within a year, including new construction and all capital 
alterations or extensions, which significantly improve upon the utility or extend the 
life of the building or works to fixed capital. Repair and maintenance are not included 
in the indicator (Turin, 1969; Ofori, 1990). Many studies have emphasized that about 
half of the investments in GFCF in most developing countries comes from 
construction (Lewis, 1955; Turin, 1978; World Bank, 1984; Wells, 1985; Ofori, 1988; 
Gruneberg, 1997; Hillebrandt, 2000; Ruddock and Lopes, 2006). It is thus 
understandable that the construction industry plays a dominant role in a country’s rate 
of GFCF (Lewis, 1955; Gruneberg, 1997). The cross-section analysis of 87 countries 
at different per capita GDP levels during the period of 1955-65 by Turin (1969) 
showed a strong linear correlation between the logarithms of per capita formation by 
construction and per capita GDP. The share of capital formation in construction in 
GDP also increased with per capita GDP (Turin, 1969). Further studies by Strassmann 
(1970), Turin (1973) and Wells (1986) all argued that during the periods of 
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accelerating economic growth, the construction industry needs to grow faster than the 
economy as a whole. A study by the World Bank (1994) also confirmed that 
construction has to expand fast enough to create adequate infrastructure and 
productive facilities for economic growth. Inadequate construction capacity is 
therefore a constraint on capital investment programs (Wells, 1986). 
 
3.4.2 National income 
Construction like any other economic activities can contribute to national income by 
creating income. Based on the definition by the United Nations, Ofori (1990) 
explained that value added by construction is the gross output value at producer’s 
prices less the value of all industry’s current purchases from other enterprises. It is 
important to note that according to the narrowly defined scope of the construction 
industry, all industry’s current purchases from other enterprises are excluded, which 
are the value of input materials and components, costs of hiring plant, costs of goods 
sold in the same conditions as purchased, legal and other professional fees, and 
payments made for repair and maintenance undertaken by others on the construction 
firm’s own assets. Value added therefore is actually the sum of salaries and wages of 
employees, interest on borrowed capital, net rent, profit and allowance for 
depreciation (Ofori, 1990). According to data provided by the World Bank (1984), the 
value added-to-output ratios of the construction industry in most developing countries 
were higher than that of manufacturing over the period of 1970-1980. In some 
countries, the ratios of the construction industry could be as high as 60% (World Bank, 
1984). 
The linkage between the value added by construction as a share in GDP and 
per capita GDP has long been recognized. According to Turin (1969) and Strassmann 
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(1970), there is a strong linear correlation between the logarithms of per capita value 
added by construction and per capita GDP. The share of value added by construction 
as a percentage in GDP also increases as per capita GDP increases. The share of the 
valued added by construction as a percentage to GDP was found to be around 3-5% 
for developing countries and 5-8% for more developed countries over the period of 
1955-1965 (Turin, 1969). The results were later confirmed by many other studies such 
as those completed by Edmonds and Miles (1984), Wells (1985, 1986), Ofori (1988), 
Low and Leong (1992), Chen (1998) and more recently Lopes (2012). Although these 
studies focused more on the static view of the close relationship between construction 
activity and economic growth, these studies do note that construction’s role in the 
economy would decline when the economy reaches the middle income stage 
(Strassmann, 1970) or when the volume of construction products was sufficient to 
raise the productive capacity of the economy at a steady growth rate (Wells, 1986). 
The contribution of the construction industry required for a steady economic growth 
as suggested by Edmonds (1979) should be 5% of GDP. Lopes et al. (2002) and 
Lopes (2012) also demonstrated that when the share of construction value added in 
GDP was around 4-5%, the economy would enter a period of sustained growth. The 
level should be interpreted within the long term trend rather than the annual 
fluctuation (Lopes et al., 2002). 
The dynamic views of construction in the national economy have been further 
examined. These views argued that as a country develops, the share of construction in 
total GNP as well as the total construction output actually follows an inverted U-
shape (for example, Bon, 1992, 2000). That is, in the initial development stages, the 
share of construction output in GNP increases, but starts to decline in the more mature 
stages. Thus in the long run, the volume of construction output will decline 
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accordingly. Therefore the contribution of the construction industry to economic 
growth is not indefinite (non-linear relationship). Bon (1992, 2000) observed that 
there is a point at which the basic major infrastructure is put in place and the need for 
new construction gradually becomes less. However, Ruddock and Lopes (2006), 
Lopes (2009) and Goh (2009) argued that in the more mature stages of development, 
construction output declines only in relative terms, not in absolute terms. That is, in 
the more developed countries, construction still grows but at slower rates than the 
economy. The inverted U-shaped relationship between the share of construction in 
GNP and GNP per capita proposed by Bon (1992, 2000) (as shown in Figure 3.2) was 
further confirmed by Maddison (1987), Crosthwaite (2000) and Yiu et al. (2004). 
These observations implied that capacity expansion in construction is more important 
for the developing countries than for the developed countries. The feature of the 
activity in the industry is also different between the developing and developed 
countries. Repair and maintenance capacity become important in the developed 
countries, whereas the industry’s capacity for new build as well as the development of 
capacity for repair and maintenance is a major focus of the developing countries (Bon 




























As a result, policy implications within the literature have focused on the 
measures to expand the capacity of the construction industry in the developing 
countries. The development strategies for the construction industry are consequently 
centered on the schemes to remove the constraints of the industry’s production factors 
such as labour, materials, capital and technology. By building up an adequate 
domestic capacity, the construction industry is expected to drive economic growth. 
The policy recommendations also include creating an institutional environment that 
facilitates a competitive business environment for an efficient construction industry. 
At the macroeconomic level, monetary and interest rate policies are expected to deal 
with the distortions in factor prices, the limits to the availability of foreign exchange 
for the purchase of imported inputs and related issues such as foreign exchange rates 
and import tariffs. Meanwhile, fiscal policies related to government spending and 
taxes on public construction works are expected to encourage employment, and to 
stabilize the construction activity. Throughout these studies, the role of governments 
has been demonstrated by using these policies to directly or indirectly influence 
construction activity to stimulate economic growth. 
 
3.4.3 Other observations 
Further empirical studies have shown that the contribution of construction in the 
economy as suggested by Turin (1969) as well as Bon (1992, 2000) is not consistent 
across countries, especially in the developing countries. The data provided by the 
World Bank (1984) indicated that construction value added in most developing 
countries over the period of 1970-1980 varied between 3% and 8% of GDP. Studying 
the data of 75 countries in 2003, Ruddock and Lopes (2006) found that the share of 
gross value added by construction varied considerably from over 2% to over 10% 
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across countries in the same category of GDP per capita. Meanwhile, a study of the 
share of construction in GFCF by Lewis (2009) found that the figure was much lower 
than 50% as suggested by previous studies. The average proportion of construction in 
GFCF from 1970 to 2006 for developed countries was around 26% and for the 
developing countries was around 23%. There was also a trend of divergence among 
the developing countries. The divergence trend was explained by the fact that most 
infrastructure in the developing countries was financed by the government; and thus 
was directly affected by different government-expenditure policies (Lewis, 2009). 
The problem of the direction of the causality between construction and GDP 
has also been analyzed. However, the results of these empirical studies were 
inconclusive. On the one hand, the study using data from Hong Kong by Tse and 
Ganesan (1997) indicated that the causality ran from GDP to construction activity. On 
the other hand, the study using data from Western Europe by Wilhelmsson and 
Wigren (2009) showed that the causality effect was weak in the case of infrastructural 
construction in the long run. Meanwhile, Chan (2001), in studying the linkage 
between construction and other economic sectors in Singapore, found a bi-directional 
causal relationship between construction activities and GDP. In the case of China, the 
study by Zheng and Liu (2004) also indicated a bi-directional casual relationship: 
construction investment had a strong short-run effect on economic growth, whereas 
economic growth had a long-term effect on construction. Lewis (2009) indicated that 
the relationship between construction and the national economy of Trinidad and 
Tobago changed over time under different circumstances: during the economic upturn, 




In striking contrast to a number of the above studies, there have been studies 
concerning the negative impacts of the construction industry in the economy. The 
concern was first raised by Drewer (1980). Analyzing the data of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) region between 1970 and 1976, Drewer 
(1980) observed that more construction does not necessarily result in higher economic 
growth when resources are misallocated. Drewer (1997) found that the relationship 
between construction and the economy is unstable and the uncontrolled expansion of 
the construction industry could negatively impact the economy. The pressures 
generated by the expansion of the construction industry may push up the costs of 
inputs (such as labour, materials), affect the availability of financial capital for other 
uses, and intensify environmental stress. As a result, the over-expansion of 
construction activity may affect macroeconomic stability by generating inflationary 
pressures, and misallocating as well as wasting resources. The negative impacts of 
over-expansion of construction activity may considerably offset the real growth of the 
economy (Drewer, 1997; Ng et al., 2008). Similarly, studying construction industry in 
China regional economy, Han and Ofori (2001) found different results of 
development programs, and that appropriate policies for the development of the 
construction industry would be key to stimulate economic growth. 
 
3.5. Construction and sectoral output 
The ability of the construction industry to stimulate economic growth also comes 
from the strong linkages between construction and other sectors in the economy. The 
construction industry is one of the top four out of twenty economic sectors in terms of 
intersectoral, backward and forward linkages (Riedel and Schultz, 1980). The 
55 
 
important role of construction through a complex set of inter-relationships was also 
highlighted by Ofori (1990).  
 
3.5.1 Backward linkages 
Since large quantities of building materials and components are purchased from a 
large number of supply industries, an expansion of the construction industry can 
stimulate the expansion of these industries through backward linkages. The impact 
can be significantly large because much of the building materials can be provided by 
relatively unsophisticated labour-intensive domestic resources and by basic industries 
such as cement and steel manufacturing (World Bank, 1984). Many input-output 
analyses (Park, 1989; Pietroforte and Bon, 1995; Bon and Yashiro, 1996; Bon et al., 
1999) have demonstrated the strong backward linkages. Consequently, should the 
value added by construction take into consideration the backward linkages such as the 
manufacture of building materials and components, the value added can account for a 
considerable proportion in GDP. The value added through backward linkages could 
be up to 55% of the value of construction purchases of materials and services from 
other industries (Kirmani, 1988). However, it is important to note that the value added 
will be high when locally produced inputs are used. Therefore while imported 
materials may be necessary in the short run, an economy needs to develop its local 
supply industries in the long run if it aims to increase value added. These issues have 
been addressed in many studies (Drewer, 1980; Wells, 1986). 
 
3.5.2 Forward linkages 
The indices of forward linkages of the construction industry are relatively less 
extensive than that of the industry’s backward linkages (Bon and Minami, 1986; Bon 
56 
 
and Pietroforte, 1990; Pietroforte and Bon, 1995; Bon and Yashiro, 1996; Bon et al., 
1999). Nevertheless, the magnitude of the forward linkages can be more significant 
since the demand for construction outputs is derived demand from all other sectors of 
the economy. As a result, how these sectors react to the change in the level of 
construction activity, and vice versa, ultimately affect the economy. 
The construction industry through its outputs, especially infrastructure, can 
have impacts on outputs of other sectors. Many studies have shown the strong 
linkages between infrastructure and sectoral outputs. The strong linkages stem from 
the fact that all other sectors of the economy use the flow of services generated by 
infrastructure, which in turn can lead to growth in the production of other economic 
sectors in two ways: through the reduction in costs of intermediate inputs from 
infrastructure services such as transport, water and electricity; and through the 
increase in the productivity of other factors of production. As a result, the supply of 
infrastructure services can raise the profitability of production, level of returns, output, 
income and employment of other sectors. In studies by Binswanger et al. (1987) and 
Binswanger et al.  (1993), roads and electricity supply were found to have a strong 
positive effect on aggregate agricultural output, as well as the growth of farm 
investments. Antle (1983) found that spending on transport and communication 
services was a significant determinant of differences in aggregate agricultural 
productivity across countries. The study by Chhibber (1988) concluded that public 
goods and services, including infrastructure, were the determinant of agricultural 
outputs in the developing countries; meanwhile, in more the developed countries 
which had better basic infrastructure, the determinant was price. Elhance and 
Lakshmanan (1988), Kranton (1991) and Lee and Anas (1992) examined the 
contribution of infrastructure to growth through reductions in costs and found that 
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infrastructure could be a major share of business expenses. The unreliable delivery of 
infrastructure services and lack of access to infrastructure services could result in 
multiple economic costs such as direct costs of production delays, loss of perishable 
raw materials or outputs, costs of under-utilization of productive capacity and so on. 
All these important contributions of infrastructure on other sectors of the economy 
highlight the crucial role of construction’s supply capacity in raising other sectoral 
outputs. However, little is known about the reverse flow of influence, which is how 
the adaptive capacities of other economic sectors can affect the construction sector. 
The influence is equally important since over-expansion of the construction sector and 
misallocation of resources in the economy might stem from the lack of understanding 
of this effect. 
 
3.6 Construction and macroeconomic stabilization 
The contribution of construction in the economy has also been measured by 
construction employment as a share of total employment (Strassmann, 1970; Turin, 
1978; Wells, 1985). Turin (1978) suggested that since employment in construction 
correlated positively with economic growth, there is a potential use of construction to 
generate sustained employment. Turin (1978) also argued that the misuse of 
construction by the government as a cheap way to absorb unskilled unemployment 
through ill-planned public work programs would only damage the healthy 
development of the construction industry.  
Numerous data has shown that there have been dramatic increases in 
construction employment in most developing countries (International Labour Office, 
2001). The fact that the construction industry is more labour intensive than many 
other industries, especially relative to manufacturing (Hillebrandt, 2000), makes the 
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industry a traditional focus of employment-generation policy in many countries 
through labour-intensive public works projects. The labour created in these projects in 
turn spends the income from the employment on other locally produced goods and 
services, thereby stimulating demand in the rest of the economy through the multiplier 
effect. The employment multiplier effect also makes public works a more promising 
instrument for moderating the business cycle over others such as credit or tax 
incentives offered to the private sector. As a result, during periods of slack demand 
and high unemployment rate, infrastructural construction projects funded by the 
government are often implemented as a counter-cyclical instrument (Gruneberg, 1997; 
Hillebrandt, 2000). Similarly, the government can stabilize the economy by 
postponing these projects during boom periods (Burns and Grebler, 1984). Through 
fiscal policy such as changing the amount of public expenditure or interest rates of 
loans financing these infrastructure projects, the government can generate desired 
changes in the economy, which has been the subject of many studies (Lea, 1973; 
United Nations, 1976; Lange and Mills, 1979; Ofori, 1988; Hillebrandt, 2000; Howes 
and Robinson, 2005). The recent 2008-2009 economic crisis has witnessed many 
countries relying considerably on construction spending to jumpstart the economy and 
spur employment. Many countries around the world have included construction of 
infrastructure such as railways, highways, airports and power grids into their fiscal 
stimulus packages (Donnges, 2009). 
However, there are several difficulties in realizing the expected results. One of 
the difficulties is the time lag between government action and the actual construction 
works from the project start to completion. As a result, these projects can be 
counterproductive if the government cannot foresee problems far in advance 
(Hillebrandt, 2000). Other difficulties might come from technical considerations when 
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the government wants to postpone infrastructural construction. Technical problems 
make it difficult and costly to cancel infrastructural construction in mid-stream (Burns 
and Grebler, 1984). An empirical study of the regional data of the U.S. by Duffy-
Deno and Eberts (1991) indicated that these difficulties caused infrastructure to only 
have short-run multiplier effects. 
In many poor countries, the objective of public programs is usually a 
combination of poverty alleviation, employment generation and the provision of 
infrastructure. These public programs have been carried out for decades in South Asia 
and Africa (World Bank, 1994). However, the results of these programs were varied. 
On the one hand, as reviewed by Kessides (1992), the emphasis of traditional public 
work programs on short-term benefits (through quick creation of employment and 
assets) have dampened the long term economic benefits, which could be derived from 
more careful project selection, creation of higher-quality assets, and more emphasis 
on the training of workers. On the other hand, as reviewed by McCutcheon (2001), 
large scale programs for employment-intensive construction and maintenance have 
successfully created employment without compromising cost, quality or time. The 
experience suggests that these programs should be integrated into other long term 
development programs to generate the greatest benefits. 
 
3.7 Government institutions for construction industry development 
The role of the construction industry in the economy recognized by academics has led 
to the recommendation of creating a government agency which specifically deals with 
the development of the construction industry. Having observed the critical role of 
construction in the developing economies, Turin (1978) suggested the establishment 
of such a government department. The roles and functions of such an agency were 
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furthered analyzed by Ofori (1985).  Several countries have realized the constraints of 
the domestic construction industry and have established sophisticated agencies to 
guide the industry towards development. The Construction Industry Development 
Board of South Africa was established in 2000 after the 1997 Green Paper identified 
some of the challenges facing the industry (Construction Industry Development Board 
of South Africa, 2000). In Australia, after a report prepared by the Joint Working 
Party (consisting of the major contractors, the Australian Federation of Construction 
Contractors, the National Building and Construction Council and the National Public 
Works Committee) to provide a report on the difficulties facing the industry in the late 
1980s, the government outlined the Construction Industry Reform Strategy, which led 
to the establishment of the Construction Industry Development Agency and 
Construction Industry Development Council in 1992 (Commonwealth of Australia 
Law, 1992; Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry, 2002). 
The Construction Industry Development Board of Singapore was formed in 1984 to 
deal with the then pressing issues of the industry (Ofori, 1993). Some other example 
of countries that have established the bureau or boards to respond to problems in the 
construction industry include Indonesia, India and Malaysia. The government 
agencies are often under ministerial control. Members of these agencies are usually 
appointed by the Ministry and compose of government officials, academics and 
private consultants to monitor and manage the sector. Generally, the creation of these 
agencies is to address the issues concerning the weaknesses of the local construction 
industry. The common functions of the agencies relate to formulating, monitoring, 
managing policies, standards, programs and initiatives to deal with the shortage of 
local skilled labour, materials, low output productivity and quality, or the low 
competitiveness of the local construction industry. Other focus might be the issues 
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relating to sustainability, regulatory reforms, new procurement procedures and 
measurement of the industry’s performance (Ofori, 1993). 
Other government agencies, professional bodies and trade associations, and 
academic institutions can also impact construction industry development (Miles and 
Neale, 1991; Ofori, 1994; Tan, 2002; Milford, 2012). Construction activities can be 
influenced by other government bodies such as the Ministry of Finance (through 
public spending and fiscal policies and so on), the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(through raw materials, manufacturing regulations, prices, tariff, taxes and so on), and 
the Ministry of Labour (employment regulations, site safety, wage policies and so on). 
The roles of professional bodies and trade associations were also emphasized (Miles 
and Neale, 1991; Ofori, 1994). These institutions can enhance the competiveness of 
the construction industry by providing their members necessary skills through course 
accreditation, and supporting professional development through data services, 
computerized libraries and similar (Ofori, 1994). In this context, academic institutions 
implement research programs, providing the industry with pertinent views about 
shortcomings in construction, and new techniques or approaches to overcome these 
shortcomings. 
By establishing these institutions to attend to pressing issues in the 
construction industry, governments have demonstrated an active commitment to 
construction industry development. The agency that is specifically concerned with 
construction industry development can be considered the core agency for this purpose. 
To function effectively, the core agency needs to co-ordinate with other government 
bodies and organizations in connection with the performance of its tasks. However, 
the intriguing question is how the co-ordination of the duties of these institutions 
towards the changing problems facing the industry can be effectively managed. The 
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question cannot be answered without more research on the relationship between 
construction and other economic activities. 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
Much of the existing empirical literature on the linkage between construction and 
economic growth seeks to capture this effect through observation of the relationship 
between increases in the construction outputs (measured by the share of construction 
in GFCF or value added) and some measures of aggregate output (GDP or GNP). 
Many of the findings from these studies have demonstrated the positive and 
significant relationship between the construction industry and economic growth in the 
developing countries. However, the conclusions have been questioned when further 
studies on this relationship were conducted for more developed countries. The results 
of these studies indicate that the relationship between economic development and the 
construction industry appears to be more complicated. Moreover, whether growth in 
the share of the value of construction activities in total GDP is a cause or a 
consequence of economic growth is not clear. However, there exists a general 
consensus on the underlying pattern of the relationship between GDP per capita and 
the share of construction in total GDP. This means that in the initial development 
stages of an economy, the share of the construction industry in GDP increases at a 
faster rate, then levels off and finally declines at higher levels of economic 
development. This suggests that in developing countries, construction is still a crucial 
factor for consideration when economic policies in these countries are being 
formulated. 
Since construction involves high stakes in the developing economies, most of 
the policy implications recommended within the literature focus on stimulating 
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construction outputs, and expanding the domestic construction capacity. However, the 
preceding discussion also suggests that there are high potential costs from over-
expansion in the sector. Consequently, construction might contribute to the economy 
in the short run, but offset the real growth of the economy in the long run. Since 
demand for construction is derived demand from other sectors of the economy, 
construction can only contribute to the economy when there is sufficient complement 
and basic productive level of other sectors to absorb the construction outputs. Further 
expansion of the construction outputs, especially infrastructure, beyond the adaptive 
capacity of the economy will only waste national resources. The knowledge suggests 
that focus on additional investment and project financing for infrastructure 
development may not bring about the desired impacts on economic development if 
these projects are not linked to broader economic development. Appropriate policies 
for the development of construction outputs should thus be those coordinated with 




CHAPTER 4 TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Developing countries are increasingly becoming concerned with international trade 
and market issues. The connection between international trade and economic 
development was first recognized in the literature on mercantilism in the 16th century. 
Since then, there have been different stances on the relationship. The first part of this 
chapter outlines these different perspectives and basic macro-level issues involved in 
international trade in the developing countries. A number of contributions of 
international trade to economic development are illustrated. Given the importance of 
international trade in economic development, integrating into international market has 
become a critical issue for public policy in developing countries. Hence, how 
governments manage trade policy, and challenges faced by national policymakers are 
also explored in this chapter. 
 
4.2 Trade between nations and some general features 
Economists typically use the term “trade” to refer to the exchange of goods and 
services between individual consumers, between regions or between nations. Trade 
viewed in different ways has distinguishing features. Since this study focuses on a 
country’s perspective on trade, the subject matter of this study concerns trade between 
nations or international trade. More specifically, international trade in this study is 
defined as all inward and outward movements across national borders of goods and 
services. One of the distinguishing features of international trade is the trade barriers 
that nations impose against trade (Markusen et al., 1995). Such trade barriers can 
range from traditional mechanisms of tariffs and quotas to “behind-the-border” issues, 
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such as supporting infrastructure and governance. The rapid growth of international 
trade, especially in developing countries, has increased the significance of these trade 
barriers for export interests in these countries (Hoekman et al., 2002).  
Globally, international trade has experienced high growth rates in recent 
decades. After World War II, the average annual growth rate of world merchandise 
exports in volume terms (i.e. in real terms, accounting for changes in prices and 
exchange rates) was 8% per year over the 1950-1973 period. Over the 1990-1999 
period, the rate was around 7% per year. The rate over the 2000-2007 period was 6% 
per year (World Trade Organization, 2001, 2008). After being affected by the 
financial crisis that began at the end of 2008, the world merchandise exports in 2010 
surged 14.5% (World Trade Organization, 2010). It is notable that trade between 
developing countries started to grow rapidly in the 1990s (Hoekman et al., 2002). In 
2010, both exports and imports in real terms grew faster in developing countries than 
in developed ones. In 2010, the growth in the volume of exports in developed 
countries was 13%, whereas the rate in developing countries was 17%. Similarly, the 
2010 imports in developed countries grew by 11% while that in developing countries 
was 18% (World Trade Organization, 2010). 
International trade has become an important part of the overall economic 
activity of developing countries. Developing countries opened up their economies by 
implementing trade liberalization. They also increased their integration into the world 
economy through acceptance of international trade agreements (Markusen et al., 1995; 
Hoekman et al., 2002). Trade policy has become a critical element of development 
agenda in these economies (Hoekman et al., 2002). Nevertheless, the debate on the 
role of international trade and trade policy in developing countries has been 
characterized by different theoretical viewpoints as reviewed in the following sections. 
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4.3 International trade and economic development 
The relationship between international trade and economic development has long 
been a debatable topic, starting from mercantilism in the 16th century. Since the 18th 
century, the debate continues mainly between neoclassical trade theory and 
dependency theory (Hein, 1992; Mullen et al., 2001; Zhang, 2008). 
 Mercantilism was the main stream of economics of the 16th and 17th century. 
The main premise of mercantilism is that a nation can increase capital, which is 
necessary for the nation’s prosperity, through positive balance of trade with other 
nations. Thus mercantilists encourage governmental intervention that promotes 
exports and discourages imports. Mercantilists view international trade as a zero-sum 
game, in which benefits of one nation would be costs of another. Although the 
theory’s arguments still have applications today, they began to fade in the late 18th 
century with widespread criticisms from classical economists, especially from Adam 
Smith (Smith, 1976, original work published 1776) (Zhang, 2008). 
The neoclassical trade theory considers free trade as an engine of economic 
growth. Starting from classical theory of absolute advantage by Adam Smith (Smith, 
1976, original work published 1776), the basic principle of absolute advantage 
suggests that both countries trading with each other can gain from trade by selling to 
the other what they produce more cheaply than the other. Adam Smith’s trade theory 
thus holds that trade is a positive sum game. Refining the theory of absolute 
advantage, Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage (Ricardo, 1971, original work 
published 1817) explained that absolute advantage was unnecessary for trade to occur. 
Even when both commodities may be produced more cheaply in one country than in 
another, trade of the commodities between the two countries can still occur. Because 
of differences in technology between countries, the relative efficiency among the two 
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goods in one country is different from that in another country, thus the former will 
gain by exporting the good which it produces relatively more efficient to the latter and 
importing the one which it has least absolute advantage from the latter. The theory 
hence holds that all participating countries share trade gains. 
Different from the Ricardian trade theory, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory (Ohlin, 
1933), demonstrated that even when all countries have the same access to technology, 
costs of production between countries are still different, thus participating countries 
can still enjoy comparative advantage. According to the theory, comparative 
advantage of a country is determined by its relative abundance or scarcity of factors of 
production (labour, capital and land) (Flam and Flanders, 1991). Because of 
differences in resource endowments, a nation can produce goods that intensively use 
its relatively abundant resource cheaper than another, and vice versa; thus trade 
occurs. The essential gains from international trade of a country therefore come from 
the reallocation of resources from one sector to another as the country increases 
specialization and concentrates investments in those sectors based on comparative 
advantage. On the global basis, international trade can help transfer the services of 
factors of production from countries where these factors are abundant to countries 
where they are scarce, leading to positive economic growth for both exporters and 
importers (Bhagwati, 1990; Mullen et al., 2001; Katsioloudes and Hadjidakis, 2007).  
Although the Ricardian model and Heckscher-Ohlin theory are the foundation 
for the theory of international trade, their contributions only deal with given and static 
supplies of factors of production (Zhang, 2008). More recently, the contemporary 
trade theory argues that even countries where factors are scarce can still enjoy 
comparative advantages through innovation. In these countries, firms have strong 
incentives to make efficient use of the scarce resources and be innovative, thus 
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creating comparative advantage (Katsioloudes and Hadjidakis, 2007). Through trade 
and foreign direct investment, firms can also achieve economies of scale, and acquire 
new knowledge and technology from abroad, thus producing more efficiently and 
increasing overall productivity. These long-term effects of trade on economic growth 
have been the focus of new trade theory and new growth theory since the early 1970s 
(Zhang, 2008). Overall, the important implication about the effects of trade on 
economic development in these theories is that through more efficient allocation of 
resources that enhances productivity, trade enables a nation to move beyond its 
production possibility frontiers, thereby acting as an engine of economic growth 
(Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Other developmental 
roles of exports and trade include increasing foreign exchange, creating employment, 
and improving living standard (Mullen, 1993; Awokuse, 2007). On a global basis, 
other benefits brought by international trade include improvements in labour 
standards, incomes and fair trade for the developing countries (Mazur, 2000; The 
Economist, 2001). 
The dependency theory, a neo-Marxist predecessor of the world-systems 
theory, by contrast, argues that exporting and importing will lead to slow economic 
growth for the developing countries. Marxist theory (Marx, 1933, original work 
published 1867) holds that trade is not a positive sum-game, and capitalist countries 
benefit most from trade with poor countries through colonialism and imperialism 
(Pincus, 1967). Trade, as viewed by the dependency theory is actually a mechanism 
for the industrialized countries with multinational firms to extract surplus wealth from 
less developed countries (Ram, 1985; Hein, 1992). These multinational firms invest in 
less developed countries to produce exports but only to send the trade gains back to 
their home countries. By securing favorable terms of trade, the core countries 
69 
 
(advanced industrial countries) transfer value from the peripheral countries (less 
developed countries) rather than reinvest in these countries (Galtung, 1971; Dholakia 
and Dholakia, 1984). Depending on foreign capital and markets is therefore 
considered as means to pave the way for multinational corporations to control less 
developed countries to benefit their home countries, thus stifling the development in 
less developed countries. From the theoretical perspective, the only way for less 
developed countries to develop is to become independent of foreign capital and goods 
(Hein, 1992). Similarly, opponents of globalization mainly argued that globalization 
threatens state democracy and intensifies inequality for the poorer participants in 
international trade flows (Taylor, 2002). 
As a result, dependency and neoclassical trade theorists suggest extremely 
diverse external-trade policies for developing countries, which have been a subject of 
much interest in the development literature as briefly reviewed earlier in Chapter 2 of 
this study. Neoclassical trade theorists with an outward-oriented perspective suggest 
export-led growth development strategies; whereas the dependency theorists with an 
inward-oriented perspective support the import-substitution growth model. Outwardly 
oriented countries focus on trade liberalization (Krueger, 1990). Inwardly oriented 
countries, by contrast, give priority to the domestic production of goods, which could 
otherwise be imported from the international market (Hein, 1992). Import-substitution 
regimes thus employ measures such as licensing procedures, quotas, tariffs or other 
barriers to restrict or prohibit imports; whereas export-oriented policies generally 
avoid all these restrictions to permit access to the international market at international 
prices, at least to exporters for their inputs, and use incentives to stimulate exports to 
the international market. It is worthwhile to mention that an outward-oriented strategy 
is not necessary to be completely free-trade. There could still be elements of 
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protection in an outward-oriented strategy as long as there is no bias of the incentive 
structure towards favoring the production of import substitutes (Krueger, 1990; 
Thirlwall, 2000). 
After the Second World War, a widespread acceptance of import substitution 
policies as a means to stimulate economic growth developed among the developing 
countries, who had just obtained their independence from the colonial powers. Policy 
makers of these newly independent countries were impressed by the historical 
experience of the more developed countries where high levels of import protection 
had contributed positively to industrialization in the nineteenth and twentieth century 
(Baldwin, 2003). For example, in the 1970s, Latin American countries applied 
policies specifically suggested by the dependency theory, which imposed high levels 
of import duties and other import barriers, and maintained a hostile attitude toward 
foreign investment (Hein, 1992). Import substitution policies actually worked quite 
well initially in these countries. However, in the 1990s, the drawbacks of such a 
policy approach became increasingly apparent. The permanent development was 
hampered by domestically high prices and markets for consumer and industrial goods 
eventually became saturated. As a result, Latin American nations experienced 
stagnant growth with immense external debts, high rates of inflation, shortages of 
investment capital, as well as the increasingly downgrading of social and economic 
well-being of large segments of their population (Gereffi, 1989; World Bank, 2000).  
In contrast to most of Latin American countries, East Asian countries, the first 
group of developing countries that shifted from an inward-oriented to an outward-
oriented approach to development, experienced the fastest growth of exports and GDP 
in the 1970s (Hein, 1992; Baldwin, 2003). The shift to export-led growth policies, 
especially attempts to attract foreign investment in the 1960s and 1970s of these 
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nations have built up flexible, dynamic economies with high rates of growth (Hein, 
1992). The success of the Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) has challenged 
the conventional thinking of scholars and policymakers, opening new development 
possibilities for the developing countries. To varying degrees, a number of empirical 
studies across countries have also showed results in favor of outward-looking over 
inward-looking policies. Balassa (1971) and Little et al. (1970) compared import 
substitution policies across industries and countries and recommended developing 
countries to reduce the average levels of effective protection, and the discrimination 
against exports. Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978) studied changes in trade 
policies as well as other macroeconomic policies in specific countries. These studies 
concluded that it was the outward oriented, instead of inward oriented, strategy that 
generated long-term high growth rate for developing countries. As a result, export-led 
growth strategy is considered the rational and efficient alternative to import-
substitution strategy for development (Awokuse, 2007). Other studies attempted to 
draw correlation between some measures of openness, particularly value of exports, 
and economic growth or productivity growth. For example, Balassa (1978), Fosu 
(1990) and Krueger (1978) found a significant positive relationship between growth 
of exports and growth of GNP. A study by Michaely (1977) showed a positive 
association between per capita GNP and export share in GNP. Similarly, a number of 
empirical evidence have concluded the important effects of export performance, 
export expansion and openness to foreign markets on economic growth (Krueger, 
1980; Ram, 1987; Moschos, 1989; Islam, 1990; Salvatore and Hatcher, 1991; Sachs et 
al., 1995; Al-Yousif, 1997; Dollar and Kraay, 2002).  
There is, however, some doubt about the causality between exports, imports 
and economic growth in the developing economies. An empirical study by Dodaro 
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(1993) showed a weak support for the view that export growth would promote GDP 
growth in developing countries. Palley (2003) was skeptical of the sustainability of 
export-led growth, although the focus was on global growth rather than growth of 
individual countries. According to the study, export-led development may work for a 
few countries, but it is a zero-sum game on a global basis. In other studies, Bhagwati 
(1988) and Krugman (1992) argued that there could be reverse causal flow from 
economic growth to exports growth. Productivity gains through increases in domestic 
levels of skilled labour and technology can lead to export expansion. Similarly, an 
important review by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) demonstrated that successful 
export performance could be a result of successful development rather than cause, 
although the study only focused on the effects of trade barriers on growth rather than 
on more general measures of openness. Also, there could be a bi-directional causality 
between exports and economic growth (Dutt and Ghosh, 1996; Bekõ, 2003). As 
explained by Dutt and Ghosh (1996), in the initial stages of development of some 
countries, economic growth stimulates exports, but along the way exports will lead to 
further economic growth. Moreover, Dutt and Ghosh (1996) believed that the 
causality structure depends on characteristics of a specific economy, thus it would be 
inappropriate to generalize the structure.  
Despite the ongoing debate, the empirical evidence available indicates that no 
nation has ever maintained high economic growth over the long-term without trade 
(Markusen et al., 1995). Empirical evidence shows that those countries that deepened 
their integration with the global economy have achieved growth much higher than 
those developing countries that did not or have slowly integrated into global markets 
(Hoekman et al., 2002; Newfarmer et al., 2002; Samli, 2002). Opening to 
international competition is considered the starting point for developing countries 
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(Dominguez et al., 1993). The important issue for developing countries is thus not 
about whether to trade but should be more about how to trade in order to secure 
improvement in economic performance (Thirlwall, 2000; Taylor, 2002). This 
enhances the significant role of trade facilitation policies that are critical in supporting 
international trade (Rodrik, 2002). Trade facilitation is broadly defined to consist of 
all factors that support a country’s capacity and effectiveness to create and maintain a 
trade-friendly environment, including border barriers to trade (such as port efficiency 
and customs administration) and “behind-the-border” (such as quality of 
infrastructure and regulatory environment) (Wilson et al., 2005). 
 
4.4 International market access issues and trade policies for developing countries 
The integration of developing countries into the international trading system has been 
extensively analyzed in the past twenty years. The variables in most studies on macro-
strategy at the national level include trade barriers, institutions that support the 
participation of national firms in international markets, trade liberalization and 
competitive advantage (Kilbourne, 2004). The first three variables have long been 
reviewed and analyzed in a number of studies within international trade literature. The 
results of these studies were used to develop negotiation as well as incentives by the 
international community and developing countries aimed at more effective integration 
of developing countries into the international economy (Michalopoulos, 1999b; 
Hoekman, 2002). These variables are considered to have a clear link with trade 
policies and market access issues for developing countries. Since trade barriers and 
trade protection are considered harmful for effective integration into the multilateral 
trading systems, most studies highlight the importance of opening up the trade system 
to competing traders, lowering the use of tariff and non-tariff barriers, removing 
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exchange rate distortions, and the possible introduction of measures to reduce the 
impact of continuing distortions (Michalopoulos, 1999b; Martin, 2001). Integrating 
into the multilateral trading systems, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
also requires the developing countries to implement trading agreements governed by 
the WTO such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for trade in 
goods, the General Agreement for Trade in Services (GATS) for trade in services, as 
well as other aspects of international exchange of goods and services, such as trade 
related intellectual property rights (TRIPS), sanitary and phytosanitary standards 
(SPS), government procurement and so on (Michalopoulos, 1999a; Hoekman et al., 
2002). 
 The main challenges for developing countries are the constraints in their 
capacity of broad, market based institutions and those which are more specifically 
trade related, such as the financial sector, as well as customs and trade facilitation. 
Developing countries are therefore recommended to combine reducing trade barriers 
with other policies that are conducive to improving the investment environment, 
macroeconomic stability, strengthening financial, regulatory and institutional capacity 
with technical and financial assistance from bilateral donors and international 
organizations (Rodrik, 1999; Wilson, 2001; Prowse, 2002). Upgrading transport, 
communication and other basic infrastructure services, and building capacity to meet 
global regulatory requirements and standards are also important to the developing 
countries in order to expand trade opportunities and to effectively integrate them into 
the world trade system (Michalopoulos, 1999b, 1999a; Hoekman, 2002).  
 The macro-strategies at the national level, including the trade agreements and 
practices, recommended above were generally based on the comparative advantage 
doctrine (Samli and Jacobs, 1995). However, more recently, it is argued that 
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comparative advantage may not provide the complete answer for the development of 
an efficient export sector; and a more coherent strategy may lie in competitive 
advantage (Dominguez et al., 1993; Lowinger et al., 1995). The competitive 
advantage model was proposed and advanced by Porter (1990, 1998a, 1998b, 2000). 
Porter’s works were based on the premise that the national competitive environment 
in which firms operate can considerably influence the international competitive 
performance of firms. The competitiveness of nations viewed by Porter (1990, 1998a, 
1998b, 2000) is the ability of a nation to create and maintain such an environment that 
shapes highly competitive industries and firms. Firms built in such a national 
environment can be more successful when they export or engage in outward foreign 
direct investment (Rugman and D'Cruz, 1993). According to Porter (1990, 1998a, 
1998b, 2000), elements of a national environment that play important roles in firms’ 
competitive performance within the world market consist of:  
 Factor conditions (i.e., the nation’s position in factors of production, especially 
advanced factors of production such as skilled labor, capital and infrastructure); 
 Demand conditions (i.e., sophisticated and demanding customers in the domestic 
market); 
 Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry (i.e., the characteristics of the business sector 
as conditions for organization of companies, and the nature of domestic rivalry); 
and 
 Related and supporting industries (i.e., the importance of clustering industries and 
spillover benefits of an industry’s investments in advanced factors of production 
within these clusters). 
Porter (1990) integrated the four primary conditions into a diamond-shaped diagram 
with two exogenous parameters, namely government and chance. The four contextual 
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variables operate interdependently and their strength of interaction determines the 
extent to which a national environment is conducive to international success. A nation 
is therefore viewed as a set of contextual variables which can hinder or support the 
competitive performance of firms and industries (Grant, 1991). As a result, the macro 
strategy through which government can have the most direct effect in the competitive 
development process involves policies that support research and development, 
investments in human resource development, and infrastructure development and 
renovation (Dominguez et al., 1993; Samli and Jacobs, 1995).  
 While Porter’s diamond framework at the country-level has become the 
emphasis within the management school, it has been ignored by the economics school. 
Recent studies within the economic literature argue that Porter’s diamond framework 
is not about trade; it cannot explain the pattern of trade and gains from trade, and thus 
cannot replace the theory of comparative advantage (Smit, 2010). Moreover, Porter’s 
explanation of international competitiveness of countries has not been undergone 
rigorous testing (Hill, 2009). Nevertheless, Porter’s diamond framework has offered 
an unprecedentedly broad range of national-level sources of competitive advantage 
and brought them together in a comprehensive model for formulating government 
strategy (Grant, 1991; Rugman and D'Cruz, 1993; Moon et al., 1998; Peng, 2009). 
Moreover, within the domain of international economics, the use of Porter’s diamond 
framework has been discussed and considered as a good starting paradigm for greater 
optimization of national efforts to achieve success in international markets (Samli and 
Jacobs, 1995; Moon et al., 1998; Smit, 2010). 
 The importance of developing countries in the world economy is increasing. 
However, only a few of the higher income developing countries (developing countries 
based on WTO’s definition with high GDP per capita, e.g. Singapore and South Korea) 
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have impressively integrated into the multilateral trading system. The progress of 
many other developing countries has been slower. There were not much 
improvements in the conditions affecting access to international markets in these 
countries (Michalopoulos, 1999b; Hoekman, 2002). Although assistance from the 
international community is important for the progress, these developing countries’ 
own policies are even more crucial. In the context of growing complexity and 
interdependence of foreign trade policies, designing and sustaining supporting 
policies are challenging tasks (Hoekman, 2002; Jordana and Ramió, 2003). The 
following section will examine the role of institutional structure in the formulation of 
foreign trade policy at the national level. 
 
4.5 Trade policy institutions 
Using international trade as a vehicle for a country’s development strategy requires 
the country to open up and liberalize trade, which represents a change of direction in 
long term development strategy, and involves a new leading role for trade policy. 
Engagement into the multilateral trading systems also makes trade policy far more 
complex, which creates pressures to reinforce the trade policy process and the 
strategic management capacity in the main organization responsible for trade-policy 
making (Rodrik, 2002; Jordana and Ramió, 2003). The related issues as discussed 
above place the focus of trade policy on creating incentives for international trade 
growth by reducing border barriers to trade (tariff and non-tariff barriers), 
strengthening the public institutions needed for efficient customs, improving legal and 
regulatory environment, and creating measures to enhance the competitiveness of 
national firms in international markets. Institutional structure and the formulation of 
international trade policy at the national level are considered critical elements for an 
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efficient trade policy process (Hoekman, 2002; Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2003; 
Lecomte, 2003; Sinha, 2007). As a result, there is a growing need for governments in 
developing countries where institutional performance remains weak to introduce 
further changes into their existing institutional models.  
 Responding to the above mentioned challenges, there have been efforts in 
many developing countries to renew and adapt themselves to the demands of the new 
international environment. Transformation of institutional structure is often 
characterized by giving greater power to the core ministry dealing with trade (Jordana 
and Ramió, 2003). For example, the power and status of India’s Ministry of 
Commerce has been radically enhanced recently, in part to attempt to further export 
its products and services aggressively and to engage the WTO more actively. The 
growing complexity of trade policy also necessitates the involvement of, or the 
integration with, other government ministries in the policy process such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industry or Ministry of Agriculture (Sinha, 
2007). The inclusion of all actors, including the relevant ministries, trade promotion 
and regulatory bodies, and nongovernmental players from the business sector, think 
tanks, independent research centers, leading universities and other civil society 
organizations is also considered part of the institutional transformation (Lecomte, 
2003). However, introducing changes into an organizational model is not a trivial task. 
Moreover, different conditions in each country require a specific institutional design. 
In many developing countries, performance has not been improved satisfactorily. 
Trade policy formulation and implementation in these countries are still dominated by 
governmental and inter-governmental agencies with overlapping functions and 
deficient coordination (Jordana and Ramió, 2003; Jerome, 2005). Further changes in 
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the existing institutional structure and improvements in institutional capacity are thus 
vital if trade liberalization is to serve as an engine of growth. 
 
4.6 Summary 
The relationship between international trade and economic development varies in the 
literature. International trade is considered an engine of economic growth in the 
neoclassical economic trade theory. This conflicts with the dependency theory, in 
which international trade is viewed as a hindrance to economic development. A 
summary of the major theoretical insights of the relationship is given in Figure 4.1. 
However, focusing more on the empirical perspective, a number of studies 
have shown a positive association between export expansion and openness to foreign 
markets, and economic development. Although there is still some doubt about the 
causality of the relationship, international trade between nations is believed to play a 
crucial role in the economic development process. It is international trade that links a 
country with its international market, and drives domestic resource allocation to be 
utilized effectively. As a result, what is needed for economic development in most 
developing countries is to effectively engage in international trade.  
 Effective integration into the international market or the world trading system 
requires a liberal trade policy using traditional policy instruments such as tariffs, 
quotas, export subsidies, and taxes, complemented by trade-related institutions to 
facilitate trade and attain national objectives. A more recent suggested trade agenda 
covers a broader focus on such policies as those involving research and development, 






Figure 4.1 Time-line of major theoretical viewpoints on the role of international trade in economic development  
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CHAPTER 5 PUBLIC INVESTMENTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR TRADE 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A review of the literature on the role of infrastructure construction as well as the role 
of international trade in economic development in previous chapters has illuminated 
several intriguing aspects of sectoral linkages in the dynamic process of economic 
development. Governments in developing countries are advised to increase 
investments in infrastructure to stimulate international trade and economic growth. 
However, there are concerns about the low efficiency of public investments in 
infrastructure construction. These concerns are discussed in this chapter. 
 
5.2 Theory of coordination failure and role of government 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, one strand of modern theory of economic development 
approaches underdevelopment as a coordination problem. The logic of coordination 
failures contends that when complementaries exist, firms’ inability to coordinate their 
behaviors leads the economy to an inefficient state (Matsuyama, 1997; Todaro and 
Smith, 2003). Models of coordination failures demonstrate that even market 
mechanism cannot solve the problem “because of difficulties of coordination, 
sometimes because people hold different expectations, sometimes because everyone is 
better off waiting for someone else to make the first move” (Todaro and Smith, 2003, 
p. 150). The first researcher to raise some of the basic coordination issues was 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) found the sources of 
coordination failures by focusing on complementaries in production decisions made 
by firms in the process of industrialization. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and later models 
based on Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), such as Murphy et al. (1989) and Krugman (1995) 
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called for a “big push” industrialization, which is a synchronized expansion of 
industries coordinated by central government planning. 
Studies in development economics such as those completed by Matsuyama 
(1997) and Hoff (2000) described the economy as a complex system of activities with 
interrelated production processes. “The development of a sophisticated economic 
system requires a high degree of coordination among these diverse activities, 
performed by a diverse set of agents, each of whom may possess the unique 
knowledge and technical expertise concerning these activities” (Matsuyama, 1997, p. 
142). The major part of the coordination problem is to figure out which combination 
of activities could bring about a better outcome for the economy as a whole 
(Matsuyama, 1997). 
The presence of coordination failures that may arise in the presence of 
complementaries between these activities highlights potential policies for 
interventions that remove the coordination problems and make the most efficient use 
of the available resources, thus achieving economic development. However, the role 
of government in improving the way to coordinate economic activities is not 
consistent in the literature on coordination problems. Recent works undermined 
government intervention to solve coordination problems. A bad policy choice could 
also be one of the important sources of a bad equilibrium. In many developing 
countries, the government appears to be inefficient and is at the root of most 
important poverty traps. The government policies are thus not superior to the market 
mechanism in coordinating economic activities (Glăvan, 2008). Nonetheless, it is the 
focus of this study that the government cannot abandon its role as coordinator and 
facilitator of overall economic development, especially in the developing countries 
where market failure is high as well. Government interventions are important to 
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ensure that in the long-run the progress that a country makes is targeted at social and 
economic priorities. From that perspective, this study will discuss the role of 
government in coordinating infrastructure development and trade growth in the 
following sections. 
 
5.3 Public investments in infrastructure and knowledge gap 
As reviewed earlier in Chapter 4 of this study, the literature on the relationship 
between international trade and economic development has been shaped by different 
theoretical views (Low and Dang, 2012). However, empirical studies have shown that 
developing countries should focus on how to trade in order to secure improvement in 
economic performance rather than on whether to trade (Thirlwall, 2000; Taylor, 2002). 
Measures to stimulate international trade growth underpinned by the comparative 
advantage doctrine (Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1817; Ohlin, 1933) emphasize the 
importance of issues relating to trade barriers, institutions, and trade liberalization. 
Meanwhile, the recent work of the competitive advantage doctrine (Porter, 1990, 
1998a, 2000) has expanded the focus to the competitiveness of nations. The model 
views a nation as a set of contextual variables which can hinder or support the 
competitive performance of firms and industries. One of the main contextual variables 
that hinders or supports the competitive performance of firms and industries is 
infrastructure development. 
There have been a number of empirical studies on the impact of infrastructure 
in general and physical distribution infrastructure in particular on trade and economic 
growth in the developing countries as briefly discussed earlier in this study. In these 
studies, infrastructure is regarded as one of the determinants of international 
competitiveness, which directly impact the ability of countries to engage in 
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international trade, and to compete for foreign direct investments (FDI). The 
remarkable growth of a number of developing countries in Asia, including emerging 
East Asian economies, in recent decades has been attributable much to the expansion 
of international trade, which in turn has been supported by infrastructure development 
(APEC Economic Committee, 1997; Kohsaka, 2006; Brooks, 2008). However, their 
levels of infrastructure development still lag far behind that of the industrialized 
economies. In Africa, the level of infrastructure development is worse. Morrissey and 
Rudaheranwa (1998) and Nwankwo (2000) found that many African countries have 
not experienced the expected increase in exports earnings although these countries 
have followed the policy of trade liberalization. Among a number of reasons for the 
poor performance of the export sector, the lack of proper and adequate infrastructure 
systems is one of the major concerns. Under-performance of infrastructure systems 
including telecommunications, energy and transport, as well as logistics infrastructure 
in many African countries have significantly increased investment and transaction 
costs, leading to an increase in entry barriers, as well as a reduction in 
competitiveness and access to domestic and international markets. Similarly, Peters 
(1992), Hulten (1996), and the Economic Research Centre (2001) found that an 
adequate and reliable infrastructure system can promote trade, expand market through 
cost and time savings in transportation and telecommunications. Evaluating the 
importance of physical distribution and logistics infrastructure system in the future 
growth of horticultural exports of developing countries, Islam (1990) also maintained 
that improvement in transportation and other infrastructure for export is an important 
factor influencing their relative competitive positions in export markets, thus their 
export performance. Furthermore, findings in an empirical study by Kumar (2001) 
showed that the availability of good quality physical infrastructure could improve the 
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investment climate for FDI, especially export-oriented FDI. Apart from increased 
trade and foreign capital flows, the impact of infrastructure on trade can also be found 
in enhanced knowledge spillovers and technology transfer (Venables, 2004). The lack 
of infrastructure in India was estimated to hinder the country’s economic growth by 
1.5% to 2% per year (World Economic Forum, 2007). Similarly, less investment in 
infrastructure was considered to be attributable to the slow economic growth of 
countries in Latin America (Fay and Morrison, 2008). 
The poor quality and inadequacy of infrastructure become one of the major 
development challenges in many developing countries. Considerable financing is 
required to meet large scale infrastructure expansions (Fay and Yepes, 2003; Davis, 
2008; Flanagan and Jewell, 2009; Arnold, 2011). However, investment in 
infrastructure is not directly seen to be feasible from individual private investors’ 
point of view. This is because an infrastructural construction project is often capital-
intensive and is more conspicuous of its public goods characteristics. For example, a 
new transportation facility could bring about the improvement in the performance of 
all individual firms. However, it is not in the interests of any individual firm to 
address such issues. Moreover, the high costs of investment may render the private 
returns of the project unattractive. Meanwhile, the external effects of the consumption 
of such goods by the whole community go beyond the benefits to individual investors. 
In other words, the social rate of returns on such investments is higher than purely the 
private rate. In the event of market failure, it is the responsibility of the government to 
provide the investment-goods for the economy as a whole. As a result, governments 
own and finance nearly all infrastructure projects worldwide. Globally, government 
investments accounted for 78% of total investments in infrastructure construction 
from 1994 to 2003 (Estache, 2006; Kenny, 2007). 
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Since there is a huge need for additional investment, the literature is 
dominated by studies focusing on challenges in project financing for infrastructure 
development, including constraints in public expenditure and private financing (Fay 
and Yepes, 2003; Davis, 2008; Mulu and Smith, 2008; Smith and Gannon, 2008; 
Hwang et al., 2012). There are studies, however, suggesting a negative relationship 
between infrastructure investments and economic growth. A study of the US data by 
Kocherlakota and Yi (1996) illustrated that infrastructure does not permanently raise 
economic growth rate. Devarajan et al. (1996) indicated that infrastructure in 
developing countries actually had negative impacts on economic growth if 
infrastructure is over-supplied relative to the economic scale. Flyvbjerg (2007) and 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) when studying 258 transportation infrastructure projects 
around the world, the largest database of its kind thus far, indicated that cost overruns, 
benefit shortfalls and waste were found in most infrastructure projects. The low 
efficiency and quality of public investments in infrastructure found in these studies 
suggest that there are important issues beyond the difficulties in project financing for 
infrastructure development. A focus on financing issues thus does not provide a 
comprehensive answer to the infrastructure development problems in developing 
countries. Some studies focus on the planning and policy making aspect of 
infrastructure development (Hossain, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2007; Mustajab, 2009; 
Marshall, 2011). However, little is known about how the entire planning and 
implementation of infrastructure can be improved to help governments in developing 
countries cut down costs and waste, thus enhancing the efficiency of public 
investments in infrastructure, and meeting development goals. The knowledge gap 
requires further study on the way infrastructure is planned and built to support trade 
and economic development. 
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5.4 Infrastructure planning and implementing in developing countries 
5.4.1 Problems in infrastructure planning 
The connection between infrastructure construction and economic development 
reviewed earlier suggests that infrastructure development is one of the most integral 
parts in government planning and policy making. Infrastructure investments continue 
to be planned, decided and financed at the national level. Policy makers formulate 
decisions on infrastructure development based on infrastructure planning outcomes. 
However, there are a number of issues with the quality of these outcomes, including 
the absence of an adequate problem analysis, lack of alternatives, ambiguities about 
the effects of improved infrastructure on the development of a wider area, inadequate 
research of the interaction across infrastructure sectors, and underestimated costs and 
overestimated benefits (Estache and Fay, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2007; Priemus, 2010). The 
poor quality of infrastructure planning outcomes would thus result in poorly selected 
infrastructure investments and bad policy choices, which subsequently have a wider 
effect on the economy. Although planning tools have recently been developed 
(Schweikert and Chinowsky, 2012; World Economic Forum, 2012), there are 
deficiencies in the capacities required for using these tools. Tackling deficiencies in 
planning and policy making capacities of governments can therefore play a crucial 
role in determining the efficiency of public investments in infrastructure in 
developing countries. From the literature review on government planning, especially 
in the area of infrastructure development, the following problems can be found 
attributed to deficiencies in the infrastructure planning and policy making process. 
Capacity for estimation and monitoring of rates of return of projects 
Unexpected infrastructure planning outcomes can first be explained by the lack of 
capacity for estimation and monitoring of rates of return of projects, including 
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limitations of forecasting methods and appraisal techniques; inadequate data; inherent 
problems in predicting the future and monetizing external and indirect effects; lack of 
experienced forecasters; lack of quality checks on planning outcomes; and inadequacy 
in routinely ex post analysis and external audits on whether policies and projects meet 
objectives (Short and Kopp, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2007; Collier and Venables, 2008; 
Todaro and Smith, 2009). 
Politicized decision making 
Besides these technical factors, failures of the planning process could be explained by 
the political factor (Todaro and Smith, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2007; Guasch et al., 2007; 
Collier and Venables, 2008). Political leaders and government bureaucrats can use 
investments in infrastructure construction as a tool for securing political positions or 
competing for scarce funds. In order to get approval and funding, investments in 
infrastructure projects backed by the political affiliations of the government would 
deliberately be proposed with overestimated benefits and underestimated costs. Risks 
in these projects would also be overlooked. Lack of commitment of political leaders 
and government bureaucrats to national goals as opposed to personal interests could 
therefore make infrastructure planning and decision making politicized rather than 
rationalized. Empirical evidences from 69 developing countries over a 20-year time 
period indicated a statistically significant negative relationship between the share of 
central government investments on transport and communications, and per capita 
GDP. The negative relationship was explained by political factors in decision-making 
(Devarajan and Swaroop (1993). In addition, powerful groups with vested interest can 
create pressure to affect the planning that serves their own interests (Todaro and 
Smith, 2003; Henisz and Zelner, 2006). 
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Transparency and accountability 
Another problem in infrastructure planning and policy making relates to the lack of 
transparency and accountability. These processes are rarely fully transparent to the 
public. Forecasting methods, criteria of project selection and the determination of 
planning objectives are often not made available for consultation with the interested 
or affected individuals or groups. Independent peer reviews and quality checks on 
forecasts and planning outcomes by independent-review bodies and the scientific and 
professional community are not sufficient. Lack of penal systems to enforce penalties 
on those that deliberately and consistently produce deceptive forecasts is also 
attributable to the accountability problem (Short and Kopp, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2007). 
Institutional weaknesses in planning 
Since planning and policy making for infrastructure is a multi-actor process, nurturing 
of an innovative institutional capacity that coordinates efforts and resources is 
considered one of the determinants of infrastructure development (Mody, 1997). 
However, there are a number of institutional weaknesses of the planning processes of 
most developing countries, including the poor communication between the planning 
agency and the day-to-day decision-making machinery of government; intersectoral 
rivalries; lack of interaction between political leaders, planners with non-
governmental actors; incompetent and unqualified civil servants; as well as 
complicated and bureaucratic administrative systems (Todaro and Smith, 2003). 
 
5.4.2 Problems in the implementation of infrastructure plans 
While there may be widespread agreement with a policy of supporting the increase of 
infrastructure investments for trade and economic growth, there are concerns in 
infrastructure construction. As reviewed earlier, even increasing investments in 
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infrastructure would not bring about the expected results. In recent years, 
governments, especially those in developing countries, such as China and India, have 
initiated ambitious infrastructure investment plans (Arnold, 2011). Empirical evidence 
in developing countries has shown that even if sufficient investments are raised, there 
are still a number of issues (for example delay, cost overruns, quality, safety and 
productivity) in infrastructure construction to transform these master plans into 
physical infrastructure capital (Le-Hoai et al., 2008; Toor and Ogunlana, 2008; 
LaFraniere, 2011; Memon et al., 2011). The poorly executed infrastructure 
investments require these issues in the implementation of infrastructure development 
plans to be examined. 
Political commitment 
Studies on infrastructure development in East Asia have emphasized that sustained 
and powerful government leadership is crucial (Mody, 1997). Infrastructure 
development involves a long-range vision that sustained commitment from the 
government is essential to support the development of a concrete strategy and 
subsequent actions. As a result, lack of political commitment could have direct effects 
on the implementation of infrastructure development plans. Literature on development 
planning highlights that the wide gap between plan formulation and plan 
implementation in most developing countries could be attributable to a lack of 
political will on the part of top leaders and high-level decision makers (Waterston, 
2006). Lack of political commitment could also be the result of political discontinuity. 
Since the execution of national infrastructure projects often take a longer time than 
the length of one government, changes in the political affiliations of the government 
responsible for the projects create significant changes to the projects. Political 
inconsistencies at the national level and between different tiers of governments could 
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also have adverse effects on the implementation of the projects. The lack of political 
consensus goes together with the lack of a high-powered government institution that 
provides an effective mechanism for implementing national infrastructure plans 
(Priemus, 2010). 
Problems of corruption in infrastructure construction 
Construction, in particular infrastructure construction, continues to be ranked as one 
of the most corrupt sectors worldwide. Corruption in the sector occurs in all stages 
from securing government contracts to the delivery of infrastructure. For securing 
government contracts, bribes are made to government officials responsible for 
budgeting decisions, project selections, tender specifications, procurement outcomes 
or contract negotiations and renegotiations. In the construction of infrastructure, 
bribes are made to government officials to cover poor quality construction practices 
and outcomes, as well as theft of materials. Major impacts of corruption in 
infrastructure can lead to poor construction, limited occupational safety and low 
returns to government infrastructure investments (Kenny, 2007). There are a number 
of causes of corruption in infrastructure construction, including the lack of 
transparency and competitiveness in bid processes, the discretionary power of 
individual bureaucrats involved in the award of contracts, inadequate financial and 
physical auditing, and inadequate capacity of regulatory bodies to enforce regulations 
(Kenny, 2007, Dabla, 2011). 
Land acquisition 
Problems in land acquisition can cause substantial delays and cost overruns in 
infrastructure construction (Priemus, 2010). In many developing countries, land 
acquisition is considered one of the major barriers to governments’ plans to develop 
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infrastructure (Agrawal, 1999; Morris, 2007). Major problems in land acquisition for 
infrastructure in developing countries can include poor compensation and 
undervalued market price of land. Several causes for these problems can be identified, 
including lack of a negotiating mechanism to make land acquisition compensation 
more market-oriented; bureaucracy in settling land disputes and claims; lack of a land 
acquisition compensation monitoring system; and lack of clarity about compensation 
valuation methods. Another problem in land acquisition is land price speculation. 
Increased costs of land acquisition caused by land price speculation could make 
infrastructure projects, especially toll road projects financially unfeasible. Lack of law 
enforcement to regulate the price of land acquired for infrastructure projects is 
regarded as the major cause of this problem (Chan, 2003; Raghuram et al., 2009; 
Widhiarto, 2011). 
Building capacity of local firms 
As reviewed earlier in this study, various construction components, including finance, 
technology, management, materials and labour are required in the construction of 
infrastructure projects. The level of development and the rate of implementation of 
infrastructure projects are determined by the combination and mobilization of these 
resources (Raftery et al., 1998). The inadequate capacity of the domestic construction 
firms in developing countries to meet the level of construction activities required for 
the construction of infrastructure could thus affect the implementation of 
infrastructure development plans. Moreover, the inadequate capacity of the domestic 
construction firms could lead to increasing foreign participation, which in turn could 
limit the opportunities for local firms to win contracts and for the local labour to gain 
employment. Inadequate capacity of local construction firms could therefore hurt 
other long-term development objectives, including employment generation and 
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poverty alleviation. Improving capabilities and resources of local construction firms is 
thus necessary for achieving these development goals in developing countries (Wells 
and Hawkins, 2010). Current issues pertaining to the capacity that domestic 
construction firms in developing countries are facing include poor level of efficiency 
and quality of work; poor level of professionalism and entrepreneurship; and 
resources shortages, especially in construction technology, management and finance 
(Ofori, 2012; Hwang and Ng, 2013). These problems become acute during periods of 
high economic activities, when demand for construction outputs, especially large 
infrastructure facilities is higher (Howes and Robinson, 2005). 
Institutional and legal weaknesses in infrastructure construction 
Other concerns involve institutional and legal weaknesses in infrastructure 
construction, including obsolescence of building regulations, changing and 
inconsistent law and regulations, ineffectiveness of implementation of existing 
statutes and codes, and bureaucracy in formal procedures relating to project planning, 
construction permissions and administration (Raftery et al., 1998; Ofori, 2000, 2006). 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
As reviewed earlier in this study, there is much literature on the relationship between 
investments in infrastructure and trade sector, as well as the national economy as a 
whole. To meet the huge demand for infrastructure, increasing infrastructure 
investment is encouraged in developing countries. The objective of investments in 
trade-related infrastructure is to stimulate trade, and thus economic growth. Besides 
the provision of infrastructure, investments in infrastructure construction are also used 
by governments in many developing countries as a tool for employment generation, 
increased work for local firms, and subsequently poverty alleviation and economic 
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growth. As a result, public investments in infrastructure in developing countries have 
been increasing. However, empirical evidence has shown that these development 
objectives might not be realized as expected due to the low efficiency and quality of 
administering these public investments. Several studies have found that the low 
efficiency and quality of public investments in infrastructure could be attributed to 
deficiencies in the planning and policy making process (Henisz and Zelner, 2006; 
Flyvbjerg, 2007; Guasch et al., 2007; Collier and Venables, 2008; Priemus, 2010). 
In addition, there are concerns about the implementation of infrastructure 
development plans that could affect the quality and efficiency of public investments in 
infrastructure (Kenny, 2007; Dabla-Norris et al., 2011). This highlights the 
importance of bringing these issues in both planning and implementation processes 
together and looking at them through the role of the government as coordinator and 
facilitator of overall economic development. A number of issues were identified, 
notably inadequate capacity for estimating and monitoring of rates of return of 
infrastructure projects; politicized decision making; transparency and accountability 
problems; institutional weaknesses in decision-making; lack of political commitment 
in the implementation of infrastructure development plans; corruption issues in 
infrastructure construction; problems in land acquisition; shortages of local 
construction firms’ capabilities and resources; and institutional and legal weaknesses 
in infrastructure construction (see Figure 5.1). In order to improve the efficiency of 
government funding invested in infrastructure to support trade and economic 































‐ Trade growth. 
‐ Economic growth. 
‐ Employment 
generation.  
‐ Poverty alleviation. 
‐ Inadequate capacity for estimation and monitoring of 
rates of return of infrastructure projects. 
‐ Politicized decision making. 
‐ Transparency and accountability problems. 
‐ Institutional weaknesses in planning. 
Infrastructure planning: 
‐ Lack of political commitment. 
‐ Corruption issues in infrastructure construction. 
‐ Land acquisition problems. 
‐ Shortages of local construction firms’ capabilities and 
resources. 
‐ Institutional weaknesses in infrastructure construction. 
Infrastructure plan implementation: 
Immediate objectives: Development objectives: 
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Since Vietnam started its economic reforms in 1986, the country has gone from one of 
the poorest in the world to become a lower-middle-income country (World Bank Data, 
2013). Moving forward, the country faces new challenges in economic development. 
The chapter provides an overview of economic development in Vietnam over the past 
decades. Emphasis is placed on the roles of trade and infrastructure construction in 
economic development, and how well the development of these sectors is 
complementary to each other. In addition, the chapter provides an understanding of 
Vietnam’s planning process at the national level, and major tasks of government 
agencies related to trade, infrastructure planning and development. 
 
6.2 Vietnam – Country and economic overview 
6.2.1 Geography and population 
Vietnam is located in Southeast Asia, bordering China in the north, Cambodia and 
Laos in the west, and the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean in the east and south 
(see Figure 6.1). The country has a total land area of more than 331,000 square 
kilometers and a coastline of more than 3,000 kilometers (km) lying on international 
seaways running along the country from the broad plain of the Red River and the Gulf 
of Tonkin in the north through to the Mekong Delta in the south (Government Web 
Portal of Vietnam, 2010a). In 2009, total population was estimated at 86 million 
people. About 24% of the population is under the age of 15, and 69% is from the age 
of 15 to 64. Population growth rate averaged at about 1.2% per year from 1999 to 




Figure 6.1 Geographical map of Vietnam 
Source: Google maps 
The urban population increased rapidly with an average annual growth rate of 
about 3.4%. At present, urban population accounts for about 29.6% of the total 
population. Vietnam is divided into 63 cities and provinces. The two largest socio-
economic centers are Hanoi, the capital city in the north with a population of about 
6.5 million people, and Ho Chi Minh City in the south with a population of about 7.16 
million (data compiled from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam [GSO] (2010)). 
Other key urban areas include the port cities of Hai Phong in the north, Da Nang on 
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the Central Coast, and Can Tho in the Mekong Delta in the south (Government Web 
Portal of Vietnam, 2010a). 
 
6.2.2 Economic overview 
Defeating the French and Japanese colonial forces, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam was established in 1945. However, it was not until 1975 that the north and 
the south of Vietnam were reunified. In 1976, the country was renamed the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam (Government Web Portal of Vietnam, 2010b). Since then, the 
country started its reconstruction and has made remarkable achievements. The 
country has recently become a lower-middle-income country (World Bank Data, 
2013). The growth record has been largely the results of the country’s economic 
reforms initiated in the 1980s.  
After independence, Vietnam faced tremendous tasks to restore the country’s 
economy that was damaged by the war. The first five-year socio-economic 
development plan was formulated for the period 1960-1965 for the north. The second 
five-year (1976-1980) plan was prepared after the reunification in 1975; thus this is 
considered the first national five-year plan. However, both plans pursued socialist 
industrialization with a major focus on heavy industry and rapid agricultural growth 
with the former placed at the forefront of development (Communist Party of Vietnam, 
2005). Between 1976 and 1980, the economy grew by only 0.4% per year, industrial 
production by 0.6% and agricultural outputs by 1.9%, and living conditions remained 
poor. The next five-year (1981-1985) plan continued to place its focus on heavy 
industry and agricultural development, although the development of agriculture was 
shifted to the forefront (Vo et al., 1995; Communist Party of Vietnam, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the results were limited with inflation soaring to 700% in 1986 and the 
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then socio-economic crisis was becoming serious at the end of this period (Harvie and 
Tran, 1997). The failure was considered to have resulted primarily from the centrally 
planned, subsidy-based, and relatively-autarkic framework that Vietnam was pursuing 
(Vo et al., 1995). Realizing these problems, the Sixth National Party Congress in 
December 1986 approved a radical reform, “Doi Moi”, i.e. “Renovation”, thus 
initiating Vietnam’s gradual transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
socialist-oriented market economy. Major policy changes initiated by Doi Moi were: 
- The decentralization of state economic management to enterprise level and the 
provision of autonomy for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in making decisions 
relating to production, distribution and financing. 
- The replacement of administrative measures and controls with economic tools to 
deal with macroeconomic issues, particularly the use of market-oriented monetary 
policies to control inflation. 
- The adoption of an outward-oriented policy in external economic relations, key 
elements of this policy including currency devaluation and the introduction of 
foreign investment law. 
- The recognition of the private sector as the engine of economic growth, key 
elements of this policy included decollectivization of agriculture and legal 
recognition of private business (Than and Tan, 1993). 
It is noticeable that the central theme of Doi Moi is market liberalization. Vo 
Nguyen Giap, the then Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, regarded Doi Moi as the one blueprint that has marked a new 
development in Vietnam’s thinking on economic theory, and in the country’s socio-
economic policies (as cited by Ronnås and Sjöberg (1990)). The results of these 
efforts started to be realized at the end of the next following five-year plan (1986-
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1990). The central economic objectives of the 1986-1990 plan were to increase the 
production of food, consumer goods and export goods. The most recognized 
achievement of the plan was the blooming of agriculture production. Since 1989, 
agriculture production not only put an end to the country’s persistent shortage of food, 
but also transformed Vietnam from a net food importer to a major world rice exporter. 
Inflation rate also fell from 300% in 1987 to 67.1% in 1991. The economy was able to 
grow at an average growth rate of 3.7% per year between 1987 and 1991, although the 
socio-economic crisis had not yet ended (Vo et al., 1995; Chiang et al., 2004). 
Following the social and economic policy reforms of Doi Moi, the next phase 
in the renovation course in economic development of Vietnam was set up by the first 
Socio-Economic Development Strategy (SEDS) for 1991-2000. 1991-2000 SEDS was 
named “Socio-Economic Stabilization and Development Strategy to 2000” (Ministry 
of Planning and Investment, 2007). The overall objectives set in the 1991-2000 SEDS 
were:  
- to overcome economic crisis, and to stabilize the socio-economic situation; 
- to rise above poverty and underdevelopment, and to improve living standards; 
- to double the country’s GDP in 1990 by 2000; 
- to establish an open economic system; 
- to create a multi-sectoral economy;  
- to enhance national defense and security; and 
- to create the necessary conditions for the country to develop more rapidly in the 
early 21st century (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2005). 
Based on these strategic goals of the 1991-2000 SEDS, the two five-year socio-
economic development plans, 1991-1995 and 1996-2000, were prepared with more 
specific goals such as those to keep inflation under control; to boost production; to 
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increase accumulation; to gradually improve living standards; to ensure macro-
economic stabilization; to prepare for the next development phase with focus on 
human resources, science and technology, infrastructure, and institutional framework; 
to develop multi-sector economy; to extend international cooperation; and to combine 
economic development with national defense and security (Communist Party of 
Vietnam, 2005). These plans had not only driven Vietnam out of the socio-economic 
crisis, but also pushed the economy to grow rapidly since 1992. The economy grew at 
an average rate of about 7% per annum between 1991-2000, nearly double that of the 
period 1986-1990 (data compiled from the United Nations Statistics Division [UNSD] 
(2010)). The highest growth during the period was 9.5% in 1995. Hyperinflation was 
curbed. Inflation rate fell dramatically from 67.5% in 1990 to 12.2% in 1995 (Harvie 
and Tran, 1997). Share of domestic savings in GDP reached 25% in 2000. Living 
standards had improved with people living below the poverty line (internationally 
defined) falling from 70% in the mid 1980s to 37% in 2000, according to the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (as cited by Chiang et al. 
(2004)). 
Results of the first step towards industrialization had also been realized during 
the period. Share of agriculture production in GDP at constant (1994) prices fell from 
around 32% in 1990 to around 23% in 2000, and that of manufacturing and 
construction rose from 25% in 1990 to around 35%, while there had not been much 
change in that of the service sector. The manufacturing and construction sector was 
the fastest growing sector with an average annual growth rate of 11.3% between 1991 
and 2000. The service sector came in second with 7.1%, and agriculture only 4.2%. 
The expanding growth in this period was also supported by strong performance in 
exports and foreign investments. Exports of goods averaged an annual growth rate of 
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around 20%. Trade deficit over total export value fell from about 50% in 1995 to 8% 
in 2000 (data compiled from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010)). Net 
inflows of registered foreign direct investments (FDI) reached an average value of 
USD 3.7 billion per year (Vo, 2005). A multi-sector economy had thus been gradually 
shaped with expansion in the domestic and foreign private sectors. During this period, 
international cooperation was also strengthened, especially when Vietnam joined the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995 and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum in 1998. In general, most of the main targets 
of the 1991-2000 SEDS had been achieved (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2005). 
Vietnam was, however, still a poor and under-developed country at the end of 
the period 1991-2000. Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was only USD 390 in 
2000 (World Bank, 2010). The development of Vietnam still lagged far behind the 
average world standards and many neighboring countries. Addressing these issues, the 
2001-2010 SEDS outlined the following long-term development goals for Vietnam: 
- to come out of under-development; 
- to improve substantially the living standards; 
- to lay the foundation for a modern-oriented industrialized country by 2020; 
- to enrich human resources, scientific and technological capacities; 
- to build infrastructure for economic development as well as national defense and 
security; 
- to establish necessary institutions for a socialist-oriented market economy; and 
- to raise the country’s status in the international community (Communist Party of 
Vietnam, 2005). 
Implementing the 2001-2010 SEDS (with two five-year plans, 2001-2005 and 
2006-2010), Vietnam has been successfully moving forward with a good number of 
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significant achievements. Vietnam has been able to maintain a relatively high 
economic growth of nearly 8% per year from 2001 to 2007 before slowing down to 
6.3% in 2008 due to the 2008 global financial crisis (see Figure 6.2) (United Nations 
Statistics Division, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Vietnam’s GDP growth (at constant 1990 prices US$) 
Source: Data compiled from the United Nations Statistics Division (2010). 
The economic structure continued to move towards the manufacturing and 
construction sector (see Figure 6.3). Share of agricultural production in GDP further 
declined from 23% in 2000 to 18% in 2008, that of the manufacturing and 
construction sector increased from 35% in 2000 to 45% in 2008, and that of the 
service sector maintained a portion of around 41%. The manufacturing and 
construction sector was still the fastest growing sector with an average annual growth 
rate of 9.7% from 2001-2008, that of the service sector and agriculture were 7.4% and 












Figure 6.3 Structure of Vietnam’s GDP at 1994 prices by economic activities 
Source: Data compiled from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010). 
Total value of exports of goods continued to grow at about 20% per year from 
2001-2008. The value in 2008 was USD 62.7 billion, which has more than quadrupled 
that of 2000. Net inflows of FDI increased steadily between USD 1.3 billion and USD 
1.8 billion from 2002 to 2006, but soared to USD 6.6 billion in 2007 and USD 9.3 
billion in 2008 (Asian Development Bank, 2009). In addition, a young and vibrant 
domestic private sector has been growing (see Figure 6.4). The sector accounts for 33% 
of manufacturing output and about 90% of labour market annually (Vo, 2007). 
 
Figure 6.4 Structure of Vietnam’s GDP at current prices by ownership (%) 
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The social aspects of development have been enhanced as well. The country 
has seen a dramatic increase in GNI per capita from USD 130 in 1990 to USD 1010 in 
2009 (see Figure 6.5), thus moving from one of the poorest countries in the world to a 
lower-middle-income country going by the World Bank classification method (World 
Bank, 2010). Poverty has been reduced considerably with the population living below 
the poverty line decreasing from 37% in 2000 to 12% in 2009 (United Nations, 
2010b). International cooperation during this period also attained some major 
achievements when Vietnam signed the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) 
with the US in 2000 and became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2007 (Kien, 2010). 
 
Figure 6.5 Vietnam’s GNI per capita, Atlas method (current prices US$) 
Source: Data compiled from the World Bank (2010). 
Vietnam has reached the end of its 2001-2010 SEDS. In general, the two 
previous SEDS (1991-2000 and 2001-2010) have driven Vietnam from a largely poor, 
centrally-planned and agriculture-based economy to a lower middle-income, rapidly 
growing, market-based economy and one which is increasingly being integrated into 
the regional and global community. However, the economic outlook for Vietnam 


















































SEDS (2011-2020) is being developed with the long-term vision of Vietnam 
becoming an industrialized and modernized country by 2020 (United Nations, 2010b). 
The next period 2011-2020 will therefore be particularly important for Vietnam to lay 
the groundwork for that turning point. Further progress will be increasingly difficult 
and need to be guided by proper strategies, action plans, and institutions. 
 
6.3 Integration into the world economy 
6.3.1 Trade liberalization 
The remarkable performance of Vietnam over the past decades has been much of a 
result from an outward-oriented approach for economic development that Vietnam 
has adopted since Doi Moi in 1986. Before Doi Moi, trade opportunities and 
specialization potentials were neglected in the first two five-year plans (1961-1965 
and 1976-1980). These plans assigned priority to achieve self-sufficiency in heavy 
industries. The poor performance of these plans resulted in a modification in 
economic orientation of the 1981-1985 five-year plan. The focus of the 1981-1985 
plan was placed on agriculture and light industries rather than heavy industries 
(Reinhardt, 1993; Vo et al., 1995). Nevertheless, the economic orientation of the 
1981-1985 plan was still largely similar to the previous ones, which was to pursue 
socialist industrialization. A major shift in policy orientation was initiated in 
December 1986 with decisions on the adoption of an outward-oriented approach. The 
center of the next five-year plan (1986-1990) was to increase production of food, 
consumer goods and export goods. Since then, trade opportunities and specialization 
have become part of the priority list of economic policy of Vietnamese government. 
In the first SEDS (1991-2000) of Vietnam, the overall goals for the trade sector were: 
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- to reduce share of primary products and to increase share of processed products in 
the structure of exports; to develop goods that have high total export turnover and 
stable markets; 
- to develop various services, particularly tourism, which can generate foreign 
exchange; 
- to import goods that effectively stimulate production development and technology 
modernization, which in turn can improve quality and competiveness of domestic 
goods, and meet domestic demand; 
- to diversify markets and to develop multilateral trading ties, to vigorously 
penetrate into new markets and to shape a favorable position in the new markets; 
and 
- to expand the trade rights; to eliminate non-tariff barriers; to reduce government 
interventions in business enterprises; to improve the roles of macro-economic tools 
such as taxes, interests, and exchange rates; and to improve the legal environment 
(Prime Minister's Office of Vietnam, 2000b).  
The missions of the trade sector were further enhanced in the 2001-2010 
SEDS with the overall goals of the trade sector included to boost export growth, in 
part to further stimulate industrialization and modernization, to generate employment, 
and to earn foreign currencies; to shift the export structure to high value-added goods, 
processed and manufactured goods, and hi-tech products, and to stimulate service 
export; to focus on importing equipment and materials for production, especially 
advanced technologies, to maintain a reasonable balance of trade and gradually 
balance exports and imports; to expand and diversified markets and business modes; 
to successfully integrate into regional and world economies (Prime Minister's Office 
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of Vietnam, 2000b). In order to achieve these goals, the following missions were 
identified for the trade sector: 
- to continue to pursue the policy that gives high priority to exports in order to 
stimulate GDP growth, to develop production, to generate employment, and to 
obtain foreign currencies; 
- to actively integrate into regional and world economic areas, on the basis of 
protecting national sovereignty and the socialist-orientation, with a master plan and 
roadmap suitable for Vietnam’s economic development progress, and regulations 
of international organizations of which Vietnam is a member; 
- to consider internalizing values, to shift the economic structure and to review the 
management mechanism; to improve the legal environment; and to increase 
efficiency and competitiveness of firms as well as the national economy as key to 
the expansion of the trade sector, and international integration; 
- to join domestic markets with foreign ones; to focus on domestic markets along 
with expanding and diversifying foreign markets; and 
- to continue to pursue the policy that diversifies economic sectors participating in 
trading activities with the state-sector playing the leading role. 
Regulated by the Ministry of Trade (now the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
[MoIT]), Vietnam’s legal and institutional framework for trading activities and related 
policies have been much improved since Doi Moi. These significant changes consist 
of the removal of restrictions on private-sector trade; the elimination of the monopoly 
position of SOEs in trading activities; the reduction of quantitative control; the 
introduction of foreign investment law; the removal of foreign exchange requirements 
for foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs); the establishment of export-processing zones; 
the implementation of import tariffs with the preferential rates (lower tariff rates) 
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applied to exported/imported goods to/from countries that have signed trade 
agreements with Vietnam; the introduction of export promotion measures such as zero 
export duty, tax exemption, export credit, and especially the duty drawback scheme. 
Legal reforms have also been highlighted with the introduction of new enterprise, 
competition and investment laws since 2000 (Than and Tan, 1993; Vo, 2005; Abbott 
et al., 2009).  Further efforts in reducing trade barriers have been made when Vietnam 
joined ASEAN in 1995 and APEC in 1998. Vietnam has also engaged in major 
bilateral, multilateral trade agreements and free trade agreements such as the 
Vietnam-EU trade agreement in 1992, the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 2001, the 
Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement in 2000, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area in 
2002, and the ASEAN-Japan Free Trade Area (2003) (Vo, 2007; Abbott et al., 2009). 
Early 2007 marked the country becoming the 150th member of the WTO. Nearly 220 
countries and territories now have trade relations with Vietnam (Dinh, 2006). The 
major timeline of these significant changes is shown in the Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Significant changes in legal and institutional framework for trading 
activities and related policies of Vietnam since Doi Moi 
Year Changes 
1986 - Outward-oriented approach was adopted. 
1987 - Restrictions on private-sector trade were removed. 
- Foreign investment law was introduced. 
- The official exchange rate was devalued. 
1988 - Import tariffs were introduced. 
- Strict control over foreign exchange was enacted.  
 
- The Vietnamese dong was sharply devalued to improve the country’s trade 
performance. 
1989 - Import duties for industrial needs were removed. 
- State monopoly in foreign trade was eliminated. 
 
- The State Committee for Co-operation and Investment (SCCI), an inter-ministerial 
body, was created to promote, approve, facilitate and implement all foreign 
investments in the country. 




Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Year Changes 
1991 
- Law on Import and Export Duties was approved with the application of preferential 
rates of tariff applied to exported/imported goods to/from countries that have signed 
trade agreements with Vietnam.  
 
- The "Vietnam Investment Forum" to attract foreign investments was jointly organized 
by SCCI, UNIDO, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 
- Law on Export-processing Zones (EPZs) was introduced. 
1992 - Trade agreement with the European Union was signed. 
1994 - The US’s trade embargo against Vietnam was lifted. 
1995 - Vietnam joined ASEAN. 
- WTO accession working party was established. 
1997 
- The “Vietnam Business Forum" was created to facilitate communication between the 
government and the business community, including foreign businesses. The Forum 
was chaired by a Deputy Prime Minister and co-chaired by the World Bank Country 
Director, the IFC Country Manager, and the Minister for Planning and Investment.  
- Reduced requirements on firms to enter foreign trade. 
- Commercial law was introduced. 
1998 - Trade licenses were abolished. 
 
- Foreign exchange was required to be deposited in one onshore account by all 
economic entities. 
- Vietnam joined APEC. 
1999 - Japan and Vietnam officially exchanged Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment for tariffs.  
2000 
- Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency under the Ministry of Trade was established. The 
agency is responsible for state management, coordination and implementation of trade 
and related-trade promotion activities. 
 
- FIEs were allowed to get foreign currency loans from domestic banks to pay off loans 
from offshore banks. 
- The Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement was signed. 
2001 - A trade policy roadmap for the period 2001-2005 was announced for the first time, making the export-import environment more transparent and predictable. 
 
- All domestic enterprises have been allowed to trade commodities or items freely, 
except those prohibited or under specialized management. 
- Most quantitative restrictions were removed. 
- Commitments under CEPT/AFTA framework began to be implemented. 
- Customs Law was introduced  
2002 - FIES have been granted the right to export goods other than those they produce. 
- Vietnam participated in ASEAN-China Free Trade Area. 
- Commitments under US-BTA started to be undertaken. 
2003 - Tariff-rate quotas were introduced and applied for certain agricultural products such as cotton, tobacco materials, and salt. 
- Restriction on foreign exchange deposits for all economic entities was removed. 
- Vietnam participated in the ASEAN-Japan Free Trade Area. 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Year Changes 
2004 - EU-Vietnam bilateral agreement on WTO Accession was signed. 
- Competition Law was introduced. 
2005 - 29 new or amended Laws on Commerce and Trade were introduced. 
- Enterprise Law was introduced. 
- Customs Law was revised to meet the requirements of a modern customs system. 
 
- Vietnam agreed to implement a Single Window Approach by 2012 for the 
establishment of the ASEAN Single Window. 
2006 - Final bilateral agreements for WTO Accession were reached. 
- CEPT/AFTA implementation was completed. 
- Investment Law was introduced. 
- Law on Intellectual Property Rights was introduced. 
- E-transaction law and the decree on E-commerce came into effect. 
- The first master plan on E-commerce was implemented for 2005-2010. 
2007 - Vietnam became a member of WTO. 
Source: Abbott et al.(2009); Commercial Law of Vietnam (1997); Customs Law of Vietnam 
(2001); Harvie and Tran (1997); Reinhardt (1993); Than and Tan (1993); Vietnam Business 
Forum (2010); Vo (2005, 2007). 
 
6.3.2 International trade and economic growth 
As a result of these improvements, achievements of the trade sector in Vietnam have 
been impressive. Size of trade has increased rapidly since Vietnam introduced Doi 
Moi in 1986. The value of total exports and imports of goods and services (at constant 
2000 US$) rose dramatically from only about USD 6.1 billion in 1989 to USD 35 
billion in 2000, and to USD 93 billion in 2008. While trade as a percentage of GDP 
was only 23% in 1986, the ratio rose to 103% in 1999 and to 172% in 2008. During 
that time, exports grew relatively faster than imports (Abbott et al., 2009). 
Contributions of exports to GDP went up from 6.6% in 1986 to 50% in 1999 and to 
78% in 2008. Similarly, the import dependency ratio increased from 16.6% in 1986 to 




Figure 6.6 Contribution of foreign trade to Vietnam’s GDP 
Source: Data compiled from the World Bank (2010). 
The trade pattern has also been changing with the export composition shifting 
away from primary products and resource-based manufacturing towards labour-
intensive light manufacturing, and more recently towards component 
production/assembly within the high-tech industries (Asian Development Bank, 2009). 
Share of agriculture in total exports declined from 32% in 1995 to 14.5% in 2007, 
while that of light industry and handicrafts improved from 28% to 42%, and heavy 
industries and minerals from 25% to 34%. The trade markets have also been much 
more diversified since 1986. Before 1986, trade was concentrated in countries of the 
Soviet bloc. However, the trade markets have rapidly expanded to many other 
countries, especially in Asia, Europe and North America (Athukorala, 2009; Das and 
Shrestha, 2009). Major trading partners of Vietnam include Asean economies, Japan 
and China in Asia; Germany, United Kingdom and France in Europe; the US in North 
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United States account for nearly 50% of total export value (data compiled from the 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010)). 
During the same period of time, the country has been able to attract massive 
inflows of FDI, of which a significant portion was export-oriented (Athukorala, 2009). 
The share of FDI in total investments improved significantly in the mid-1990s and 
reached 30% in 1995. Affected by the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, the share 
went down and remained stable around 17-18% at the end of the 1990s and the first 
half of the 2000s or equivalently an increase by USD 1.3-1.8 billion in net inflows of 
FDI per year. However, the value soared to USD 6.6 billion in 2007 and USD 9.3 
billion in 2008. Accordingly, the share of FDI in total investments increased to 27% 
in 2007 and 35% in 2008. The contribution of FIEs in GDP expanded from only 2% 
in 1992 to 13% in 2000 and to 18% in 2008 (Vo, 2007; Asian Development Bank, 
2009; Athukorala, 2009; Vo and Nguyen, 2009; General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 
2010). Share of FIEs in total manufacturing exports increased from about 20% in 
1991 to 47% in 2000, and to 55% in 2008 (see Figure 6.7). 
 
Figure 6.7 Contribution of FIEs in Vietnam’s total export value of goods (%) 











Despite the above-mentioned significant progress in trade liberalization and 
international economic integration, Vietnam’s position in global production networks 
is still insignificant. By 2006, Vietnam’s share in total world non-oil exports and in 
total non-oil exports of developing countries were only 0.34% and 0.9%, respectively. 
Compared to the other five major ASEAN member countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand), Vietnam has the smallest share in total world non-
oil exports. Vietnam’s 2006 export level of about USD 41 billion was surpassed by 
regional countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and 
the Philippines in the 1980s and the 1990s (Athukorala, 2009). Moreover, the 2006 
share of manufacturing (39%) and hi-tech exports (4.5%) in total exports of Vietnam, 
albeit growing, were relatively smaller than those of the East Asian countries between 
1997 and 1998. Producing low value-added products, most private firms in Vietnam 
were small-sized and remained at very weak positions in the global and regional value 
chains (Vo, 2007). 
There have been some concerns over the effectiveness of FDI recently. Large 
inflows of FDI were considered a necessary condition for Vietnam’s economic 
transition (Ohno, 2009). However, in the past few years, the gap between registered 
and realized FDI has increased. The disbursement rates of FDI were 41% in 2006, 31% 
in 2007 and 18% in 2008, much lower than the average of 52.7% during the 1988-
2007 period. Moreover, FIEs in heavy industries such as chemicals and chemical 
products, basic metal products, fabricated metal products and motor vehicles have not 
contributed as much to export expansion as expected (Athukorala, 2009). FDI’s 
positive spillover effects via skills and technology transfer have not been fully 
realized. Vietnam’s internal value, a sufficient condition for Vietnam in the next stage 
of development, remains small. Foreigners still dominate in all areas of production 
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including management, technology, design, factory operations, logistics, quality 
control, and marketing (Ohno, 2009).  
The obstacles to the above mentioned constraints in the development of trade 
and international economic integration of Vietnam have been highlighted in a number 
of studies. The constraints are related much to the country’s capacity bottlenecks in 
the domestic private sector, industrial human resources, institutions and infrastructure 
(Ohno, 2009; Tran, 2009; Vo and Nguyen, 2009). Issues related to infrastructure in 
Vietnam are considered in the following section. 
 
6.4 Infrastructure development 
6.4.1 Infrastructure related indicators compared to other Asian countries 
Since a proper infrastructure system is recognized as crucial for Vietnam to sustain 
the high economic growth, infrastructure has been included in the national 
development plans. In the first SEDS (1991-2000), the strategy focused on upgrading 
and modernizing major communication and transport (including sea, land, and air 
transport) networks that facilitate the north-south link and international links. In the 
second SEDS (2001-2010), the first priority was to accelerate the development of the 
energy sector. In order to realize these tasks, the Vietnamese government has invested 
billions of dollars in infrastructure. Over the last decade, Vietnam has sustained about 
9-10% of GDP invested in infrastructure (Nguyen and Dapice, 2009; Moore et al., 
2010). Compared to other East Asian countries during their period of rapid 
industrialization, Vietnam’s level of infrastructure investment was relatively higher. 
For example, Taiwan invested 9.5% of GDP during 1970-1990, South Korea invested 
8.7% during 1960-1990, and China invested about 8% between 2003 and 2004. 
Development experience also suggests a lower level of infrastructure investment, 7% 
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of GDP, in order to maintain high economic growth (Nguyen and Dapice, 2009). 
However, the progress of infrastructure development in Vietnam remains slower than 
other regional countries, including its neighbor and rival, China. Vietnam’s 
infrastructure ranked 111th out of 133 countries surveyed in the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2009-2010 (Schwab, 2009) (see Table 6.2). 
According to the GCR 2009-2010 (Schwab, 2009), rankings of the quality of roads, 
ports and air transport infrastructure and electricity supply of Vietnam, were among 
the lowest in the world and regarded as Vietnam’s competitive disadvantages (see 
Table 6.3). 
Table 6.2 Comparison of quality of overall infrastructure of Vietnam and some 
neighboring countries 
Country Rank/133 Score* 
Singapore 2 6.7 
Hong Kong SAR, China 3 6.7 
Taiwan, China 19 5.8 
Malaysia 27 5.4 
Thailand 41 4.8 
China 66 4.0 
Indonesia 96 3.1 
Philippines 98 3.1 
Vietnam 111 2.8 
*: 1=extremely underdeveloped; 7=extensive and efficient by international standards 
Source: Schwab (2009) 
Table 6.3 Rankings of infrastructure quality of Vietnam 
Indicator Rank/133 
 Quality of overall infrastructure 111 …...x 
 Quality of roads 102 …...x 
 Quality of railroad infrastructure 58 …...x 
 Quality of port infrastructure 99 …...x 
 Quality of air transport infrastructure 84 …...x 
 Available seat kilometers 38 …...√ 
 Quality of electricity supply  103 …...x 
 Telephone lines 36 …...√ 
Note: x – competitive disadvantage; √ – competitive advantage 
Source: Schwab (2009) 
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From 2006 to 2010, although the cost to export from Vietnam has been lower 
than in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, it has increased faster, except for 
Indonesia. The time to export is also longest in Vietnam as shown in Table 6.4. Share 
of logistics costs was about 20-25% of Vietnam’s GDP in 2009, which was far higher 
than that of developed countries and even higher than its neighbor and rival, China 
(Manila Bulletin, 2009). Costs of exporting and importing a standardized cargo of 
goods (including inland transport, and port and terminal handling) in Vietnam have 
seen an upward trend (see Figures 6.8 and 6.9). 
 Table 6.4 Time to export and to import of Vietnam and some neighboring countries 
Country Time to export (days) Time to import (days) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Singapore 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
Malaysia 18 18 18 18 18 14 14 14 14 14 
Thailand 24 24 17 14 14 22 22 14 13 13 
China 18 21 21 21 21 24 24 24 24 24 
Indonesia 25 25 21 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 
Philippines 17 17 17 16 16 18 18 18 16 16 
Vietnam 24 24 24 24 22 23 23 23 23 21 
Source: Doing Business (2010) 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Costs to export in Vietnam and some neighboring countries 

































Figure 6.9 Costs to import in Vietnam and some neighboring countries 
Source: Doing Business (2010) 
Inland transport of Vietnam is still slow and difficult. Road, the dominant 
means of transport, accounts for 67% of cargo moved. Vietnam has about 175,000km 
of roads, of which only about 10 percent are asphalted, and only 15 percent of bridges 
have a capacity of more than 10 tones (Vietnam Financial Review, 2010). Almost all 
roads are one and two-lane roads with narrow widths, poorly designed junctions and 
restrictive vehicle weight limits. Railway transport is the slowest. Vietnam has a total 
of 2,600km of rail lines connecting major population centers (Moore et al., 2010). 
However, most railways have been built almost 100 years ago and are in need of 
repairs (Davis Langdon & Seah International, 1995). Trains can travel at a maximum 
speed of 70km/hour, but frequently have to slow to under 30km/hour on older 
sections of track and aged bridges along the network. Subway or elevated rail lines 
have not been built in urban centers of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (Moore et al., 
2010). 
Vietnam has more than 3,000 km of coastline along the international seaways, 






























international trade. However, port congestion is threatening export growth of Vietnam. 
As noted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam (2006), port congestion 
in Ho Chi Minh city, where FDI has been most concentrated, was then forecasted to 
worsen in 2008 and 2009 when shipping demand began to exceed terminal capacities 
in 2007 (see Figure 6.10). Ports in and around Ho Chi Minh City in the south 
accounting for about 65% of total container throughputs in Vietnam can only 
accommodate feeder vessels under 30,000 tons deadweight (DWT). Similarly, the 
main ports in the northern city of Hai Phong can only receive ships of less than 
30,000 DWT (America Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam, 2006; Moore et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 6.10 Supply and demand at Ho Chi Minh City ports 
Note: TEU - Twenty-foot equivalent units. 
Source: American Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam (2006). 
Power supply in Vietnam also falls short of demand. This primarily happens 
during the dry season. During the dry season, hydropower plants operate at only 40% 
to 50% of designed capacity. Furthermore, reduced outputs at various plants for 
maintenance and servicing purposes are common, resulting in shortages to the 
nationwide grid. During the first seven months of 2008, there were 3000 blackout 
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incidents, i.e. 14 blackouts a day, due to system overloading. From 2001 to 2008, total 
electricity consumption grew at an annual average rate of 14.5%. Electricity demand 
was forecasted to continue to grow at 14-15% per year until 2015 (Nguyen and 
Dapice, 2009; Moore et al., 2010). 
The weaknesses of infrastructure in Vietnam are holding back the country 
from further economic development. Many international surveys have identified 
Vietnam’s infrastructure as the biggest hindrance to the economic development 
process (Nguyen and Dapice, 2009). According to various GCRs published by the 
World Economic Forum (Schwab, 2008, 2009), ranking of the overall global 
competitiveness index (GCI) of Vietnam fell from 70/134 in 2008-2009 to 75/133 in 
2009-2010. In the GCR 2009-2010, among the major competitiveness indicators, 
Vietnam’s infrastructure remained the biggest drag on the country’s further economic 
development (see Figure 6.11). 
 
Figure 6.11 Global competitiveness score of Vietnam 
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Similarly, in other recent surveys such as those conducted by the Vietnam 
Business Forum and the Japanese External Trade Organization (as cited by Moore et 
al. (2010) and Nguyen and Dapice (2009)), poor infrastructure, especially roads, ports 
and power system, was identified as the largest bottleneck for doing business in 
Vietnam. Weak infrastructure is therefore holding back the country to compete for 
both domestic and foreign investments in manufacturing and exports even though 
Vietnam is still a globally competitive, low wage manufacturer and commodity 
producer (Tran, 2009; Vo and Nguyen, 2009). 
Vietnam’s poor infrastructure is therefore regarded as one of the major 
constraints to further development of trade and international economic integration of 
the country. Limited state budget and ODA funds have been identified in many 
studies as the major cause for this poor progress. Solutions to the infrastructure 
bottlenecks in Vietnam seem to lie in further improvement in the PPP regulatory 
regime and the encouragement of private sector participation, especially the foreign 
sector, in infrastructure delivery. Improvements in structuring the investments in 
infrastructure as a PPP could ease the problem of tight budget of the government with 
additional financing from the private sector (Warlters, 2006; Vo, 2007; Vo and 
Nguyen, 2009; Moore et al., 2010). It is, however, notable that while investments in 
infrastructure development have recently increased, the quality of the infrastructure 
system of Vietnam has not improved very much. The country’s experience in the 
construction of large-scale infrastructure projects has proved to be very problematic 





















Figure 6.12 Photos of the poor infrastructure of Vietnam 
Source: Thanh (2011); Tho (2008); Thinh (2010). 
 
6.4.2 Government planning on infrastructure development 
To deal with future infrastructure demand, the MPI, the Ministry of Transport (MoT) 
and the MoIT have developed numerous plans to invest in national and major 
municipal port, road, railway, airport and telecoms projects to 2020 (Prime Minister's 
Office of Vietnam, 2004a, 2004b, 2005). Highlights of these plans consist of: 
- Roads: to upgrade key segment of the North-South highway; to build a new 
highway along Vietnam’s coastline; and to build new expressways connecting 
major business centers in northern, central and southern Vietnam; 
(a) Hanoi     (b) Can Tho 
 
(c) Nha Trang     (d) Hanoi 
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- Railways: to consider a North-South high-speed rail line; to upgrade key rail lines 
and to build new high-speed rail lines connecting major business centers in 
northern, central and southern Vietnam; 
- Ports: to upgrade and expand major national ports; to build new deep water ports 
in northern, central and southern Vietnam, and new international terminal ports; 
- Airports: to upgrade and expand the existing international airports, and to build 
new international airports with capacities and standards comparable with regional 
benchmarks; to upgrade domestic airports with international standards; 
- Electricity: to build new thermal power plants to reduce the reliance on 
hydropower; to build new hydro power plants that can facilitate water supply, 
drainage and flood control; to build the first nuclear power plant by 2020; to 
develop power plants using renewable energy; and to develop 200kV and 500kV 
transmission networks; and 
- Telecoms: to develop a national information infrastructure in order to deploy 
high-capacity communications and innovative technology throughout the entire 
country, including remote areas; to increase telephone and internet penetration 
rates, and to ensure all provinces and cities to connect to broadband networks via 
optic fiber cable, TV cable and satellite as a basis for the application of 
information technology in e-trade, e-government, public services and other areas. 
To meet the expected demand, Vietnam was estimated to need around USD 139 
billion invested in infrastructure over the next five years (Moore et al., 2010). The 
major source of finance for infrastructure projects in Vietnam has been the state 
budget, including investments by major state-owned enterprises. In addition to 
government funding, ODA has accounted for a major portion of spending on 
infrastructure projects. Major donors of ODA are the World Bank, Japan, and the 
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Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Nam, 2009). However, since Vietnam has been 
moving to a middle-income country, some ODA donors are planning to stop provision 
of ODA funds to Vietnam in the near future (Intellasia News Online, 2011). 
With limited state budget and constraints in getting ODA funds, the 
government has issued and introduced policy and regulatory documents to facilitate 
domestic private and foreign investments in the infrastructure sector (see Section 
6.4.3). These measures are also expected to introduce competition to the infrastructure 
sector which has been monopolized by a single state-owned enterprise. 
 
6.5 Construction industry 
6.5.1 Construction and economic growth  
Since the economy started to grow rapidly in 1992, the construction industry of 
Vietnam has always been among the fastest growing sectors from the demand side, 
but also the hardest hit during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 
global financial crisis (see Figure 6.13). In terms of total value added, the average 
growth of the sector was about 11% per year during 1992-2008, while that of the 
economy was 7.7% per year (United Nations Statistics Division, 2010). 
As shown in Figure 6.14, before 1991, the contribution of the construction 
industry to GDP (the ratio of value added in construction to total value added of the 
economy) in Vietnam stayed almost the same at about 3.84%. However, since 1992, 
the ratio steadily increased from 3.88% in 1992 to 5.17% in 1997. Seriously affected 
by the Asian financial crisis, the ratio in 1998, 1999 and 2000 went down to 4.86%, 
4.75% and 4.78% respectively. However, since 2001 the contribution of the 
construction industry to the economy started to rise again from 5.05% in 2001 to 
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nearly 6% in 2007, before going down to 5.53% in 2008 due to the negative effects 
from the 2008 global financial crisis (United Nations Statistics Division, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 6.13 Vietnam’s growth by economic activities 
Note: Data measured at constant prices 1990 US$ 
Source: Data compiled from the United Nations Statistics Division (2010). 
 
 
Figure 6.14 Contribution of Vietnam’s construction industry to GDP 
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From the demand side, although published records of the contributions of the 
construction sector in GFCF are not available, the data of GFCF can be compiled 
from UNSD. Before 1990, GFCF comprised only about 10% of GDP. Since 1991, the 
ratio increased steadily from 11% in 1991 to 36% in 2008 (see Figure 6.15). 
 
Figure 6.15 Vietnam’s GFCF in GDP 
Source: Data compiled from the United Nations Statistics Division (2010) 
According to Business Monitor International (2010), infrastructure demand 
dominates the construction sector of Vietnam, accounting for about 42% and 46% of 
total construction value in 2007 and 2008 respectively. With poor infrastructure 
provision, it was forecasted that infrastructure will account for an average of about 47% 
in total construction value per year during the period 2009-2014 (Business Monitor 
International, 2010).  
During the period 1995-2008, employment in the construction industry has 
increased significantly from 793,000 people in 1995 to about 2.5 million people in 
2008. However, employment in construction made up only a small share in total 
employment in Vietnam. In 2005, employment in construction accounted for about 
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construction grew about 7.6% per year (Data compiled from the General Statistics 
Office of Vietnam (2010) and Pham (2008)). 
 
6.5.2 Construction labour, materials and equipment 
Vietnam is well endowed with natural resources for the manufacture of building 
materials. Most of the construction materials can be produced domestically. Before 
1986, the building materials sector, however, was dependent much on imported 
materials. Since the market liberalization in 1986, investments from both the public 
and private, including foreign invested, sectors in new production lines have grown 
considerably. The expansion of the domestic production facilities has helped the 
sector provide sufficient quality and quantity of building materials for domestic 
consumption, and gradually reduced the reliance on imports. In 2000, the supply of 
some major building materials had met domestic demand and started to contribute to 
exports. Total outputs of some major building materials have grown remarkably. For 
example, from 1990 to 2007, there had been a 14-fold increase in the amount of 
cement output. Over the seven-year period from 2000 to 2007, cement output had 
almost tripled, from about 13.3 million tons (Mt) in 2000 to 36.8 Mt in 2007. Total 
outputs of some major building materials from 2000 to 2007 are shown in Table 6.5. 
As part of the government strategy, it is expected that the production capacity will be 
further expanded. Forecast of the expansion of some key building materials to 2020 is 







Table 6.5 Total outputs of major building materials in Vietnam from 2000 to 2007 









m2 42 67.83 96.33 110.2 120 170 180 230 5.5 
Glass million m2 30.71 30.72 38.77 38.35 43.68 74.76 81.31 80 2.6 








m3 22.17 30.9 36.72 53.25 55.13 70.8 79 88 3.9 
Slates million m2 1.52 1.65 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.2 4.5 6.0 3.9 
Sand million m3 33.27 43 50.09 53.21 58.1 66.4 73 80 2.4 
Source: Tran (2008) 
Table 6.6 Forecasts of capacities and outputs of key building materials in Vietnam 





2010 2015 2020 
Capacity Output Capacity Output Capacity Output 
Cement million tons 65.59 59.02 99.5 88.5 > 112 112 
Tiles million m2 275.4 206 335 302 460 414 
Glass million m2 172.4 93 172.4 135 228 200.4 
Bricks million 27 25 35.5 32 46.5 42 
Roofing 
materials million m
2 140 126 190 171 248 224 
Building stones million m3 115 104 164 148 226 204 
Sand million m3 107 97 151 136 211 190 
Source: Prime Minister’s Office of Vietnam (2008a) 
The construction industry currently has a labour force of more than 2 million 
people (Vietnam Association of Construction Contractors, 2011).  Vietnam has a 
comprehensive system of education and training for construction professionals and 
workers. Major education and training programs in infrastructure construction in 
Vietnam are offered by public institutions, including: 
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- Hanoi Architectural University; 
- Ho Chi Minh City University of Architecture; 
- University of Civil Engineering; 
- The Faculty of Civil Engineering of the University of Transport and 
Communication; 
- The Faculty of Civil Engineering of Ho Chi Minh City University of Transport; 
- Post and Telecommunications Institute of Technology; 
- The Faculty of Hydraulic Engineering of the Vietnam Maritime University; 
- Academy of Managers for Construction and Cities; 
- Construction Technical Colleges No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3; 
- Construction College of Mien Tay; 
- Urban Construction College; 
- Construction College of Nam Dinh; 
- Technical College for Construction Mechanics No. 1; and 
- Construction Polytechnic No. 4 (Ministry of Construction, 2008). 
Some construction companies also provide training programs. These public 
institutions and construction companies provide 44,000 skilled labour to the industry 
each year. With investments in construction growing at an annual growth rate of 15-
20%, the skilled labour available every year accounts for only 25% of demand. The 
lack of skilled workers was particularly acute in large construction projects where 
unskilled workers were employed to carry out jobs requiring technical skills (Vietnam 
Association of Construction Contractors, 2011). The lack of a skilled workforce was 
reflected in the irrational structure of the workforce in the construction industry of 
Vietnam. While the rational structure should be 1 engineer/4 technicians/10 workers, 
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that of the construction industry of Vietnam was 1 engineer/1.3 technicians/3 workers 
(Pham, 2008). 
The shortage of well-trained manpower, including trained engineers, project 
managers and on-site construction staff has impaired the sector’s labour productivity.  
A comparison with 1995 as the base year showed that the ratio of value added in 
construction (at constant (1994) prices) to labour employed by the construction sector 
of Vietnam raised by 18% from 18.4 million dong/employee in 1995 to 21.8 million 
dong/employee in 2001. However, from 2002 to 2005, labour productivity went 
below the 1995 level. The lowest labour productivity was 1.62 million dong/employee 
in 2004 or a drop of 12% compared to that in 1995. After 2005, there was a small 
progress in labour productivity. The productivity increased to 19.2 and 20.4 million 
dong/employee in 2006 and 2007 respectively. On average, labour productivity in the 
construction industry grew a mere 1.3% annually during the period 1995-2007 (see 
Figure 6.16). 
 
Figure 6.16 Vietnam’s labour productivity in construction industry 




















While the labour productivity of the construction sector recorded a little 
progress from 1995 to 2007 as mentioned above, the average income of the labour 
force during the same period saw an upward trend. As shown in Figure 6.17, the 
average income of the labour force grew faster than labour productivity. Average 
income of labour in 2007 rose by 84% compared to that in 1995, almost double the 
1995 level. 
 
Figure 6.17 Labour productivity and average income of labour in the construction 
industry of Vietnam 
Source: Data compiled from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam as cited by Pham (2008) 
Similarly, data compiled from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010) 
indicated that the average housing and material construction prices year on year have 
grown faster recently. In 2000, average housing and material construction prices rose 
by only 4.5%, while the prices climbed by 8% in 2003, about 11% in 2007, and more 
than 20% in 2008, before going down to 3.5% in 2009 due to the housing market’s 
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Figure 6.18 Average price index for housing and material construction in Vietnam 
Source: data compiled from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010). 
Besides labour, current construction technologies and equipment were 
inadequate to meet the growing domestic demand, especially in large-scale projects 
such as large-scale bridge, tunnel and highway projects that required high quality and 
the use of modern construction technologies (Davis Langdon & Seah International, 
1995; Pham, 2008). Most equipment required for the construction of infrastructure 
projects was not produced in Vietnam and therefore demand for equipment 
manufactured overseas is rising. According to Mr. Vo Quang Diem, Vice Head of the 
Department of Building Materials of MoC, every year about USD 2 to 3 million were 
spent on importing construction equipment from Italy, Germany, Britain, Spain, 
China, Korea and Japan. Although Vietnam was capable of manufacturing partial or 
complete construction equipment, the market was overlooked by Vietnamese 
companies. Notably, the plant hire market was also depressed. Many large-scale 
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through hire (May Xay Dung, 2010; Vietnam Association of Mechanical Industry, 
2010c). 
 
6.5.3 Legal environment  
Since 1986, following the government policy on liberalization of the market, legal and 
institutional framework of the infrastructure construction sector has been improved 
considerably. One of the initial changes was the issue of Decree 385/HDBT by the 
Ministers’ Committee (HDBT) in 1990 to convert the whole development process of 
state investments towards a socialist-oriented market mechanism. Enclosed in the 
decree was a circular promulgating the bidding procedures for construction works. 
Prior to the issue of the Decree, under the centrally planned system, a majority of 
public works were allocated to the public sector contractors. They did not need to go 
through any bidding procedures. The issue of the Decree was therefore considered as 
a breakthrough step in raising the competitiveness of contracting firms in the country 
(Ministry of Construction, 2008). 
Further improvements in the legal environment and operating conditions for 
infrastructure construction have been achieved over the years. Due to the enormous 
need for infrastructural development in Vietnam, since 1993 the government has 
issued a number of regulations accommodating the Build-Operate-Transfer contract 
and the like as authorized forms of investments. A government decree on the Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) scheme was also under consideration and a pilot PPP 
financing regulations was issued in late 2010 (Ministry of Construction, 2008; Moore 
et al., 2010). 
In addition, the introduction of Construction Law in 2003 is considered the 
most important milestone in the administration reform of the construction industry, 
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which creates a favourable legal environment for investments from all economic 
sectors to meet the increasing construction demand. Following the issue of the 
Construction Law, the Tendering Law was introduced in 2005, promulgating the 
procedures for tendering for all types of construction projects. The introductions of 
the Construction Law and Tendering Law have officially ended the centrally planned 
and subsidy-based system in the construction sector (Ministry of Construction, 2008). 
In 2010, as a measure to encourage the participation of domestic contractors as well 
as equipment and material suppliers, new regulations under Directive 494/CT-TTg 
were issued. These regulations require that projects financed by state capital (except 
for ODA (Official Development Assistance) funded projects) can only issue tenders 
for goods, equipment and EPC contracts to international suppliers if it is determined 
that local bidders do not meet the required standards (Davis Langdon & Seah 
International, 1995; Moore et al., 2010). 
At the same time, a number of appropriate standards, codes and regulations 
have also been issued and updated to improve practices and procedures in the 
development process of construction works in general and infrastructure construction 
in particular. Construction quality was mainly regulated through a set of construction 
standards (Ministry of Construction, 2008). Since Vietnamese construction standards 
were often regarded as incomplete and out-of-date, application of other relevant 
technical standards such as ISO, British, American, French, Japanese standards and so 
on are allowed in Vietnam. These foreign standards were studied and modified to fit 
the conditions of Vietnam. At the same time, standards with reference to the local 
environment such as those related to soil and hydrology, fire, explosion, climate, 
safety, sanitation and so on have been imposed as well. Other regulations tackling 
violations of environmental and planning requirements and the applications of 
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Vietnamese Codes have also helped to improve the industry’s standard practices. 
Quality inspection was strengthened with the establishment of quality inspection units 
at both ministry level and provincial level (Chiang et al., 2004). 
 
6.5.4 Industry structure for infrastructure development 
The importance of infrastructure has long been established in Vietnam. The central 
government has legislated the creation of infrastructure development implementation 
organizations since the post-war recovery period. After the reunification in 1975, 
most roads and communication networks in the whole country were damaged and 
outdated, and could not catch up with the national economic growth. The need for the 
recovery of transport and communication networks was emphasized during the Fourth 
Party Congress in 1976. As a result, hundreds of public enterprises in transport and 
communication sectors in the whole country were created during the first decade after 
the reunification (Ministry of Transport, 2008).  
Following the liberalization in the mid to late 1990s, the government decided 
to reform these public enterprises into public limited corporations. Their funding has 
been mainly drawn from the state budget and ODA resources. However, the state 
budget and ODA resources have shrunk as the country moved forward. To ease the 
budget constraints, the reform was speeded up since 2001. These corporations were 
restructured into a parent-subsidiary consortium comprising a management board to 
manage the parent and the creation of separate subsidiaries. To take up the burden for 
financing and constructing infrastructure, these public corporations could issue their 
own bonds, borrow from the private sector, or initiate a joint-venture with private 
companies (Vietnam Business Forum, 2011). Major players engaged in the 
development of the transport and telecoms sector in Vietnam are discussed below. 
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The main developer of new roadways in Vietnam is the Vietnam Expressway 
Corporation (VEC). VEC is a state-owned corporation established in 2004 under the 
administration of the MoT. The Corporation has been designated to cover investments, 
development, management and maintenance for the national expressways. A number 
of key expressways have been developed by VEC, including key routes in the north-
south link and in the Greater Mekong Subregion transport corridor (Vietnam 
Expressway Corporation, 2009; Moore et al., 2010). 
The Vietnam Railways Corporation (VNR) operates all the railway tracks and 
rolling stocks in Vietnam. The Corporation was established in 2003. The Corporation 
was designed to become a leading state-owned economic group in the country and the 
region with business areas focusing on railway transportation and operations for the 
economic development of Vietnam. Major national and provincial rail projects have 
been assigned to VNR, including  
- To upgrade and modernize the existing railways, especially those on the north-
south link; 
- To invest in and develop elevated rail lines in urban cities, new rail lines and 
stations to connect major business and industrial zones in the whole country, 
creating a modern railway network; and 
- To study and initiate the development of strategic railways, including the high-
speed rail lines linking Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (Prime Minister's Office of 
Vietnam, 2007a).  
Similarly, the majority of airport upgrades and new terminal construction have 
been developed by Vietnamese aviation bodies including the Northern Airports 
Corporation, Middle Airports Corporation and Southern Airports Corporation under 
the administration of the Civil Aviation Administration of the MoT. These state-
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owned corporations were reformed from the airports authorities founded in 1993. The 
market for airports construction is dominated by Vietnamese state-owned companies. 
However, foreign contractors and designers, especially from Japan, have been 
involved in some investments financed by ODA (Moore et al., 2010). 
Participation of foreign developers and contractors in the port sector is more 
considerable. Global port operators such as Hutchison from Hong Kong, SSA 
(Stevedoring Services of America) Marine from the US and the Maritime and Port 
Authority of Singapore have participated in a series of projects, and often in the form 
of a joint-venture with major Vietnamese port operators such as Vietnam National 
Shipping Lines and Saigon Port. Main contractors and suppliers in these projects were 
from neighboring countries, including China, Japan, Korea and Hong Kong. The 
Vietnam Waterway Construction Corporation and TediPort (a member of Tedi) under 
the MoT are the largest state-owned companies in port construction and design 
respectively (Moore et al., 2010). 
The Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group (VNPT) currently owns 
and controls the national communications network on behalf of the government. The 
Group was reformed from the Vietnam Post and Telecommunication Corporation 
founded in 1995 under the Ministry of Information and Communication. The Group 
currently accounts for approximately 94% of the aggregate market, including 
operations in all telecom segments: equipment, engineering, construction and 
consulting (Nguyen et al., 2005). 
In the energy sector, most large power projects were invested by the two state-
owned groups including Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) and the Vietnam Oil and Gas 
Group (Petrovietnam). While EVN is the main builder of new power plants in the 
country, the role of Petrovietnam is increasingly important. Several foreign-invested 
138 
 
projects were primarily those involved in renewable energy, offshore gas reserves and 
pipelines development. 
Electricity of Vietnam was established in 1994 under the direction of the 
Ministry of Energy (now the Ministry of Industry and Trade) as the leading state-
owned corporation in power supply. Major activities of the Corporation involve 
power supply, investments and development in accordance with the state master plans 
and development plans of the power sector. The Corporation was reformed into EVN, 
a state-owned economic group in 2006 with other corporations in the power sector as 
company members. EVN accounts for more than 90% of total power generation with 
a transmission and distribution network to every district in the whole country (Prime 
Minister's Office of Vietnam, 1994; Electricity of Vietnam, 2008; Anh, 2010).  
The main contractors in infrastructure construction projects were state-owned 
construction companies. Major Vietnamese contractors and consultants are 
Construction Company #1, Lilama, Cienco, Licogi, Vinaconex and Tedi. There were 
also a few foreign contractors, who are mostly involved in ODA-funded projects. 
Most foreign companies participated in the sector as equipment and machinery 
suppliers rather than as engineering and construction contractors. However, foreign 
contractors have greater opportunities in large-scale infrastructure projects which 
require greater technical expertise or which are mainly funded by ODA sources. 
Many Japanese engineering and construction firms were awarded contracts in 
Japanese ODA projects in Vietnam. These foreign construction firms subsequently 
worked with local construction firms for project implementation (Moore et al., 2010). 
 More recently, the participation of foreign contractors, especially Chinese 
contractors, has increased. It was estimated that Chinese contractors was awarded 90% 
of EPC contracts in Vietnam. Among them, many are major national projects in oil 
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and gas, chemicals and power. Notably, Chinese contractors usually imported 
equipment, materials and even labour from China rather than worked with local firms 
for project implementation. Local firms were losing their domestic market. 
Government authorities have unofficially expressed cautious opinions about the level 
at which the sector should be opened to foreign participation, especially Chinese firms, 
and the real economic growth of Vietnam as well as the national security. It was 
argued that bidding requirements for large projects, which were often prepared by 
foreign consultants rigidly applying international formats, were not suitable in the 
Vietnam context. As a result, local bidders were rarely short-listed for these bids. In 
smaller projects, local contractors stood a greater chance. However, local bidders 
often had to deal with high costs in preparing bidding documents and kickbacks. As a 
result, low prices offered by Chinese contractors often helped them win the bids. In 
addition, the increase of noncompliance with the Tendering Law and exploiting some 
loopholes in the law had made the situation worse (Vietnam Association of 
Mechanical Industry, 2010a, 2010b). 
 
6.5.5 National professional organizations 
The Vietnam Federation of Civil Engineering Associations (VFCEA), formerly 
known as “the Vietnam Association of Building Technology”, was founded in 1982. 
VFCEA is the largest professional organization in the sector. VFCEA is under the 
administration of the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations 
(VUSTA) and a member of the Asian Civil Engineering Coordinating Council. The 
member list of VFCEA is shown in Table 6.7 (Vietnam Federation of Civil 




Table 6.7 Member national associations of VFCEA 
No. National Associations 
1 Vietnam Association of Port - Waterway - Offshore Engineering 
2 Vietnam Society for Soil Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering 
3 Vietnam Association of Construction Economics 
4 Vietnam Association of Structural Engineering and Construction Technology 
5 Vietnam Urban Environment and Industry Zone Association 
6 Vietnam Association of Construction Environment 
7 Vietnam Association for Information Processing  
8 Vietnam Lighting Association 
9 Vietnam National Commission on Large Dams and Water Resources Development 
10 Vietnam Association for Building Materials 
11 Vietnam Aviation Construction Association 
12 Vietnam Concrete Association 
Source: Vietnam Federation of Civil Engineering Associations (2011). 
The Vietnam Bridge and Road Association (VBRA) founded in 1987 is a 
major national association in the infrastructure construction sector. VBRA is a 
member of VUSTA, the International Road Federation and the Road Engineering 
Association of Asia and Australasia. Members of VBRA are bridge and road 
associations of cities and central provinces, including the Ho Chi Minh City Bridge, 
Road and Port Association, and the Hanoi Bridge and Road Association (Vietnam 
Bridge and Road Association, 2011). Vietnam Association of Construction 
Contractors (VACC) was founded in 1999. Members of the Association are 
companies from all sectors of the construction industry. VACC officially became a 
member of the Asean Constructors Federation in 2002 (Vietnam Association of 
Construction Contractors, 2010; Asean Constructors Federation, 2011). These 
associations were created to provide opportunities for members to exchange ideas and 
innovations in construction technology, research and development. With members 
from all sectors of the industry, these associations have been playing an important role 
in shaping the future of the infrastructure construction sector. 
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6.5.6 Infrastructure construction 
6.5.6.1 Infrastructure investment planning 
There are a number of issues related to inappropriate master planning in project 
selection and investment coordination (Nguyen and Dapice, 2009; Vo and Nguyen, 
2009). Investments in infrastructure in rapidly growing and key regions should be the 
most essential. However, many large-scale roads, ports and airports have been 
planned and built without regard to these regions. For example, in 2000, the Ho Chi 
Minh National Highway, built parallel to National Highway No. 1A (also known as 
National Highway No. 1) linking the north and the south, was planned to reduce the 
heavy traffic in National Highway No.1A and thus to stimulate economic growth in 
the poorer regions in the highlands that it cut through. The construction work was 
divided into three stages with total expected cost of USD 1 billion. The first stage of 
the construction work was completed with an actual cost of more than USD 2 billion. 
Although many parts of the highway have been opened for use, traffic on these parts 
has not considerably increased and most vehicles still chose to travel on National 
Highway No. 1A. Da Nang port in central Vietnam was another example. It was built 
in the early 2000s and was ranked first class in Vietnam. However, it cost more and 
took more time to export goods through Da Nang port than through Sai Gon port in 
the south where economic activities were heavily concentrated (Nguyen and Dapice, 
2009). Consequently, these newly built infrastructures were under-utilized, while 
many rapidly growing regions were still facing severe infrastructure bottlenecks. 
Similarly, the railway system of Vietnam, which has been in operation since 
1936 (Vietnam Railways, 2012), is in need of repair. However, annual capital 
expenditure on the sector remained insignificant that could not meet 40% of minimal 
demand (Ho, 2011). Uneven distribution of funds also occurred in the energy sector. 
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While Vietnam was always short of electricity supply, the Electricity of Vietnam 
(EVN), the largest state-owned corporation in electricity supply, was expanding its 
investments in mobile phone and financial services as well as real estate 
developments (Nguyen and Dapice, 2009). 
Besides inappropriate planning, the report by the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly of Vietnam on the implementation of the state-funded 
infrastructure construction policy from 2005 to 2007 indicated that the disjointed 
distribution of investments was common and showed an upward trend. A number of 
investments were planned individually albeit their overlaps. The Vice Head of the 
Government Inspection Agency, Mai Quoc Binh, maintained that if more attentive 
initial planning was carried out, billions of dollar could have been saved (Phuong, 
2008). 
 
6.5.6.2 Infrastructure project implementation 
Over the past few years, the government of Vietnam has approved a number of 
infrastructure investment projects. However, the increasingly poor performance of 
existing civil engineering works is affecting the effectiveness of these investments. 
Many roads in Vietnam are still in bad condition, suffering from insufficient structure 
(such as poor drainage and inadequate foundations or supporting structures) and poor 
maintenance. Even some newly-built major municipal roads and bridges also suffered 
severe quality problems. For example, shortly after being built or upgraded, a number 
of roads in Ho Chi Minh City were dug up again for the installation of underground 
utilities, causing further traffic congestion. Finishing work was done improperly and 
potholes were common on these roads (Tuan, 2010). The first phase of the ring road 
around the central city of Ha Tinh was completed in 2009 with a total investment of 
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VND 300 billion (around USD 19 million at that time). However, the road has already 
exhibited a number of serious surface distortions (Van, 2010b, 2010a). 
The construction of Can Tho Stayed-cable Bridge over Hau River connecting 
Can Tho City and Vinh Long province in the south of Vietnam started in 2004. The 
bridge, the longest stayed-cable bridge in Southeast Asia, was designed by a Japanese 
consultant and constructed by Vietnamese, Japanese and Chinese contractors. The 
USD 342.6 million investment (2001 exchange rate) was funded mainly by ODA 
from Japan and a small corresponding portion from the state budget of Vietnam. 
While still under construction in 2007, two side spans of the bridge collapsed 
(Nguyen, 2007). Although it was planned to be completed in 2008, the incident 
subsequently delayed the completion until 2010 (Nguyen, 2009).  
 The Kim Lien Road Tunnel, one of the most modern road tunnels in Vietnam 
was built to reduce traffic congestion in one of the major traffic corridors of Hanoi. 
The VND 467 billion (around USD 28 million at that time) investment was funded 
mainly by ODA and a small corresponding portion from the state budget of Vietnam. 
The tunnel was designed and constructed by Japanese firms (Do, 2010). The 
construction of the tunnel started in 2006 and was planned to be completed within 22 
months, but was delayed by a year. Completed in 2009, the tunnel was severely 
flooded on the opening day in 2009 (Duc, 2009). A few months after the opening, a 
number of leaks also appeared in the tunnel’s connections (Tien and Huong, 2009). 
The Thu Thiem Tunnel crossing Sai Gon River in the south, the longest river 
tunnel in Southeast Asia, is the main part of the East-West Highway and tunnel 
project that run through southern Ho Chi Minh City; the total estimated cost was 
about USD 583 million and was mainly funded by ODA from Japan and a small 
corresponding portion from the state budget of Vietnam (Prime Minister's Office of 
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Vietnam, 2000a). The six-lane road tunnel is 1490m long designed and constructed by 
Japanese firms. The construction works started in 2005. In 2008, the four under-river 
tunnel sections had a number of cracks when the construction of these tunnel sections 
was almost complete. The tunnel was opened for use in 2011 (Kap, 2008; Vu, 2008; 
Quang, 2011). 
 The feasibility and cost effectiveness of building major infrastructure projects 
were questionable as well. One of the most problematic issues in building municipal 
roads is site-clearance related issues, which often remarkably raised total development 
time and costs of these roads. For example, the construction cost for the Nam Ky 
Khoi Nghia Road, which played a key role in the development of the urban transport 
axis of Ho Chi Minh city, was only VND 68 billion, but site clearance cost was VND 
654 billion, almost 10 times higher (Vo, 2008). Likewise, many ports have been built 
albeit in a very low cost-effective way. For example, in 2004, the first phase of the 
Cai Lan Port in the northern city of Hai Phong was completed and available for use 
with a total cost of VND 1,500 billion (around USD 96 million at that time) funded by 
ODA from Japan, and was expected to be one of the central ports in the north to 
accommodate ships of up to 40,000 DWT. The port, however, could accommodate 
only 15-20,000 DWT ships. Consequently, container cargos carried by 40,000 DWT 
ships were trans-shipped to 15,000 DWT ships before being unloaded in the port. This 
subsequently increased the shipping costs (and time) by tens of millions of USD per 
year (Do, 2006). Upgrades to the port, including the dredging operation for the 
passage leading to the port to accommodate ships of up to 40,000 DWT, is currently 
under development with an investment of USD 100 million (Moore et al., 2010). 
A development of a deep water seaport at Lach Huyen, also near Haiphong is 
under consideration. The unstable site of the port requires a multi-billion dollar 
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investment, let alone other issues. However, the feasibility of the development, which 
should be studied carefully, has been studied and verified by the same company (Dao, 
2007). 
A report by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly discovered that 
within 3 years from 2005 to 2007, the number of infrastructure developments with 
fraudulent practices, or with time delay, low quality, or low-cost effectiveness have 
gone up both by total amount and by percentage. The number was 1882 projects, 
accounting for 14.57% of the total number of projects in 2005; and 3,173 projects, 
accounting for 18.1% of the total number of projects in 2006. The number continued 
to increase to 4,763 projects in 2007. According to the general secretary of VFCEA, 
Mr. Tran Ngoc Hung, time delay was, in fact, worse than what was reported; 
construction time in Vietnam was often 1.5 to 2 times longer than that in other 
regional countries; and an upward trend could also be found in loss and waste in 
construction. Unnecessary bureaucracy was one of the major causes of time delay. On 
average, total time from acquiring investment approval to the beginning of 
construction works was about 42 months for group-A projects, 29 months for group-B 
and 23 months for group-C. Some group-A developments took 4 years to clear the site 
and 5 to 7 years to complete the construction works (Vo, 2008). 
Long et al. (2004) conducted a survey of the issues relating to the poor 
performance of large construction projects in Vietnam. The survey’s respondents 
were owners, designers/consultants and contractors/subcontractors. Top ranked 
factors included incompetent designers and contractors; poor estimation and change 
management; social and technological issues; site related issues, and improper 
techniques and tools. The problems for these factors are listed in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8 Major factors explaining the poor performance of large construction 
projects in Vietnam 
Factors Problems 
Incompetent designers and 
contractors 
 Inadequate project management assistance; 
 Impractical design; 
 Lack of involvement through project life; 
 Contractor’s financial difficulties; 
 Incompetent project team; and 
 Poor site management. 
Poor estimation and change 
management 
 Excessive contractors and/or subcontractors; 
 Inaccurate time estimating; 
 Inaccurate cost estimating; and 
 Excessive change orders. 
Social and technological issues 
 Obsolete technology; 
 Bureaucracy; and 
 Fraudulent practices and kickbacks. 
Site related issues  Slow site clearance; and  Unsatisfactory site compensation. 
Improper techniques/tools  Inadequate modern equipment; and  Improper planning and scheduling. 
Source: Adapted from Long et al. (2004) 
Similarly, Le-Hoai et al. (2008) conducted a survey on the cause of delay and 
cost overruns in large construction projects located in robust development economic 
zones in Vietnam. The study revealed a number of issues in the implementation of 
construction projects, which were often funded by the government. These issues 
included slow payment of completed works, poor contract management, obsolete or 
unsuitable construction methods and unforeseen site conditions; poor site 
management and supervision, slow information flow between parties and poor project 
management assistance; mistakes in design, design changes and additional works; 
shortages of materials, inaccurate estimates and price fluctuations; financial 
difficulties of contractors and owners; obstacles from government; and shortages of 
skilled workers. Besides delay and cost overruns, other consequences caused by these 
problems were project failure, reduction of profit margin, waste of resources and loss 
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of sponsors’ as well as citizens’ trust in government-funded projects (Le-Hoai et al., 
2008). 
In a recent work by Ling and Hoang (2010), a number of risks related to the 
implementation of construction projects in Vietnam were also identified. The major 
risks were corruption, termination of public projects, bureaucratic administrative 
system, changing and inconsistent regulations, inadequate legal framework, and 
fluctuation of exchange, interest and inflation rates. 
While investments in infrastructure have increased, the level of development 
and the rate of implementation of infrastructure construction have not been improved 
as expected. Vietnam was still suffering from more and more infrastructure 
weaknesses. Investments in infrastructure developments were often large and funded 
by state budget, loans and aids from international organizations. Low quality, time 
and cost effectiveness of infrastructure construction in Vietnam thus not only resulted 
in huge waste of resources and under-capacity performance of infrastructure in the 
short term but also severely affected the economic development in the long term. 
 
6.6 Government institutions involved in the development planning process 
6.6.1 Overview of the governmental system 
The government of Vietnam has a relatively vertical structure. Members of the 
government include a prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers and heads of 
ministry-equivalent agencies. The Prime Minister of Vietnam leads a cabinet 
currently composed of five deputy prime ministers and the heads of twenty-one 
ministries and commissions. The Prime Minister also has the power to establish, 
dissolve, or restructure public agencies, all to be confirmed by the National Assembly. 
The government is in charge of the supervision of public sector agencies at all levels. 
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The government is in turn under the supervision of the National Assembly, and 
reports to the National Assembly, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, 
and the President. The President is elected by the National Assembly, and the Prime 
Minister is nominated by the President and approved by the National Assembly. The 
President, in principle, functions as Head of State and the nominal commander of the 
armed forces and chairman of the Council on National Defense (Government Web 
Portal of Vietnam, 2011). 
Although the government is responsible for the overall management of the 
economy, the broad parameters of national policy are set by the Communist Party of 
Vietnam, the only party in power in the country since independence. The actual role 
of the Party in state management is opaque. However, the occupancy of all senior 
government positions by party members has ensured the primary adherence of the 
Politburo guidelines. Party cells function in parallel with state agencies at all levels 
(Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
The National Assembly is the highest organ of the state. Almost 90% of the 
members of the National Assembly are party members. Elections for member are held 
every 5 years. Generally, the National Assembly has authority over scrutinizing 
legislation, reviewing government plans, budgets, and implementation performance. 
Although decisions of the National Assembly are still subject to the direction of the 
Party, the role of the National Assembly has become increasingly important in 
overseeing all government functions in recent years. The National Assembly is 
considered by the bureaucracy as a significant source of authority and a potential 
arena for independent criticisms of government performance. The Assembly meets 
twice a year, although its Standing Committee meets monthly and many members 
function full-time on various committees (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
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6.6.2 Coordination of planning across ministries 
6.6.2.1 Development plans 
Official planning documents of Vietnam have varying time frames, ranging from 1 to 
10 years. The ten-year Socio-Economic Development Strategy (SEDS) was the main 
long-term planning documents formulated by the central government (Communist 
Party of Vietnam, 2005). Commonly, these development plans are long on broad 
thrusts, but short on detail and concrete commitments. The SEDS generally consisted 
of an analytical report that assesses the current status of the economy, the progress 
achieved under the previous plan and the challenges faced by the economy; defined 
goals for a range of economic and social indicators; and prescribed the development 
approaches and strategies to achieve these goals. The ten-year SEDS set overall 
development direction of the country within the next ten years including strategic 
goals, development approaches and major instruments to achieve the goals (Ministry 
of Planning and Investment, 2007). The five-year Socio-Economic Development Plan 
(SEDP) was formulated based on the national long-term development strategy with 
more concrete and disaggregated targets, which in turn provided the basis for the 
preparation and approval of annual plans. The ten-year SEDS and five-year SEDP 
also served as the basis for the formulation of sectoral and local development plans, 
including economic infrastructure development. Accompanying the five-year SEDP 
was a Public Investment Program (PIP). The PIP formed the basis for developing a 
framework of capital allocation among investments (Pincus and Nguyen, 2004; 















Figure 6.19 Vietnam’s national planning system 
 
6.6.2.2 Planning process 
Vietnam has a long tradition of planning. After independence, Vietnam ran a centrally 
planned economy. During the period of central planning, investment planning relied 
on command and control. Since the implementation of economic reforms in the late 
1980s, the planning has relied on incentives and a general policy framework. The 
present investment planning process can be described as a centralized, but formally 
consultative process. In principle, decision making at all levels conforms to the 
consensual style, which engages a wide range of actors before decisions are finalized. 
However, the extent to which these consultations can influence the final draft is not 
clear. The actual drafting process is complex and opaque to the general public and 
mass organizations at large (Pincus and Nguyen, 2004). 
The planning process is implemented in Vietnam at all level of government. 
While national and sectoral development plans are developed by the central 
government and relevant line ministries, local development plans are formulated by 














plans and strategies) is shown in Figure 6.20. Proposals on SEDSs and SEDPs were 
prepared by the central government and submitted to the National Assembly for 
approval. The central government’s preparation of SEDSs and SEDPs was led by the 
Prime Minister with the assistance of the MPI. The drafting process of the SEDSs for 
the next period started at the end of the previous period with a decision issued by the 
Politburo. Following the decision, the Prime Minister also established a strategic 
planning subcommittee composing of Party institutions, government agencies and 
national research institutes and a drafting committee led by the MPI (Arkadie and 














Figure 6.20 Vietnam’s planning process at central level 
The MPI was responsible for canvassing opinions from all the line ministries 









































socio-economic development strategies and plans. More specifically, the 
Development Strategy Institute, a think-tank under the MPI was responsible for 
drafting the national plans based on sectoral strategies produced by line ministries and 
other central government agencies. The draft was then circulated for consultation with 
mass organizations and party institutions. During the final stages of consultation, the 
draft was published in national newspapers for public discussion. The final drafts 
were submitted to the National Assembly for ratification. The SDES and SEDP were 
then formally presented to the National Party Congress which is usually held every 
five years and approved by the National Assembly, following the resolution of the 
Party Congress (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Pincus and Nguyen, 2004; Ministry of 
Planning and Investment, 2007). 
Based on these national development plans, master plans for sectoral 
development, such as those for construction, transportation, energy, 
telecommunication and trade were developed by line ministries and approved by the 
Prime Minister’s Office. The consistency between sectoral plans and national socio-
economic plans was coordinated by the MPI at the central level (Warlters, 2006).  
In relation to capital investments, the coordination was led by the MPI and the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF). While the MPI provided the Public Investment Program 
(PIP), including the list of investments, and investment budget compiled from sectoral 
master plans, the MoF was in charge of preparing the fiscal framework and recurrent 
expenditure for each sector. The PIP was prepared with reference to assessment of 
investment priorities given by the agencies involved. The PIP was finalized by the 
MPI and approved by the Prime Minister. Investments were classified into four levels 
(national, A, B and C) in terms of their scale and importance. National projects along 
with other special projects have to be approved by the Prime Minister following the 
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resolution issued by the National Assembly. If necessary, the Prime Minister could set 
up a state committee to evaluate the investments which require approval by the Prime 
Minister, and the head of the state committee must be the minister of the MPI. Group-
A projects were decided by relevant line ministries. Group-B, -C investments were 
evaluated by relevant agencies at the provincial level (Prime Minister's Office of 
Vietnam, 2009a). 
 
6.6.3 Ministries in construction, infrastructure and trade sectors 
Various government bodies engage in trade, infrastructure and construction planning 
and policy making. The roles and responsibilities of these organizations in the said 
activities are outlined in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9 Ministries responsible for trade, infrastructure and construction sectors 
Agency Relevant responsibilities 
Ministry of Planning 
and Investment 
- To ensure the consistency between sectoral development plans 
and national economic-social development plans; and 
- To ensure sufficient and timely investments are available for 
approved development plans. 
Ministry of 
Construction 
- To formulate policies and develop legislation and programs for 
building activities. 
- To oversee the planning of urban areas, industrial zones, 
economic zones and hi-tech zones, and infrastructure facilities 
for these areas and zones. 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources and 
Environment 
- To formulate policies for and regulate land use, land price, land 
survey and mapping, land registration, land compensation and 
resettlement. 
Ministry of Transport 
- To formulate policies for and regulate the transport sector. 
- To develop strategies and plans of major transport subsectors, 




- To formulate policies for and regulate the telecom sector. 
- To develop strategies and plans of major telecom subsectors, 





Table 6.9 (Continued) 
Agency Relevant responsibilities 
Ministry of Industry 
and Trade 
- To formulate policies for and regulate the power sector. 
- To develop strategies and plans of major power subsectors, 
including power infrastructure. 
- To formulate policies for and regulate trading activities. 
- To develop strategies and plans of trade development. 
Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment (2010); Ministry of Construction (2010); 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (2010a); Ministry of Transport (2008); 
Ministry of Information and Communications (2010a); Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(2010a). 
 
6.6.3.1 Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
The MPI was founded in 1995. The predecessor of the MPI was the National Planning 
Committee created in 1955. At the central level, the consistency between sectoral 
plans and national socio-economic plans were coordinated by the MPI. The 
departments involved in the said activities in infrastructure construction and trade 
planning are: 
‐ Department for National Economic Issues; 
‐ Department of Infrastructure and Urban Centers; 
‐ Department of Investment Supervision & Appraisal;  
‐ Department of Planning Management; and 
‐ Public Procurement Agency (Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2010). 
These departments oversee the development strategies and master plans for 
infrastructure and cities, and coordinate with other relevant units within the MPI to 
develop national and regional socio-economic development strategies. 
 
6.6.3.2 Ministry of Construction (MoC) 
The MoC was formed in 1973. However, its predecessor, the Ministry of Architecture 
had been established since 1958. The MoC was created in order to assume uniform 
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state management of the construction industry in the whole country. The MoC is the 
state administration in charge of policy-making and regulatory matters in construction 
management and planning. More specifically, the major functions of the MoC are to 
create and implement policies, set construction standards, norms and rules, design 
processes and regulations, systems of limits, technical and economic criteria, limits of 
costs of investments and construction consultancy, and regulations for specialized 
construction works. The MoC also oversees state management of standards of quality, 
produces guidelines for the operation of construction engineering and consultancy 
enterprises, and implementation of the Regulations on Management of Investment and 
Construction. The MoC is also tasked to evaluate technical designs and budget for 
group-A investments and major national construction works. The MoC has 11 entities 
overseeing different areas of the construction industry, including: 
 The Department of Architecture and Spatial Planning: The department oversees the 
planning of urban and rural areas, industrial zones, economic zones, hi-tech zones 
and important international-border gates. 
 The Infrastructure Facility Agency: The agency oversees the planning of 
infrastructure facilities for urban transport infrastructure, and water supply and 
drainage, lighting, greenery, cemetery, and waste treatment for urban areas, 
industrial zones, economic zones and hi-tech zones. 
 Urban Development Agency: The agency oversees the of planning of urban 
development. 
 The Housing and Property Market Management Agency: The agency oversees 
housing development and the property market. 
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 The Department of Building Materials: The department oversees the planning of 
exploration, exploitation of minerals for the manufacture of building materials, and 
the demand and supply of building materials. 
 The Department of Construction Economics: the department oversees the 
preparation of economic criteria, costs of investments and construction consultancy, 
and building material pricing. 
 The Department of Science, Technology and Environment: The department is in 
charge of research and development of science and technology; advanced 
technology application; technology transfer; goods standards, measurements and 
quality; industrial properties; technological barriers in trade; environment 
protection; environment and science-technology information. 
 The State Authority for Construction Quality Inspection: The authority is in charge 
of quality management for and inspections of construction works. 
 The Department of Investment and Construction Management: The department is 
in charge of the development process in construction, and the operation of 
construction firms from all economic sectors. 
 The Department of Legal Affairs: the department oversees the building of legal 
framework, and related matters in areas within the Ministry’s functions. 
 The Department of Finance and Planning: the department is tasked, inter alia: 
- to compile strategies, master plans, long-term plans, five-year plans and annual 
plans for the development of the construction industry, as well as development 
plans for the Ministry’s subordinate bodies; and 
- to compile and provide feedbacks on subjects related to construction and the 
implementation of development strategies and plans for the construction sector, 
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which are part of national, regional socio-economic development plans, or of 
master plans of other sectors. 
Besides, the MoC has three research institutes involved in studying and reviewing the 
development of the construction sector, including Vietnam Institute of 
Architecture, Urban and Rural Planning; Institute of Construction Economics; and 
Vietnam Institute for Building Science and Technology (Prime Minister's Office of 
Vietnam, 2008b; Ministry of Construction, 2010). 
 
6.6.3.3 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment was official founded in 2002. 
The Ministry was formed by uniting the General Directorate of Land Registry, 
General Directorate of Hydrometeorology, Bureau of Environment (under the 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment), Bureau of Geology and Mineral 
Resources (under the Ministry of Industry), and Water Resource Management 
Department (under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment, 2010a). Relating to land, major tasks of the 
General Directorate of Land Registry under the Ministry include taking a lead in 
implementing and monitoring long-term strategies for land use approved by the Prime 
Minister’s Office; directing the process of national and local land use planning; 
coordinating with other relevant ministries to provide land use price frames and 
regulate land price-related issues; land surveying and mapping; land registration and 
certification; guiding and monitoring land compensation, resettlement and assistance; 
directing and coordinating with other relevant agencies to regulate and monitor land 
acquisition, transfer of land use titles and land optimization in accordance with land 
use master plans (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 2010b). 
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6.6.3.4 Ministry of Transport (MoT) 
The predecessor of the MoT, the Ministry of Public Transport, was established since 
independence in 1945. In 1955, the Ministry of Public Transport was renamed as the 
Ministry of Post and Transport to cover the postal sector. However, the Ministry was 
renamed as the Ministry of Transport after the postal sector was separated from the 
Ministry’s functions in 1992. The MoT engages in state management of roads, 
railway, inland waterway, maritime and airway transportation for the whole country. 
The development of major transportation sub-sectors are administered by separate 
agencies, including: 
- The Department of Planning and Investment; 
- The Directorate for Roads of Vietnam; 
- Vietnam Railway Administration; 
- Vietnam Inland Waterways Administration; 
- Vietnam Maritime Administration;  
- The Civil Aviation Administration of Vietnam; and 
- Transport Engineering Construction and Quality Management Bureau. 
Strategies, master plans, long-term plans, five-year plans, annual plans, national 
programs and projects for the development of major transportation subsectors, 
including transport infrastructure, are studied and prepared by these administrations. 
The Department of Planning and Investment under MoT is responsible for compiling 
these plans as well as evaluating plans and investments in transport infrastructure 
within the Ministry’s authority. The MoT also has two institutes involved in the 
formulation of development strategy for transport development in Vietnam, namely 
the Transport Development Strategy Institute and the Institute of Transport Science 
and Technology (Ministry of Transport, 2008). 
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6.6.3.5 Ministry of Information and Communications (MoIC) 
The communication sector was under the administration of the Ministry of Posts and 
Transport founded in 1955. In 2002, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
(MPT) was founded and became the primary driver of telecom strategies, policies and 
regulations. However, since 2007, the MPT was reformed into the MoIC to include 
the state management of the press and publication related issues, which used to be 
functions of the old Ministry of Culture and Information. Based on the recent changes, 
the MoIC is responsible for state administration relating to press; publications; posts 
and courier services; telecom and internet; wave transmission and emission; 
television-frequency management; information technology and electronics; radio and 
television broadcasting; and national information infrastructure. Subordinate agencies 
were created to administer each subsector. The department in charge of the telecom 
sector is the Department of Telecommunications. More specifically, the department 
oversees policies, standards, strategies, master plans, development plans and 
programs in such areas as telecom, internet, as well as wave transmission and 
emission. Planning of network expansion in telecom, internet, wave transmission and 
emission are also part of the functions of the National Institute of Information and 
Communications Strategy, an independent unit of the MoIC (Ministry of Information 
and Communications, 2010a). 
 
6.6.3.6 Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) 
The new MoIT was created in 2007. Its predecessor was the Ministry of Economics 
founded in 1945. The Ministry of Economics was renamed the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade in 1951. The then MoIT was subsequently divided into several ministries 
before the two separate ministries, the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Industry, 
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were formed in 1997. The two ministries were merged again in 2007 to form the 
current MoIT. 
Under the MoIT, the Energy Department is responsible for the planning of the 
power sector. The department is tasked, inter alia, to prepare strategies, development 
policies and national master plans for the development of oil and gas, power, new 
energy and renewable energy resources. The MoIT also created the Electricity 
Regulatory Authority to oversee pricing, new investments in generation and 
transmission, and gradual liberalization of the generation, wholesale and retail 
markets. In addition, the Institute of Energy under MoIT plays an important advisory 
role in the planning of energy and power development.  
Apart from industrial activities, the MoIT sets policy and develops legislation, 
strategies, master plans, and programs for trading activities, including export and 
import, market management, trade promotion, e-commerce, trading services, 
international trade integration, competition management, anti-monopoly controls, the 
application of safeguards, anti-dumping, and anti-subsidy measures, and consumer 
protection. Separate departments were created to oversee each activity, including: 
- The Department of Export and Import; 
- The Department of International Cooperation; 
- The Department of Multilateral Trade Policy; 
- Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency; 
- Vietnam Competition Authority; 
- Market Control Department; and 
- Vietnam e-Commerce and Information Technology Agency. 
In addition, the MoIT has separate departments responsible for developing trade 
relations between Vietnam with specific regions, including the Asia-Pacific Market 
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Department; the Europe Market Department; the America Market Department; and 
the Africa, West Asia, and South Asia Market Department. The Ministry’s think-tank 
on trade matters is the Vietnam Institute for Trade (Prime Minister's Office of 
Vietnam, 2007b; Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2010a). 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
Over the last 20 years, Vietnam has made significant development progress to become 
one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia. Vietnam’s achievements over the past 
decades have been largely attributed to a combination of liberalization of markets, 
implementation of “open-door” policy and integration into the world economy, and a 
stable macroeconomic environment. Major economic policies that Vietnam has 
implemented are summarized in Figure 6.21. The country has just entered into a 
lower-middle income country status, and preparing a new set of SEDS aiming to 
establish the foundation for Vietnam to become a modern, industrialized country by 
2020 (Than and Tan, 1993; Vo, 2007; Asian Development Bank, 2009; United 
Nations, 2010b). However, the SEDS for 2001-2010 ended with many challenges. 
While the importance of infrastructure financing has grown significantly, the 
efficiency in public investments in infrastructure is one of the key issues challenging 
the country. It was noticeable that investments in infrastructure development in 
Vietnam have heavily been increased over the past decades. The level of 
infrastructure development, however, has not been improved correspondingly. The 
infrastructure system in Vietnam is still regarded as one of the major factors holding 
back further development of trade and international economic integration of the 
country. The intriguing question is therefore why public investments in infrastructure 
have not been efficiently used. Further research should be conducted to find out what 
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the problems affecting the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure to 
support trade and economic development in Vietnam. 
Experience in Vietnam suggests that problems in the planning and execution 
of infrastructure construction would affect the efficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure. In Vietnam, a considerable portion of public investments goes to 
infrastructure construction. All major large-scale infrastructure projects are planned at 
central level. As reviewed earlier, the centralized planning process in Vietnam is 
complicated and opaque. Although the process is described as consultative, the actual 
participations of related actors and the influence of these consultations are not clear. 
From the literature review, poorly selected, uneven and disjointed infrastructure 
investments in Vietnam would therefore resulted from lack of transparency and 
accountability, institutional weaknesses in planning, politicized decision making as 
well as the inadequate capacity of estimating and monitoring rates of return. The 
efficient use of public investments in infrastructure could also be affected by a 
number of issues in the execution of infrastructure development plans. Reviews of 
construction sector in Vietnam have shown the low quality, time and cost 
effectiveness of infrastructure construction, which would result in the poor 
performance of infrastructure system and waste of national resources in the short term 
as well as affecting economic development in the long term. This suggests the 
efficiency factor in infrastructure construction cannot be neglected. From the 
literature review, issues that could affect the efficiency of the execution of 
government-funded infrastructure construction are corruption in infrastructure 
construction, shortage of local construction firms’ capabilities and resources, land 






























































































































CHAPTER 7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methodology used in this study. Since government 
planning is one of the issues of the broader public administration research, the chapter 
starts with a review of the use of qualitative and quantitative research strategies within 
the literature of public administration. This section is followed by a brief description 
of the research design selected for this study. Details of the approaches used for data 
collection and data analysis for this study are then discussed. The focus is on the 
efficient use of public investments in infrastructure to support trade and economic 
development, as well as the influencing factors. 
 
7.2 Qualitative versus quantitative methods 
The study of public administration used multiple research methods and techniques 
(Adams and White, 1994; Lan and Anders, 2000). Generally, these methods can be 
divided into two major approaches, namely, quantitative and qualitative (McNabb, 
2002). More specifically, the methods employed include:  
- Quantitative methods: descriptive statistics and/or simple correlation analysis; 
intermediate statistics (hypothesis testing and some inferential statistics); and more 
advanced statistical tests including regression analysis, time series and more 
sophisticated inferential statistics; 
- Qualitative methods: case study; ethnography; and others (for example literature 
reviews and reports of interviews) (Lan and Anders, 2000); 
There has been a quantitative versus qualitative debate. Scientists, who were 
in favor of quantitative methods, argued that an idea or concept was not meaningful if 
it was unable to be measured or expressed in numbers. Meanwhile, qualitative 
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methods owed their growth in popularity in researches required to uncover complex 
causal-effect relationships, processes, and structures in their natural settings as 
experienced by the actors themselves (Tan, 2007). A survey by Lan and Anders 
(2000), however, showed that the frequency of studies using quantitative method and 
that of studies using qualitative method were comparable. Since no single method has 
proved to be more useful than others within the literature of public administrative 
research, Lan and Anders (2000) argued that the major issue concerning research 
methodology should be about how to use a method appropriately rather than on which 
methods should be used. In order to use a method appropriately, it is important for 
researchers to consider all relevant characteristics as well as strengths and weaknesses 
of these methods. 
Quantitative and qualitative research methodologies are mainly distinguished 
by the ways of describing and processing research data. Quantitative methodologies 
often involve the use of statistical analysis of data to answer research questions, which 
is often to measure and analyze causal relationship between variables. This approach 
thus requires a sample size much larger than the one used by the qualitative approach 
to ensure that statistically, the sample can be a good representative (Carey (1993) as 
cited by Sale et al. (2002)). Techniques that quantitative methodologies usually utilize 
to collect data include experimental design and administered survey with a limited 
range of predetermined responses (McNabb, 2002). Therefore, the advantage of this 
approach is that its standardized data collection task is less time consuming and useful 
to study a large sample size, thus facilitating comparison and statistical aggregation of 
the data, as well as making generalized research findings possible.  This approach is 
consequently useful in studies focusing on phenomenon predicting or explaining 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
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Qualitative methodologies focus on interpretation and understanding rather 
than predicting and explaining (Miller and Whicker, 1999). Two most-often used 
methods in the social and administrative sciences are ethnography and case study 
(McNabb, 2002). The approach involves the use of in-depth and focus-group 
interviews, participant observation, and analysis of documents and/or artifacts in order 
to collect data (McNabb, 2002). As a result, qualitative method relies on the texts and 
discourses of participants involved. Samples used by this approach are small and 
purposeful samples that are capable of delivering important information. Samples are 
thus not supposed to represent large populations, but to represent detailed snapshots 
of the samples under study (Reid (1996) as cited by Sale et al. (2002)). Major 
advantages of this approach are that it is useful for describing complex phenomena, 
thus providing individual case information with rich details. However, the method is 
more time consuming, and the knowledge obtained may not be generalizable to other 
case (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Recent studies have argued that both methods are important and could be used 
in a single research study (Sale et al., 2002; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). A 
combined research strategy, a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative methods 
and techniques is possible. The goal of combining the two methods is not to replace 
either of these approaches but rather to strengthen the advantages and minimize the 
disadvantages of both. Each method is used as a way to expanding one’s 
understanding of a phenomenon. Generally, a mixed method strategy is selected for 
complementary purposes that a single method cannot accomplish. Combining 
research methods is thus useful in some areas of research where the complexity of 
phenomena requires data from a large number of perspectives. In addition, the 
generalizability of the results can increase using this approach. However, a mixed 
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method strategy requires more resources than a single method strategy and is 
therefore more expensive, more time consuming, and requiring more human resources.  
It is also more difficult for researchers to learn about multiple methods and 
approaches and understand how to mix these appropriately (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
 
7.3 Research design 
Selection of research design mainly depends on the research objectives and questions. 
The approach selected is the one that provides the most needed data to answer 
research questions and ensures that the objectives of the study are achieved (Crabtree 
and Miller, 1999; Sale et al., 2002; Yin, 2009). Surveys, in-depth interviews and case 
studies are common in social science and management spheres (Fellows and Liu, 
2003). Surveys are quick and efficient to explore particular issues (Tan, 2007). 
Meanwhile, in-depth interviews and case studies are essentially to examine why and 
how a decision or a set of decisions were taken, and implemented, and with what 
result (Schramm, 1971; Morse, 1994). Studies focusing on infrastructure planning 
usually employ the mixed use of data (for example documents, interviews and 
observations) to provide a stronger basis for analysis and interpretation of related 
government policies (see for example: (Hossain, 2000; Webster and Theeratham, 
2004; Mustajab, 2009). 
Following the traditional approach, a questionnaire survey was adopted in this 
current research to capture the views of the concerned parties on the research issues. 
In-depth interviews involved case studies and document analyses were also employed 
in this research. In addition, a longitudinal survey was used to study the efficiency of 
public investments in infrastructure over time. The longitudinal survey was conducted 
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before the survey and interviews were carried out. The purpose of the longitudinal 
survey is to provide an overview of the developmental trends of the use of funded 
infrastructure construction to support economic development in Vietnam. Notably, the 
longitudinal survey does not attempt to establish the linkages between the use and 
potential “causal” factors, but aims to explore the extent to which public investments 
in infrastructure is efficiently used in Vietnam. 
A semi-structured questionnaire was used to collect the data in this research. A 
semi-structured questionnaire is designed with open-ended questions, thus not 
limiting the respondents’ choice of answers (McCracken, 1988; Gubrium and 
Holstein, 2002). The disadvantages of this type of questionnaire are that responses are 
time-consuming, coding is difficult, and more effort from the respondents is required 
(Oppenheim, 1992). However, compared to structured and unstructured 
questionnaires, semi-structured questionnaires fit the study’s needs with questions that 
help and direct the respondent into the research topic area and provide the opportunity 
for the researcher to gather more information in depth whenever appropriate 
(McCracken, 1988; Creswell, 1998). 
In-depth interviews were conducted to examine how to resolve the issues 
found from the survey. The population of interest for in-depth interviews is therefore 
key planners, policy makers and key players from the non-governmental sector. 
Besides, in-depth interviews involved some relevant case studies and document 
analyses. 
 
7.4 Longitudinal survey 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of the longitudinal survey is to provide an overview 
of the development trends of the use of public investments in infrastructure to support 
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trade and economic growth. The survey was carried out by examining the efficiency 
of public investments in infrastructure construction to support trade and economic 
growth over time. 
 Public sector expenditure efficiency analysis is used to compare the relative 
outcomes (effects) and costs of the relevant public expenditure. Public sector 
expenditure efficiency is expressed in terms of a ratio where the numerator is a 
performance level (a gain in performance from a measure, e.g. the competitiveness 
index) and the denominator is the amount of public expenditure used to achieve a 
given performance level (Afonso et al., 2005). The method has been widely used for 
efficiency analysis of public spending such as those completed by Pang and Herrera 
(2005), Mandl et al. (2008) and Borge et al. (2008). Since this study focuses on 
efficiency analysis of public investments in infrastructure construction to support 
trade and economic growth, the method is particularly relevant. 
From the literature review, the objective of public investments in 
infrastructure to support trade is to improve the quality and the extensiveness of 
infrastructure networks for trading expansion, subsequently economic growth. Public 
investments in infrastructure construction expressed as a share of GDP can be 
assumed to reflect costs of achieving the objective. Therefore, in order to examine the 
efficiency of public investments in infrastructure construction to support trade and 
economic growth, the ability of infrastructure to support trade and economic growth 
was weighted by the amount of public investments in infrastructure construction.  
International organizations (for example International Road Federation, 
International Air Transport Association and International Telecommunication Union) 
often use a set of indicators for assessing infrastructure development for a given 
means of transport, including passenger-carrying capacity, freight-carrying capacity, 
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infrastructure density and level of infrastructure investments and so on. While these 
indicators reflect the level of infrastructure development for a given means of 
transport in many ways, it is not useful when a single and integrated index for 
assessing infrastructure development as a whole is needed. Such an integrated index, 
however, can be found in the Global Competitiveness Report published annually by 
the World Economic Forum (WEF). Besides separate indices for different type of 
infrastructure, the World Economic Forum uses a composite index for assessing the 
competitiveness of a nation in terms of infrastructure development. The indicator 
reflects the quality and extensiveness of infrastructure networks that integrate the 
national market and connecting it at low cost to markets in other countries and regions 
(Schwab, 2009). The indicator offered by the WEF is thus particularly useful in this 
study. Moreover, data collected from WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report is more 
reliable as these were backed by eminent Harvard academics Professor Jeffrey Sachs 
and Professor Michael Porter. Data quality in the Global Competitiveness Report has 
improved over the years with stronger academic foundation and methodology 
(Schwab, 2008). Data from the Global Competitiveness Report continues to be used 
as a significant source of policy discussion about related issues in developing 
countries (Dollar et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 2006; Arvis et al., 
2007). As a result, the competitiveness index of Vietnam in terms of infrastructure 
development as reported by the WEF was used as a proxy for the ability of 
infrastructure to support trade and economic growth in this study. 
Data of the competitiveness index of Vietnam in terms of infrastructure 
development was thus collected from the Global Competitiveness Reports. Data of 
public investments in infrastructure construction was collected from the General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) and the Ministry of Planning and Investment of 
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Vietnam, as well as other official documents, related studies, reports and articles. 
With the data collected, the efficiency of public investments in infrastructure 
construction to support trade and economic growth was computed on a yearly basis 
(see Section 8.2). Microsoft Excel software was utilized to assist in the data analysis. 
 
7.5 Questionnaire survey 
7.5.1 Data collection 
The survey was divided into two parts. The first part is used to examine the 
perceptions of achievements of public investments in infrastructure for supporting 
trade expansion, and subsequently economic growth among the actors and 
stakeholders involved. From the literature review, government’s investments in 
infrastructure construction play an important role in providing quality and 
extensiveness of infrastructure networks that integrate the national market and 
connecting it at low cost to markets in other countries and regions. However, the 
results found in the majority of infrastructure projects were cost overruns, benefit 
shortfalls and waste (Flyvbjerg, 2007). As reviewed in Chapter 5, the outcomes of the 
inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure in the planning and 
implementation of infrastructure development can be described as poorly selected and 
poorly executed infrastructure investments, and ultimately waste of national resources. 
As a result, to elicit the perceptions of the achievements, respondents were asked to 
rate against a five-point Likert scale, from “not significant” to “extremely significant” 
about the occurrence of these un-expected outcomes. 
The second part of the survey was conducted to explore the factors affecting 
the use of public investments in infrastructure for supporting economic development. 
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Derived from the literature review, these factors are classified into the following 
major groups: 
- Infrastructure planning: 
 Capacity for estimating and monitoring of rates of return of infrastructure projects 
 Politicized decision making 
 Transparency and accountability problems 
 Institutional weaknesses in planning 
- Infrastructure delivery: 
 Political commitment 
 Corruption issues in infrastructure construction 
 Land acquisition problems 
 Building capacity of local firms 
 Institutional weaknesses in infrastructure construction 
Similarly, the five-point Likert scale was applied for questions relating to the degree 
of occurrence and influence of factors. These questions were then followed by open-
ended questions asking the respondents about further issues based on their experience. 
A sample of these questions is attached in Appendix 1. The cover letter that 
provides a brief description of the survey and its goals is also included. A pre-test was 
carried out before the actual survey was conducted. A small sample of respondents 
from the population of interest was randomly selected. The pre-test respondents 
included two senior government officials, and two seniors working in infrastructure 
construction-related firms headquartered in Hanoi. Besides, two professors working 
for research institutions in Hanoi joined the pre-test to enhance the validity of the 
research. The pre-test respondents were requested to give their feedbacks on the 
relevance of questions. In general, all pre-test respondents agreed that the 
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questionnaire was comprehensible. However, they were concerned that requiring 
respondents’ particulars, especially respondents’ names might make them reluctant to 
answer the questionnaires. That is because the issue of the efficiency of government 
funding invested in infrastructure is quite sensitive. Many Vietnamese, especially 
those who work for the government may not feel comfortable to take part in the 
survey. Other concerns were related to phrasing. The unexpected outcomes mentioned 
in Part I should be more specific. The expression “Political discontinuity” in Part III 
could make respondents confused with changes of leading party and government. 
Since there is no change of leading party in Vietnam since independence, it should be 
better to replace the expression with “changes in the political affiliations of the 
government responsible for the projects”. Based on these suggestions, the 
questionnaire was modified before the actual launch of the survey. 
The purpose of the survey is to examine perceptions of issues and challenges of 
the current use of public investments in infrastructure among the actors involved. 
These actors can be classified into two groups: governmental and non-governmental 
actors. The population of interest thus consists of both governmental and non-
government actors. 
Since the level that this study focuses on is national level, the governmental-
actor group thus consists of planners and policy makers working in central 
government agencies, which have a role in policy making as well as planning for 
construction, infrastructure and international trade of Vietnam as highlighted in 
Chapter 6, including relevant departments and agencies under the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of 
Information and Communications, and Ministry of Industry and Trade as well as the 
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ministries’ think tanks. The initial list of agencies was discussed with policy experts 
from the central government to see if there was any omission (see Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 Number of divisions and units under relevant ministerial departments 
Departments Units 
Under the MPI: 16 
Department for National Economic Issues 
Department of Infrastructure and Urban Centers 
Department of Investment Supervision & Appraisal      
Department of Planning Management 
Public Procurement Agency 
Under the MoC: 29 
Department of Architecture and Spatial Planning 
Urban Development Agency 
Infrastructure Facility Agency 
State Authority for Construction Quality Inspection 
Department of Construction Economics 
Department of Science, Technology and Environment 
Department of Building Materials 
Department of Finance and Planning 
Department of Legal Affairs 
Department of Investment and Construction Management 
Department of Housing and Real Estate 
Under the MoT: 101 
Department of Planning and Investment 
Directorate for Roads of Vietnam 
Vietnam Railway Administration 
Vietnam Inland Waterways Administration 
Vietnam Maritime Administration 
Civil Aviation Administration of Vietnam 
Transport Engineering Construction and Quality Management 
Bureau  
Under the MoNRE: 14 
General Directorate of Land Registry 
Under the MoIC: 16 
Department of Telecommunications 
Under the MoIT: 85 
Department of International Cooperation 
Multilateral Trade Policy Department 
Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency 
Department of Export and Import 
Vietnam Competition Authority 
Vietnam e-Commerce and Information Technology Agency 
Market Control Department 
Asia-Pacific Market Unit 
Europe Market Unit 
America Market Unit 
Africa, West Asia and South Asia Market Unit 
Total 261 
Source: Ministry of Construction (2010); Ministry of Industry and Trade (2010b);Ministry of 
Information and Communications (2010b); Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (2010b); 
Ministry of Planning and Investment (2010); Ministry of Transport (2010). 
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In total, there are 261 units and divisions under relevant departments of the 
above mentioned ministries (see Table 7.1). The list of these divisions and 
departments can be found in various websites of the related ministries. The list served 
as the sampling frame for this study. Based on the list, a few respondents from these 
government agencies were contacted and asked to provide referrals for additional 
respondents. Selected individuals were planners and policy makers with at least 5 
years of work experience since they would be senior enough to provide both a 
technical and a policy perspective. 
In addition, this study is interested in perceptions of non-governmental actors 
who are involved in the implementation of government-funded infrastructure projects. 
The non-governmental-actor group in this study thus refers to the actors other than the 
planners and policy makers, including financial institutions, traders, developers, 
consultants and contractors. There are 178 banks, financial institutions, and 
equipment rental companies. The list of these organizations (with contacts), which 
served as the sampling frame for financial institutions, is posted on the website of the 
State Bank of Vietnam (State Bank of Vietnam, 2011). The list of the most prominent 
traders in Vietnam is similarly posted on the website of the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade. The list of the 217 traders (with contact details) served as the sampling frame 
for traders (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2011). 
According to a report by the Ministry of Construction, there are 55,870 firms in 
the construction sector (Hoang, 2013). The sampling frame for local developers, 
consultants and contractors is the list of major developers, consultants and contractors 
in the infrastructure sector posted on the websites of the Ministry of Construction, the 
Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Information and Communication. There are 
19 major developers and 326 consultants and contractors in the list (Ministry of 
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Information and Communications, 2011; Ministry of Transport, 2011). The sampling 
process started with the original list of relevant individuals in the lists of organizations 
mentioned above. Each potential survey participant was personally contacted to see if 
they were interested, and the contacted individuals would also be asked to suggest 
other individuals who were of interest to this study. Similar to respondents from 
government agencies, respondents from firms with at least 5 years of work experience 
were selected. 
The population of the survey includes professionals in government agencies as 
well as firms engaged in large-scale infrastructure projects. Since all major 
government agencies are headquartered in Hanoi, most questionnaires were delivered 
to professionals in Hanoi. Questionnaires can be delivered via mail, telephone or 
directly delivered. Mail and telephone delivery can save time and cost while personal 
delivery can increase response rate (Alston and Bowles, 1998; Jackson, 2006). For 
this study, in order to increase response rate and ensure the accuracy of answers, 
questionnaires were directly delivered to professionals in Hanoi. Only a small number 
of questionnaires were delivered to professionals in Ho-Chi-Minh City via email to 
save cost and time. 
 
7.5.2 Data analysis 
The simple data analysis of responses was first conducted by ranking the problems in 
terms of degree of occurrence and level of influence. The analysis also examined 
whether there was any difference in perceptions of different groups of respondents by 
using rank correlation. Scores, therefore, were first converted to ranks. Based on the 
ranks, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient would be computed to test the 
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strength of associations between the rankings of respondent groups using the 
following formula (Tan, 2007): 
ݎ௦ ൌ 1 െ 6∑݀௜
ଶ
݊ଷ െ ݊  
where di is the difference between ranks for ith characteristic and n is the number of 
characteristics ranked. For large samples (n>20), a test of significance for r (with Ho: 
the correlation is not significant) is given by (Tan, 2007): 
ݖ ൌ ݎ௦ඥሺ݊ െ 1ሻ ~ N(0,1) 
Further data analysis of this study involved the analysis of 35 variables in 
order to identify key factors affecting the efficiency of government-funded 
infrastructure construction. In order to identify key factors, the degree of criticality 
was considered first. By considering the degree of criticality first, the study could 
eliminate factors that are not perceived as critical. Those factors that are perceived as 
critical would then be selected for further data analysis of their degree of occurrence. 
Data analysis is thus first performed to extract the problems that are perceived as 
critical by the respondents based on their degree of criticality. In next step, the 
relationships between the occurrences of the key problems and the outcome or effect 
are examined. Since the data analysis involved simultaneous analysis of the large 
number of variables, the application of multivariate statistical techniques are 
considered. The selection of an appropriate multivariate technique depends on how 
variables are classified as shown by Hair (2010). Without a reason to divide the 
variables in this study into dependent and independent classifications, an 
interdependence technique should be utilized in factor analysis. 
Among interdependence techniques, factor analysis and structural equation 
modeling (SEM) are useful for studies focusing on variables rather than on cases or 
respondents. Factor analysis is more appropriate in analyzing the structure of 
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variables by reducing a large number of variables into a smaller set of factors. 
Meanwhile, SEM is more appropriate in analyzing the cause-effect relations between 
factors (Hair et al., 2010). As a result, in the first stage, factor analysis was used in 
this study to extract key causal factors limiting the efficient use of public investments 
in infrastructure. In the second stage, SEM was used to examine the relationships 
between these key causal factors and the outcomes; the dependent variable is a 
measure of the occurrence of the outcomes of the inefficient use of public investments 
in infrastructure, and the independent variables are measures of the occurrence of the 
factors. Measures of the outcomes and factors are thus the respondents’ ratings of the 
occurrence of the outcomes and factors. 
Using factor analysis to extract key factors from a large number of variables 
with p variables and k common factors to be determined and a unique factor δ, the 
factor analytic model can be written as: 
X1 = l11F1 + l12F2 + … + l1kFk + δ1 
X2 = l21F1 + l22F2 + … + l2kFk + δ2 
… 
Xp = lp1F1 + lp2F2 + … + lpkFk + δp 
The coefficients (ls) reflect the contribution of each factor to each variable, thus called 
factor loadings. In matrix form, 
x = Lf + δ 
where x is a p x 1 vector, R is the correlation matrix, x ~ N(0, R) and Var(xi) = 1; L is 
a p x g matrix of factor loadings; f is a g x 1 vector of independent common factor, f ~ 
(0, I); δ is a p x 1 vector of unique factors, δ ~ (0, Ψ) or Var(δi) = ψi; and f and δ are 
independent. Hence, 
Var(xi) = Var(li1F1 + li2F2 + … + ligFg + δi) 
 = li12Var(F1) + … + lig2Var(Fg) + Var(δi) 
 = ∑ lij2 + ψi = 1 
In the matrix form proposed by Tan (2007), 
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Var(x) = R = E[xx´]  = E[(Lf + δ)(Lf + δ)´] 
= E[(Lf + δ)(f´L´ + δ´)] 
= E[Lf f´L´ + δδ´] 
= LL´ + Ψ 
This relation is used to estimate factor loadings. The first step is to compute R: 
R = λ1u1u1´ + … + λpupup´ 
where λs are eigenvalues of R and us are corresponding eigenvectors. Eigenvalues 
greater than 1 is used to identify the number of factors (g) to retain. Then, 
LL´ = λ1u1u1´ + … + λgugug´ 
and ψ = R - LL´(Tan, 2007). 
Principle component analysis is used to extract factors and VARIMAX rotation is 
used to rotate factor loadings so that they are close to 0 and 1 to facilitate factor 
interpretation (Hair et al., 2010). With the large number of variables and data, the use 
of software programs is considered.  For statistical analysis, the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) is chosen for factor analysis in this study. There are some 
common statistical packages, such as MINITAB, SPSS, and SYSTAT. However, the 
SPSS is a comprehensive statistical package widely used by social scientists (Tan, 
2007). By utilising this software package it is possible for researchers to: 
- import data from a variety of formats; 
- retrieve and view a pre-existing data file; 
- manipulate and perform statistical analysis; and 
- produce joint configurations of tables and graphs (Bryman and Cramer, 2009). 
Utilizing this software, raw data were first entered into a computer and frequencies 
and percentages were calculated. Tables and cross tabulations were then constructed 
in order to examine the relationship between variables. 
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The next stage involved the SEM to identify the relationships between the 
occurrences of key factors extracted from the factor analysis stage and the outcomes 
of the inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure. Causal factors that were 
statistically perceived as significant in the factor analysis were used as the 
independent variables in SEM. The outcomes the inefficient use of public investments 
in infrastructure were the dependent variables in SEM. A single regression analysis 
can only interpret a single relationship between two variables. However, in a model 
with a number of interrelated variables, it would not be meaningful for the 
relationships to be interpreted separately. SEM is thus more useful to simultaneously 
examine the structural relationships. SEM examines the structure of interrelationships 
expressed in a series of equations, which depict all of the relationships among 
constructs (the dependent and independent variables) involved in the analysis (Hair et 
al., 2010). As multiple relationships are expected among variables in this study, SEM 
is useful to indicate which relationships are critical among variables and which 
require more attention. 
There are two distinct approaches to carry out SEM analysis: covariance-based 
SEM (CB-SEM) and partial least squares SEM (PLS-SEM). CB-SEM technique 
estimates model parameters by minimizing the difference between estimated 
covariance values and observed covariance values (Hair et al., 2010). In order to 
apply CB-SEM, several assumptions of data and minimum sample size need to be met. 
Compared to CB-SEM, PLS-SEM has less stringent assumptions of data and 
minimum sample size. Statistically, PLS-SEM also uses different approach to produce 
parameter estimates. PLS-SEM estimates model parameters by maximizing the 
explained variance of the dependent latent constructs. While CB-SEM has been 
widely applied in marketing researches, the number of studies using PLS-SEM is 
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growing. On the one hand, CB-SEM is appropriate if the research objective is about 
theory confirmation. On the other hand, PLS-SEM proves more useful if the research 
objective is about prediction or more about an extension of an existing structural 
theory. Moreover, when data characteristics or sample size do not meet the CB-SEM 
assumptions, PLS-SEM estimates can be used as proxies of CB-SEM results. Another 
advantage of PLS-SEM is the ability to produce estimates of factor scores which are 
specifically valuable in impact-performance analyses. Based on factor scores, key 
factors can be identified for potential performance improvements (Hair et al., 2011). 
Given the research objective is to uncover key issues affecting the investment 
efficiency of funded infrastructure development, PLS-SEM is more appropriate for 
this study. Among software packages executing PLS-SEM, SmartPLS software can 
conduct all data analyses required in PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2011). The software is 
thus selected in this study. With a path model example, the stages and steps in 





































The path model example shown in Figure 7.1 has two components. The 
structural model (the inner model) in the PLS-SEM context refers to the relationships 
between latent variables yg (LVs). The measurement model (the outer model) refers to 
the relationships between latent variables and observed variables (x1, …, x3). The 
following PLS-SEM algorithm is adopted from Monecke and Leisch (2012). 
In the measurement model, the latent variables yg (LVs) is measured by the 
block Xg consisting of three observed variables such as x1, x2 and x3 (MVs) in the 
model. Assuming that all MVs contained in the data matrix X are scaled to have zero 
mean and unit variance; and each block of MVs Xg is already transformed to be 
positively correlated for all LVs yg, g = 1,…., G. Each block of MVs reflects its LV 
and can be written as the multivariate regression: 
௚ܺ ൌ ݕ௚ݓ௚ᇽ ൅ ܨ௚,          ܧൣܨ௚หݕ௚൧ ൌ 0 
So outer weight ݓ௚ᇽcan be estimated by least squares as  
ݓෝ௚ᇽ ൌ ൫ݕ௚ᇽݕ௚൯ିଵݕ௚ᇽ ௚ܺ ൌ ܸܣܴ൫ݕ௚൯ିଵܥܱܸ൫ݕ௚, ௚ܺ൯  
   ൌ ܥܱܸ൫ݕ௚, ௚ܺ൯  
   ൌ ܥܱܴ൫ݕ௚, ௚ܺ൯ . 
Assigning κg = {k א{1, …, K} | xk ~ yg} to be a set of indices for MVs related to LV yg 
the wg, g = 1, …, g, is a column vector of length |κg|. Adjacency matrix M for the 
measurement model has the same structure as the matrix of outer weights W, and is 
used for the initialization. With mkg = 1, MV xk is one of the indicators of LV. 
Calculating the basic PLS-SEM algorithm thus starts with matrix M used for the 
initialization: 
- Step 1: Initialization (constructing each LV as a weighted sum of their MVs): 
scaling LVs to have unit variance. 




,            ݃ ൌ 1,… , ܩ  
- Step 2: Inner approximation ෨ܻ  (estimating each LV as a weighted sum of its 
neighbouring LVs) as matrix product of the outer estimate ෠ܻ and the matrix of inner 
weights E: again scaling computed LVs to have unit variance. 
෨ܻ ൌ ෠ܻܧ  
ݕ෤௚ ൌ ௬෤೒ට௏஺ோ൫௬෤೒൯
,            ݃ ൌ 1,… , ܩ  
- Step 3: Outer approximation (recalculating the weights on the basis of the LV values 
from the inner approximation (Step 2)). 
ݓෝ௚ᇽ ൌ ൫ݕ෤௚ᇽݕ෤௚൯ିଵݕ෤௚ᇽ ௚ܺ  
ൌ ܥܱܴ൫ݕ෤௚, ௚ܺ൯ . 
- Step 4: Outer estimation (estimating the factor scores by means of the MVs) 
෠ܻ ൌ ܺܯ  
෠ܻ௚ ൌ ௒෠೒ට௏஺ோ൫௒෠೒൯
           ݃ ൌ 1,… , ܩ  
- Step 5: If the relative change of all the outer weights from one iteration to the next 




ฬ ൏ ݐ݋݈݁ݎܽ݊ܿ݁        ׊ ݇ ൌ 1,… , ܭ         ר ݃ ൌ 1,… , ܩ    
The estimation of factor scores done in Step 4 is taken to be final. Otherwise go back 
to Step 2. 
- Step 6: Estimates of path coefficients (βg). The estimates can be done by ordinary 
least squares (OLS). For each LV  ݕො௚ , g = 1, …, G, the path coefficient is the 
regression coefficient on its predecessor set ݕො௚௣௥௘ௗ. 
ߚመ௚ ൌ ൫ݕො௚௣௥௘ௗ ᇽݕො௚௣௥௘ௗ൯ିଵݕො௚௣௥௘ௗ ᇽݕො௚ 
ൌ ܥܱܴ൫ݕො௚௣௥௘ௗ, ݕො௚௣௥௘ௗ൯ିଵܥܱܴ൫ݕො௚௣௥௘ௗ, ݕො௚൯ 
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The estimated matrix of path coefficients ܤ෠  
ߚመ௜௝ ൌ ቊߚመ௚௝     , ݂݋ݎ ݆ א ݕ௜
௣௥௘ௗ,
0       ,    ݈݁ݏ݁.             





The cross and outer loadings are estimated as (Monecke and Leisch, 2012): 
רෝ௖௥௢௦௦ൌ ܥܱܴ൫ܺ, ෠ܻ൯ 
ڊෝ௞௚௢௨௧௘௥ൌ ൜ڊෝ௞௚
௖௥௢௦௦      , ݂݅ ݉௞௚ ൌ 1,
0             ,        ݈݁ݏ݁.               
 
7.6 In-depth interviews 
For in-depth interviews, open-ended questions were used to collect the data. The 
interviews started by asking respondents about the respondent’s experience of major 
issues found from the questionnaire survey. Subsequently, whenever appropriate 
respondents were asked how these issues affected the use of public investments in 
infrastructure and how they should be resolved. The interviews were recorded and 
fully transcribed to help the researcher to recall the narrative responses for review and 
discussion thereafter. Original tape recordings are kept for checking original 
meanings and contexts whenever necessary. A sample of the interview questions is 
attached in Appendix 2. 
Determining sample size for interviews is difficult. A number of factors can 
determine sample sizes in qualitative studies, such as the heterogeneity of the 
population, selection criteria, the scope of study, and the quality of the data, etc 
(Morse, 2000; Ritchie et al., 2003). There are no specific rules to be followed for 
qualitative inquiry. Generally, the concept of saturation is used as a guiding principle 
in determining sample sizes in qualitative studies. A study is considered to be 
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reaching saturation when the collection of new data does not necessarily add any 
further insights to the overall subject being studied (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
However, qualitative studies are rarely found to be able to prove how this point is 
achieved (Morse, 1995; Bowen, 2008; Mason, 2010). Little guidance for estimating 
actual sample sizes is found (Mason, 2010). For phenomenologies, Morse (1994) 
recommended a minimum sample of six. Creswell (1998) suggested a sample size 
from five to twenty five. Guest (2006) also indicated that a minimum sample size of 
six would be sufficient for key themes to be present. Since in-depth interviews in this 
study mostly involved describing with depth and in details the current challenges and 
response approaches from respondents’ experiences, the minimum sample size that 
the research targeted at is six. 
After the survey, in-depth interviews with key “actors” were employed. The 
selected respondents were those who had/have been holding key positions in the 
organizations involved in planning and executing national infrastructure development 
plans. The sampling frame was thus the same as the questionnaire survey (see Section 
7.5.1 for sampling method). Snowball method was used to identify the respondents. 
Moreover, project-related documents including related reports, evaluations and other 
documentation would be collected as alternative sources for cross-checking.  
Data analysis for open-ended questions is challenging. One of the most 
difficult issues in analyzing open-ended survey responses is to choose an appropriate 
methodology. Broadly, two methodological approaches can be found in the literature 
on methods for analyzing free-flowing text: word-based analysis methods and code-
based analysis method (Ryan and Bernard, 2000). Word-based analysis methods, such 
as keywords in context, word counts, semantic networks and cognitive maps, use 
words as units of analysis. These methods can be used to capture relationships 
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between concepts by identifying co-occurrences of words or similarities in responses 
between individuals. They can be useful in analyzing both dense and sparse types of 
text (Carley, 1993; Stone, 1997; Jackson and Trochim, 2002). On the other hand, 
code-based analysis methods, such as grounded theory, traditional content analysis 
and schema analysis, use codes as units of analysis. These methods are often used in 
denser types of text. They are useful for organizing text data into manageable 
categories and making inference about a sample (Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1990). 
Since the study focuses more on making inference than on capturing relationships 
between concepts, the code-based analysis method is more suitable for this study. 
Among code-based approaches, thematic content analysis is typically used in 
analyzing verbal materials, although it can be used for nonverbal materials as well. 
The technique is used to extract desired information from large body of verbal 
materials by categorical coding schemes (Weber, 1990; Burnard, 1991). Although 
content analysis is mainly criticized due to its researcher-driven categorical coding 
schemes (Geer, 1988; Weber, 1990; Seidel and Kelle, 1995), the coding schemes in 
this research are developed from the survey. Thematic content analysis is used in this 
study to extract desired information from in-depth interviews to illustrate the various 
issues identified from the survey. 
 
7.7 Two-stage validation 
The first stage of validation involved quantitative validation via statistical tests 
applied to the research hypothesis (see Sections 8.3 and 8.4). Various statistical tests 
were carried out throughout data analysis, including the tests of significance of the 
correlation among groups of factors, the hypothesis test on the median value of 
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criticality of problems, the tests of the reliability and validity of the measurement 
model and the structural model. These tests are explained in Sections 8.3 and 8.4. 
In order to further enhance the validity of the research findings and 
recommendations, an independent check was undertaken at the end of the study (see 
Section 9.4). Besides the researcher, the research findings can generally be validated 
by research respondents or by people who are external to the study (Creswell and 
Miller, 2000). Respondent validation is relevant when the purpose of validation is to 
clarify perceptions of research participants. Using the method, research findings 
would be returned to research participants for their feedbacks. The results of the 
method depend to a great extent on the stability of respondents’ situation and views 
(Long and Johnson, 2000). 
 Research findings can also be validated by reviewers, colleagues and 
interested users, who are external to the study. Among these groups, interested groups 
are used with particular focus on the relevance of research findings and implications 
(Long and Johnson, 2000). Since the research findings and recommendations are 
relevant to the academic, public and private sectors, validation by these interested 
users is suitable. More specifically, the validation process was conducted through 
interviewing these concerned parties, including senior stakeholders from both the 
academic, public sector and industry communities. Notably, selected interviewees 
were not research participants. The number of interviewees to validate research 
findings varies from study to study. For instance, the study by Mustajab (2009) was 
backed by 22 interviews. Seven interviewees were mentioned by Marshall (2011). 
Imriyas (2007) contacted five interviewees to verify the research outcomes. In the 
study by Hossain (2000), three interviews were conducted to ensure the internal 
validity of the research findings. In this research, five interviews were conducted to 
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validate the research findings and recommendations. They are senior stakeholders 
with about 30 to 40 years of working experience. They have been engaging in the 
process of public investments in infrastructure since the mid-1990s. One of them was 
involved in the public sector, two in academics and two in the industry. They have 
been working in universities, research institutes, government agencies at ministerial 
level and the private sector. The highest educational qualification all of them hold is a 
doctorate. The interviews started with an explanation of the research findings. The 
interviewees were then asked about their feedback on the research recommendations. 
The discussion of their feedback is presented in Section 9.4 
 
7.8 Summary 
The selection of research methodology is discussed in this chapter. The methods and 
approaches used in this study adopt both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The 
type of research design, method of sampling, data collection and processing, the 
choice of statistical and data analysis technique used in this study are examined. The 
types of research designs adopted in this study include a longitudinal survey, a 
questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews. Major steps of the research designs are 
shown in Figure 7.2. These methods are complementary to each other in order to 




















Figure 7.2 Research design 
Longitudinal survey 
- To evaluate the level of efficiency of 
public investments in infrastructure in 
supporting trade and economic growth 
over time. 
Data collection: 
- Competitiveness index in terms of 
infrastructure quality and public expenditure 
on infrastructure investments on yearly basis. 
- Source of data: WEF’s Global 
Competiveness Reports and MoC, GSO. 
- To explore the key factors limiting the 
efficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure (using factor analysis) 
- To confirm the relationships between 
these key causal factors and the 
outcomes or effects (using SEM). 
35 problems identified from the literature 
review 
In-depth interviews 
Data collection  
- Open-ended questions. 
- Accompanied by case studies and program-
related documents, including final reports, 
evaluation reports, etc. 
- Population: using the same poplation used 
for questionnaire survey. 
- Sampling: using sampling frame of the list 
of related government agencies and 
registered firms; snowball method; selected 
interviewees holding key positions in these 
organizations..
- To make recommendations to 
improve government’s use of public 
investments in infrastructure. 
Questionnaire survey 
Data collection: 
- Structured questionnaire. 
- Population: government agencies and 
financial institutions, developers, 
contractors and traders involved in policy 
making and planning, and delivering as 
well as in utilizing infrastructure. 
- Sampling: at least 5 years of work 
experience and using sampling frame of 
the list of related government agencies and 
registered firms; and snowball method. 
Data analysis: 
- Rankings and mean ratings of problem 
occurrence and influence. 
- Factor analysis for exploratory study of 
key factors limiting the efficient use of 
public investments. 
- SEM for confirmatory study of the 
relationships between these key factors 
and the outcomes of the inefficient use of 
public investments in infrastructure. 
Data analysis:  
- Thematic content analysis and 
interpretation: the interviewees’ 
experience of major factors and their 
effects found from the questionnaire 
survey, and their recommendations to deal 
with these factors. 
- Document analysis. 
Validated by 
statistical tests 











- Public sector expenditure efficiency analysis. 





CHAPTER 8 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses data collected and discusses the results. The chapter starts with 
a study of the efficiency of public investments in infrastructure. Next, the survey data 
is analysed and hypotheses are tested using several statistical techniques. Results 
obtained from the survey are discussed and explained together with the interviews in 
the last section. The research framework is expected to emerge from the discussion. 
 
8.2 Longitudinal analysis 
The purpose of the analysis is to provide an overview of the level of efficiency of 
public investments in infrastructure to support trade and economic growth in Vietnam. 
Notably, the analysis does not attempt to formulate regression models to establish 
relationship between public investments in infrastructure and the ability of 
infrastructure to support trade and economic growth. Rather, it seeks to provide 
evidence that reflects the efficiency of public investments in infrastructure to support 
trade and economic growth over time. As explained in section 7.4, the efficiency of 
public investments in infrastructure to support trade and economic growth is 
measured by weighting the ability of infrastructure to support trade and economic 
growth by the amount of public investments in infrastructure used to achieve the 
ability (Afonso et al., 2005): 
ܧ ൌ ܣܨ  
Where: E: Efficiency of public investments in infrastructure to support trade 
and economic growth; 
A: Ability of infrastructure to support trade and economic growth; and 
  F: Public investments in infrastructure (as % of GDP). 
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The ability of infrastructure to support trade and economic growth (A) is 
measured by the competitiveness index of Vietnam in terms of infrastructure 
development as reported in the Global Competitiveness Reports published annually 
by the World Economic Forum (WEF). F is the public expenditure used to achieve the 
competiveness level of Vietnam in terms of infrastructure development. Government 
funding invested in infrastructure construction (F) is measured by state investments 
(as % of GDP) in electricity supply, transport and communications as reported in the 
Statistical Yearbooks of Vietnam. Collected data are given in Table 8.1.  
Table 8.1 Efficiency of public investments in infrastructure construction to support 





























1997 2.08  7.72%   
1998 3.22  7.85%   
1999 2.63  8.13%  46.54   
2000 2.1  7.81%  29.52  ‐17.02  1.46%  ‐1163.58  ‐11.64 
2001 2.2  7.74%  28.51  ‐1.01  0.60%  ‐167.53  ‐1.68 
2002 2.5  8.48%  31.85  3.34  0.13%  2515.50  25.16 
2003 2.7  7.62%  33.20  1.35  0.28%  478.31  4.78 
2004 2.6  7.84%  33.29  0.09  ‐0.32%  ‐27.94  ‐0.28 
2005 2.6  7.93%  33.61  0.32  ‐0.07%  ‐430.41  ‐4.30 
2006 2.6  7.41%  30.66  ‐2.96  0.75%  ‐396.32  ‐3.96 
2007 2.8  7.05%  36.76  6.10  ‐0.86%  ‐706.52  ‐7.07 
2008 2.86  6.21%  36.48  ‐0.28  0.22%  ‐124.13  ‐1.24 
2009 3  7.68%  37.85  1.37  0.09%  1583.94  15.84 
2010 3.56  7.07%  48.02  10.17  ‐0.51%  ‐1985.28  ‐19.85 
50.89  2.87  ‐0.36%  ‐799.00  ‐7.99 
*: Data collected from Global Competitiveness Reports issued by WEF from 1997 to 2010. 
#: Data collected from Statistical Yearbooks issued by GSO from 1999 to 2010. 
^: a 5-year lagged effect from government funding is applied. 
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Due to the time lag characteristic of construction outputs (Ofori, 1990), a 
lagged effect from investment on competitiveness is assumed in order to compute the 
efficiency indicator. As mentioned in Section 6.6.2.1, the five-year Socio-Economic 
Development Plan of Vietnam is accompanied by a Public Investment Program (PIP), 
which serves as the basis for the formulation of infrastructure investments (Pincus and 
Nguyen, 2004). Therefore, a time lag of five years is applicable in this study. For 
example, public investments in infrastructure in 1995 are assumed to affect the 
competitiveness of infrastructure in 1999. For example, 
E1999 = A1999/F1995 = 2.63/5.65% = 46.54 
∆F2000 = F1996-F1995 = 7.11% - 5.65% = 1.46% 
∆E2000 = F2000-F1999 = 29.52 – 46.54 = -17.2. 
The results shown in Table 8.1 indicated that efficiency of public investments 
in infrastructure increases across the years, i.e. ∆E=∆(A/F) >0 (except in 2000, 2001, 
2006 and 2008). To extract more information from the efficiency indicator, marginal 
effect of the public investments in infrastructure is computed. The marginal effect 
(∂E/∂F) is measured by the impact on efficiency of one-unit change in public 
investments in infrastructure. The marginal effect was divided by 100 for easy 
reference (see the last column in Table 8.1). As shown in Figure 8.1, the marginal 
effect peaked in 2001 and then went down from 2002 to 2007. The marginal effect 
peaked again in 2008 and then went down in 2009. The overall trend of the marginal 
effect (see red line in Figure 8.1) presents a declining trend. In other words, the 
efficiency of public investments in infrastructure to support trade and economic 
growth is falling. Since the marginal effect indicator has taken a weighted average of 
capital investment into consideration (i.e. one-unit change in public investments in 
infrastructure), the declining trend implies that there are issues other than capital 
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provision reducing the marginal effect. The efficiency problem implies that further 
study on what causal factors are and how to overcome them are necessary in Vietnam. 
 
Figure 8.1 Marginal effect of public investments in infrastructure for supporting trade 
and economic growth in Vietnam 
 
8.3 Factor analysis 
8.3.1 Sample profile 
The survey was conducted in Vietnam between March and June 2012. Questionnaires 
were directly sent to professionals in Hanoi and sent via email to professionals in Ho-
Chi-Minh City (see Section 7.5.1 for sampling method). In total, 319 questionnaires 
were sent out. There were 126 respondents returning their responses. The response 
rate is thus about 39%. The sample size is adequate for meaningful statistical analysis 
(Hair et al., 2010). Table 8.2 provides the characteristics of the respondents. Out of 
126 respondents, 39 respondents, accounting for 31% were from government agencies. 
Most of them are advisors, senior advisors and researchers. Two department heads 
and three department deputies participated in the survey. The remaining respondents 






































accounting for 69% of total respondents. Their professional and management levels 
are provided in Table 8.3. Out of 126 respondents, 16 respondents answered the last 
open-ended question about further issues other than those mentioned in the 
questionnaires by the researcher. The issues mentioned in these answers have been 
more or less captured in the questionnaires. As a result, these answers did not provide 
useful information for further understanding of issues under consideration. These 
answers were thus not used for further analysis. Three samples of questionnaire 
feedback are attached in Appendix 3. 








Government agencies 108 39 36% 31%
Non-government agencies 211 87 41% 69%
 Developers 19 19
 Consultants/Contractors 112 31
 Traders 37 16
 Financial institutions 43 21
Total 319 126 39% 100%





management Professionals Total 
Government agencies 5 15 19 39 
Percentage 13% 38% 49% 100% 
Non-government agencies 21 38 28 87 
Developers 9 5 5 19 
Consultants/Contractors 8 17 6 31 
Traders 2 9 5 16 
Financial institutions 2 7 12 21 




8.3.2 Ranking of problems’ occurrence and criticality 
From the literature review, 35 problems that would affect the efficient use of public 
investments in infrastructure were identified. They were approximately divided into 
the categories shown in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4 List of variables affecting the efficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure 








Limitations of forecasting methods and appraisal techniques X1 
Inadequate data X2 
Inherent problems in predicting the future and monetizing external 
and indirect effects X3 
Lack of experienced forecasters X4 




Political leaders and government bureaucrats make decisions in 
their personal, sectoral or regional interests (e.g. securing political 
positions or competing for scarce funds) as opposed to national 
goals 
X6 




Lack of consultation with the interested or affected individuals or 
groups about forecasting methods, criteria of project selection and 
the determination of planning objectives 
X8 
Lack of independent peer reviews and quality checks on forecasts 
and planning outcomes by independent-review bodies and scientific 
and professional community 
X9 
Lack of penal systems to enforce penalties on those that 




Poor communication between planning agency and the day-to-day 
decision-making machinery of government X11 
Lack of inter-ministerial and intersectoral coordination X12 
Lack of interaction between political leaders and planners with non-
governmental actors X13 
Incompetent and unqualified civil servants X14 
Complicated and bureaucratic administrative system X15 
Political 
commitment 
Lack of political will on the part of top leaders and high-level 
decision makers X16 
Changes in the political affiliations of the government responsible 
for the projects X17 
Political inconsistencies at national level and between different tiers 
of governments (central, regional, local) X18 
Lack of a high-powered government institution that provides an 
effective mechanism for implementing national infrastructure plans X19 
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Table 8.4 (Continued) 




Lack of transparency and competitiveness in bid processes X20 
Discretionary power of individual bureaucrats involved in award of 
contracts X21 
Inadequate financial and physical auditing X22 




Poor level of efficiency and quality of work X24 
Poor level of professionalism and entrepreneurship X25 
Resources shortages, especially in construction technology, 
management and finance X26 
Land 
acquisition 
Lack of a negotiating mechanism to make land acquisition 
compensation more market-oriented X27 
Bureaucracy in settling land disputes and claims X28 
Lack of a land acquisition compensation monitoring system X29 
Lack of clarity about valuation methods for compensation X30 
Lack of law enforcement to regulate the price of land acquired for 






Obsolescence of building regulations X32 
Changing and inconsistent law and regulations X33 
Ineffectiveness of implementation of existing statutes and codes X34 
Bureaucracy in formal procedures relating to infrastructure project 
planning, construction permission and administration X35 
 
The full rankings of problems in terms of their occurrence and criticality by 
non-government agencies and by government agencies are given in Tables 8.5 and 8.6. 
The rankings are based on sample median occurrence rating and median critical rating, 
using the following formula (Tan, 2007): 
݉ ൌ  ଵ௡∑ݔ௜  
where m is the sample median value, n is the sample size (n=39 for the government 
group and n = 87 for the non-government group), xi is the score rated by respondent i. 
For example, the median occurrence rating of X15 is computed as follows: 
m (of X15 by the non-government group) = 
ଵ
଼଻ ሺݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ ൅ ڮ൅ ݔ଼଻ሻ 
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= ଵ଼଻ ሺ4 ൅ 3 ൅ 4 ൅ڮ൅ 3 ൅ 3 ൅ 2ሻ ൌ 3.74. 
A similar method is applied for computing sample median critical rating. Results are 
provided in Tables 8.5 and 8.6. 
Table 8.5 Median occurrence rating of problems 
Ranking
Non-government agencies Government agencies 
Problems 
Median 
occurrence rating Problems 
Median 
occurrence rating 
1 X15 3.74 X4 3.23 
2 X23 3.60 X10 3.21 
3 X35 3.60 X28 3.21 
4 X28 3.57 X26 3.15 
5 X20 3.44 X30 3.15 
6 X30 3.25 X24 3.13 
7 X10 3.24 X27 3.10 
8 X24 3.22 X29 3.10 
9 X29 3.22 X3 3.08 
10 X5 3.18 X15 3.03 
11 X25 3.18 X5 2.97 
12 X27 3.16 X23 2.97 
13 X14 3.14 X25 2.97 
14 X26 3.07 X2 2.92 
15 X7 3.06 X9 2.90 
16 X31 3.05 X31 2.90 
17 X4 3.03 X35 2.77 
18 X9 3.02 X7 2.74 
19 X19 2.99 X14 2.74 
20 X6 2.93 X34 2.74 
21 X33 2.91 X20 2.72 
22 X3 2.90 X22 2.69 
23 X22 2.89 X1 2.62 
24 X21 2.87 X8 2.56 
25 X2 2.82 X12 2.54 
26 X1 2.76 X19 2.44 
27 X12 2.74 X6 2.38 
28 X13 2.74 X11 2.38 
29 X34 2.72 X13 2.36 
30 X8 2.59 X33 2.33 
31 X32 2.55 X21 2.21 
32 X18 2.37 X18 2.15 
33 X16 2.33 X32 2.15 
34 X11 2.30 X16 2.10 
35 X17 2.15 X17 2.08 
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Table 8.6 Median criticality rating of problems 
Ranking
Non-government agencies Government agencies 
Problems 
Median 
criticality rating Problems 
Median criticality 
rating 
1 X23 3.97 X26 3.67 
2 X35 3.92 X24 3.62 
3 X15 3.90 X23 3.59 
4 X28 3.83 X25 3.51 
5 X20 3.77 X29 3.44 
6 X24 3.68 X20 3.41 
7 X14 3.62 X30 3.38 
8 X30 3.59 X31 3.38 
9 X27 3.55 X27 3.36 
10 X25 3.49 X15 3.36 
11 X31 3.48 X35 3.36 
12 X29 3.46 X28 3.28 
13 X10 3.45 X7 3.26 
14 X7 3.37 X14 3.23 
15 X19 3.37 X22 3.21 
16 X22 3.36 X4 3.15 
17 X26 3.34 X10 3.15 
18 X4 3.34 X3 3.05 
19 X6 3.31 X34 3.03 
20 X33 3.31 X33 3.03 
21 X21 3.31 X2 3.00 
22 X5 3.23 X9 3.00 
23 X2 3.21 X6 3.00 
24 X9 3.20 X16 3.00 
25 X12 3.13 X5 2.97 
26 X34 3.09 X8 2.97 
27 X3 3.01 X19 2.95 
28 X1 2.98 X21 2.87 
29 X13 2.98 X32 2.85 
30 X16 2.97 X12 2.79 
31 X8 2.82 X1 2.77 
32 X32 2.80 X18 2.77 
33 X18 2.79 X13 2.72 
34 X11 2.76 X11 2.69 





From the ratings, many problems were ranked highly by both non-government 
and government actors. Examples are: 
- Complicated and bureaucratic administrative system in infrastructure 
development planning (X15); 
- Inadequate capacity of regulatory bodies to enforce regulations to reduce 
corruption in funded infrastructure construction projects (X23); 
- Bureaucracy in settling land disputes and claims (X28); 
- Lack of a negotiating mechanism to make land acquisition compensation more 
market-oriented (X27); 
- Poor level of efficiency and quality of work of local construction firms (X24); and 
- Lack of clarity about valuation methods for compensation for land acquired for 
infrastructure projects (X30). 
However, in order to ascertain the degree of agreement between the perceptions of the 
non-government agency group and government-agency group towards these problems, 
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient r is computed using the bivariate correlation 
procedures from SPSS. The Spearman rank correlation coefficients for ranking of the 
occurrence of problems and of the criticality of problems between the two groups are 
0.748 and 0.844 (with p = 0.00) respectively. With p < 0.01, there was a strong 
evidence to believe that the correlations are significant at the 1% significance level. 
The statistically significant correlation thus implies that there is a high degree of 
agreement between the two groups on the level of occurrence and criticality of 
problems. Thus, separate factor analyses for each group are not necessary to be 
performed (Hair et al., 2010).  
Among 35 problems, only problems with their degree of criticality perceived 
from moderate to very significant are selected for factor analysis in the following 
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section. These problems thus should have their median of criticality from 3 to 5 on a 
scale of 1-5. As a result, only the top ranking problems with the median critical 
ratings from 3 from the group of respondents combining both non-government and 
government agencies are selected for factor analysis. In other words, the median 
difference between these problems and “3” should be positive (Table 8.7). One-tailed 
hypothesis test on the median of criticality of these problems was used with test value 
of 3. The null hypothesis is H0: M = 3 and the alternative hypothesis H1: M < 3. The 
test statistic is (Tan, 2007): 
ݐ ൌ ௠ିଷ ௦ √௡⁄   
Where: m : sample median 
s : sample variance 
n : sample size 
Only problems with positive values of median difference (between the observed 
median and the test value of 3) and t values higher than the critical value at the 5% 
significance level are selected as critical factors for factor analysis. The test results on 
the median of critical ratings for each problem are computed using the one sample t-
test procedures in SPSS. The test results given in Table 8.7 show that the first 27 top 
ranked problems have positive values of median difference and the t values of these 
problems are higher than the critical value at the 5% significance level (–1.65). That 
means there is no evidence to reject H0 and accept H1. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that at the 0.05 level of significance there is no evidence to support the proposition 






Table 8.7 Hypothesis test on the median of criticality ratings 
 One-Sample Statistics Test Value = 3 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 




Mean t df 
Median 
Difference Lower Upper 
1 X23 3.85 1.066 .095 8.939 125 .849 .66 1.04
2 X35 3.75 .987 .088 8.481 125 .746 .57 .92
3 X15 3.73 .933 .083 8.784 125 .730 .57 .89
4 X20 3.66 .948 .084 7.800 125 .659 .49 .83
5 X24 3.66 .878 .078 8.423 125 .659 .50 .81
6 X28 3.66 1.021 .091 7.242 125 .659 .48 .84
7 X30 3.52 1.033 .092 5.691 125 .524 .34 .71
8 X14 3.50 1.101 .098 5.098 125 .500 .31 .69
9 X25 3.50 .927 .083 6.052 125 .500 .34 .66
10 X27 3.49 .978 .087 5.649 125 .492 .32 .66
11 X29 3.45 .985 .088 5.157 125 .452 .28 .63
12 X31 3.45 1.001 .089 5.074 125 .452 .28 .63
13 X26 3.44 .872 .078 5.719 125 .444 .29 .60
14 X10 3.36 .975 .087 4.110 125 .357 .19 .53
15 X7 3.33 1.066 .095 3.511 125 .333 .15 .52
16 X22 3.31 1.039 .093 3.344 125 .310 .13 .49
17 X4 3.29 1.011 .090 3.173 125 .286 .11 .46
18 X19 3.24 1.099 .098 2.433 125 .238 .04 .43
19 X33 3.22 1.019 .091 2.448 125 .222 .04 .40
20 X6 3.21 1.211 .108 1.987 125 .214 .00 .43
21 X21 3.17 .989 .088 1.983 125 .175 .00 .35
22 X5 3.15 1.089 .097 1.555 125 .151 -.04 .34
23 X2 3.14 1.056 .094 1.518 125 .143 -.04 .33
24 X9 3.13 .950 .085 1.595 125 .135 -.03 .30
25 X34 3.07 .989 .088 .810 125 .071 -.10 .25
26 X3 3.02 .907 .081 .295 125 .024 -.14 .18
27 X12 3.02 1.000 .089 .267 125 .024 -.15 .20
28 X16 2.98 1.039 .093 -.257 125 -.024 -.21 .16
29 X1 2.91 .938 .084 -1.044 125 -.087 -.25 .08
30 X13 2.90 .875 .078 -1.324 125 -.103 -.26 .05
31 X8 2.87 .880 .078 -1.722 125 -.135 -.29 .02
32 X32 2.82 1.061 .095 -1.931 125 -.183 -.37 .00
33 X18 2.79 1.100 .098 -2.187 125 -.214 -.41 -.02
34 X11 2.74 .981 .087 -2.996 125 -.262 -.43 -.09
35 X17 2.47 1.001 .089 -5.960 125 -.532 -.71 -.36
 
The remaining 8 problems were identified as unimportant by non-government 
and government agencies in infrastructure development in Vietnam, including: 
 Limitations of forecasting methods and appraisal techniques (X1); 
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 Lack of consultation with the interested or affected individuals or groups about 
forecasting methods, criteria of project selection and the determination of 
planning objectives (X8); 
 Poor communication between planning agency and the day-to-day decision-
making machinery of government (X11); 
 Lack of interaction between political leaders and planners with non-governmental 
actors (X13); 
 Lack of political will on the part of top leaders and high-level decision makers 
(X16); 
 Changes in the political affiliations of the government responsible for the projects 
(X17); 
 Political inconsistencies at national level and between different tiers of 
governments (central, regional, local) (X18); and 
 Obsolescence of building regulations (X32). 
Under “Capacity for estimating and monitoring rates of return” category, 
limitations of forecasting methods and appraisal techniques (X1) were considered as 
not having critical impact on the efficiency of government-funded infrastructure 
construction in Vietnam. This could be explained that forecasting methods and 
techniques are often expected to be refined over time. Better forecasting methods and 
techniques in national infrastructure development plans would have been developed 
(Flyvbjerg, 2007). Forecasting techniques are thus not a major concern among 
respondents. 
Under “Institutional weaknesses in planning” category, poor communication 
between planning agency and the day-to-day decision-making machinery of 
government (X11) and lack of interaction between political leaders and planners with 
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non-governmental actors (X13) have somewhat critical influence on the efficiency of 
government-funded infrastructure construction in Vietnam. As described in Chapter 6, 
the planning process involved a wide range of actors. This implies that there are links 
between planning agency and other part of government machinery, and non-
governmental actors as well. As a result, X11 and X13 were not important factors for 
further analysis. 
Problems X16, X17 and X18 under the “Political commitment” category are 
eliminated from further factor analysis. This can be explained that having only one 
party, the Communist Party of Vietnam, since independence has ensured the 
consistency of the political system in Vietnam. With all senior and top government 
positions occupied by party members, decisions made are committed to the direction 
of the Party (Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
Finally, “Obsolescence of building regulations” (X32) is not identified as one 
of the major issues affecting the efficiency of government-funded infrastructure 
construction in Vietnam. This suggests that a number of updates of appropriate 
standards, codes and regulations in recent years have eased the concern about 
obsolescence. The application of relevant technical standards such as ISO, British, 
American, French, and Japanese standards in Vietnam have also helped improve the 
industry practices (Chiang et al., 2004). 
 
8.3.3 Factor analysis of problems’ occurrence 
8.3.3.1 Assumptions in factor analysis 
As mentioned earlier, the top 27 high-ranked problems in terms of their criticality 
were selected for factor analysis. The purpose of this analysis is to capture the 
multivariate relationship existing among problems in terms of their degree of 
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occurrence. All measured variables are metric. The sample constitutes a homogeneous 
set of perceptions. The sample size of 126 provides an adequate basis for the 
computation of the correlations between variables (Hair et al., 2010). 
Several tests are required to justify the application of factor analysis. The 
purpose of these tests, including visual inspection, the Bartlett test of sphericity and 
the measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) is to ensure that the data matrix has 
sufficient correlations for factor analysis to proceed (Hair et al., 2010). The test 
results are given in Tables 8.8 and 8.9 using factor analysis procedures in SPSS. 
Visual inspection of the correlations among the 27 variables reveals a 
substantial number of correlations greater than 0.30 and all correlations are significant 
at 5% level (See Table 8.8). The partial correlations also show no value greater than 
0.5, indicating that factor analysis is appropriate (see Table 8.8). The value of the 
Bartlett test of sphericity is 2275.5 and the correlation matrix has significant 
correlations. The overall MSA value is 0.91 and the MSA value for each variable is 
more than 0.8, meeting the fundamental requirements for factor analysis (see Table 
8.9). Overall, the results of these tests suggest that a structure exists to group variables 




Table 8.8 Correlation matrix 
 
Variables X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X9 X10 X12 X14 X15 X19 X20 X21 X22 X23 X24 X25 X26 X27 X28 X29 X30 X31 X33 X34 X35
X2 1.00 .45 .49 .49 .39 .47 .46 .40 .55 .36 .30 .37 .33 .27 .46 .36 .27 .33 .36 .47 .33 .31 .42 .42 .37 .54 .36
X3 .45 1.00 .46 .47 .37 .39 .41 .34 .35 .26 .22 .24 .23 .22 .44 .44 .24 .44 .39 .41 .33 .25 .31 .36 .19 .49 .32
X4 .49 .46 1.00 .48 .39 .45 .53 .39 .47 .42 .35 .29 .33 .22 .44 .39 .26 .37 .48 .49 .35 .38 .34 .28 .21 .57 .39
X5 .49 .47 .48 1.00 .50 .49 .58 .43 .56 .50 .47 .57 .39 .27 .47 .56 .37 .42 .41 .44 .46 .36 .48 .55 .38 .61 .46
X6 .39 .37 .39 .50 1.00 .71 .53 .43 .55 .63 .47 .41 .53 .37 .53 .48 .41 .48 .43 .42 .44 .37 .44 .39 .47 .50 .45
X7 .47 .39 .45 .49 .71 1.00 .54 .41 .52 .55 .50 .39 .53 .34 .53 .45 .45 .51 .45 .42 .46 .44 .55 .38 .44 .52 .52
X9 .46 .41 .53 .58 .53 .54 1.00 .54 .58 .53 .38 .52 .39 .33 .62 .45 .38 .48 .42 .40 .31 .36 .46 .52 .45 .62 .44
X10 .40 .34 .39 .43 .43 .41 .54 1.00 .44 .49 .42 .34 .38 .32 .54 .52 .42 .35 .40 .35 .33 .33 .36 .39 .38 .49 .37
X12 .55 .35 .47 .56 .55 .52 .58 .44 1.00 .61 .54 .49 .54 .44 .58 .53 .28 .37 .30 .47 .48 .43 .47 .52 .44 .61 .47
X14 .36 .26 .42 .50 .63 .55 .53 .49 .61 1.00 .59 .45 .59 .44 .62 .61 .49 .56 .50 .34 .49 .40 .42 .47 .61 .45 .46
X15 .30 .22 .35 .47 .47 .50 .38 .42 .54 .59 1.00 .41 .57 .39 .46 .61 .33 .38 .32 .35 .52 .33 .42 .36 .49 .49 .66
X19 .37 .24 .29 .57 .41 .39 .52 .34 .49 .45 .41 1.00 .47 .41 .49 .44 .31 .38 .33 .46 .36 .36 .37 .49 .40 .50 .38
X20 .33 .23 .33 .39 .53 .53 .39 .38 .54 .59 .57 .47 1.00 .72 .61 .67 .41 .46 .41 .52 .61 .43 .58 .43 .55 .53 .66
X21 .27 .22 .22 .27 .37 .34 .33 .32 .44 .44 .39 .41 .72 1.00 .48 .54 .33 .38 .37 .44 .35 .25 .37 .20 .42 .42 .49
X22 .46 .44 .44 .47 .53 .53 .62 .54 .58 .62 .46 .49 .61 .48 1.00 .58 .38 .57 .50 .41 .36 .32 .42 .50 .48 .58 .46
X23 .36 .44 .39 .56 .48 .45 .45 .52 .53 .61 .61 .44 .67 .54 .58 1.00 .42 .44 .50 .47 .55 .38 .44 .46 .45 .51 .68
X24 .27 .24 .26 .37 .41 .45 .38 .42 .28 .49 .33 .31 .41 .33 .38 .42 1.00 .67 .52 .37 .35 .28 .45 .37 .46 .30 .33
X25 .33 .44 .37 .42 .48 .51 .48 .35 .37 .56 .38 .38 .46 .38 .57 .44 .67 1.00 .61 .40 .38 .35 .53 .45 .50 .53 .44
X26 .36 .39 .48 .41 .43 .45 .42 .40 .30 .50 .32 .33 .41 .37 .50 .50 .52 .61 1.00 .36 .33 .26 .39 .34 .39 .48 .38
X27 .47 .41 .49 .44 .42 .42 .40 .35 .47 .34 .35 .46 .52 .44 .41 .47 .37 .40 .36 1.00 .59 .45 .58 .54 .28 .60 .45
X28 .33 .33 .35 .46 .44 .46 .31 .33 .48 .49 .52 .36 .61 .35 .36 .55 .35 .38 .33 .59 1.00 .50 .64 .55 .39 .49 .61
X29 .31 .25 .38 .36 .37 .44 .36 .33 .43 .40 .33 .36 .43 .25 .32 .38 .28 .35 .26 .45 .50 1.00 .68 .61 .29 .48 .43
X30 .42 .31 .34 .48 .44 .55 .46 .36 .47 .42 .42 .37 .58 .37 .42 .44 .45 .53 .39 .58 .64 .68 1.00 .63 .42 .58 .52
X31 .42 .36 .28 .55 .39 .38 .52 .39 .52 .47 .36 .49 .43 .20 .50 .46 .37 .45 .34 .54 .55 .61 .63 1.00 .37 .50 .42
X33 .37 .19 .21 .38 .47 .44 .45 .38 .44 .61 .49 .40 .55 .42 .48 .45 .46 .50 .39 .28 .39 .29 .42 .37 1.00 .44 .48
X34 .54 .49 .57 .61 .50 .52 .62 .49 .61 .45 .49 .50 .53 .42 .58 .51 .30 .53 .48 .60 .49 .48 .58 .50 .44 1.00 .59





Table 8.8 (Continued) 
 
Variables X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X9 X10 X12 X14 X15 X19 X20 X21 X22 X23 X24 X25 X26 X27 X28 X29 X30 X31 X33 X34 X35
X2 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X3 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00
X4 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00
X5 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X6 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X7 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X9 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X10 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X12 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X14 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X15 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X19 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X20 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X21 .00 .01 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00
X22 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X23 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X24 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X25 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X26 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X27 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X28 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X29 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X30 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X31 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X33 .00 .02 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
X34 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00






Table 8.9 Anti-image correlation 
 
a the measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) 
Var. X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X9 X10 X12 X14 X15 X19 X20 X21 X22 X23 X24 X25 X26 X27 X28 X29 X30 X31 X33 X34 X35
X2 .928a -.155 -.178 -.073 .062 -.161 .128 -.090 -.245 .029 .124 -.048 .100 -.015 -.067 .061 -.001 .115 -.035 -.113 .100 .119 -.117 -.079 -.202 -.035 -.077
X3 -.155 .897a -.133 -.121 -.082 -.094 .000 -.014 .040 .194 .100 .120 .167 -.071 -.113 -.273 .120 -.256 .023 -.033 -.134 .017 .098 -.071 .032 -.080 .075
X4 -.178 -.133 .846a -.155 .117 .024 -.285 .002 -.088 -.153 -.084 .162 -.094 .205 -.043 .130 .037 -.002 -.291 -.311 -.027 -.292 .166 .352 .199 -.064 -.053
X5 -.073 -.121 -.155 .928a -.089 -.049 -.055 .040 -.027 -.045 -.039 -.338 .121 .047 .116 -.248 -.092 .083 .062 .168 -.049 .189 -.149 -.177 .024 -.203 .048
X6 .062 -.082 .117 -.089 .945a -.432 -.099 -.050 -.095 -.212 .024 .029 -.102 .048 .029 .035 .028 -.014 -.051 -.123 -.008 -.027 .071 .079 -.026 -.008 .031
X7 -.161 -.094 .024 -.049 -.432 .933a -.110 .046 -.029 -.024 -.121 .008 -.086 .117 -.099 .160 -.114 .004 -.085 .010 .002 -.131 -.131 .194 .061 .078 -.137
X9 .128 .000 -.285 -.055 -.099 -.110 .915a -.171 -.124 -.060 .175 -.188 .202 -.092 -.178 .028 -.055 .063 .085 .106 .185 .184 -.168 -.223 -.115 -.129 -.166
X10 -.090 -.014 .002 .040 -.050 .046 -.171 .934a .068 -.045 -.122 .064 .112 -.042 -.206 -.172 -.259 .206 -.007 .041 -.018 -.086 .001 .010 .001 -.164 .089
X12 -.245 .040 -.088 -.027 -.095 -.029 -.124 .068 .949a -.176 -.168 .005 -.008 -.171 -.059 -.062 .035 .074 .218 .050 -.081 -.015 .032 -.146 .042 -.190 .145
X14 .029 .194 -.153 -.045 -.212 -.024 -.060 -.045 -.176 .925a -.182 .020 -.061 -.037 -.086 -.191 -.011 -.201 -.083 .150 -.172 -.115 .181 -.085 -.268 .141 .234
X15 .124 .100 -.084 -.039 .024 -.121 .175 -.122 -.168 -.182 .935a -.123 .035 .067 -.011 -.133 .010 .001 .107 .041 -.038 .135 -.082 .040 -.083 -.042 -.345
X19 -.048 .120 .162 -.338 .029 .008 -.188 .064 .005 .020 -.123 .925a -.103 -.099 -.061 .053 .027 -.046 -.048 -.192 .022 -.151 .208 -.071 -.032 -.039 .094
X20 .100 .167 -.094 .121 -.102 -.086 .202 .112 -.008 -.061 .035 -.103 .910a -.474 -.313 -.184 -.066 .117 .085 .008 -.183 .062 -.227 -.028 -.127 -.049 -.169
X21 -.015 -.071 .205 .047 .048 .117 -.092 -.042 -.171 -.037 .067 -.099 -.474 .879a -.002 -.063 .012 -.053 -.133 -.225 .147 -.055 -.001 .312 -.002 .028 -.082
X22 -.067 -.113 -.043 .116 .029 -.099 -.178 -.206 -.059 -.086 -.011 -.061 -.313 -.002 .939a -.083 .165 -.231 -.031 .059 .122 .126 .092 -.193 .017 -.056 .125
X23 .061 -.273 .130 -.248 .035 .160 .028 -.172 -.062 -.191 -.133 .053 -.184 -.063 -.083 .923a -.063 .128 -.224 -.107 .002 -.071 .084 .032 .085 .141 -.339
X24 -.001 .120 .037 -.092 .028 -.114 -.055 -.259 .035 -.011 .010 .027 -.066 .012 .165 -.063 .884a -.482 -.153 -.171 -.001 .032 -.037 -.010 -.114 .263 .072
X25 .115 -.256 -.002 .083 -.014 .004 .063 .206 .074 -.201 .001 -.046 .117 -.053 -.231 .128 -.482 .893a -.178 .062 .088 .066 -.218 -.047 -.066 -.209 -.122
X26 -.035 .023 -.291 .062 -.051 -.085 .085 -.007 .218 -.083 .107 -.048 .085 -.133 -.031 -.224 -.153 -.178 .922a .119 -.009 .137 -.048 -.107 -.025 -.162 .057
X27 -.113 -.033 -.311 .168 -.123 .010 .106 .041 .050 .150 .041 -.192 .008 -.225 .059 -.107 -.171 .062 .119 .901a -.236 .127 -.136 -.267 .082 -.234 .099
X28 .100 -.134 -.027 -.049 -.008 .002 .185 -.018 -.081 -.172 -.038 .022 -.183 .147 .122 .002 -.001 .088 -.009 -.236 .937a .035 -.234 -.129 -.005 .041 -.223
X29 .119 .017 -.292 .189 -.027 -.131 .184 -.086 -.015 -.115 .135 -.151 .062 -.055 .126 -.071 .032 .066 .137 .127 .035 .861a -.426 -.379 .013 -.111 -.078
X30 -.117 .098 .166 -.149 .071 -.131 -.168 .001 .032 .181 -.082 .208 -.227 -.001 .092 .084 -.037 -.218 -.048 -.136 -.234 -.426 .909a -.100 -.012 -.070 .101
X31 -.079 -.071 .352 -.177 .079 .194 -.223 .010 -.146 -.085 .040 -.071 -.028 .312 -.193 .032 -.010 -.047 -.107 -.267 -.129 -.379 -.100 .883a .039 .116 -.062
X33 -.202 .032 .199 .024 -.026 .061 -.115 .001 .042 -.268 -.083 -.032 -.127 -.002 .017 .085 -.114 -.066 -.025 .082 -.005 .013 -.012 .039 .949a -.082 -.109
X34 -.035 -.080 -.064 -.203 -.008 .078 -.129 -.164 -.190 .141 -.042 -.039 -.049 .028 -.056 .141 .263 -.209 -.162 -.234 .041 -.111 -.070 .116 -.082 .939a -.196
X35 -.077 .075 -.053 .048 .031 -.137 -.166 .089 .145 .234 -.345 .094 -.169 -.082 .125 -.339 .072 -.122 .057 .099 -.223 -.078 .101 -.062 -.109 -.196 .910a
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8.3.3.2 Choosing factor models and number of factors 
With p variables and k common factors to be determined and a unique factor δ, the 
factor analytic model can be written as: 
X1 = l11F1 + l12F2 + … + l1kFk + δ1 
X2 = l21F1 + l22F2 + … + l2kFk + δ2 
… 
Xp = lp1F1 + lp2F2 + … + lpkFk + δp (Tan, 2007) 
In this study, p = 27 and Fs are common factors to be determined. The coefficients (ls) 
are called factor loadings since they indicate the degree of association of each factor 
to each variable. The process of estimation factor loadings starts with determining the 
number of factor to be retained. Principle component analysis was used to extract 
factors. The results are shown in Table 8.10. 
Table 8.10 Component analysis 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 12.595 46.649 46.649 
2 1.626 6.022 52.670 
3 1.490 5.517 58.187 
4 1.227 4.544 62.731 
5 1.046 3.875 66.607 
6 .900 3.333 69.940 
7 .803 2.975 72.915 
8 .709 2.625 75.539 
9 .639 2.365 77.905 
10 .633 2.344 80.248 
11 .610 2.258 82.507 
12 .559 2.069 84.576 
13 .469 1.736 86.312 
14 .424 1.572 87.883 
15 .412 1.526 89.410 
16 .391 1.448 90.858 
17 .367 1.359 92.216 
18 .326 1.207 93.424 
19 .283 1.048 94.472 
20 .267 .990 95.461 
21 .237 .878 96.339 
22 .207 .765 97.104 
23 .205 .760 97.865 
24 .171 .634 98.499 
25 .162 .601 99.100 
26 .131 .486 99.586 




According to the latent root criterion, only the factors having eigenvalues 
greater than 1 are considered to be retained. As shown in Table 8.10, there are five 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. The five factors represent about 67% of the 
variance of the 27 variables, meeting the requirement of total variance explained. As a 
result, five factors are retained for the computation of factor matrix of loadings. 
Results in Table 8.11 present the unrotated component analysis factor matrix for the 
five factors that are extracted. The numbers shown in the first five columns of the 
Table are factor loadings of each variable on each of the factors. Given the sample 
size of 126, factor loadings of 0.5 or higher will be considered significant for factor 
interpretation (Hair et al., 2010).  As shown in Table 8.11, all variables have high 
loadings. However, factor interpretation would be difficult since all variables have 
high loadings only on the first factor, and one variable (X24) have cross-loadings. 
Hence, factor rotation should be used to improve the interpretation by resulting in 
more meaningful factor pattern (Hair et al., 2010). Table 8.11 also provides the 
communalities of the variables. Communality of each variable reflects the amount of 
variance accounted for by the factor solution for each variable. For variables to meet 
the acceptance levels of explanation, at least one-half of the variance of each variable 
in this study should be taken into account. In other words, communality of each 
variable should be at least 0.5. There is only variable X10 having communality lower 








Table 8.11 Factor matrix 
Factor Communality
1 2 3 4 5 
X2 .612 .394 .020 -.146 .036 .553 
X3 .537 .460 .124 .006 .364 .648 
X4 .606 .423 .088 -.110 .260 .634 
X5 .718 .264 -.007 -.122 -.156 .625 
X6 .715 -.038 .168 -.026 -.155 .566 
X7 .731 .024 .102 .067 -.086 .557 
X9 .721 .269 .202 -.117 -.238 .703 
X10 .626 .093 .216 -.092 -.094 .464 
X12 .744 .081 -.084 -.327 -.188 .710 
X14 .757 -.223 .231 -.031 -.243 .736 
X15 .676 -.310 -.059 -.249 -.054 .622 
X19 .632 .017 -.047 -.176 -.263 .502 
X20 .760 -.442 -.137 -.094 .156 .826 
X21 .585 -.430 .036 -.197 .321 .671 
X22 .754 .009 .260 -.140 -.028 .657 
X23 .764 -.213 .008 -.165 .199 .695 
X24 .585 -.174 .297 .536 -.024 .747 
X25 .692 -.039 .298 .443 .073 .770 
X26 .629 .035 .383 .287 .264 .696 
X27 .676 .156 -.330 .075 .271 .669 
X28 .685 -.143 -.437 .108 .109 .704 
X29 .597 .091 -.479 .261 -.166 .689 
X30 .723 .002 -.381 .351 -.037 .793 
X31 .679 .185 -.324 .220 -.299 .739 
X33 .640 -.330 .193 .034 -.228 .609 
X34 .787 .235 -.076 -.116 .117 .707 
X35 .726 -.251 -.198 -.132 .211 .691 
VARIMAX was used to rotate factors and estimate rotated factor loadings for 
each variable. As shown in Table 8.12, the rotated factor solution improves the 
structure considerably. There are no variables cross-loading on two factors. All 
variables have sufficient communality, which is more than 0.5. Moreover, all of the 
loadings above 0.5 are redistributed among factors rather than gathering in one single 
factor. Variable X7 does not have high loadings (loadings less than 0.5), thus is not 
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considered in the interpretation of factors. Rearranging the factor loadings, the pattern 
emerges (see Table 8.13). 
Table 8.12 Rotated factor-loading matrix 
Rotated Factor Matrix 
Factor Communality 
1 2 3 4 5 
X2 .397 .096 .209 .585 .066 .556 
X3 .089 .094 .116 .759 .211 .651 
X4 .232 .153 .136 .722 .135 .636 
X5 .564 .145 .302 .432 .122 .632 
X6 .551 .281 .169 .218 .344 .577 
X7 .467 .253 .260 .282 .373 .568 
X9 .658 .081 .168 .415 .237 .695 
X12 .649 .347 .268 .320 -.024 .716 
X14 .623 .384 .139 .066 .422 .736 
X15 .450 .604 .195 .068 .099 .620 
X19 .597 .240 .258 .168 .071 .515 
X20 .270 .775 .298 .084 .235 .824 
X21 .139 .768 .022 .141 .199 .669 
X22 .528 .360 .061 .362 .327 .650 
X23 .292 .659 .192 .298 .224 .695 
X24 .161 .158 .239 .050 .796 .745 
X25 .227 .186 .221 .265 .757 .777 
X26 .127 .239 .047 .424 .665 .698 
X27 .072 .358 .536 .484 .108 .667 
X28 .128 .494 .633 .173 .122 .705 
X29 .214 .132 .777 .128 .112 .696 
X30 .182 .258 .753 .182 .304 .792 
X31 .416 .043 .705 .188 .177 .739 
X33 .518 .384 .128 -.067 .423 .615 
X34 .379 .325 .339 .570 .133 .707 







Table 8.13 Rearrangement of rotated factor matrix 
Rotated Factor Matrixa 
Factor 


























a Loading less than 0.5 are not shown and variables are sorted by highest loading 
As shown in Table 8.13, with VARIMAX rotation, the factor structure for the 
remaining 25 variables is now defined, comprising five distinct groups of variables, 
which can be utilized in further data analysis. Factor 1 is heavily loaded on variables: 
- Lack of inter-ministerial and intersectoral coordination (X12); 
- Political leaders and government bureaucrats make decisions in their personal, 
sectoral or regional interests (for example securing political positions or 
competing for scarce funds) as opposed to national goals (X6); 




- Lack of independent peer reviews and quality checks on forecasts and planning 
outcomes by independent-review bodies and scientific and professional 
community (X9); 
- Lack of a high-powered government institution that provides an effective 
mechanism for implementing national infrastructure plans (X19); 
- Inadequacy in ex post analysis on whether projects meet objectives (X5);  
- Inadequate financial and physical auditing for infrastructure construction (X22); 
and 
- Changing and inconsistent law and regulations in infrastructure construction (X33). 
These variables center on issues relating to the government’s capacity in planning, 
coordinating and monitoring infrastructure development, and commitment of political 
leaders. Factor 1, therefore, can be called insufficient institutional capacity of the 
government. 
Factor 2 is characterized by variables: 
- Lack of transparency and competitiveness in bid processes (X20); 
- Discretionary power of individual bureaucrats involved in award of contracts 
(X21); 
- Bureaucracy in formal procedures relating to infrastructure project planning, 
construction permission and administration (X35); 
- Inadequate capacity of regulatory bodies to enforce regulations of corruption 
(X23); and 




These variables describe weaknesses in transparency and accountability in 
infrastructure development. Factor 2 can thus be called lack of transparency and 
accountability in infrastructure development. 
Factor 3 represents the group of five variables, including 
- Lack of a land acquisition compensation monitoring system (X29); 
- Lack of clarity about valuation methods for compensation (X30); 
- Lack of law enforcement to regulate the price of land acquired for infrastructure 
projects (X31); 
- Bureaucracy in settling land disputes and claims (X28); and 
- Lack of a negotiating mechanism to make land acquisition compensation more 
market-oriented (X27). 
Straightforwardly, Factor 3 can be named as lack of an effective land acquisition 
framework. 
Factor 4 is defined by variables: 
- Inherent problems in predicting the future and monetizing external and indirect 
effects (X3); 
- Lack of experienced forecasters (X4); 
- Inadequate data (X2); and 
- Ineffectiveness of implementation of existing statutes and codes in infrastructure 
construction (X34). 
Since X34 has the lowest loading among these variables, and all variables X2, X3 and 
X4 refers to issues related to the capacity of forecasting, Factor 4 is named as 
inadequate forecasting capacity.  
Factor 5 is highly loaded on variables: 
- Poor level of efficiency and quality of work (X24); 
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- Poor level of professionalism and entrepreneurship (X25); and 
- Resources shortages, especially in construction technology, management and 
finance (X26). 
Factor 5, thus, is called insufficient building capacity of local firms. 
 
8.3.3.3 Factor interpretation 
Factor 1 Insufficient institutional capacity of the government 
This factor raises questions about the institutional capacity and political leaders’ 
commitment. The key question of such capacity lies in the ability of the government 
to create a strong planning authority for spearheading infrastructure development. 
Strong government leadership and commitment are considered crucial in determining 
infrastructure development strategies (Mody, 1997). However, several variables (X6, 
X9, X12, X14, X19) included in this factor suggests that there is a lack of commitment to 
national goals and planning agencies in Vietnam are fragmented. As a result, they fail 
to serve as focal points for inter-ministerial and inter-agency coordination, and as 
vehicles that enable political leaders and government bureaucrats to develop 
collaboration in infrastructure development. The insufficient institutional capacity 
also restricts planning agencies to determine priorities and organize resources with a 
broader vision. Other variables of Factor 1 emphasize on the limit of monitoring 
aspect of institutional capacity. Two constraints in this aspect are highlighted, 
including lack of ex post analysis on whether projects meet objectives (X5), and 
insufficient financial and physical auditing for infrastructure construction (X22). With 
these constraints, planning agencies are prevented from being well informed of how 
the plans are implemented and how the resources are allocated. Planning outcomes 
are difficult to achieve without ongoing assessment of the effectiveness of plan 
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implementation. The deficiencies in government capacities become more critical in 
such a developing country as Vietnam where the government still account for a 
majority of funding invested in infrastructure construction. In addition, changing and 
inconsistent law and regulations in infrastructure construction (X33) also reflects the 
weaknesses of the institutions in supporting efficient infrastructure delivery. 
Factor 2 Lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure development 
Factor 2 directs attention to areas associated with transparency and accountability. 
Variables with high loadings on Factor 2 include the lack of transparency and 
competitiveness in bid processes (X20), the abuse of power by the bureaucrats 
involved in contract awarding (X21) and the weak enforcement abilities of regulatory 
bodies (X23). The survey evidence also classifies bureaucracy in administrative system 
and formal procedures relating to infrastructure construction into this factor group 
(X15 and X35). The occurrence of these problems highly correlates with each other, 
implying the low level of transparency and accountability in funded infrastructure 
construction in Vietnam. The variables highlighted in this factor suggest that the lack 
of accountability can be found in all stages of infrastructure construction from 
government planning, contract awarding to the execution of physical facilities. The 
consequences of this factor would range from the low efficiency of services delivered 
by government agencies to the increasing bureaucratic corruption in infrastructure 
construction. Corruption in infrastructure construction is found to be significant 
(Kenny, 2007). More importantly, it would affect the quality of infrastructure 
construction and ultimately on the delivery of infrastructure services. The lack of 
transparency and accountability thus can have significantly negative impact on the 
efficiency of funded infrastructure construction. 
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Factor 3 Lack of an effective land acquisition framework 
The factor group describes problems with the current framework of land acquisition 
for infrastructure construction in Vietnam. The survey evidence identifies that land 
acquisition problems are among those having the highest degree of occurrence. Two 
major aspects contributing to the factor include land prices and regulations. With land 
prices, the attention focuses on approach to valuation, and methods of valuation and 
monitoring (X27, X30, X29). It is suggested that the current approach to valuation does 
not adequately reflect the market price of land. Methods of valuation are not clearly 
defined and a monitoring system is not in place to ensure that the land owner gets the 
correct value for the land. The factor also raises concerns about the regulatory 
framework used to control land price and the process of acquisition (X28, X31). 
Increasing land demand for infrastructure would boost land price to an unreasonably 
high level, thus requiring government to have a control policy. As a result, lack of 
tools for government to improve market efficiency for land acquired for infrastructure 
could make it hard to meet land demand driven by rapid growth. Finally, bureaucracy 
in setting land disputes and claims is listed in this factor. The presence of the issue 
implies that the current land management practices could pose significant risks to the 
success of the land acquisition process. 
Factor 4 Inadequate forecasting capacity 
This factor presents deficiencies in forecasting for government planning. Attention is 
directed to inherent problems in forecasting, and concerns about input data and human 
resources (X2, X3, X4). The existence of inherent problems in predicting the future and 
monetizing external and indirect effects reduces forecast accuracy. As Vietnam is 
open to international trade, aid and foreign investments, the country is more 
vulnerable to external economic disturbances. Unanticipated external effects can thus 
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induce serious errors in forecasting. The statistical results also placed inadequate data 
and lack of experienced forecasters in this factor group. This reveals problems in the 
quality of statistical data and planning personnel used in the formulation of 
development plans in Vietnam. Interestingly, X34 is also included in this factor. 
Collectively, these problems diminish the government’s forecasting ability and 
subsequently the value of development plans. 
Factor 5 Insufficient building capacity of local firms 
Variables highly loading on this factor emphasize on issues with local construction 
firms in Vietnam. The statistical results support the view that local construction firm 
problems can be reflected by problems of construction quality, problems of 
professionalism and problems of resource shortages in construction technology, 
management and finance (X24, X25, X26). Taken together these problems enhance the 
understanding of building capacity of local construction firms in meeting growing 
demand for infrastructure construction. 
 
8.4 Structural equation modeling (SEM) 
8.4.1 Hypotheses and the model 
In Section 8.2, the study discovered that the efficiency of public investments in 
infrastructure construction to support trade and economic growth in Vietnam is falling. 
The objective of this stage of data analysis is to capture the relationship between 
causal factors and the outcomes of the inefficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the unexpected outcomes refer to the 
occurrence of the following: 
- Poorly selected infrastructure projects (IU1); 
- Poorly executed and ineffective infrastructure projects (IU2); and 
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- Waste of national resources in funded infrastructure projects (IU3). 
Results of the survey have shown that IU3 (Waste of national resources) and 
IU2 (Poorly executed and ineffective infrastructure projects) were rated as having 
moderate to high occurrence. The considerable occurrence of IU1 (Poorly selected 
infrastructure projects) was also observed (Table 8.14). 
Table 8.14 Ranking of the outcomes of the inefficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure 
Rank Outcomes of the inefficient use of public investments Median SD 
1 Waste of national resources in funded infrastructure projects 3.4 1.1 
2 Poorly executed and ineffective infrastructure construction 3.1 0.87 
3 Poorly selected infrastructure projects 2.4 0.89 
 
From the exploratory factor analysis, five key factors could be extracted from 
variables that might be related to the outcomes of the inefficient use of public 
investments in infrastructure. Their conceptual definitions and reflective indicators are 
as follows: 
- Insufficient institutional capacity of the government (IC): Institutional capacity 
and commitment in this context implies the strength of political leaders and 
government authority for spearheading infrastructure development. Reflective 
indicator variables are X5, X6, X9, X12, X14, X19, X22 and X33. 
- Lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure construction (TA): 
Transparency and accountability in infrastructure construction refer to the 
government being open and accountable to the bureaucratic system in contract 
awarding, project planning, construction permission and administration. 
Reflective indicator variables are X15, X20, X21, X23 and X35. 
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- Lack of an effective land acquisition framework (LA): Land acquisition 
framework in this study concerns the environment which is created to facilitate 
land acquisition for infrastructure construction. Reflective indicator variables are 
X27, X28, X29, X30 and X31. 
- Inadequate forecasting capacity (FC): Forecasting capacity refers to 
government’s ability to formulate quantitative plans for infrastructure 
development. Reflective indicator variables are X2, X3, X4 and X34. 
- Insufficient building capacity of local firms (BC): Supply capacity of local 
construction firms refers to the ability of local construction firms to meet demand 
for infrastructure construction. Reflective indicator variable are X24, X25 and X26. 
From the literature review, these factors are hypothesized to affect the efficient use of 
public investments in infrastructure in different ways. Insufficient institutional 
capacity of the government is hypothesized to be the core factor as it would have 
critical effects on other factors, which in turn affects investment efficiency of funded 
infrastructure development. More specifically, these hypotheses are: 
H1: Insufficient institutional capacity of the government is positively related to 
inadequate forecasting capacity for infrastructure development (IC + FC). 
H2: Insufficient institutional capacity of the government is positively related to lack 
of transparency and accountability in infrastructure construction (IC + TA). 
H3: Insufficient institutional capacity of the government is positively related to lack 
of an effective land acquisition framework (IC + LA). 
H4: Insufficient institutional capacity of the government is positively related to 
insufficient supply capacity of local construction firms in meeting demand for 
infrastructure development (IC + BC). 
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H5: Inadequate forecasting capacity is positively related to the inefficient use of 
public investments in infrastructure (FC + IU). 
H6: Lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure development is 
positively related to the inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure (TA 
+ IU). 
H7: Lack of an effective land acquisition framework is positively related to the 
inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure (LA + IU). 
H8: Insufficient building capacity of local firms is positively related to the 
inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure (BC + IU). 
These hypotheses are visually illustrated with Figure 8.2. As shown in Figure 
8.2, the model displays 28 measured indicator variables and six latent constructs (IU, 
IC, TA, LA, FC and BC). While measured variables are shown with a box, latent 
constructs are shown with an oval. IC is exogenous (independent) construct in this 
model as there is no single-headed arrow entering the construct. IC is indicated by 
eight measured variables. TA, LA, BC, LC and IU are all endogenous (dependent) 
constructs. TA, LA, BC and LC are all hypothesized as outcomes in some 
relationships and as predictors in others. TA and LA are indicated by five measured 
items; FC is indicated by four measured items; and BC is indicated by three measured 
variables. IU is the final outcome and is indicated by three measured variables. 
Hypotheses to be tested are represented by arrows connecting two constructs and 






















IU : Inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure  
IC : Insufficient institutional capacity of the government 
 TA : Lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure development 
 LA : Lack of an effective land acquisition framework 
 FC : Inadequate forecasting capacity 
 BC : Insufficient building capacity of local firms 
 P : Parameter estimates 
 
Figure 8.2 Model of the inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure in 
Vietnam 
 
As discussed in Section 7.5.2, between CB-SEM and PLS-SEM, the latter is 
more appropriate to examine the multiple interrelated dependence relationships in this 
study given its prediction orientation. Similar to CB-SEM, PLS-SEM assessment of 
the theoretical model as specified in Figure 8.2 consists of two sections. The first 
section, evaluation of measurement model, engages the evaluation of the reliability 































evaluation of structural model, involves the assessment of parameter estimates 
representing the structural relationships among latent constructs. 
 
8.4.2 Evaluation of the measurement model 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of the evaluation is to assess the reliability and 
validity of measurement. This step is important as it provides the evidence of the 
extent to which the measured indicators actually represent the theoretical latent 
constructs. The evaluation focuses on construct reliability, convergent validity and 
discriminant validity. 
Construct reliability considers two elements: internal consistency reliability; 
and indicator reliability. A construct’s internal consistency reliability reflects the 
consistency that all measured indicators represent the same latent construct. A 
construct’s internal consistency reliability is estimated by a composite reliability value. 
A composite reliability value should be higher than 0.7 to be regarded as satisfactory 
(Hair et al., 2011). Table 8.15 shows the composite reliability values of constructs 
computed using SmartPLS software. All composite reliability values are from 0.8 to 
0.9, indicating that internal consistency exists in all latent constructs. 
Indicator reliability focuses on loadings on a factor. Each indicator’s absolute 
standardized loading should be higher than 0.7. High standardized loadings means 
that measured indicators converge on a common point. As shown in Table 8.15, only 
two estimates (IU1 and X33) fall below the 0.7 cutoff. However, loadings of IU1 and 
X33 can be considered adequate as they are only slightly below 0.7. As a result, IU1 
and X33 are retained to support content validity (Hair et al., 2010). 
Convergent validity is a summary indicator of convergence. It reflects the 
extent to which measured indicators of a specific construct converge or share a high 
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proportion of variance in common. The convergence validity is assessed by 
examining average variance extracted (AVE). AVE is computed using standardized 
loadings (Hair et al., 2010): 
ܣܸܧ ൌ ∑ ௅೔మ೙೔సభ௡   
where Li is standardized factor loading and i is the number of items. A sufficient 
degree of convergent validity requires an AVE value of 0.5 or higher. That is because 
an AVE value of 0.5 or higher means that the latent construct explains more than half 
of its indicators’ variance. The AVE values for all six constructs of this study are 
higher than 0.5 (Table 8.15), suggesting an adequate convergence. 
Finally, discriminant validity involves the assessment of the distinction 
between constructs. In order to ascertain that a construct is unique and captures some 
phenomena other measures do not, Hair et al. (2011) mentioned two criteria: the 
Fornell-Larker criterion and cross loadings. The Fornell-Larker criterion suggests that 
a latent construct is distinct from others if the construct shares more variance with its 
assigned indicators than with another latent construct in the structural model. 
Statistically, the AVE value of each latent construct should be higher than the 
construct’s highest squared correlation with any other latent construct, if discriminant 
validity exists. Table 8.16 shows the squared correlation between constructs of this 
study. As shown in Table 8.16 AVE values of a construct are all higher than the 
construct’s highest squared correlation with other latent constructs (the numbers in 
bold type). Besides, comparing an indicator’s factor loadings with its cross loadings 
can also reveal discriminant validity.  As shown in Table 8.17, all indicators’ loading 
with its associated latent constructs (the numbers in the shaded area) are higher than 
their cross loadings with all the remaining constructs, implying that discriminant 
validity of constructs of this study is supported. 
 225 
 
Table 8.15 Measured indicator loadings 
Measured indicators   FC      IC      IU      LA      BC      TA 
X2 0.7969                                         
X3 0.7203                                         
X4 0.7805                                         
X34 0.8572                                         
X5         0.7511                                 
X6         0.7572                                 
X9         0.7913                                 
X12         0.7923                                 
X14         0.8165                                 
X19         0.6999                                 
X22         0.7909                                 
X33         0.6859                                 
IU1                 0.6716                         
IU2                 0.9285                         
IU3                 0.9139                         
X27                         0.7817                 
X28                         0.8095                 
X29                         0.7794                 
X30                         0.8667                 
X31                         0.8245                 
X24                                 0.8566         
X25                                 0.8932         
X26                                 0.8198         
X15                                         0.7793 
X20                                         0.8854 
X21                                         0.7554 
X23                                         0.8546 
X35                                         0.8469 
Composite Reliability 0.8689 0.9169 0.8813 0.9068 0.8923 0.9144 
AVE 0.6245 0.5805 0.7161 0.6609 0.7345 0.6819 
 
Table 8.16 Squared correlations of constructs 
Squared 
correlation FC      IC      IU      LA      BC      TA 
FC 1                                         
IC 0.5345 1                                 
IU 0.2688 0.4143 1                         
LA 0.4171 0.4587 0.3232 1                 
BC 0.2999 0.4169 0.2766 0.2946 1         
TA 0.3312 0.5616 0.3486 0.4328 0.3124 1 




Table 8.17 Indicators’ cross loadings 
Indicators FC      IC      IU      LA      BC      TA 
 X2 0.7969 0.5679 0.4777 0.4823 0.371 0.3937 
 X3 0.7203 0.4531 0.2901 0.4098 0.4154 0.3492 
 X4 0.7805 0.5339 0.2878 0.4505 0.4285 0.4077 
X34 0.8572 0.7091 0.521 0.6511 0.5109 0.6162 
 X5 0.6525 0.7511 0.4338 0.5685 0.4635 0.525 
 X6 0.5262 0.7572 0.5218 0.5069 0.5139 0.5607 
 X9 0.6459 0.7913 0.426 0.507 0.4973 0.4847 
X12 0.6427 0.7923 0.4659 0.5874 0.3675 0.6132 
X14 0.4818 0.8165 0.5036 0.5186 0.6039 0.6532 
X19 0.463 0.6999 0.4995 0.5028 0.3943 0.5126 
X22 0.6136 0.7909 0.5313 0.4993 0.5615 0.6295 
X33 0.4054 0.6859 0.5547 0.432 0.5269 0.5809 
IU1 0.3281 0.4197 0.6716 0.2361 0.3387 0.238 
IU2 0.4502 0.5571 0.9285 0.562 0.523 0.5412 
IU3 0.5139 0.6335 0.9139 0.5597 0.4546 0.6258 
X27 0.6299 0.5286 0.5126 0.7817 0.4386 0.5456 
X28 0.4821 0.5407 0.4798 0.8095 0.4135 0.6445 
X29 0.4576 0.4728 0.3507 0.7794 0.3449 0.445 
X30 0.5402 0.5709 0.4877 0.8667 0.5373 0.5724 
X31 0.5052 0.6239 0.4604 0.8245 0.4524 0.4575 
X24 0.3369 0.5026 0.5208 0.4546 0.8566 0.4447 
X25 0.5344 0.6151 0.433 0.5198 0.8932 0.51 
X26 0.54 0.5404 0.3967 0.4168 0.8198 0.4826 
X15 0.4434 0.6246 0.4057 0.489 0.4033 0.7793 
X20 0.4671 0.6695 0.596 0.6353 0.4983 0.8854 
X21 0.371 0.5178 0.4649 0.3956 0.4166 0.7554 
X23 0.5426 0.6788 0.4778 0.5719 0.5286 0.8546 
X35 0.5452 0.5902 0.4788 0.6004 0.4504 0.8469 
 
8.4.3 Evaluation of the structural model 
Given the measurement model was tested in Section 8.4.2 and the results generally 
support the measurement model, the measurement model can be used in the 
evaluation of the structural model’s quality. As illustrated in Figure 8.2 the structural 
model of this study consists of eight relationships between constructs.  These 
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relationships are represented by path coefficients or parameter estimates (P). The goal 
of the evaluation of the structural model is to assess the stability of these parameter 
estimates. Several criteria can be applied. 
The evaluation is started with the coefficient of determination R2. R2 reflects 
the regression function’s goodness of fit by measuring the share of the latent 
construct’s explained variance. The higher R2 is, the larger the share of the latent 
construct’s variance explained. However, there is no common ground of the 
acceptable threshold of R2. The judgment of acceptable values of R2 depends on the 
specific research (Götz et al., 2010). In this study, R2 for IU, which is the final 
dependent construct in the model, is 0.44. R2 for other outcome constructs are 0.53 
(FC); 0.46 (LA); 0.42 (BC); 0.56 (TA). Overall, these R2 values of the model can be 
described as moderate (Chin, 1998; Ringle et al., 2010; Hair et al., 2011). 
 The evaluation of the structural model is also based on the assessment of the 
significance of path coefficients (Chin, 1998). The estimated path coefficients of the 
structural model of this study are provided in Table 8.18. These path coefficients can 
be regarded as standardized beta coefficients resulting from the least-squares method 
(Götz et al., 2010). The PLS-SEM approach uses bootstrap resampling procedure to 
test hypotheses about beta coefficients. The significance of each path coefficient is 
assessed by comparing the t-values from bootstrap resampling and critical t-values for 
a one-tailed test. As shown in Table 8.18, all but one structural path estimates are 
significant (at 0.1 level of significance) and in the expected direction. The estimate 
between FC and IU has t-value below 1.65, the critical t-value at 0.1 level of 
significance. Therefore, the hypothesized relationship is not supported. Overall, the 




Table 8.18 Estimated path coefficients and t-value 
Hypotheses Parameter estimates 
Standard 
deviation
t-value t-critical value 
at 0.1 level
H1 IC + FC PFC,IC 0.7311 0.0423 17.2785 1.65
H2 IC + TA PTA,IC 0.7494 0.0380 19.7156 1.65
H3 IC + LA PLA,IC 0.6773 0.0556 12.173 1.65
H4 IC + BC PBC,IC 0.6457 0.0527 12.2468 1.65
H5 FC + IU PIU,FC 0.1216 0.0843 1.4423 1.65
H6 TA + IU PIU,TA 0.2803 0.1040 2.6958 1.65
H7 LA + IU PIU,LA 0.2003 0.1008 1.9865 1.65
H8 BC + IU PIU,BC 0.1940 0.1016 1.9087 1.65
In addition to R2 measures and the significance of path coefficients, the 
predictive relevance of the structural model is used to assess the model’s capability to 
predict each endogenous latent construct’s indicators. The assessment is carried out 
by using a blindfolding procedure in which every dth data point part is left out and the 
resulting estimates are used to predict the omitted part. The Stone-Geisser test 
criterion Q2 is computed as follows: 
ܳ௝ଶ ൌ 1 െ
∑ ܧ௝௞௞
∑ ௝ܱ௞௞  
Where: 
Ejk = the squares of the prediction errors, which represent the difference 
between true values of the data omitted from the blindfolding procedure and 
the predicted values; 
Ojk = the squares of the trivial prediction error provided by the mean of the 
remaining data from the blindfolding procedure; 
j = the observed endogenous measurement model; and 
k = the index for all indicators of the measurement model (Götz et al., 2010). 
Q2 can be provided in two forms, the cross-validated redundancy and cross-validated 
communality. In studies using the PLS-SEM approach, Q2 as endogenous constructs’ 
cross-validated redundancy measure value is more appropriate. In this study, the 
blindfolding procedure is applied for five endogenous constructs IU, FC, LA, BC and 
TA. As shown in Table 8.19, all endogenous constructs’ cross validated redundancy is 
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larger than 0, indicating that the model has predictive relevance (Fornell, 1994; Chin, 
1998). 
Table 8.19 Endogenous constructs’ cross validated redundancy 
Total      SSO       SSE 1-SSE/SSO 
   FC 504 340.9448 0.3235
   IU 378 275.2743 0.2718
   LA 630 446.1687 0.2918
   BC 378 265.2498 0.2983
   TA 630 390.5696 0.3800
 
8.4.4 Interpreting relationships 
With estimated path coefficients, the relationships among target constructs are 
illustrated in Figure 8.3. The sizes of these coefficients indicate that lack of 
transparency and accountability in infrastructure development has the biggest impact 
(0.28) on the inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure, whereas lack of an 
effective land acquisition framework is somewhat less (0.20) and insufficient building 
capacity of local firms has the smallest impact (0.194). Although the estimated 
parameter representing FCIU is 0.122, the statistical test results show that there is a 
high probability that the actual is equal to zero. Inadequate forecasting capacity thus 
does not have significant impact on the inefficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure.  
In addition, although there is no direct relationship between insufficient 
institutional capacity of the government, and the inefficient use of public investments 
in infrastructure, the indirect paths relate to insufficient institutional capacity of the 
government are considerable. Insufficient institutional capacity of the government has 
substantial impacts on lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure 
development (0.749), on lack of an effective land acquisition framework (0.677), on 
insufficient building capacity of local firms (0.646), and on inadequate forecasting 
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capacity (0.731). As a result, total estimated effect of insufficient institutional 
capacity of the government on the inefficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure is computed as a sum of these indirect paths:  
IC  LA  IU = 0.677 x 0.200 = 0.1357 
IC  FC  IU = 0.731 x 0.122 = 0.0889 
IC  BC  IU = 0.646 x 0.194 = 0.1253 
IC  TA  IU = 0.749 x 0.280 = 0.2101 
The total estimated impact is substantial (0.56) and provide the evidence of that 














Figure 8.3 Estimated structural equation model of factors affecting the use of public 
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8.5 Interviews and discussion  
8.5.1 Profile of interviewees 
After the questionnaire survey was conducted with some results, in-depth interviews 
were conducted. The interviews were conducted in Vietnam in July 2012. Fifteen 
professionals, who are holding key positions in the organizations involved in planning 
and executing national infrastructure development plans, were contacted (see Section 
7.6 for sampling method). However, only seven of them agreed to be interviewed. 
The sample size satisfies the required minimum size of in-depth interviews for this 
study (see Section 7.6). Two samples of interview records are attached in Appendix 4. 
The profiles of these interviewees can be found in Table 8.20. 
Table 8.20 Profiles of interviewees 
Interviewee 
code Designation Organization’s main business 
G1 
Director of Construction 
Department of Hai Duong 
province 
Assisting People’s Committee of Hai Duong 
province with construction management and 
planning. 
G2 
Deputy Head of the Department 
of Infrastructure and Cities under 
the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment 
Studying and synthesizing development 
strategies and master plans for infrastructure 
and cities; coordinating with other relevant 
units within the MPI to develop national and 
regional socio-economic development 
strategies. 
G3 
Former Head of Finance and 
Planning Department under the 
Ministry of Construction 
Compiling strategies, master plans, long-term 
plans, five-year plans and annual plans for the 
development of the construction industry, as 
well as development plans for the Ministry’s 
subordinate bodies. 
G4 
Former Head of Government 
Authority for Construction 
Quality Inspection under the 
Ministry of Construction 
Quality management for and inspections of 
construction works. 
P1 General Director of a private developer 
Real estate development, construction of 
building and civil engineering works. 
P2 
Deputy Director of Vietnam 
Institute for Building Science and 
Technology 
Building research and verification, and 
consultancy. 
P3 General Director of a private consultant 
Consultancy (architecture, civil engineering, 
project management, and so on) 
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Based on the survey results, interviewees were mainly asked to explain why 
these factors occurred, and how to address them to improve the investment efficiency 
of funded infrastructure development in Vietnam. Using the thematic content analysis, 
transcripts of interviews were first read and used to identify and check topics and 
aspects of contents. In the next stage, all contents of each topic were generally 
grouped together for direct reference for the discussion. Contents, including cases and 
examples, would be extracted from transcripts to link with the survey findings. 
Related documents were collected to illustrate various issues as well. The interviews 
are thus combined with the survey findings and discussed in the following sections. 
 
8.5.2 Inadequate forecasting capacity 
From the results of factor analysis, this factor consists of inadequate data, inherent 
problems in predicting the future and monetizing external and indirect effects, and 
lack of experienced forecasters. These issues are identified as technical issues that 
could affect forecasting accuracy (Flyvbjerg, 2007). From the literature of 
development planning, forecasting has long been considered an important area in 
development planning as it guides decisions made by policy-makers (Lewis, 1966). 
Inadequate forecasting capacity was thus hypothesized to have effects on the efficient 
use of public investments in infrastructure. However, the PLS-SEM analysis 
presented above leads to the rejection of such hypothesis. Several methods used to 
assess the stability of the structural model (see Section 8.4.3) suggested that the 
parameter coefficient of 0.2 between inadequate forecasting capacity and inefficient 
use of public investments in infrastructure is not statistically different from zero. It 
implies that data, techniques and experiences in forecasting are not important 
variables in explaining the inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure in 
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Vietnam. This is consistent with and complementary to indications in the growing 
literature on decision making with respect to large infrastructure construction projects 
(Flyvbjerg, 2007; Van Wee, 2007). 
The long tradition of planning has brought many benefits to the forecasting 
capacity of Vietnam. It allows the accumulation of data, experience and knowledge, 
and the gradual improvement of forecasting techniques and methods. At the early 
stage of the planned economic regime, there was an understanding of the need for 
data collection. The Statistics Service, now the General Statistics Office under MPI, 
was established in 1946. Its major task is to collect and accumulate data for 
macroeconomic forecasting and planning. The planning system has also long 
developed a mechanism for forecasting. Macroeconomic forecasting, including 
forecasting for infrastructure development, lies with several institutions under the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment. For instance, forecasts by the Development 
Strategy Institute are used by the government to assist in the development of national 
socio-economic development master plans and strategies, including infrastructure 
development for periods from 5 to 20 years. Besides, macroeconomic forecasts by the 
Central Institute for Economic Management and the National Center for Socio-
Economic Information and Forecast are used by the government to assist in the 
development of areas such as economic policies and economic management strategies. 
At sectoral and local levels, forecasting is carried out by research and forecasting 
institutions under the sectoral ministries and local authorities. The establishment of 
such research and forecasting institutions suggests that the government of Vietnam 
has recognized the importance of forecasting and has invested resources to improve 
the government’s forecasting capacity. Nevertheless, there still exists a substantial gap 
between forecasts and the actual results of infrastructure development planning 
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(Nguyen and Dapice, 2009). This can be explained that the forecasting capacity is 
available but its effective use might not be realized. G3 had experienced the 
difficulties when engaging in even sectoral forecasting, let alone national planning 
because input data submitted by enterprises were often manipulated. G2 shared that 
decision making and planning in Vietnam was based on political leaders’ will, rather 
than on forecasting or estimating. Political leaders could direct planners to prepare the 
master plans based on their subjective assessment. The interference of political 
leaders in planning (discussed further in the following sections) has rendered 
forecasting and estimating ineffective. Besides, P2 and P3 added that unanticipated 
economic disturbance (both external and internal) and natural disasters also affect the 
quality of forecasting. For example, the occurrence of the 2008 global financial crisis, 
the oil price increases over the last decade, and the Japanese earth quakes and 
tsunamis in 2011, all have effects on public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam. 
However, Vietnam has no control over these events, thus having difficulties in 
predicting their occurrence. 
Inadequate forecasting capacity is thus not an important constraint to the 
current use of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam. Improving forecasting 
capacity per se is not an important target. How to use these resources to provide good 
planning decisions seems to be a more important matter. As such the efficient use of 
public investments in infrastructure is not affected by the inadequate forecasting 
capacity but the lack of effective use of forecasting resources. 
 
8.5.3 Lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure development 
This study hypothesized that lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure 
development would be positively related to the inefficient use of public investments in 
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infrastructure. That is because lack of transparency and accountability poses 
significant risks of corruption, and cost and time overrun, which in turn result in bad 
investments with poor quality of infrastructure and low economic returns (Kenny, 
2007; Sohail and Cavill, 2008). Results of the PLS-SEM analysis and evaluation (see 
Section 8.4.3) have confirmed that lack of transparency and accountability is a 
statistically significant cause. The estimated parameter between TA and IU of 0.28 
implies that lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure development is 
largely responsible for the inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure in 
Vietnam. 
 From factor analysis, lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure 
development in Vietnam is first reflected in the lack of the transparency and 
competitiveness in bidding and award. Transparency and competitiveness in bidding 
and award are very important as they ensure that a qualified firm is selected to fulfill 
project objectives. Bidding and award of public procurements are regulated by the 
Ministry of Construction, at the central government level and local construction 
departments, at local government levels. Since the industry’s reforms in early 1990s, 
the regulatory framework of bidding and award of public works has been improved 
considerably. A number of related laws and regulations have been issued by the 
Ministry of Construction over the years. The most important milestones are the 
introduction of Construction Law in 2003 and Tendering Law in 2005. Bidding and 
award of all types of construction projects including funded infrastructure projects 
must be carried out in accordance with these laws and regulations (Ministry of 
Construction, 2008). However, in practice open competitive tendering is merely a 
formality. The bidding procedures are primarily based on subjective assessments. G4 
observed that qualifications of tendering firms were not sufficiently considered. With 
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firms that meet minimum qualifications required, the only selecting criterion is tender 
price. With the acceptance of lowest tender price, there are no criteria to capture the 
difference in qualifications of tendering firms necessary to ensure firms’ capability to 
fulfill the contract. Moreover, there are no guidelines to verify firms’ tendering 
applications and to prevent fraud. As a result, firms are primarily selected based on 
the lowest evaluated tender price. Contract winners are often those having strong 
relationships with relevant government ministries or procurement officials. 
Furthermore, the Tendering Law does not forbid tender price to be lower than a floor 
tender price. G3 and G4 indicated that many Chinese firms took advantage of the 
regulation and produced strategically under-evaluated tender prices to get the jobs. 
However, without adequate resources and the required capability, many Chinese firms 
could not complete these projects. G1 and P3 also shared that firms could involve 
collusive agreements with others to manipulate bidding prices in the bidding 
processes. According to a recent report on building quality management in transport 
infrastructure projects issued by the Transport Engineering Construction and Quality 
Management Bureau of Vietnam (TEC & QMB), these practices pose a threat to the 
quality of construction projects. After the contract has been awarded, firms would 
lower the quality standards to lower contract costs (Transport Engineering 
Construction and Quality Management Bureau, 2011). 
In addition, under the Tendering Law, selecting contractors, suppliers and 
consultants for infrastructure projects with the contract valuation below a certain level 
can be carried out by limited tendering or direct appointments of contractors (National 
Assembly of Vietnam, 2005). This regulation creates improper incentive mechanism 
for avoiding the open tendering process by adjusting the valuation of contracts or 
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dividing procurement into smaller contracts (Transport Engineering Construction and 
Quality Management Bureau, 2011). 
Lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure development in 
Vietnam is also reflected in the complicated and bureaucratic administrative system 
that exists throughout the planning and execution stages of infrastructure projects. The 
development usually involves conceptual proposal, pre-feasibility study, feasibility 
study, detailed engineering design, appraisal, and final approval. During the process, 
nearly every decision, which was within the capacity of Project Management Units, 
required some form of review and approval by a number of relevant ministries and 
local authorities before finally being approved by the Prime Minister. Project design 
alone has to go through a number of steps of verification and approval by related 
government agencies (Ministry of Construction, 2013). Project costs are calculated 
using state norms and quota systems for labour and materials and so on. Deviation 
from the norms is required to be approved by relevant government offices at 
intermediate levels before moving to the Prime Minister’s Office (Prime Minister's 
Office of Vietnam, 2009c). All interviewees reported that bureaucratic procedures 
have caused significant delays and raised costs in the implementation of public works. 
However, the government is rarely held accountable for its decisions and actions 
when infrastructure projects fail to achieve project objectives. As described by G1: 
Many meetings would be held before a project proposal was approved. Attending 
these meetings were a number of representatives from various government agencies. 
But, no single government official had to take the responsibility for the decisions 
made. For instance, a number of committees would be set up to study project 
proposals. When a project was completed, a committee, whose chairman would have 
never been to the project site, was also responsible for the issuance of the official 
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acceptance of work. That is because the issuance is merely a formality. Whether the 
quality of work is acceptable is not responsibility of the chairman. 
Besides a bureaucratic administrative system, collective responsibility is still a 
prevailing cultural issue in Vietnam. Vietnamese people would expect other group 
members to protect them from any individual responsibility, and vice versa (Low and 
Dang, 2008). Low and Dang (2008) also described collectivism as one of the major 
unfavourable conditions for organizations to effectively deal with each other in 
Vietnam.  
P1 explained that the combination of many roles of government as decision 
makers, regulators, supervisors, clients and so on prevents the detection of fraud or 
corruption around the actions of government officials. For example, quality inspection 
for all funded infrastructure projects is carried out by several government agencies 
such as the State Authority for Construction Quality Inspection (under the Ministry of 
Construction) and Transport Engineering Construction and Quality Management 
Bureau (under the Ministry of Transport). Using the complicated rules and procedures, 
government officials can involve collusive agreements with consultants and 
contractors to cover poor quality construction practices and outcomes. This is 
compounded by the poor enforcement of the existing legislation and regulations. G3 
indicated that the existing legislation and regulations were not equipped with effective 
tools to protect whistleblowers and punishments stringent enough to prevent 
corruption. According to a report issued by the Government Inspectorate of Vietnam, 
discovering fraudulent and law breaking practices in the construction sector is 
difficult due to the collusive agreements and complicated association among the 
parties involved. In addition, when discovered, those responsible for the law breaking 
practices are not promptly punished due to bureaucracy in administrative procedures. 
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These issues have significantly dampened anti-corruption efforts as well as 
encouraged harmful practices in the sector (Government Inspectorate of Vietnam, 
2005). The lack of transparency and accountability is thus an important constraint on 
the efficiency of funded infrastructure development in Vietnam. 
 
8.5.4 Lack of an effective land acquisition framework 
Without an effective land acquisition framework, land acquisition for infrastructure 
development can be costly and time consuming (Priemus, 2010). Thus, this study 
hypothesized that lack of an effective land acquisition framework would positively 
affect the investment inefficiency of funded infrastructure development. Based on the 
PLS-SEM analysis and evaluation, the underlying cause is statistically significant (see 
Section 8.4.3). The relationship between LA and IU is illustrated by the estimated 
parameter of 0.2. The results suggest that an improvement in the land acquisition 
framework can mitigate the risk of investment inefficiency of funded infrastructure 
development in Vietnam. 
Land acquisition in Vietnam is carried out in accordance with the provisions 
of Land Law. According to the first Land Law issued in 1987, there was no private 
landownership in Vietnam. The government representing the People owned and 
distributed land to users. The government had the right to acquire land that had been 
distributed and land users had no right to transfer land. However, since 1988 more 
rights over the land have been given to land users. The Land Law issued in 1993 
officially gave land users the rights of land transfer and rental, which made land an 
asset to users (Han and Vu, 2008). Since then, the issue of compensation has become 
the core element of land acquisition. According to the latest Land Law issued in 2003, 
land users have the rights to claim for compensation when land is acquired. In order to 
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have the rights and to avoid any disputes, land users are required to have legal titles to 
the land. However, up to 1999 urban households without land use certificates still 
accounted for about 90% of total urban household (Quang and Kammeier, 2002). 
Bureaucracy in settling land claims and disputes is regarded as a major contributing 
factor to inefficiency. Various legal documents issued by different government offices 
are required before a land use certificate would be issued. High tax and legal scrutiny 
required for transfer of land use titles also prevent land users from applying for land 
use certificates (Kim, 2004). Besides, overlapping and inconsistency between land use 
regulations make land claims and disputes settlement more complicated (Thanh, 
2012). 
There are two types of procedures for compensation. For large public projects, 
the government would set up a site-clearance committee to acquire the land. For 
private projects, developers would have to negotiate to buy land from the residents. 
Valuation for compensation is based on the state price framework. Prices listed in the 
price framework are required to be close to market prices and updated annually. In 
addition, the prices can be adjusted within a limited range depending on the 
conditions of the projects (National Assembly of Vietnam, 2003). In principle, based 
on the price frame, government officials and developers would determine the amount 
of compensation. In practice, the process is more complicated. In private projects, 
private developers could initially value the land on the basis of the government price 
framework. However, transaction prices were often higher. That is because land users 
have the right to decide the price at which they want to sell their land. Many land 
users abuse the right to force developers to buy their land at rates much higher than 
the rates set by the government. In addition, the mechanism encourages speculative 
purchases of land in the areas which were announced for acquisition. Purchasers of 
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the land have high expectation that the price would increase dramatically when the 
infrastructure were developed. As a result, compensation for land users in these areas 
would have to be much higher than generally accepted (Han and Vu, 2008). 
On the contrary, in land acquisition for public projects the government is both 
the takeover and the valuer. Government officials decide compensation rates based on 
the government price framework which were regarded as comparable with market 
value. Land Law 2003 stipulates that local authorities have to build price frameworks 
closely to market prices under normal conditions, and the price frameworks would 
have to be adjusted when there is a large difference between the frameworks and 
market prices. The law also specifies that assistance measures for resettlement would 
be provided so that resettlement sites should offer conditions which are at least equal 
to the previous one (National Assembly of Vietnam, 2003; Prime Minister's Office of 
Vietnam, 2009b). Nevertheless, the extent to which price frameworks are considered 
to be close to the market price, or the extent to which resettlement sites is equal to the 
previous one are not defined in the law. Moreover, there is also no independent 
monitoring system for the implementation of resettlement to ensure that adequate 
assistance is provided. Having no right to negotiate with the government, land users 
have to accept the compensation packages, which are often lower than what they 
expected. In many cases, rural land users were poorly paid because they did not have 
any clear title to the land. With inadequate compensation packages, land users usually 
have to relocate far from the city or employment centers. For rural land users, without 
adequate assistance, they also faced difficulties in settling down to a new way of life 
or finding new jobs. This has created a much dissatisfaction among those whose land 
was being taken away (Kim, 2011).  
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In both compensation procedures, there is a risk that a compensation package 
would become increasingly unacceptable to one of the parties. While in private 
projects, compensation rates would be driven to an unreasonably high level, there is 
always a disagreement over the adequacy of compensation packages in public projects. 
The situation is worse in public projects since the government do not often have 
sufficient public financial resources to offer a higher compensation rate in order to 
clear a site more quickly. As a result, a compensation assessment would be difficult to 
be reached, which in turn slow down the project development, causing significant 
delays and cost overruns. 
Interviewees regarded land acquisition as the major reason for time delay, 
especially in projects located in urban areas. In many cases, project construction could 
not start as planned because of the difficulties in the land acquisition process. G1, G4 
and P2 observed that execution of many infrastructure projects had to be cut into parts. 
Project construction would start first in the area where the land acquisition was settled. 
Construction of the remaining parts of the road would have to wait until the 
compensation deals for the remaining area were reached. P2 mentioned the 
construction of the Cau Gie – Ninh Binh high way (a section of the North – South 
high way project) as an example. The development of the Cau Gie – Ninh Binh high 
way was approved by the Prime Minister in 2004. The total length of the high way 
was planned to be 50km. In 2011, after 7 years of construction, only about 20km of 
the high way (the part connecting Cau Gie and Phu Ly) was opened for use. The 
construction of the remaining of the high way had faced a number of issues in land 
acquisition, which were finally settled in March 2012 (Tinh, 2012). 
G1 suggested that in order to accelerate the land acquisition process in 
Vietnam, land acquisition and compensation for public purposes in Vietnam should be 
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separated, in which land should be acquired first for project development, and 
compensation deals would be settled later. However, the measure would leave no 
room for land users to challenge the validity of land acquisition. Meanwhile, G4 
suggested that the first step to solve land acquisition issues is that the government 
should have clear spatial plans for infrastructure development, based on which land 
would be set aside in advance. In the case of land acquisition for public projects 
involving resettlement, public support for public projects is often low.  P2 and G4 
recommended that the government should do more to educate the public about the 
citizens’ obligations to serve national interests. Besides, compensation packages 
should be adequate to cover the loss of business and ensure a smooth transition to a 
new way of life for displaced land users. The interviewees emphasized that improving 
transparency and accountability is necessary to ensure that in practice adequate 
compensation and assistance would be provided. 
Concerning public finance resources for compensation, G4 emphasized that 
the key is to capture a proportion of the increase in land value associated with 
infrastructure improvements. Besides raising revenue for the government for 
compensation, capturing the increase in land value has a potentially larger effect to 
achieve equality between those who suffer and those who benefit from infrastructure 
improvements, thus gaining public support. In an effort to capture the increase in land 
value, G4 shared that the local government of the central city of Da Nang has taken an 
initiative. G4 explained that in Da Nang when a road, for instance, was planned to be 
built in Da Nang, not only the road site but also land in the immediate vicinity would 
be acquired. The local government would use the revenue from selling the 
surrounding areas for private land development to compensate the sitting tenants and 
to finance the road development project. However, the method might not be applied in 
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Hanoi where houses of a number of government bureaucrats are located, said G4. 
There were also cases where local governments would exchange private land 
development approval for the public financing of public infrastructure including 
compensation costs. However, the method was criticized for its low level of 
transparency and competition, and thus heightening the potential risks for corruption 
(Kim, 2011).  
The issues in compensation procedure for public projects highlight the need 
for a negotiating mechanism to make the market price of land play a correct role in 
land acquisition compensation. The government, being both the takeover and the 
valuer, could not ensure a fair compensation valuation for land users. Controversies 
over compensation packages are the root cause of increasing claims and disputes in 
land acquisition. Meanwhile, the issues in the approach taken in private projects 
underline the need for law enforcement to regulate the price of land acquired from 
growing wildly, which could affect the whole land market. Besides, the lack of 
transparency and accountability in the valuation methods and compensation process 
and bureaucracy in land disputes and claim settlements are further evidence that the 
land acquisition framework for infrastructure development in Vietnam is in need of 
improvement. 
 
8.5.5 Insufficient building capacity of local firms 
The results of the PLS-SEM analysis show that insufficient building capacity of local 
firms positively impacts the inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure. 
The test of significance also confirms that the parameter of 0.194 between BC and IU 
is significantly different from zero (see Section 8.4.3).  In other words, capacity of 
local firms is identified as a constraining factor of the efficiency. The local 
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infrastructure construction sector is dominated by a few large state-owned 
construction firms. The rest of the sector is made up of several thousand small to 
medium construction firms (Kenny, 2007). Involvement of foreign construction firms 
is greater in large scale infrastructure projects (often funded by ODA). However, 
participation of these foreign firms is mainly through a joint venture with local firms. 
Local construction firms are often criticized for the poor level of efficiency and 
quality of work (Long et al., 2004; Low and Dang, 2008). The interviewees reported 
that most of the parties involved are responsible for these problems. 
First, developers of infrastructure projects under the responsibility of the 
central governments as specified in national infrastructure development plans are a 
few large state-owned corporations or the relevant ministries. These developers are 
represented by a Project Management Unit, a temporary organization set up to be 
responsible for project development. G1 shared that in large-scale infrastructure 
projects which required greater technical expertise, assigned developers or PMUs 
often did not have the required capacity and level of professionalism. The issue is also 
reported by TEC&QMB (2011). Most PMUs employed supervision consultants 
representing them to manage projects. Being overly dependent on supervision 
consultants, government officials of PMUs were responsible for the lack of 
involvement in the project life and slow decision making. P2 and P3 commented that 
developers (PMUs) were often responsible for interruptions in funding. Uncertainties 
over the government budget allocation, lengthy and time consuming payment 
procedures created cash flow problems for contractors and consultants to implement 
projects on time. Another concern is PMUs’ lack of profit motivation. PMUs are 
responsible for implementing infrastructure projects without any financial liability. 
G1 explained that after the delivery of physical facilities, PMUs would not be tied to 
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any financial liability. Costs of construction, operations and maintenance would be 
the responsibility of other relevant government agencies, who later run the 
infrastructure facilities. As a result, PMUs lack a commercial focus to cut the costs of 
construction, as well as of operations and maintenance by setting appropriate design 
and technical standards for infrastructure facilities. 
Supervision consultants are employed to manage project execution. 
Supervision consultants represent clients (PMUs) to supervise project execution of 
contractors including certifying volume and quality of work done by contractors, 
approving construction methods for contractors, and proposing solutions for technical 
issues on site. In Vietnam, local supervision staff play an important role in quality 
management, assisting clients to ensure quality throughout projects. According to 
TEC&QMB (2011), even when foreign supervision consultants are employed (such as 
in ODA funded projects), foreign engineers accounted for a small portion of the 
workforce and mainly acted as chief engineers. The rest of the workforce was made 
up of local engineers. However, there are concerns with the capacity of local 
supervision consultants to adequately fulfill their roles in large funded infrastructure 
projects, including lack of experience in contract management, lack of quality control 
over contractors’ performance and slow response to site-related issues. G1 
commented that since clients and PMUs used public funds without any financial 
liability, supervision consultants would be poorly selected. In addition, G4 shared that: 
The collusion between supervision consultants and contractors to overlook poor 
quality materials and works is one of major issues affecting project quality. Although 
local supervision consultants were able to provide supervision staff in quantity, they 
lack highly qualified and ethical professionals in their workforce. It has been difficult 
to mobilize and retain skilled staff in the supervision consultancy profession. Low 
income is considered the major cause of the issue. Despite its important role in 
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quality assurance, the supervision consultancy profession has not received adequate 
attention in the industry. 
According to TEC&QMB (2011), the workforce is mainly provided by supervision 
centers of relevant universities, institutes, government agencies and some private 
organizations. There are organizations providing training, certification and 
registration for supervision consultants. However, there are no system to guarantee 
their consistency and standard procedures to ensure quality and ethics of supervision 
consultancy. 
During the design stage, designers and engineers employed to design the 
projects are responsible for poor quality of feasibility study and design, and 
impractical engineering solutions and technologies (Long et al., 2004). The report 
issued by TEC&QMB (2011) indicated that except for a few large design and 
engineering consultants, a large number of small local design and engineering firms 
have been established in recent years to meet increasing market demand. However, 
without long term development plans, these firms were lagging in the market and 
incapable of handling large projects. G1 reported that the local industry lacks 
experienced and highly qualified designers and engineers for undertaking feasibility 
studies at macro-level, preparing master plans, proposing engineering solutions and 
technologies that are within the capability of local contractors. G1 and P3 added that 
local designers and engineers are often overly influenced by local government 
authorities (clients), instead of defending their proposals. Besides, they tend to rely on 
standard engineering solutions, rather than putting in efforts to explore alternative 
designs. As a result, the selected design and engineering solutions would not be cost-
effective and optimal to specific conditions and complexities of projects. P3 quoted a 
case where a foreign engineering solution, stone mastic asphalt (SMA), was selected 
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to upgrade the surface of the Thang Long Bridge (connecting Hanoi and Noi Bai 
International Airport). The technology was first developed in Germany in the 1960s. 
This was the first time the technology was used in Hanoi. However, a few months 
after the project was completed (at the end of 2009), there were a number of serious 
cracks on the bridge’s surface. According to a report by the State Authority for 
Construction Quality Inspection (Thinh, 2011), it was concluded that the 
incompatibility between the newly stone-mastic-asphalted surface and the existing 
steel structure of the bridge was the main cause of the incident. 
Quality management was poorly implemented by local design and engineering 
consultants. G1 observed that they lack in-house resources and capacity for design 
coordination, review and checks. Quality of design could not also benefit from design 
verification. TEC&QMB (2011) reported that design verification mainly focused on 
criticizing design weaknesses rather than on providing suggestions to optimize design. 
There is no local firm specializing in verification. Design verification was mostly 
done by relevant institutes or universities. Besides, P3 commented that the poor 
quality of input data have significantly affected the quality of design. For example, 
inadequate data from topographical surveys could result in design variations. 
Topographical surveys are the basis for engineering design. However, G4 shared that 
project funding for topographical surveys in Vietnam was limited. Topographical 
surveys were often not sufficiently carried out and checked in order to provide 
accurate and detailed results. Errors in the survey results were only discovered during 
the execution stage. Consequently, design with poor quality had to be revised or 
added during project execution, resulting in project delay and waste as well as 
affecting the overall project quality (Government Inspectorate of Vietnam, 2005; 
Transport Engineering Construction and Quality Management Bureau, 2011). P2 
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commented that unanticipated weak soil foundation was the main cause for the 
collapse and settlement of roads and bridges during construction in Vietnam. P2 
quoted the case of the Can Tho Bridge (connecting Can Tho City and Vinh Long 
province in the south of Vietnam) where the collapse of two side spans of the bridge 
during construction in 2007 was due to the unanticipated weak soil foundation. 
During the construction phase, local contractors were found to be responsible 
for financial difficulties, inaccurate project planning and scheduling, poor 
construction quality, inadequate and ineffective coordination among parties, poor site 
management and inadequate use of modern equipment (Long, 2004). Besides cash 
flow problems caused by clients, financial difficulties of local contractors were 
attributable to their own internal weaknesses. As reported by TEC&QMB (2011), at 
the management level, local contractors lacked the expertise in corporate finance 
management, including the right skills to carry out proper calculations of funds for 
operational and developmental purposes, and project cash flow analysis. Project 
financial resources were inappropriately used or diverted for other projects, resulting 
in serious cash flow problems during project execution. Cash flow and work flow are 
poorly managed, resulting in inefficient use of inputs. Relating to the development of 
human resources, most contractors do not have any human resource management 
policy. As explained by G1, they hired an informal labour force and only provide 
poorly on-the-job training to save on costs of production. TEC&QMB (2011) also 
reported that at the technical level, local firms lacked professional and skilled staff 
capable of managing large infrastructure projects. Many contractor staffs are not 
familiar with the latest project management techniques and emerging technologies. 
Local contractors also encountered the limitation of equipment resources in large 
infrastructure projects. Investments in modern technology and equipment are limited 
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due to financial constraints (Transport Engineering Construction and Quality 
Management Bureau, 2011). 
Concerning building quality, local firms lacked a quality management 
structure and culture. Although many firms have obtained ISO 9001:2000 
certification, they only implemented the ISO system in their offices rather than on the 
construction site. Policies and procedures for health and safety in construction work 
were not taken seriously (Transport Engineering Construction and Quality 
Management Bureau, 2011). G1 shared that most contractors depend on other parties 
including designers, supervision consultants and related government agencies for 
quality management. Investments in quality control and quality assurance in these 
firms were not prioritized. Subcontracting practices in funded infrastructure projects 
also make the issue worse. Many public projects awarded to qualified contractors 
were subcontracted several times over. However, contractors often failed to provide 
adequate supervision of lower-level contractors, leading to sub-standard work. 
Another problem with project quality is related to fraudulent practices. G1 and P3 
observed that: 
Very few firms understand that time is money, and focus on improving construction 
practices to save time and money, thus reducing costs and raising revenues. Instead, 
most firms increase profit margins and reduce construction costs through poor 
quality construction practices and material theft. Moreover, firms that had to put in 
low bid prices or involved some forms of corruption to get the jobs often wanted to 
compensate for the low prices or the corruption expenses through lower quality 
standards. 
Vietnamese construction firms lack the expertise and resources in 
management, finance and technology to guarantee quality and professional 
competence of large infrastructure projects. The capacity constraint of local 
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construction firms is evident from poor quality, poor construction planning and 
project management, and ineffective utilization of input resources. Local construction 
firms suffer from a serious lack of professional management structure and culture. 
Quality management system is generally inadequate. These supply constraints faced 
by the local infrastructure construction sector are at the project level and are subject to 
the capacity of individual firms. However, structural equation modeling in this study 
revealed that there was a certain relationship between building capacity of local firms 
and the efficiency of funded infrastructure development of Vietnam. Capacity 
constraints of local firms affected their own efficiency, which eventually resulted in 
the deterioration of efficiency of funded infrastructure development. The relationship 
suggested that the efficiency of funded infrastructure development can be increased 
through increasing capacity of local construction firms. Increasing building capacity 
of local construction firms can benefit both the government and local construction 
firms. Thus there is a need for the government to consider the area for improving the 
building capacity of local firms when formulating the national infrastructure 
development policy. Constraints that local firms encountered call for actions to be 
taken in tackling human resources and skill development issues, investing in quality 
management, modern technology and equipment, building professional working 
culture and offering more financial means for local firms to sustain efforts on large 
civil works. 
 
8.5.6 Insufficient institutional capacity of the government 
Insufficient institutional capacity of the government was hypothesized as the root 
construct affecting other factors. The PLS-SEM analysis and the tests of significance 
indicated that insufficient institutional capacity of the government had direct effects 
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on other factors including inadequate forecasting capacity, lack of transparency and 
accountability, lack of an effective land acquisition framework and insufficient 
building capacity of local firms (see Section 8.4.3). This creates an indirect 
relationship between insufficient institutional capacity of the government and the 
inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure. The combined effect of IC on 
IU is 0.56, which placed insufficient institutional capacity of the government in the 
critical position among factors affecting the use of public investments in infrastructure 
in Vietnam. This is consistent with the literatures on development policy making and 
the role of the government (Todaro and Smith, 2009). 
The government of Vietnam has been structured relatively vertical. One of the 
weaknesses of the institutional structure is the lack of horizontal coordination. The 
causal explanation can be identified in the literatures on governance and economic 
development. The increasing complementaries between economic activities require a 
high degree of coordination across several policy spheres. This requires capabilities 
that emphasize inter-relationships, interdependencies and a holistic rather than a 
hierarchical approach. The need to manage these interdependencies across sectors 
poses difficulties for the traditional form of institutional structure. Traditionally, the 
government is organized with many specialized and non-overlapping departments 
resulting in fragmented planning and policy making, and uncoordinated actions. Lack 
of policy cooperation and coordination can thus pose high risks of inefficiency 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). At the national planning level, the lack of horizontal 
coordination in infrastructure development is reflected in the lack of inter-ministerial 
and intersectoral coordination. Given the interdependencies and linkages between 
infrastructure and other sectors as well as the economy as a whole (see Chapter 3), 
infrastructure planning for trade and economic development involves various sectors 
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such as trade, land, construction and infrastructure service technology. National 
development planning in Vietnam as described in Chapter 6 is a top-down and 
bottom-up process led by the Prime Minister and coordinated by the MPI. Top-down 
planning is formulated by a strategic planning subcommittee, which is staffed by top 
civil servants from Party institutions, government agencies and national research 
institutes and a drafting committee led by the MPI. Bottom-up planning involves the 
policy needs and interests of line ministries and local governments. The MPI is tasked 
to drive planning and overall monitoring and evaluation from the centre of the 
government (Pincus and Nguyen, 2004). However, there has not been enough 
systemic effort to ensure that the visions and strategies of the sectors and local 
governments mesh with one another. For example, as G3 and G4 explained, although 
every line ministry or local government had its own master plan for building airports 
and seaports in the local area, there was no organizer to compile the plans. There is no 
central system of horizontal coordination between ministries and between lower levels 
of government, which make it difficult for any individual government department to 
collaborate across institutions. In the absence of such a system, the MPI’s 
coordinating function is largely limited to monitoring separate, sometimes 
contradictory, policy agendas adopted by individual sectors and regions (Government 
Inspectorate of Vietnam, 2005). G4 quoted a case of the Can Tho International 
Airport, in which the airport has been built without a plan for attracting international 
flights to the airport. Major seaports were complete without suitable passageways for 
accommodating ships, said G4. G1 also described the case of the Thanh Tri Bridge: 
Because the design of Thanh Tri Bridge (the largest among 7 bridges across the Red 
River in Hanoi) was done within the transportation sector, it was quickly readied at 
the time of decision making. The construction of the bridge started in 2002. A lot of 
money thus had been invested in building it. However, the access roads to the bridge 
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were not put on the table because of the difficulties in land acquisition, which 
involved sectors and the local government other than the transportation sector. As a 
result, after the bridge had been completed for more than 2 years, the access roads to 
the bridge were still under construction, and the bridge could not be opened for use. 
G1 and G2 also indicated that there is a lack of connection between planning 
and allocation of resources. Allocation of investment budget is often inconsistent with 
the long-term plans. G1 revealed that: 
Although it is called Ministry of Planning and Investment, more than 80% of the 
MPI’s work involves allocating investment budget. The MPI’s development planning 
function only accounts for a small part... Development plans require a long term 
vision, e.g. for 5 years, 10 years. But, what planners mostly do is to allocate the 
investment budget on a yearly basis... Investment budget to be available in the 
coming fiscal year would be allocated to short-term needs arising at the time of 
decision making, rather than being linked to the long-term goals specified in 
development plans. Long-term development plans are prepared just for the sake of 
planning. Many investments were planned and approved by various government 
levels even though there is no corresponding plan of allocating capital investments... 
As a result, investments were scattering and incomplete, and things that must have 
been done first were done later, and vice versa. 
As explained by G4, the excessively spread and disjointed investments would 
be attributable to the lack of a long-range vision of the planners. The lack of 
competent and qualified planners has constrained the government’s ability to set clear 
economic development objectives, formulate strategies, and prioritize action plans. As 
described in Chapter 6, development plans in Vietnam were prepared by the MPI and 
approved by the National Assembly. However, G1 reported that most members of the 
National Assembly had a limited knowledge of construction investments. Besides, as 
reviewed in Chapter 6, there was little evidence of consultations in the public sector in 
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the planning process in Vietnam. G1 and G2 shared that public influence on the final 
decisions made by related government agencies were not the major concern of the 
planners. Instead, planning was based mainly on the will of the political leaders, 
commented G2. However, G1, G2 and P1 indicated that in lacking a commitment to 
national goals, political leaders and government bureaucrats in Vietnam focused on 
taking advantage of the state budget available at the time of decision making, rather 
than supporting the national development goals. P3 also explained that political 
leaders and government bureaucrats could manipulate budgeting decisions so that the 
infrastructure development plans with overestimated benefits, underestimated costs, 
and unfeasible schedules could be approved. Besides, in pursuing their personal, 
sectoral or regional interests, they lacked a long term vision in development planning. 
The tendency of politicians and civil servants to pursue self-interests could therefore 
result in poor judgment, poor quality of planning and bad policy choice, leading to 
resource wastage and inefficiency of infrastructure development in Vietnam. 
Moreover, during the planning process, ex ante assessment of infrastructure 
development plans by independent review bodies and the scientific and professional 
community were considerably poor. P1 and G2 indicated that decision making and 
assessment were both implemented by the government. The interviewees thus 
suggested the setting up of an independent monitoring and evaluation mechanism, and 
reducing the interference of political leaders in planning were necessary throughout 
the process of planning and approval for infrastructure development. 
During the implementation of infrastructure development plans, the 
institutional capacity of Vietnam also lacks a high-powered agency responsible for the 
success of the entire delivery of infrastructure assets. The functional and fiscal 
decentralization associated with public investments in infrastructure has been 
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increasing in recent years. The actual implementation of national infrastructure 
development plans in Vietnam rests with a number of line ministries and lower levels 
of government. More specifically, the enforcement of construction and land use 
regulations are under the authority of local governments (Han and Vu, 2008). 
However, as revealed by G2 and G3, the declining central control and increasing local 
autonomy in infrastructure development before the managerial capacity of local 
governments become sound enough have resulted in wasteful investments, abuse of 
public funds at the lower level of government. G2 and G3 commented that a central 
capacity to drive priorities and ensure quality control is necessary to provide an 
effective mechanism for implementing national infrastructure plans. Cabinet 
committees (for example, Steering Committee on master planning for national 
development of electricity; and Steering Committee on key transportation projects) 
could be established to organize and coordinate the implementation of these national 
infrastructure projects (Government Web Portal of Vietnam, 2012). In most instances, 
the interdepartmental teams of officials are, however, linked to one another only when 
updates have to be provided. Moreover, the performance monitoring and evaluation 
were poorly carried out. There are no designated measurable criteria to evaluate the 
real costs of the infrastructure delivery. Similarly, there is no established procedure 
for ex-post assessment to verify whether infrastructure projects meet objectives.  
Reports  produced by government agencies (Government Inspectorate of Vietnam, 
2005; Transport Engineering Construction and Quality Management Bureau, 2011) 
are often long on describing the current status of related sectors but short on analysis 
and practical policy implications. Accordingly, remediation or acts to ensure that 
improved financial and physical performances actually take place in the delivery of 
national infrastructure assets was often vaguely suggested in these reports. 
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The last issue relating to institutional capacity of the government is the 
changing and inconsistent laws and regulations in infrastructure construction. 
Governments directly influence the public construction sector by setting rules for 
development that govern contractual relationships. The common features of legal 
systems in developing countries are that rules are constantly changed and inconsistent. 
The uncertainty caused by the inconsistency in policies, changes in laws and 
regulations could pose a high degree of risk to the industry’s development and growth. 
Difficulties in complying with changing and inconsistent laws and regulations are 
regarded as the main obstacles in improving the industry’s performance (Ofori, 2000). 
Following rapid economic development since the country liberalized its market in 
1986, the Vietnamese infrastructure construction sector has also increasingly 
expanded. Over the years, innumerable laws and regulations for governing the sector 
have been enacted (Ministry of Construction, 2008). However, there is still a need for 
a unified legal framework. In an interview with the Vietnam Economic Times (Anh, 
2011), the vice chairman of VFCEA, Dr. Pham Sy Lien, shared that there are a 
number of inconsistency, duplication, and even contradiction between the 
Construction Law introduced in 2003 and others introduced more recently. The 
chairman explained that since there was an urgent need for a governing legal 
framework, the Construction Law was created within 6 months and set up to cover all 
types of construction activities and participants. At the same time the rapid pace of 
legal development left many issues unanswered. Similarly, the Tendering Law rigidly 
applies international formats without taking into consideration the local conditions, 
thus overlooking many important issues to protect the interests of the local 
participants. As a result, amendments and new laws and regulations are constantly 
enacted to deal with these issues. Although they have their respective emphasis, many 
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of them are inconsistent with the existing statutes and codes (Anh, 2011). G2 asserted 
that laws and regulations on construction investments and financing in Vietnam were 
frequently changed and inconsistent, causing fluctuations in prices and inflation rates 
in Vietnam, which in turn raised land compensation rates, material prices, salaries, 
and consequently capital investments. Eventually, these problems could affect the 
stability and continuity of the implementation of the country’s development plans in 
general and the infrastructure sector in particular. 
By setting national policy agenda, making national policy decisions, guiding 
law making process, as well as monitoring and guiding policy implementation, an 
adequate institutional capacity of the government that generates good planning and 
sensible policies get to be implemented. Without an adequate institutional capacity, 
the government would move policy agenda unrealistically or set planning policies that 
do not reflect the interests of a majority of the population. Besides, institutional 
capacity specifies an operating environment and a set of rules for the implementation 
of government policy. It provides a framework to ensure the good performance of 
various actors in carrying out central policies. The empirical results indicate that an 
inadequate institutional capacity of the government influences forecasting, 
transparency and accountability, as well as land acquisition and capacity of local 
firms, which in turn directly influence the efficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure. This suggests that inadequate institutional capacity of the government 
is at the root of investment inefficiency of funded infrastructure development in 
Vietnam. An adequate institutional capacity of the government is thus a precondition 
for improving the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure. This is 
consistent with the literature on economic developmental pointing to development 




Analysing the data collected, the chapter shows that efficiency of public investments 
in infrastructure in Vietnam is falling. Factor analysis indicates that factors critical to 
the current use of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam are institutional 
capacity of the government, transparency and accountability, land acquisition, and 
building capacity of local firms. Among these factors, institutional capacity of the 
government is at the root of the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure. 
The results presented in this chapter will be used to develop the research framework 
in the next chapter. Discussions of the related problems and challenges in this chapter 
will also be extended to provide policy implications and recommendations in the 




CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Infrastructure funding has been shown to be critical to the questions of trade and 
economic growth (see Chapters 3 and 4). This research examines the question of 
efficiency in using public investments in infrastructure to support trade and economic 
growth in the context of Vietnam. Over the last decade, Vietnam has invested more 
than 7.5% of GDP in electricity supply, transport and communications (see Table 8.1). 
Over the next five years, Vietnam will need about US$139 billion to be invested in 
infrastructure for promoting trade and economic growth (Moore et al., 2010). 
Apparently, whether the amount of US$139 billion set aside for infrastructure 
development would make a long-term contribution to improving the nation’s public 
infrastructure depends on the quality of the government’s infrastructure plan and 
delivery. More importantly, what factors influence how well the nation’s fixed assets 
are planned and built? 
The first objective of this study is to review how public investments in 
infrastructure are used to support trade and economic growth in the literature. The 
study reviews the literatures on construction and economic development, international 
trade theories, and infrastructure development in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The literature 
review suggests that public investments in infrastructure play an important role in 
supporting trade and economic growth by providing physical structures and facilities 
for the economy as a whole and improving access to international markets. The 
second objective of this study is to examine how infrastructure is planned and built in 
Vietnam. The objective has been achieved in Chapter 6. Infrastructure development, 
government planning and related issues in Vietnam have been reviewed in the chapter. 
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In achieving the last three objectives, this study examined how efficiently 
public investments in infrastructure used over the last decade support trade and 
economic growth in Vietnam. With this backdrop, the study tested a model that 
examined the impact of institutional capacity of the government, forecasting capacity, 
transparency and accountability, land acquisition, and capacity of local construction 
firms on the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure in Chapter 8. The 
following findings and recommendations emerged from the data analyses. 
 
9.2 Major findings 
9.2.1 Efficiency level of public investments in infrastructure 
The efficiency of public investments in infrastructure is measured by the extent to 
which the public investments in infrastructure are well used for improving the quality 
and the extensiveness of infrastructure networks for trading expansion, and 
subsequently economic growth. Public investments in infrastructure are measured by 
state investments (as % of GDP) in electricity supply, transport and communications. 
The data was collected from the various Statistical Yearbooks of Vietnam issued by 
the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. The quality and extensiveness of 
infrastructure networks for promoting economic activity is measured by the 
competitiveness index of Vietnam in terms of infrastructure development. The index 
was collected from the various Global Competitiveness Reports published by the 
World Economic Forum. 
 The results of the longitudinal survey show that from 1999 to 2010, the 
efficiency of public investments in infrastructure increased in some years, but 
decreased in others. More importantly, the marginal effect of the public investments 
in infrastructure (the impact on efficiency of one-unit change in public investments in 
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infrastructure) was an inverted U-shaped. Since 2002, the marginal effect has been 
declining. This reflects the falling trend in efficiency of public investments in 
infrastructure for supporting trade and economic growth in Vietnam. 
 
9.2.2 Factors affecting the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure 
From the literature review, 35 problems (see Table 8.4) were identified. These were 
used in a questionnaire survey to explore what problems would significantly affect the 
efficient use of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam. The questionnaire 
was sent to both the government officials and major developers, financial institutions, 
traders, contractors and consultants involved in planning and delivering infrastructure, 
as well as in utilizing infrastructure services for trading activities. Spearman ranking 
correlation test shows that there is a high degree of agreement between the two groups 
on the level of occurrence and criticality of problems. From the simple data analysis, 
the top 27 ranking problems in terms of the median critical ratings were selected for 
further factor analysis. 
Factor analysis was employed to capture the multivariate relationship existing 
among the problems. The Bartlett test of sphericity and the measure of sampling 
adequacy (MSA) justifying the application of factor analysis suggest that a structure 
exists to group problems. Based on the procedure in applying factor analysis (Hair et 
al., 2010), 25 problems were retained and structured into five distinct group factors, 
including insufficient institutional capacity of the government, lack of transparency 
and accountability in infrastructure development, lack of an effective land acquisition 




Based on the results of factor analysis, a model of major group factors 
affecting the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure was developed. In 
the model, lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure development, lack 
of an effective land acquisition framework, inadequate forecasting capacity, and 
insufficient building capacity of local firms were all positively related to the 
inefficient use of public investments in infrastructure. In addition, insufficient 
institutional capacity of the government was considered as the root construct having 
critical effects on other factors, and ultimately on the inefficient use of public 
investments in infrastructure in Vietnam. The assessment of the theoretical model was 
conducted with PLS-SEM. PLS-SEM assessment consists of two parts: evaluation of 
measurement model and evaluation of structural model. Results of the measurement 
model suggest that reliability and validity of measured indicators (construct reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity) are supported (see Section 8.4.2). 
Evaluation of the structural model was conducted using the coefficient of 
determination R2, the assessment of the significance of path coefficients, and the 
predictive relevance of the structural model (see Section 8.4.3). The results suggested 
that all relationships in the model are statistically significant and robust to PLS-SEM 
techniques, except for the impact of inadequate forecasting capacity. The theoretical 
model is thus generally supported. Each relationship is symptomatic of a set of 
underlying causes. The results were discussed together with in-depth interviews. The 
following are the main results of the analysis. 
Effects of Inadequate forecasting capacity 
The analysis shows that inadequate forecasting capacity has no statistically significant 
effects on the efficiency of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam. Issues 
with forecasting capacity have previously been associated with forecasting inaccuracy 
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(Ascher, 1979; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). Others argued that 
misleading forecasts are not truly caused by inadequacies in forecasting capacity 
(Flyvbjerg, 2007). The results of the empirical analysis in this research suggest that 
inadequacies in forecasting capacity per se do not matter. Although improvements in 
forecasting capacity have been made in Vietnam, a substantial gap between forecasts 
and the actual results of infrastructure development planning still exists (Nguyen and 
Dapice, 2009). This points to the importance of examining other factors that would 
affect efficiency of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam. 
Effects of Lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure development 
The analysis shows that lack of transparency and accountability in infrastructure 
development is largely responsible for the inefficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure in Vietnam. The low level of transparency and accountability poses 
significant risks of corruption, and fraudulent and law breaking practices of 
government officials and local firms in public projects. This can have serious 
detrimental effects on the quality of infrastructure development and ultimately on the 
efficiency of public investments in infrastructure. There are three broad areas of 
problems associated with transparency and accountability in currently funded 
infrastructure development: 
(i) Lack of transparency and competitiveness in bidding and award: the inadequate 
consideration of appropriate qualifications when selecting firms, the absence of 
measurable criteria for capturing the difference in qualifications of tendering 
firms and the lack of a mechanism to verify the tendering applications of firms; 
the avoidance of open competitive bidding by adjusting the contract valuation 
below a certain level or dividing procurement into smaller contracts. 
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(ii) Complicated and bureaucratic administrative system in infrastructure 
development: complicated rules and procedures for review and approval across 
levels of government; and weak accountability for government officials’ actions 
and decisions and a culture of collective responsibility among government 
officials. 
(iii) Poor enforcement of the existing legislation and regulations relating to corruption: 
the combination of many roles of the government in infrastructure development; 
lack of effective protection for whistleblowers and punishments stringent enough 
to prevent corruption. 
Effects of Lack of an effective land acquisition framework 
The analysis shows that lack of an effective land acquisition framework is a 
statistically significant cause of the inefficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure. Lack of an effective land acquisition framework can lead to 
controversies over compensation packages and increasing claims and disputes in land 
acquisition. The empirical analysis in this study reveals that these difficulties in land 
acquisition can slow down the project development, causing significant delays and 
cost overruns. There are two broad areas of difficulties with the current land 
acquisition framework in Vietnam: 
(i) Bureaucracy in land disputes and claim settlements: bureaucracy in issuing land 
use certificates; high tax and legal scrutiny required for transfer of land use titles; 
and overlapping and inconsistency in land use regulations. 
(ii) Inadequate compensation for land acquired for public projects: large gaps 
between state price frameworks and market prices of land, the loss of business of 
affected land users, inadequate assistance for resettlement, inadequate public 
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financial resources for compensation, speculative purchases of land surrounding 
the area to be acquired; and 
(iii) Lack of a clear spatial plan for infrastructure development. 
Effects of Insufficient building capacity of local firms 
Data analysis in this study reveals that there is a certain relationship between building 
capacity of local firms and the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure in 
Vietnam.  Local firms lack the expertise and resources to guarantee the quality and 
professional competence of the workforce in large infrastructure projects. 
Consequently, these constraints result in the deterioration of efficiency of funded 
infrastructure development. The relationship suggests that increasing the building 
capacity of local firms can raise the efficiency of funded infrastructure development, 
benefiting both the government and local firms. Thus, increasing the building capacity 
of local firms is an important part of the national infrastructure development plan. The 
major challenges with the current building capacity of local firms in undertaking 
public projects include: 
(i) With state-owned companies or PMUs assigned to be responsible for project 
development: lack of managerial expertise for large infrastructure projects, lack 
of thrust on optimization of costs, low level of accountability, inadequate and 
slow release of funds and payments. 
(ii) With supervision consultants: low consultant fees, low level of accountability and 
professionalism, lack of systematic training, certification and registration. 
(iii) With designers and engineers: lack of experienced and highly qualified designers 
and engineers, lack of thrust on optimization of design, inadequate topographical 
surveys; lack of resources and capacity for quality control, low level of 
accountability and professionalism. 
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(iv) With contractors: lack of capable contractors for handling large infrastructure 
projects; lack of experienced staff and skilled labour, lack of a quality 
management structure and culture, and financial and modern equipment 
constraints. 
Effects of Insufficient institutional capacity of the government 
A result that should be of particular concern to the government is the detrimental 
effects of insufficient institutional capacity of the government. The empirical results 
show that insufficient institutional capacity of the government has produced 
detrimental effects far beyond other factors. As insufficient institutional capacity of 
the government influence forecasting, transparency and accountability, land 
acquisition and capacity of local construction firms, their effects spill over into the 
efficiency of public investments in infrastructure. Insufficient institutional capacity of 
the government restricts government’s ability to generate good planning and sensible 
policies, as well as the ability to create a framework that ensure the good performance 
of various actors in carrying out central policies. There are three broad areas of 
difficulties with the current institutional capacity of the government, including: 
(i) Inadequate coordination in infrastructure planning: inadequate coordination 
between sectoral ministries and between lower levels of government; lack of 
incorporation of financial considerations into infrastructure planning. 
(ii) Poorly executed decision-making: lack of national interests and lack of a long 
range vision on the part of political leaders and government bureaucrats, lack of 
competent and qualified planners, lack of ex ante assessment by independent-
review bodies and scientific and professional community, lack of an independent 
mechanism for monitoring decisions and actions made by government officials. 
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(iii) Deficient organizing for delivery: the absence of a high-powered agency 
responsible for the entire delivery of national infrastructure programs, the lack of 
managerial capacity of local governments in infrastructure development, the 
absence of measurable criteria for evaluating (physical and financial) 
performance and poor ex-post assessment to verify whether infrastructure 
projects meet objectives, and changing and inconsistent laws and regulations in 
infrastructure construction (including construction investments and financing, and 
bidding regulations). 
Findings of the research identified above are summarised in the framework illustrated 
in Figure 9.1. 
 
Figure 9.1 Major factors affecting the efficient use of public investments in 




From the factor analysis, four groups of factors emerge as key challenges in moving 
toward the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure. The following 
recommendations stem from the underlying causes of each factor and suggestions 
discussed in Section 8.5. Recommendations can be prioritized based on the extent to 
which a particular factor acts as a constraint to the efficient use of public investments 
in infrastructure. Results of the factor analysis suggest that the lack of institutional 
capacity of the government is the root construct. Transparency and accountability 
have the second biggest impact, and the next two factors are land acquisition and 
building capacity of local firms (see Figure 8.3). As a result, the starting point for 
recommendations would be solutions to sustain governmental commitment and to 
improve institutional capacity. Other recommendations are measures to enhance 
transparency and accountability in infrastructure development, to improve the land 
acquisition framework, and to strengthen building capacity of local firms. 
Recommendations would mainly require capacity building or changes in policies and 
regulations. While capacity building needs a medium-term timeframe, changes in 
policies and regulations can be implemented in a shorter timeframe. The central 
government, including the Ministry of Planning and Investment, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Information and 
Communication should take a lead in organizing and directing these efforts.  
 
9.3.1 Institutional capacity of the government 
Developing institutional capacity reflects the leading role of the government in 
spearheading and coordinating infrastructure development. Concerns over 
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institutional capacity of the government of Vietnam suggest that there is a pressing 
need for better planning and running of infrastructure development across sectors and 
government levels. Solutions recommended in this area focus on developing ways to 
strengthen institutional links and to bring interests from different sectors and 
government levels together, and to improve laws governing the infrastructure 
construction sector. More specifically, attention should be paid to the following: 
(i) The relatively vertical structure of the government has resulted in little 
coordination between ministries and between local governments. Outcomes of the 
problems are the excessively spread out and disjointed investments. As a result, 
the development of horizontal coordination channels across the ministries and 
across the local governments that have infrastructure responsibilities would help 
strengthen their coordination and cooperation. 
(ii) The mismatch between budget allocation plans and investment plans requires the 
government to develop a process for integrating budgeting decisions with 
investment decisions made by ministries and local governments, and ensuring 
that projects are to be approved with corresponding plans for budget allocation. 
(iii) With reference to decision-making, there is a need for safeguarding national 
interests. The underlying causes suggest that there is a strong need for an 
independent advisory board within the central government composed of a wide 
range of stakeholders from government officials, academics and independent 
consultants to monitor the direction of infrastructure development and develop 
tools to ensure that sectoral and local interests are aligned with national priorities. 
The government should also focus on building a core cadre of planners within the 




(iv) The current decentralization arrangement in the delivery of national infrastructure 
requires the establishment of a high-level government body (within the central 
government) that has the resources and the mandate to co-ordinate, monitor and 
resolve any disputes between lower levels. The concerns over the evaluation 
system of delivery performance suggests the need to introduce a system of 
regular evaluation with (physical and financial) performance indicators that can 
measure progress toward goals and the real costs of infrastructure delivery, and 
ensure that public disclosure (as a driver for more accurate evaluation) is 
provided, thus providing actionable advices for related government agencies to 
respond to problems. 
(v) The laws governing the construction industry is another institutional barrier that 
requires the government to conduct a regulatory review of the current 
construction laws and regulations, especially those related to construction 
investments and financing, and bidding. Findings of the review would be used as 
a basis for building a unified legal framework. 
 
9.3.2 Transparency and accountability 
Transparency and accountability are primary concerns for the efficient use of public 
investments in infrastructure. Based on major weaknesses in transparency and 
accountability identified in infrastructure development, actions center on competition 
in bidding, administrative reforms, and explicit anti-corruption measures are 
suggested. 
(i) Supporting greater use of competitive bidding for infrastructure projects, the 
government should revise the Tendering Law to ensure that firms are selected 
based on both their qualifications and prices, rather than focusing on tender price 
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only. Accordingly, there is a need for introducing measurable criteria and 
procedures for capturing and evaluating the difference in the qualifications of 
tendering firms necessary to ensure their capability to fulfill the contract. There is 
also a need to set up a mechanism to verify their tendering applications and to 
prevent fraud. In order to increase competition in bidding, the government should 
also develop tendering regulations that forbid the selection of valuation methods 
and division of procurement with the view to avoid open-tendering. 
(ii)  Dealing with the bureaucracy in infrastructure development requires the 
establishment of a system where lower level governments are capable of making 
decisions without referring back to higher level governments or the Prime 
Minister. For such a system to work, training for local government officials 
should be offered to enhance their management capability relating to 
infrastructure development. There is also an issue concerning how government 
officials should be held accountable for their actions and decisions. The low level 
of accountability and the culture of collective responsibility suggest more needs 
to be done in improving information disclosure concerning the decisions and 
actions of government bureaucrats, subjecting their conduct to public scrutiny; 
and establishing a system of rewarding good practices and punishing bad ones.  
(iii) The combination of many roles of the government suggests that there is a need 
for establishing an independent regulatory institution (independent of ministerial 
influence), and the use of external auditors to detect fraud and corruption, and 
enforce rules when required. In addition, providing effective measures to ensure 
the confidentiality of whistleblowers, and stricter punishments for offenders are 




9.3.3 Land acquisition 
Increasing demand for infrastructure would inevitably involve considerable instances 
of land acquisition. Difficulties in land acquisition in Vietnam show that the key is to 
ensure that adequate compensation is provided for affected land users. 
Recommendations are: 
(i) The starting point would be addressing bureaucracy in issuing land use 
certificates, which give land users the right to claim for compensation for the land 
acquired. The current bureaucratic process suggests that simplification of land 
registration arrangements would be particularly important. Furthermore, 
measures should be studied to reduce land-use tax burden for land users once 
land use certificates are issued. The current regulations for dispute resolution 
should be reviewed to ensure that land disputes and claims are fairly and 
consistently settled. 
(ii) Under the current mechanism in public projects where the government is both the 
valuer and the takeover institution, there is no room for those displaced to 
challenge the compensation rates set by the government. Developing a 
mechanism for land users to discuss/negotiate compensation rates with relevant 
authorities would thus help fill the gap between the state price framework and 
market prices of land. In addition, the government should develop guidelines and 
criteria for building compensation packages that recognize loss of business of 
affected land users. 
(iii) Although assistance measures for resettlement are required by Land Law, in 
practice these are not adequately implemented. Improving transparency and 
accountability in practice is thus necessary. The starting point would be to 
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develop an independent monitoring system for the implementation of 
compensation and resettlement. 
(iv) Paying proper compensation is becoming more problematic due to the high price 
of land. A possible direction suggested in this study would be for the government 
to develop land taxes to capture a proportion of the increase in land value 
associated with infrastructure improvements. The collected taxes would not only 
serve as an avenue to increase revenue for compensation, but also have the happy 
side-effect of reducing social inequality and gaining public support. 
(v) Speculative purchases of land remain the major force that push up land prices 
artificially. Addressing the issue is thus particularly important to improve the 
efficiency of land markets, and to reduce compensation costs. A suggested 
solution is to establish procedures and criteria for the transparent and competitive 
sale of land in the area to be acquired for infrastructure development. 
(vi) There is also a suggestion to develop a clear spatial plan for infrastructure 
development, so that land would be set aside in advance for infrastructure 
development, and resettlement costs would be significantly reduced. 
 
9.3.4 Building capacity of local firms 
Building capacity of local firms is identified as an essential element for achieving the 
efficient use of public investments in infrastructure. There is room for improvement in 
many aspects of building capacity of local firms. This includes improving 
management capability, developing human resources, increasing level of 
accountability and professionalism, and strengthening financial and equipment rental 
markets. The details of recommendations are: 
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(i) For state-owned companies or PMUs assigned to be responsible for project 
development: 
- Since there are no rules for assigning state-owned companies or PMUs, the 
government should set up the procedures for appointing PMUs, and providing 
criteria for selecting capable PMUs. Training for PMUs should be offered to 
enhance their management capability, and capacity for quality control, contract and 
contractor management. 
- To encourage greater accountability, the government should also provide rules for 
PMUs to manage project effectively, make strategic decisions about the project 
performance, and hold the project manager accountable for its performance. 
Selected PMUs should be tied to financial responsibility related to costs of 
construction, operations as well as maintenance. 
- In order to accelerate the release of funds and payments and reduce uncertainties 
over budget allocation, the government should simplify the release procedures and 
match medium and long term project financing needs with the government budget 
allocation plans. 
(ii) For supervision consultants: 
- More attention should be given to promote the supervision consultancy profession. 
National government agencies and the industry associations should take a lead in 
improving consultant fees for supervision consultants and providing incentives to 
retain people in the sector. 
- In order to achieve greater accountability and professionalism, a formal system of 
performance evaluation should be established. In addition, training, certification 




(iii) For designers and engineers: 
- A long-term capacity development framework for local consultants should be 
introduced to address the needs for high quality designers and engineers. 
- Government agencies should introduce merit-based rewards or other incentive 
schemes to encourage designers and engineers to optimize design. Also, there 
should be a formal system of performance evaluation and forms of liability on the 
consultants on the costs incurred due to poor quality of design. Training should 
also be offered to enhance their capacity for quality control. 
- The government agencies should develop measures to ensure that adequate funds 
are set aside for topographical surveys; and set standards to ensure the quality of 
survey reports. 
 
(iv) For contractors: 
- The government and the industry should focus on ways and means to facilitate and 
attract larger contractors. For small-scale contractors, training should be offered to 
enhance their management and financial management capability, and capacity for 
quality control. Contractors should set up their in-house quality management 
systems rather than to rely on other parties. 
- The government and the industry should provide incentives or create an enabling 
environment for banks and other financial institutions to develop financial markets 
that provide commercial loans for small-scale contractors. Likewise, measures to 
foster an equipment rental market should be instituted to meet the demand for 






The qualitative validation exercise for this research study was conducted in April 
2013. Five experts in Vietnam were selected for the validation interviews. As 
explained in section 7.7, they are senior stakeholders with one involved in the public 
sector, two in academics and two in the industry. They have been involved with the 
process of public investments in infrastructure since the mid-1990s. Major steps in the 
validation included presenting these experts the research findings and asking them to 
give comments on the reliability of the research findings and the relevance and 
practicability of the research recommendations. All experts commented that the 
research findings were comprehensive as they reflected on the current situation in 
Vietnam. With reference to the research recommendations, the interviewees 
commented that they were generally relevant and practical. Two experts said that the 
research recommendations are comprehensive and practical. One expert said that 
many of the research recommendations are outstanding. One expert said the research 
recommendations can contribute to improve the efficiency of the use of public 
investments in infrastructure in Vietnam. One interviewee was not impressed with the 
research recommendations. However, when the expert was asked for suggestions on 
how to improve them, the expert could not give a clear answer. In addition, all experts 
emphasized that Vietnam has made a number of changes in laws and regulations to 
close the gaps between international principles and Vietnamese policies on paper at 
least. However, difficulties remain in the execution of these laws and regulations. 
Therefore, the experts suggested that recommendations for capacity building should 





Institutional capacity of the government 
All experts emphasized that in order to avoid excessively spread and disjointed 
infrastructure investments, identifying strategic goals for infrastructure development 
is crucial. Identifying strategic goals for infrastructure development should be based 
on a comprehensive study to select priorities that could seize the opportunities and 
utilize resources on a few strategic goals. The experts agreed with the research 
findings and recommendations as explained by one expert: 
Functions and roles of the government at different levels (vertically and horizontally) 
and at various stages in policy making and planning have to be more clearly defined; 
and budget must be adequately allocated in accordance with investment schedule. 
Roles of “relevant authorities” must be clearly defined since in many cases, 
interference of relevant authorities in various stages caused waste and created 
obstacles in infrastructure development. 
Although one expert disagreed with the research finding that there is a lack of 
national interests among government officials, the expert’s explanation is in 
agreement with the research finding: 
There is not a lack of national interests among government officials. The problem is 
that they abuse public funds to serve their local interests. 
Two experts suggested that the government should use professional 
associations as independent advisory boards as explained by one of the experts: 
Professional associations can serve as independent advisory boards, helping to 
monitor the direction of infrastructure development and ensure that sectoral and 
local interests are in line with national priorities. Besides, the State (the Party, 
National Assembly and Government) can consult with professional associations when 
preparing master plan for infrastructure development and outlining strategic vision 
of a future infrastructure system. 
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Given the role of professional associations in Vietnam, the suggestion is appropriate 
and can be added to the research recommendation. 
One expert suggested that infrastructure should be developed systematically at 
local level and national level, and in collaboration with neighbouring countries for 
long-term development goals. Since the study focuses on national level, the 
suggestion of regional collaboration in infrastructure development can be considered 
in future research work. 
The experts concurred with the research findings and recommendations of the 
establishment of a high-level government body for coordination in the delivery of 
national infrastructure programs. One expert emphasized that: 
The establishment of a high-level government body is necessary for coordination in 
delivery of national infrastructure programs. The government body should regularly 
use the evaluation system with performance indicators comparing planned goals with 
actual progress and costs of infrastructure delivery; and publicize these results (as a 
driver for more accurate evaluation), thus providing actionable advices for related 
government agencies to respond to problems. 
Regarding the research recommendation for a formal monitoring and 
evaluation system, one expert highlighted that: 
Currently lower level governments are required to periodically report performance of 
public investments in infrastructure to higher levels. However, the lack of specific 
guidelines with measurable criteria for performance evaluation reduces the 
effectiveness of the reporting system. It is necessary to issue standard principles for 
performance evaluation of public investments in infrastructure. 
Relating to changes in laws and regulations, one expert commented that the 
government is taking steps to review laws and regulations governing the construction 
 280 
 
industry, and amendments are expected to be made to address the inconsistencies 
among them. 
Transparency and accountability 
The experts shared the same opinion with the research findings that lack of 
transparency and accountability in infrastructure development is one of the pressing 
issues in Vietnam. The experts emphasized that existing laws and regulations have 
provided a set of rules to ensure the good performance of various actors in carrying 
out central policies. The experts agreed with the research findings that the poor 
execution of the existing laws and regulations, and the absence of a set of measurable 
criteria for performance evaluation of the actors involved pose a significant threat to 
the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam. With reference to 
bidding, one expert explained: 
Although the Tendering Law mentioned the acceptance of the lowest evaluated tender 
bid, the current Construction Law allows firms meeting minimum requirements of 
relevant qualifications be selected on the basis of rational tender price, which might 
not necessarily be the lowest one. However, in practice as long as firms meet 
minimum requirements of relevant qualifications, firm selection focuses on tender 
price, which can be the lowest. The major issue is that there are no measurable 
criteria to capture the difference in qualifications that go beyond the minimum 
requirements. With reference to a mechanism to verify firms’ tendering applications, 
the current Tendering Law requires that each province will select a top leader (at 
least vice president of provincial people’s committee) to be in charge of tendering at 
the provincial level. The selected government official has the right to cancel the 
tendering and reject the tendering results if any fraudulent practices are discovered. 
However, the absence of guidelines and measurable criteria for verification has made 
it difficult to prevent fraud. Besides, tendering applications with subcontracting work 
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is allowed in the current Tendering Law. However, there is no mechanism to verify 
the relevant qualifications of the subcontractors. 
One expert added that there should be measures to prevent firms affiliated with 
related government ministries or procurement officials from bidding. The expert 
stressed the research recommendation of the use of independent monitoring 
institutions, and external auditors throughout various stages of infrastructure 
development to deal with the combination of many roles of the government. 
Relating to decentralization in infrastructure development, one expert 
emphasized on the research findings that: 
Decentralization is necessary, but training should be provided for lower government 
levels. The government should develop specific regulations for lower government 
levels on how to monitor and evaluate infrastructure development. Financial liability 
should be applied for fraudulent practices made by government officials. 
Land acquisition 
Regarding land acquisition, one expert commented that the research recommendations 
of measures to ensure adequate compensation to be provided for affected land users 
are novel. The expert also concurred with the research recommendations that 
establishment of an independent monitoring system for the implementation of 
compensation and resettlement is necessary to improve transparency and 
accountability in land acquisition. 
One expert focused on the research finding that inconsistency in current 
regulations for land use and dispute resolutions should be addressed. In addition, the 
expert proposed that the vicinity of the infrastructure site should be acquired together 
with the infrastructure site. The local government can sell the vicinity and create 
equality between those displaced and those benefiting from infrastructure 
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improvements. The suggestion that has been discussed in Chapter 8 might not be 
relevant in urban areas. 
Two experts are, however, concerned with the difference in compensation 
rates offered across adjacent land areas, and thus suggested some solutions. As 
explained by one of the experts: 
Land-related policies should be consistent for at least 5 years. According to current 
Land Law, compensation rates vary between land zones. As a result, land users in 
different land zones would be offered different compensation rates, even though they 
stay in adjacent land zones. The mechanism creates social inequality among land 
users in adjacent areas. To deal with the issue, there should be special compensation 
valuation methods for adjacent land zones and land areas where land users can 
benefit from infrastructure improvements. There should also be regulations to prevent 
fraudulent practices in order to get higher compensation rates, delaying land 
acquisition. 
One expert emphasized that the research recommendation for the development 
of a mechanism for land users to negotiate compensation rates with developers in 
public projects would be the answer to the dissatisfaction over land compensation 
rates among land users, especially those in adjacent areas. 
Building capacity of local firms 
With reference to building capacity of local firms, one expert highlighted that the two 
most pressing issues in infrastructure delivery in Vietnam are quality and time and 
that improving capacities of related parties are important to address these issues. The 
expert suggested that capacity building for local firms should focus on building high 
quality firms for niche markets. 
Regarding the capacity of PMUs, one expert emphasized and concurred with 
the research finding that PMUs representing the relevant ministries for project 
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development must have sufficient capability, and are allowed to make decisions 
independently of the ministries in the areas where the PMUs are capable of. One 
expert suggested that the government should encourage contracting out project 
management work through bidding rather than performing them in-house to deal with 
the lack of managerial expertise of the PMUs and to improve the level of 
professionalism. The suggestion can be added to the list of research recommendations. 
 Regarding the capacity for supervision consultants, one expert focused on the 
research recommendation that training, certification and registration should be 
renewed to improve the level of professionalism and work ethics. The expert also 
recommended that there should be regulations to revoke the professional certificates 
of those found to have fraudulent practices. The suggestion is suitable to improve the 
level of accountability of supervision consultants. 
Relating to the capacity of designers and engineers, one expert emphasized the 
need to improve the level of the accountability. The expert agreed with the research 
recommendation of setting up a formal system of performance evaluation, suggesting 
that: 
Their performance should be evaluated through a set of criteria.  Performance should 
be evaluated through aesthetics, functional, sustainable and economical criteria of 
designed buildings and structures. In addition, information on capacity of designers 
and engineers should be posted online and updated annually. 
For contractors, the expert also suggested that: 
Firms should be classified according to their capacity. Measurable criteria for firm 
classification should be formulated. List of classified firms should be posted online 
and updated annually. 




 Relating to the research recommendation of introducing incentive schemes to 
improve the level of professionalism among supervision consultants, designers and 
engineers, one expert suggested that there should be regulations to increase consultant 
fees. The expert stressed that the current low level of consultant fees could pose a 
high risk of corruption and fraudulent practices. 
Out of these discussions, a few suggestions made by these experts can be 
added to the research recommendations. The validated research recommendations are 





*suggested by experts during validation exercise. 
Figure 9.2 Framework for developing capacities for the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam 
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9.5 Contributions and implications 
9.5.1 Theoretical contributions 
The current research has several contributions to knowledge. The study addressed the 
main research question of what factors influence/limit the efficient use of public 
investments in infrastructure to support trade and economic development. 
The study explored public investments in infrastructure based on an entire 
management system that encompasses planning, budgeting, inter-ministry and inter-
local government cooperation, and delivery. The approach focuses on the macro-level 
in order to identify the sources of issues in using public investments in infrastructure 
to support trade and economic development across government departments and 
policy spheres. 
Employing the above-mentioned approach, the research supplements the 
understanding of the role of government in the theory of coordination failure in 
economic development. The theory of coordination failures argues that when 
complementaries exist, but are not seen to be feasible from individual private 
investors’ point of view, the active roles of governments as coordinators and 
facilitators are needed (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). The focus of the policy 
recommended is thus the use of a government-led approach/investment as a basis for 
coordinated efforts (Krugman, 1995). Similar to other developing countries during 
their early stage of development, massive injections of funds in infrastructure 
development have become the keystone in the strategy for rapid economic growth in 
Vietnam. Meanwhile, the potential role of government in ensuring productive 
deployment of public investments in infrastructure has been downplayed. Findings of 
the study suggest that as the country transforms into a middle-income country, the 
potential role of the government extend beyond provision of capital. Massive funding 
 287 
 
is necessary for accelerated economic development, but it is not sufficient to ensure 
the long-term benefits. The way that the government plans and runs infrastructure 
policies lies at the root of the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure. 
Infrastructure interventions in a middle-income country are likely to require the 
government to take the lead in ensuring that development funds induce a long-term 
and sustainable growth. State capacities are thus critical to support the efficient use of 
public investments in infrastructure. 
In addition, the research supplements the theory of coordination failure by 
highlighting the linkages between infrastructure investments for trade and economic 
development and infrastructure delivery. Recent works in the literature on 
coordination failure emphasized that in an economy of a complex system of activities, 
dealing with the coordination problem requires the government to figure out and 
identify which combination of activities could bring out a better outcome as a whole 
(Matsuyama, 1997; Hoff, 2000). Literature on the linkages between infrastructure and 
trade as well as the economy focuses on directions in which public investments in 
infrastructure need to develop for accelerated trade and economic development in 
developing countries. However, findings of this study show that infrastructure 
investment is only part of the equation. Impact of infrastructure delivery is just as 
important. The efficient use of public investments in infrastructure does not end at 
planning and decision making of infrastructure investments. There are a number of 
policies and activities that can cause infrastructure plan disruptions, including 
budgeting decisions, land acquisition, spatial development, and construction laws and 
policies. Findings of the research imply that the government should look more into 
policy initiatives that would significantly improve the management of infrastructure 
delivery. Well-targeted infrastructure interventions for trade and economic 
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development require infrastructure planning to take into account these policy 
initiatives, generate strategic vision and develop a mechanism to translate that vision 
into reality. Understanding of the linkages is critical for devising an effective 
framework for infrastructure interventions in developing countries. Major theoretical 
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9.5.2 Practical policy implications 
Since the liberation process started in Vietnam more than 20 years ago, Vietnam has 
made an impressive progress in GDP growth (see Figure 6.1) and rapidly integrated 
into the world economy. A critical contribution to this success has been the high level 
of investments in infrastructure. Over the past decade, the government has invested 
around 8% of GDP annually in transport, energy, and telecommunications to promote 
trade and economic growth (see Table 8.1). However, analyses of recent issues in 
infrastructure development (see Chapter 6) and the marginal effect of public 
investments in infrastructure over the past decade (see Figure 8.1) have suggested a 
falling trend in the efficiency of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam. 
Improving the efficiency of public investments in infrastructure is thus necessary for 
Vietnam to continue and accelerate the growth process. The research offers a 
consensus framework for developing capacities which are critical for using public 
investments in infrastructure to support trade and economic development in Vietnam. 
Examining how infrastructure investments are formulated points to various 
coordination problems in national policymaking and the planning process. Findings of 
the study imply that the government needs a more refined planning system that would 
bring interests together and solve coordination issues. Thus, the government is 
recommended to take measures to strengthen institutional links and sustaining 
commitment to national interests, including cooperative planning mechanisms at the 
central level, independent consultations, ex-ante and ex-post monitoring and 
evaluation systems of national infrastructure programs, and a unified legal framework 
governing the infrastructure construction sector. Infrastructure planning and delivery 
demand a higher level of coordination across sectors and government levels. However, 
the traditional vertical models of planning can result in fragmented policy-making of 
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sectoral ministries and local governments. Lack of horizontal coordination channels is 
found to be a major challenge for government agencies to coordinate policies in 
Vietnam. Findings of the research also show that decentralization during delivery can 
pose significant coordination challenges. Decentralization of government in Vietnam 
has been increasing in recent years. However, local governments often lack a capacity 
to drive priorities and ensure the overall quality of national infrastructure programs. 
Central institutions that can coordinate lower government levels to implement 
national infrastructure programs will play a major role. With extensive involvement of 
the State in the Vietnamese economy, improving the quality of national planning is 
critical to develop better infrastructure policies, thus sustaining and accelerating the 
rate of economic growth. The lessons from Vietnam have broad application since the 
needs for governments to remake institutional links and bring interests together are 
commonly found in other developing countries, especially those in their early stages 
of development (Todaro and Smith, 2009). 
One of the apparent implications of the research is that transparency and 
accountability are becoming increasingly significant for the efficient use of public 
investments in infrastructure. Key challenges to transparency and accountability in 
infrastructure development in Vietnam include the combination of many roles of the 
government (as decision makers, regulators, supervisors, clients, and so on), the 
complicated and bureaucratic administrative system (in project planning and 
approval), and low level of competition in bidding and award. While transparency and 
accountability are not preconditions for infrastructure development, low level of 
transparency and accountability can undermine the efficient use of public investments 
in infrastructure to support trade and economic growth in the long term. Findings of 
the study highlight that Vietnam needs to address transparency and accountability 
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issues for ensuring the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure, thus 
generating further economic growth. Transparency and accountability can be 
improved through specific tools and incentives. The government should consider 
changes at two main levels: the policies and laws that encourage greater competition 
in bidding, measures that improve information disclosure concerning decisions made 
by public authorities, and enforcement of rules; and organizational development 
(including allocation of responsibilities across government tiers to limit excessive 
bureaucracy, and systematic monitoring and evaluation). 
One of the key factors affecting the efficient use of public investments in 
Vietnam relates to land acquisition. Findings of the research suggest that the current 
framework could not correspond to the considerable requirements for land acquisition 
and resettlement. Current compensation rates are highly distorted due to regulatory 
and procedural constraints, necessitating changes in land laws and policies. Another 
important factor that can exert influence on the efficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure is building capacity of local firms. The fact that implementation of 
project works often suffers from inefficiency and low quality implies that greater 
effort needs to be made to strengthen the building capacity of local firms. Findings of 
the study suggest that there should be policy to address these needs at two main levels: 
organizational development (the respective roles of PMUs, contractors, supervision 
consultants, designers and engineers; and their management, financial and 
technological capabilities); and human resource development (training). 
The importance of the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure to 
support trade and economic growth will increase as demand for large infrastructure 
facilities is higher. Given limited national resources, in its current phase, Vietnam 
needs to develop capacities that would remove constraints on the efficient use of 
 292 
 
public investments in infrastructure. Other developing countries at the same 
developmental stage can benefit from the research findings and recommendations in 
dealing with similar problems in infrastructure development. In summary, the 
research has mapped out the general principles of significant capacity building work 
which are useful for policy implications, including: 
- Institutional capacity for spearheading and coordinating infrastructure 
development is the centerpiece of the efficient use of public investments in 
infrastructure; 
- Transparency and accountability are becoming increasingly significant for the 
efficient use of public investments in infrastructure; 
- Ensuring adequate compensation is the key to solve the land acquisition issues in 
infrastructure development; and 
- Strengthening the building capacity of local firms is essential for achieving the 
efficient use of public investments in infrastructure. 
Both the academic, public and industry communities in developing countries with 
similar problems can adopt the research findings as guiding principles to bring 
changes in their current use of public investments in infrastructure, thus supporting 
trade and economic growth in the long term. 
 
9.6 Limitations of the research 
There are some limitations on the findings of this research: 
- The study considers all infrastructure sectors that support trade and economic 
growth in Vietnam. Thus, the findings are based on analyses of what limits the 
efficient use of overall public investments in infrastructure. However, each 
infrastructure sector is different in the way it supports trade and economic growth. 
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Sectors thus would have different priorities that require different strategic 
approaches. 
- Although the background information on the economic development, trade 
growth and infrastructure construction of Vietnam is based on longitudinal data 
analysis, the major findings of the study are connected with data collected at a 
given time to reflect issues in the current use of public investments in 
infrastructure in Vietnam. A longitudinal design may be useful to further explain 
the effects of relevant historical, political and economic events on the use of 
public investments in infrastructure over a period of time. 
- Factors affecting the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure 
examined in this study are limited to internal factors in Vietnam. However, the 
influence of external factors is of growing importance, as countries become more 
integrated into the world economy. 
 
9.7 Suggestions for future research 
The current study has several contributions to knowledge. There remains, however, 
potential scope for future research. 
First, the current study focused on common issues which can be found across 
infrastructure sectors. A better understanding of the most pressing obstacles 
encountered by each sector would be helpful to identify sector-specific areas that need 
urgent actions. Measures and tools would then be better targeted to sectoral priorities. 
The current study therefore can be extended to include sector-specific analyses for 
different infrastructure sectors. Future research can examine the efficiency of public 
investments in infrastructure of each sector, and uncover the specific factors that 
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determine the sectoral efficiency. Review across infrastructure sectors is required to 
further explain the performance of each sector and to formulate sectoral strategies. 
Second, as the economy liberalizes, factors outside the country can have 
significant influence on international trade, aid and foreign investments. The current 
study should be extended to determine how external factors influence the use of 
public investments in infrastructure. 
Third, given the rapid processes of trade and regional integration, regional 
coordination has become an important issue recently. Regional coordination of 
infrastructure can play an important role in lowering regional infrastructure costs. 
Future research can examine the effects of regional coordination of infrastructure 
policies on the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure, whether regional 
coordination of infrastructure policies help improve the efficiency of delivery of 
infrastructure services, and what are the difficulties a country faces in regional 
coordination of infrastructure policies. 
Finally, a longitudinal design can be employed to link relevant historical, 
political and economic events occurring outside the country to the progress of 
infrastructure development. This understanding is important to shape development 






Appendix 1 – Questionnaire 
 
SURVEY OF PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE EFFICIENT USE OF PUBLIC 
INVESTMENTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT TRADE AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM 
According to many international surveys, the quality of Vietnam’s infrastructure has 
been identified as the biggest hindrance to the growth of the economy in general and 
the trade sector in particular. This suggests that there is a need for Vietnam to balance 
infrastructure quality with trade expansion in order to secure further economic growth. 
However, heavy investments in infrastructure have not effectively created adequate 
infrastructure quality. The current situation in Vietnam could result from a number of 
issues in plan formulation and implementation for national infrastructure development 
plans. Addressing these issues is important to ensure most efficient use of the funding 
invested in infrastructure in the long run. Therefore, this survey seeks to shed light on 
the current factors affecting the efficiency of government funding invested in 
infrastructure to support trade growth and economic development. The survey is 
divided into three sections: 
- Unexpected outcomes to meet  objectives of national development infrastructure 
plans; 
- Problems in infrastructure planning; and 
- Problems in delivery of infrastructure programs. 
The responses will be analysed to identify the current practices, thus obtaining 
information on the problems known to participants in Vietnam. The findings are 
valuable for policy makers and planners to develop tools to improve the efficiency of 
government-funded infrastructure construction for trade and economic growth. 
This survey is conducted as part of a PhD study in the Project Management 
Program, Department of Building, School of Design and Environment, National 
University of Singapore. All individual answers will remain confidential. The survey 




Types of organizations you have been working: 
  Government agencies 
  Research institutions (research institutes, universities, etc.) 
  Clients/Investors 
  Banks 
  Consultants, contractors 
  Suppliers 
  Traders 
Positions or/and academic qualifications: ___________________________________ 
Number of years of work experience:   < 5 years     ≥ 5 years 
 
PART I – FAILURE TO MEET OBJECTIVES OF NATIONAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PLANS  
1. Please tick in the relevant boxes to indicate the extent of the 
occurrence of unexpected outcomes on objectives of national 
infrastructure planning. 















































1 2 3 4 5 
1.1 Poorly selected infrastructure investments      
1.2 Poorly executed and ineffective infrastructure projects      
1.3 Waste of national resources in funded infrastructure projects      
 
PART II – PROBLEMS IN INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING  
Please tick your answers in the relevant boxes to indicate the extent of the occurrence 
of problems in the planning process and their degree of influence on the efficiency of 
government funding invested in infrastructure to support trade growth and economic 
development. 
2. Capacity for estimating and 
monitoring of rates of return of 
infrastructure projects 




















































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
2.1 Limitations of forecasting methods 
and appraisal techniques      
     
2.2 Inadequate data      
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2.3 Inherent problems in predicting the 
future and monetizing external and 
indirect effects 
     
     
2.4 Lack of experienced forecasters      
     
2.5 Inadequacy in ex post analysis on 
whether projects meet objectives      
     
 
3. Politicized decision making 




















































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
3.1 Political leaders and government 
bureaucrats make decisions in their 
personal, sectoral or regional 
interests (e.g. securing political 
positions or competing for scarce 
funds) as opposed to national goals
     
     
3.2 Interest group pressure      
     
 
4. Transparency and 
accountability 




















































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
4.1 Lack of consultation with the 
interested or affected individuals 
or groups about forecasting 
methods, criteria of project 
selection and the determination of 
planning objectives 
     
     
4.2 Lack of independent peer reviews 
and quality checks on forecasts 
and planning outcomes by 
independent-review bodies and 
scientific and professional 
community 
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4.3 Lack of penal systems to enforce 
penalties on those that deliberately 
and consistently produce deceptive 
forecasts 
     
     
 
5. Institutional weaknesses in 
planning 




















































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
5.1 Poor communication between 
planning agency and the day-to-
day decision-making machinery of 
government 
     
     
5.2 Lack of inter-ministerial and 
intersectoral coordination      
     
5.3 Lack of interaction between 
political leaders and planners with 
non-governmental actors 
     
     
5.4 Incompetent and unqualified civil 
servants      
     
5.5 Complicated and bureaucratic 
administrative system      
     
 
PART III – PROBLEMS IN DELIVERY OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMS 
Please tick your answers in the relevant boxes to indicate the extent of the occurrence 
of problems in the implementation process and their degree of influence on the 
efficiency of government funding invested in infrastructure to support trade growth 
and economic development. 
6. Political commitment 




















































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
6.1 Lack of political will on the part of 
top leaders and high-level decision 
makers 
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6.2 Political discontinuity (e.g. 
changes in the political affiliations 
of the government responsible for 
the projects) 
     
     
6.3 Political inconsistencies at national 
level and between different tiers of 
governments (central, regional, 
local) 
     
     
6.4 Lack of a high-powered 
government institution that 
provides an effective mechanism 
for implementing national 
infrastructure plans 
     
     
 
7. Corruption in infrastructure 
construction 




















































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
7.1 Lack of transparency and 
competitiveness in bid processes      
     
7.2 Discretionary power of individual 
bureaucrats involved in award of 
contracts 
     
     
7.3 Inadequate financial and physical 
auditing      
     
7.4 Inadequate capacity of regulatory 
bodies to enforce regulations      
     
 
8. Local construction firms’ 
capabilities and resources 




















































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
8.1 Poor level of efficiency and quality 
of work      
     
8.2 Poor level of professionalism and 
entrepreneurship      
     
8.3 Resources shortages, especially in 
construction technology, 
management and finance 
     






9. Land acquisition 




















































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
9.1 Lack of a negotiating mechanism 
to make land acquisition 
compensation more market-
oriented 
     
     
9.2 Bureaucracy in settling land 
acquisition disputes and claims      
     
9.3 Lack of a land acquisition 
compensation monitoring system      
     
9.4 Lack of clarity about valuation 
methods for compensation      
     
9.5 Lack of law enforcement to 
regulate the price of land acquired 
for infrastructure projects 
     
     
 
10. Institutional and legal 
weaknesses in infrastructure 
construction 




















































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
10.1 Obsolescence of building 
regulations      
     
10.2 Changing and inconsistent law 
and regulations      
     
10.3 Ineffectiveness of 
implementation of existing statutes 
and codes 
     
     
10.4 Bureaucracy in formal 
procedures relating to infrastructure 
project planning, construction 
permission and administration 
     





11. Please indicate any other related issues (other than those mentioned above) that could inhibit the 
efficiency of the funding invested in trade-related infrastructure construction for trade and economic 
growth in Vietnam. Please write your answer in the box below. 
 
 
Thank you very much for your kind assistance. The findings of this study should go a long 




Appendix 2 – Interview questions 
 
1. According to several surveys conducted by international organizations, the 
quality of Vietnam’s infrastructure has been identified as the biggest hindrance 
to the growth of the economy in general and the trade sector in particular. 
Would you please give me some thoughts on the current use of public 
investments in infrastructure to support trade and economic development in 
Vietnam? 
2. According to a recent survey of major issues affecting the efficient use of 
public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam, a number of issues were 
identified from infrastructure planning and delivery, including: institutional 
weaknesses in planning; corruption in funded infrastructure projects; land 
acquisition problems; shortages of local firms’ capabilities and resources; 
bureaucracy in infrastructure construction; transparency and accountability 
problems. 
2a. From your experience, how are these problems affecting the efficient 
use of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam? 
2b. What kind of changes would you recommend to bring into the 
processes of infrastructure planning and delivery to improve the use of 
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T6 chuc/ Co quan Ong/Ba da va dang lim vi~c thuQc nhUng thanh ph~n nao sau day: 
D Co quan quan ly nha nuac
 
D T6 chilc nghien clm (vi~n nghien clm, truCmg d~i hQc, v.v)
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Quac GIA sa Dl)NG VON NHA Nudc 
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van 0 thich hQlJ, _d~ danh gia tinh tr~ng thvc tS xay ra 
nhUng k€t qua khong nhu nl0ng dqi sau day trong vi~c 
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1.2 Vi~c tri~n khai va thlJc hi~n dv an d~u tu thi~u hi~u qua, 
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1.3 Thftt thoat, lang phi ngu6n Ivc qu6c gia trong qua trinh 
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tY suM hri nhu~n cho cac dl}:' an 
d~u ttr xay d,!ng cO' s(fh~ t~ng 


























































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
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V V 
2.4 Thi€u ehuyen gia dV bao co kinh 
nghi~m. V V 
2.5 Khong thve hi~n day dli vi~e phan 
tieh h~u ky nh~m danh gia dv an 
dftu tu co d(;lt nhfrng m\le tieu d~ ra 
khong. 
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huOng ho?c co quan tam v~ phuang J 
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o s:: )ro· o· 
~b 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
5.1 Thieu SlJ trao d6i thong tin gifta co 
quan l~p kS ho~ch va be> may ra 
quy~t dinh h~ng ngay cua chinh 
phu. 
\/ V 
5.2Thi~u SlJ ph6i hgp gifta cae be>, 
nganh c6lien quan. v/ 
-
V 
5.3 Thieu S\I tuang tac gifra nguai lffnh 
d~o, nguai l~p k~ ho~ch v6i nhfrng 
ben con l~i (ngoai chinh phu) c6 lien 
qllan. 
V J 
5.4 C6ng chuc nha nuac thi~u nang 19c 
va trinh de> Cfill thiSt. V 
. 
I 
5.5 H~ th6ng hanh chinh ruOm ra va 
phuc t~p. vi if 
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PHAN III - NHONG H~N CHE TRONG QuA TRINH THl!C HIJ;:N KE HO~CH xAy 
Dl)NG CO SO H~ TANG Quac GIA 
Xin vui long cho bi€t '1 ki€n cua Ong/Ba b~ng cach tich vao 6 thich hqp, d~ daOO gia tiOO 
tr~ng th\Ic t€ xay ra cua OOUng h~ ch€ t6n t~i trong qua triOO tri~n khai thlJc hi~n k€ ho~ch 
xay d\ll1g co so h~ tftng qu6c gia va muc de> anh huOng eua OOUng h~n ch€ d6 d6i v6i hi~u 
qua dftu tu xay d\ll1g co sa h~ tftng sir d\lng v6n OOa nu6c, OO~m thuc d~y tang truOng thuang 
m~i va phat tri~n kiOO t€ cua Vi~t Nam. 
---­
6. V~ quy~t tam ella chinh quy~n 






















































































1 2 3 I 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
6.1 Thi€u quy€t tam chiOO tr1 cua laOO 
d~o va nguai ra quy€t diOO cfip cao vi V 
6.2 C6 SlJ thay d6i trong cae be> ph~n 
cua chiOO phu tI1JC ti€p ph\! trach dlJ 
an. 
,j v' 
6.3 Mau thu§.n trong qllan 1'1 OOa nu6e a 
cfip trung uang va gifra cac cfip khac 
OOau eua chiOO phu (cfrp trung uang, 
c§.p vung, cfip dja phuang). 
/ J 
6.4 Thieu mQt co quan cua chiOO phu co 
du quy~n l\Ic ban haOO OOUng co 
ch€ hi~u qua cho vi~c th\Ic hi~n k€ 
ho~ch xay d\ll1g eo sa h~ t~ng qu6c 
gla. 
/ V 
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~.,~I'~.~..,. 
7. V~ tham nhiing trong xay dtpIg cO' 
sO' h~ t~ng 
























































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
7.1 Thi~u tinh minh b~ch va c~ tranh 
trong qua trinh dfru thfru dlJ an. V IJ 
7.2 Giao quy~n tlJ quy~t cho ca nhan 




7.3 Kh6ng thlJc hi~n dfry dli vi~c ki~m 
toan v~t tu, thi~t bi va tai chinh. V IJ 
7.4 Co quan chuc nang thi~u nang h,rc 
thi hanh cac bi~n phap ch6ng tham 




Nhfrng h~n ch~ v~ nang ll}'c va8. 
nguBn ll}'c cua cac doanh nghi~p 
xay dtpIg trong nU'O'c 























































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
8.1 Chfrt luqng va hi~u qua c6ng trinh 
thfrp. \J ·V 
8.2 Tinh chuyen nghi~p va nang llJc 
quan ly di~u hanh doanh nghi~p 
thfrp. ~ V 
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Nhfrng h~n ch~ v~ nang l\fc va8. 
nguan l\fc cua cac doanh nghi~p 
xay d\fng trong DtrO'C 

























































































u ~ )ro· 0­
~b 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5­
8.3 Thi~u ngu6n l\Ic, d~c bi~t 1£1 trong 
cong ngh~ xay d\ffig, trong quan ly 
di€u hanh va kha nang tai chiOO. 
\1 Vi 
-
9. V~ giai phong m~t bing 
I 
Tinh tr~ng th\fc te xiiy ra 
"«1) on ~ ~ 
"ro on 
0.0 "0 "(0) t: 
s:: ~ "ro 
'ro ~o 'to 
'to "0 "(0) on +-' 
~ ~ (0).Ol) 0.0 "ro :B~ § OJ) "0<0 ~ +-' u
..c= ::s "(0) "ro "<ro ~...<O) ~ E-~ 0 0:=: ~~ 










Milc do ~nh huang 
~ 
ro on 
::s ~ §CT o· 
~o OJ) ~ ::s s:: +-' 0'" 
"0 o· s:: +-' p ro (0). 
- 0.0 . ::s :Bonf: 0.0 ~ CT 
o t:: ro +-' u ~ ::s o· ::s "<ro )ro· 0­E-b CJ cG Ob 
2 3 4 5· 
9.1 Thi~u co ch~ thuong thao .trong giai 
quy~t d€n bu giai ph6ng m~t b~ng 
thea hu6ng thi truOng han nfra. 
V iJ 
9.2 Thil t\lC ruOm ra trong giai quy~t 
traOO chftp va khi~u n~i lien quan 
d~n giai ph6ng m?t bkg. \I 
.; 
9.3 Thi~u h~ th6ng giam sat vi~c d€n bu 
giai ph6ng m~t bimg. V J 
9.4 Thi~u tiOO minll b~ch trong phuong 
phap diOO gia d€n bu. V 
/' vi 
9.5 Thi~u lu~t di€u chiOO gia dftt giai 
ph6ng m?t b~ng dung cho xay d\ffig 
co So' h~ tftng. V V 
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10. Nhfrng h~n ch~ v~ thS ch~ va lu~t 
phap trong xay d,!ng cO' sO' h~ 
t~ng 



























































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
10.1 Cac quy dinh v~ xay d\ffig 
khong duqc e~p nh~t kip thai. 
vi V 
10.2 Lu~t v.a cae quy dinhquan ly 
xay d\ffig thuOng xuyen thay d6i va 
co nhi~u m~u thu~n. 
-
-~ 
V ---_.".~ V' 
10.3 ThlJc hi~n khong nghiem ruc cac 




10.4 Thu t\lC dau tu xay d\ffig co sa 
h~ t~ng phuc t~p (tir khau duy~t dl! 
an d~n xin gifry phep xay d\ffig tri~n 
khai dg an). 
) / 
11. Ngoai nhUng y~u t5 neu a tren, xin Ongffia cho bi~t con co nhUng y~u t5 nao cinh huCmg t6i 
hi~u qua d~u tu xay d\ffig co sa h~ t~ng ph\lC V\l phat tri~n kinh t~ va thuang m~i cua Vi~t Nam. 
Xin vui long cho bi~t y ki~n cua Ong/Ba b~ng cach vi~t van 0 tr5ng du6i day. 
Xin chan thanh cam on nhUng y ki~n dong gop cua Ong/Ba. NhUng phat hi~n cua nghien clm 
· nay se dong gop rfrt nhi~u van S\f phat tri€n kinh t~ cua Vi~t Nam. 





Thong tin ca nhan 
T6 chucl Co quan Ong/Ba dff va dang lam vi~c thuQc OOfrng thaOO phfuJ nao sau day: 
D Co quan quan Iy OOa nu6c
 






~ Nha thiu tu v§.n thi~t k~}xay d\lllg
 
D Nha thiu cung dp may moc, thi~t bi, v~t li~u xay d\lllg
 
D Cong ty thuang m~i, xu~t OO~p kh&u
 
Chuc daOO ho~c/va hQc vi ho~c/va chuc V\l: K; h' to bf> ~ etV,. P4/G{) ~ fJ· 
S6 nam kiOO nghi~m lam vi~c: D < 5 nam ~ ~ 5 nam 
PHAN I - DANH GIA KET QuA DAu TV xAY DVNG pHAT TRIEN CO SO HA TANG 
QUOC GIA sa D1)NG VON NHA NVOC 
1. Xin vui long cho bi~t y ki~n cua OngiBa bfu1g cach tich 
vao 0 thich hqp, d€ danh gia tiOO tr~g thvc t~ xay ra 
OOfrng k~t qua khong nhu mong dgi sau day trong vi~c 
diu tu xay d\ffig phat tri€n co sa h~ ting qu6c gia sir 











































1.1 Vi~c Iva chQn dV an diu tu khong dugc can oo~c kyo v 
1.2 Vi~c tri€n khai va thlJc hi~n dv an diu tu thi~u hi~u qua, 
ch~t lugng th~p. J 
1.3 Th~t thoat, lang phi ngu6n IlJc qu6c gia trong qua triOO 
diu tu xay d\ffig co sa h~ ting. vi 
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PHAN II - NHONG HAN CHE TON TAl TRONG QuA TRfNH LAp KE HOACH XAY 
Dl)NG co so HA TANG Quac GlA 
Xin vui long eho bi~t y ki~n eua Gng/Ba bing each tich vao 0 thich hgp, d~ danh gia tiOO 
tn;mg thl,fe t~ xay fa eua nhfrng hl;ln eh~ t6n tl;li trong qua triOO l~p k~ hOl;lCh xay dlJllg eo sa hl;l 
tclng qu6e gia va muc dQ aOO huang eua OOfrng hl;ln eh~ do d6i v6i hi~u qua diu tu xay dlJllg 
co sa hl;l tclng Slr dl,mg v6n nha nu6e, nhim thue dfty tang truang thuang ml;li va phat tri~n 
kinh t~ eua Vi~t Nam. 
• 
v~ kha nang danh gia va giam sat2. 
tY su~t lQi nhu~n cho cac dl! an 
dftu tU' xay dl!ng cO' sO' h~ tftng 


























































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
2.1 Nhfrng hl;ln eh~ trong phuang phap 
dl,I bao va ky thu~t danh gia. V V 
2.2 Tinh khong diy du eua dfr li~u. V V 
2.3 Nhfrng h~n ehe von eo trong vi~c dl,I 
doan tuang lai va danh gia nhfrng 
tac dQng til moi truemg ben ngoai va 
nhfrng tac dQng gian ti~p. 
V \/ 
2.4 Thi~u chuyen gia dl,f baa co kinh 
nghi~m. V V 
2.5 Khong thl,fc hi~n day dli vi~c pharr 
tich h~u ky nhim danh gia dl,f an 
diu tu co d~t nhfrng m\lc tieu d~ ra 
khong. 
V V 
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3. V~ y~u t6 chinh trj trong qua 
trinh ra quy~t djnh 























































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
3.1 Lanh d<;lO va quan ?huc chinlf phu 
dua ra OOfrng quyet diOO dau tu 
OO~m 19i ich ca OOan, ho~c 19i ich 
cho bQ, nganh, dia phuong (vi dv d~ 
giu vi tri lanh d<;lo, hay tranh gianh 
ngu6n tai chiOO). 
V V 
3.2 Ap h,rc cua 19i ich OOom (vi dV cac 
cong ty, t~p doan Ian) d6i v61 qua 
triOO ra quy~t diOO dAu tu cua chiOO 
phU. 
\i V 
Tinh tqmg th\Ic te xay ra Muc do anh huo'ng 
4. V~ tinh minh bach va cong khai
. , 























































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
4.1 Thieu trao doi doi v6i OOfrng ca 
OOan hay OOom d6i tugng chiu anh 
huang ho~c co quan tam v~ phuong 
phap dv bao, tieu chi Iva chQn dV an 
dAu tu va each xac diOO mvc tieu 
cua vi~c l~p k~ hO<;lch. 
v v 
4.2 Thieu OOfrng bao cao phan bi~n dQc 
l~p va ki~m tra ch~t lugng cua 
OOfrng t6 chuc phan bi~n dQc l~p va 
cua cac hQi khoa hQc va ngh~ 
nghi~p d6i v61 OOfrng dv bao va k~ 
hO<;lch d~ ra. 
v oj 
4.3 Thieu h~ thong lu~t thvc thi hiOO 
thuc ph<;lt d6i v6i nhullg nguai c6 y 
va thu<'mg xuyen dua ra OOfrng dV 
bao gia. 
V v 
Page 3 of 8 
... 
313
Nhfrng y~u kern v~ th~ ch~ trong5. 
vi~c l~p k~ ho~ch 



















































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
5.1 Thieu SlJ trao doi thong tin gifra cO" 
quan l?p k~ ho(}.ch va be> may ra 
quy~t dinh hfulg ngay cila chinh 
phil. 
J J 
5.2 Thi~u SlJ ph6i hqp gifra cac be>, 
nganh co lien quan. \/ yI' 
5.3 Thieu SlJ tuang tac gifra nguai Hinh 
d(}.o, nguai l?p k~ ho(}.ch v6i nhfrng 
ben con l(}.i (ngoai chinh phil) co lien 
quan. 
V J 
5.4 Cong chuc nha nu6c thi~u nang IlJc 
va trinh de> dB thik V J 
5.5 H~ th6ng hanh chinh warn ra va 
phuc t(}.p. V V 
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PHAN III - NHONG Hh.N CHE TRONG QuA TRINH TH{jC HIBN KE H0h.CH xAy 
DTfNG CO s6 Hh. TANG Quac GIA 
Xin vui long cho bi~t y ki~n clla Ong/Ba b~ng each Hch vao 6 thich hgp, d~ danh gia tinh 
tr~ng th\JC t~ xay ra cua nhUng h~n ch~ t6n t~i trong qua trinh tri~n khai th\Jc hi~n k~ ho~ch 
xay dlJllg CCY sa h~ t~ng qu6c gia va muc dQ anh huang clla nhUng h~n ch~ d6 d6i vai hi~u 
qua d~u tu xay dlJllg CCY sa h~ tkg su d\lng v6n nha nuac, nh~m thuc dfty tang truang thuang 
m~i va phat tri~n kinh t~ cua Vi~t Nam. 
6. v~ quy~t tam eiia ehinh quy~n 














































































u = >roo O. 
Q1:: 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
6.1 Thi~u quy~t tam chinh trj cua lanh 
d~o va nguai ra quy~t djnh dp cao V V 
6.2 C6 S\J thay d6i trong cac bQ ph?n 
clla chinh phu tfIJC ti~p phI) trach d\J 
an. 
..j J 
6.3 Mau thu~n trong quan ly nha nuac a 
d p trung uang va gifra cac d p khac 
nJ;1au cua c~nh phu (dp trung uang, 
dip vling, cap dja phuang). 
V J 
6.4 Thieu mQt cO' quan cua chinh phu c6 
du quy~n l\Jc ban hanh nhUng cO' 
ch~ hi~u qua cho vi~c th\Jc hi~n k~ 
ho~ch xay dlJllg cO' sa h~ t~ng qu6c 
gla. 
J \J 
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Tinh tr~ng thlle te xay ra M(re d9 anll huo'ng 
7. V~ tham nhiing trong xay d,!ng coo 






























































































7.1 Thi~u tinh minh b~ch va q.nh tranh 
trong qua trinh dftu th~u dl,f an. v v 
7.2 Giao quy~n tl,f quy~t cho ca nhan 
cac quan chilc lien quan d~n vi~c 
giao th~u. ,} v 
7.3 Khong thlJc hi~n d~y dli vi~c kiem 
toan v~t tu, thi~t bi va tai chinh. ,j J 
7.4 Ca quan chilc nang thi~u nang Il,fc 
thi hanh cac bi~n phap ch5ng tham 
nhilng co hi~u qua. " " 
8. Nhfrng h~n ch~ v~ nang I,!c va 
ngu6n l,!c cua cac doanh nghi~p 
xay df!Dg trong mro'c 


























































































J<t:. 0. Qt:: 
5 
8.1 Chftt Im;mg va hi~u qua cong trinh 
thftp. \/ v 
8.2 Tinh chuyen nghi~p va nang Il,fc 
quan Iy di~u hanh doanh nghi~p 
thftp. 
v v 
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...I<: OIl C::l C;g <'30"'(<1) COIl o·.@8. Nhii'ng h~n ch~ v~ nang Il}'c va ::lOIl<'3C 
...I<: t:
"0 0"::l C~o ~o'<'3 cOIl ...­ ...­'(<1) 0""0 o·"0 "0nguAn Il}'c cua cac doanh nghi~p (<l)o (<1).<'3C
...I<: t:OIl OIlOIl ::l'<'3 :EC OIl C OIl c"0 0" :E 0Ilxay dl}'ng trong nuo'c §(0 §OIl gf(0 c <'3C o...­ o C...­~ ::l'(<'3 >CI:l. o.)(lj-.<<1.) ...c: o. ::l 0­::l'(<1) "'<'3Q 4l ~ ~f-<...I<: 4l...l<: ::>ct: f-<t: C/ 4lt: 
2 3 24 5 43 5 
8.3 Thi~u ngu6n l\Jc, di,lc bi~t lei trong 
c6ng ngh~ xay dlJIlg, trong quan Iy JJdi~u hanh va kha nang tai chinh. 
• 
9. V~ giai phong m~t b~ng 























































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
9.1 Thi~u cO' ch~ thuO'11g thao trong giai 
quy~t d~n bu giai ph6ng mi,lt bfulg 
thea hu6ng thi truemg han nlla. V V 
9.2 Thli t\lC ruOm nl trong giai quy~t 
tranh ch~p va khi~u nC;li lien quan 
d~n giai ph6ng mi,lt bfuIg. V V 
9.3 Thi~u h~ th6ng gifun sat vi~c d~n bli 
giai ph6ng mi,lt b~ng. V V 
9.4 Thi~u tinh minh bC;lCh trong phuO'11g 
phap dinh gia d~n bu. V J 
9.5 Thi~u lu~t di~u chinh gia d~t giai 
ph6ng mi,lt bfuIg dung cho xay dlJIlg 
cO' sa hC;l t~ng. ..; V 
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10. Nhfrng h~n ch~ v~ th~ ch~ va lu~t 
phap trong xay d1!ng cO' sO' h~ 
:l­tang 


















































































2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
10.1 Cac quy dinh v~ xay d\lllg 
kh<3ng duqc c~p nh~t kip thill. v J 
10.2 Lu~t va cac quy dinh quan ly 
xay d\lllg thuOng xuyen thay d6i va 
co nhi~u miu thuin. v vi 
10.3 Thvc hi~n kh<3ng nghiem tuc cac 
tieu chuAn va van ban phap quy hi~n 
hanh. v J 
10.4 Thu t\lC dau tu xay d\lllg co sa 
h~ d.ng phuc t~p (til khau duy~t dv 
an d~n xin gi~y phep xay d\lllg tri~n 
khai dv an). 
v' v 
1]. Ngoai nhfmg y~u t6 neu a tren, xin OnglBa cho bi~t con co nhfrng y~u t6 nao anh hUOng t6'i 
hi~u qua d<lu tu xay d\lllg co sa h~ t<lng ph\lc V\l phcit tri~n kinh t~ va thuang m~i cua Vi~t Nam. 
Xin vui long cho bi~t y ki~n cua Ong/Ba bfulg cach vi~t VaG <3 tr6ng du6'i day. 
- ThtI: Q&~' ~ G~ /r·; ~. ~ VI1J i ~ /4 tlt~-: 
Xin chan thanh cam an nhfrng y ki~n dong gop cua Ong/Ba. NhClllg phcit hi~n cua nghien Clm 
nay se dong gop r~t nhi~u VaG sv phcit tri~n kinh t~ cua Vi~t Nam. 




Thong tin ca nhan 
T6 chucl Ca quan Ong/Ba da: va dang lam vi~c thuQc nhilng thanh ph~n nao sau day: 
ifJ Ca quan quan ly nha nuac 
D T6 chuc nghien Clru (vi~n nghien Clru, truemg d~i hQc, v.v) 
D Chu d~u tu 
D Ngan hang 
D Nha th~u tu v~n thi~t k~ixay d1JIlg 
D Nha th~u cung dp may moc, thi~t bi, V?t li~u xay d1JIlg 
D C6ng ty thuang m~i, xu~t nh?P kh~u 
Chuc danh hoi;lc/va hQc vi hoi;lc/va chuc V\l: _ 
S6 nam kinh nghi~m lam vi~c: D < 5 nam o 2: 5 nam 
PHAN I - DA.NH GIA. KET QuA DAu TU XA.Y DljNG PHA.T TRIEN co s6 HA TANG 
QUOC GIA sa DVNG VON NHA. Nudc 
Tinh trl.lng tlwc tS x:iy ra 
1. Xin vui long cho bi~t y ki~n cua Ong/Ba bing cach tich co 
vao 6 thich hgp, d~ danh gia tinh tr~ng thlJc t~ xay ra 


















d~u tu xay d1JIlg ph3.1 tri~n ca sa h~ t~ng qu6c gia Slr C (~ C coPc co c "0 ~ ..0 () 
d\lng v6n nha nuac. - 0'(1) ~..o.::: ;:l oo:jt--<"'O oo:j Q 0'0':: c.::: )0'::'0'<1) Q..o.::: 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.1 Vi~c llJa chQn dlJ an d~u tu kh6ng duqc can nhiic kyo v 
1.2 Vi~c tri~n khai va thlJC hi~n dlJ an d~u tu thi~u hi~u qua, 
ch~t luqng th~p. v 
1.3 Th~t tho3.1, lang phi ngu6n llJc qU6c gia trong qua trinh 
d~u tu xay d1JIlg ca sa h~ t~ng. ..../ 
Page 1 of 8 
319
PHAN II - NHUNG HAN CHE TON TAl TRONG QuA TRINH LAp KE HOACH XAY 
D1)NG co so HA TANG QUOC GIA 
Xin vui long eha bi~t y ki~n ella Ong/Ba bing each tieh vaa a thfch hgp, d~ danh gia tinh 
tn;mg thlJe t~ xay ra ella nhling Iwn eh~ t6n t~i trang qua trinh l~p k~ ha~eh xay dlJDg eo sa h~ 
t~ng qu6e gia va mue do anh huang ella nhling h~n eh~ do d6i vai hi~u qua d~u tu xay dlJDg 
eo sa h~ t~ng S11 dVng v6n nha nuae, nhim thue d~y tang truang thuang m~i va phat tri€n 
kinh t~ ella Vi~t Nam. 
Tinh tr~lng tlwc te xay ra M(rc de) anh hucmg 
C1) C
'<0) oj bl)C 
ell c'oj ::l oj 
-
§.C"0 0'ell C'<0)2. V~ khii nang danh gia va giam sat 
~ 




.oj 0'C<0 ::l <0C1) C0·"0 "0 '<0) 0' 1"0 oj <0).tY su~t 19i nhu~n cho cac dl!' an 
~ 







ellc C ell C"0 0'§d~u ttl' xay dl!'ng cO' sO- h~ dng oj<0 <0 CuC u c
.oj~ ~(O,.) '<oj- )cc· ~(O,.) ::: 6 0·C ::l '(oj- >ro· o·..r::: ..c 0­~ ~ 4=l~ ~ bf-~ f- b CJ4=l ~ 4=l b 
2 41 3 5 1 2 3 4 5 
2,1 Nhfrng h~n eh~ trong phuang philp IIV 
dlJ baa va ky thu~t danh gia. 
2.2 Tinh khong d~y dll ella dfr li~u. JJ 
2.3 Nhung h~n ehS von eo trong vi~e dlJ 
daan tuang lai va danh gia nhling V I 
tae dong tu moi tnremg ben ngaai va
 
nhling tae dong gian ti~p.
 
2.4 Thi~u ehuyen gia dlJ baa eo kinh V Vnghi~m. 
2.5 Khong thlJe hi~n day dll vi~e phan 
tieh h~u ky nhim danh gia dlJ an V /d~u tu eo d~t nhling mve tiSu d~ ra 
khong, 
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• • 
Tinh tr~ng t1wc te xay ra Muc d(> anh 11ll'(mg 
3. V~ y~u tB chinh trj trong qua 


























































































I 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
3.1 Uinh d<;io va quan chuc chinh phu 
dua ra nhUng quy~t dinh d~u tu 
nh~m lqi ich ca nhan, ho~c lqi ich 
cho bQ, nganh, dja phuang (vi dV d€ 
giu vi tri Hinh d<;io, hay tranh gianh 
ngu6n tai chinh). 
.; ~ 
3.2 Ap hJC cua lqi ich nhom (vi dv cae 
c6ng ty, t~p doan Ian) d6i vai qua 
trinh ra quy~t dinh d~u tu cua chinh 
phu. 
vi vi 
Tinh tr~ng tlwc te xay ra M{rc d(> anh huo'ng 
"(1) ~ 8 bll ~ -c;; tlJ)::l C I c 
bll "0 "(1) _~ c CT p. ~ 
A,. ,~ • I-8 <0 ~ "0 ~ ;0 ~ ;:l cr4. Ve tmh mmh b:.tch va cong khal "0 "0 "(1) ~ ,d:). cr "0 2' ~ ,d:). 
trong qua trinh Hip k~ hoach ~ ~ ~ .;§:.o ~ bll ~ bll ~ ~:.o bll 
<0 be....... u <0 c b c C'I:l ..... U c:
A ~ «<1.) 'C'Cl "<C'j )C\j. '<<u ...q o· ::s o· ;::::j, "<(lj >(l:j- o· ~ f-.~ Q 0::: Q~~bf-.b CI 0::: Qb 
123451234\5 
4.1	 Thieu trao d6i d6i vai nhfrng ca 
nhan hay nhom d6i tuqng chiu anh 
huang ho~c co quan tam v€ phuong viIphap dv bao, tieu chi Iva ch9n dv an
 
d~u tu va cach xac dinh mvc tieu
 
cua vi~c l~p k~ hO<;ich.
 
4.2 Thieu nhUng baa cao phan bi~n dQC 
l~p va ki€m tra ch~t luqng cua 
nhUng t6 chuc phim bi~n dQc l~p va J J 
cua cac hQi khoa h9C va ngh€
 




4.3 Thieu h~ th6ng lu~t thvc thi hinh 
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5. Nhfrng y~u kern v~ th~ ch~ trong 
vi~c l~p k~ ho~ch 
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<0 ....Q ,g. 
Ml'rc d9 anh Inrong 
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1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 I 4 5 
5.1 Thieu 51,! trao doi thong tin gifra cO" 
quan l~p k~ ho?ch va bl) may ra 
quy~t dinh h~ng ngay cua chinh 
phu. 
J J 
5.2 Thi~u 51,! ph6i hQ"P gii1'a cac bl), 
nganh co lien quan. vi rJ 
5.3 Thi~u 51,! tuang tac gifra nguai Hinh 
d?o, nguai l?p k~ ho?ch vai nhfrng 
ben con l?i (ngoai chinh phu) co lien 
quan. 
J J 
5.4 Cong chuc nha nuac thi~u nang ll,!c 
va trinh dl) dB thi~t. .j \/ 
5.5 H~ th6ng hanh chinh ruam ra va 
phuc t?p. J t/ 
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PHAN III - NHUNG HAN CHE TRONG QUA. TRINH THlfC HIBN KE HOACH XAy 
DVNG CO SO HA TANG Quac GIA 
Xin vui long cho bi~t y ki~n cua Ong/Ba b~ng cach Hch vao 6 thich hqp, d~ danh gia tinh 
tr<;\ng thvc t~ xay ra cua nhfrng h<;\n ch~ tbn t<;\i trong qua trinh tri~n khai thvc hi~n k~ hO<;1ch 
xay dvng C(J so h<;1 t~ng qubc gia va rnuc de> anh huang cua nhfrng h<;1n ch~ d6 dbi v6'i hi~u 
qua d~u tu xay dvng C(J so h<;1 t~ng Slr dl,l11g vbn nha nu6'c, nh~rn thuc d~y tang truang thuang 
rn<;1i va phat tri~n kinh t~ cua Vi~t Narn. 
Tinh tn;mg thllc te xay ra Mtrc d9 anh huo'ng 
bJ) C
·<OJ oj bJ)C bJ)-"<: c-oj 
=' ojg.bJ) c:r"'0 c"OJ ~a bJ)oj ='c 
..'<: b
"'0 c:r
-oj C~o ::l '0bJ) 
..... C .....o·c:r"'0 "'0 "'0"OJ 




=':EbJ) :E bJ)C bJ)c C bJ)"'0 C c:r 
oj<0 () 
Q C '0 C b c u c..... ..... .,oj'oj )ro,. ~(Q) -,oj )C1j;. o·...c: o·~ ~(aJ ::l o· =' f--<-"<: Cl:l ~ CfJ-"<: ~b CIf--< b ~ Cl:l b 
2 3 4 5 41 1 2 3 5 
I 
~6.1 Thi~u quy~t tam chinh tr! cua Hinh vi 
d<;1o va ngmJi ra quy~t d!nh dp cao 
6.2 C6 SIJ thay dbi trong cac be> ph~n 
cua chinh phu trvc ti~p ph\! trach dv JI 
an. 
6.3 Mau thu~n trong quim ly nha nu6'c a 
d p trung uang va gifra cac dp khac JJnhau cua chinh phu (dp trung uang,
 
dp vung, dp d!a phuang).
 
6.4 Thieu rne>t C(J quan cua chinh phu c6 
du quy~n lvc ban hanh nhfrng C(J 
ch~ hi~u qua cho vi~c thvc hi~n k~ !vi 
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7. V~ tham nhung trong xay d'.l'llg CO' 
sO' h~ dng 
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7.1 Thi~u tinh minh b<;lch va C<;lnh tranh 
trong qua trinh a~u th~u dlJ an. J rJ 
7.2 Giao quy~n t1J quy~t cho C<1 nh3.n 
cac quan chuc lien quan a~n vi~c 
giao th~u. 
I r) 
7.3 Khong thlJc hi¢n a~y ali vi¢c ki~m 
to<1n V?t tu, thi~t bi va tai chinh. t! v 
7.4 Co quan chuc nang thi~u nang llJc 
thi hanh cac bi¢n phap ch6ng tham 
nhung co hi~u qua. 
J J 
Nhfrng h~n ch~ v~ nang l,!c va8. 
nguBn l,!c Clla cac doanh nghi~p 
xay d,!ng trong nuo'c 





























































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
8.1 Ch~t 1uQ1lg va hi¢u qua cong trinh 
th~p. V vi 
8.2 Tinh chuyen nghi~p va nang llJc 
quan 1;' ai~u hanh doanh nghi~p 
th~p. 
J J 
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Nhfrng hl.ln ch~ v~ nang h.rc va8. 
nguBn h.rc cua cac doanh nghi~p 
xay dl)'ng trong nuo'c 




























































































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
8.3 Thi~u ngu6n h,rc, di[tc bi~t 1a trong 
c6ng ngh~ xay d\ffig, trong quan 1y 
di~u hanh va kha nang tai chinh. 
,J tI 
9. V~ giai phong m~t bing 























































































u c)ro· o. 
Ci:l b 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
9.1 Thi~u cO' ch~ thucrng thao trong giai 
quy~t d~n bu giai ph6ng mi[tt bing 
thea hu6ng thi tmemg hO'n nfra. 
J / 
9.2 Thli t\lC mOm ra trong giai quy~t 
tranh ch~p va khi~u n<;ti lien quan 
d~n giai ph6ng mi[tt bing. 
. vi vi 
9.3 Thi~u h~ th6ng giam sat vi~c d~n bu 
giai ph6ng mi[tt bing. vi I 
9.4 Thi~u tinh minh b<;tch trong phucrng 
phap dinh gia d~n bu. J J 
9.5 Thi~u 1u~t di~u chinh gia d~t giai 
ph6ng mi[tt bing dung cho xay d\ffig 
cO' So' h<;t dng. 
V j 
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Tinh tr~ng thllC te xay ra Mtl'C dO anh hucmg 
10. Nhfrng h~n ch~ v~ th~ ch~ va lu~t 



































































































10.1 Cae quy dinh v~ xay dvng 
kh6ng dUQ'e e~p nh~t kip thai. vi j 
10.2 Lu?t va eae quy dinh quan ly 
xay dvng thuang xuyen thay dbi va 
eo nhi~u m~u thu~n. vi vi 
10.3 ThVe hi~n kh6ng nghiem tue ca.e 
tieu ehu:1n va van ban phap quy hi~n 
hanh. 
J I 
10.4 Thu tve dau tu xay dVng ea sa 
lw ting phue t<;1.P (t11 khau duy~t dv 
an d~n xin gi~y pbep xay dVng tri~n 
khai dv an). 
r/ J 
11. Ngoai nhung y~u t6 neu atren, xin Ong/Ba eho bi~t eon eo nhung y~u t6 nao anh huang tai 
hi~u qua d§.u tu xay dVng ea sa h<;1. t§.ng phve vv phat trib kinh t~ va thuemg m<;1.i eua Vi~t Nam. 
Xin vui long eho bi~t y ki~n eua Ong/Ba bing eaeh vi~t van 6 tr6ng duai day. 
Xin ehan thanh cam em nhfrng y ki~n dong gop eua Ong/Ba. Nhung phM hi~n eua nghien elm 
nay se dong gop nit nhi~u van SlJ phM tri~n kinh t~ eua Vi~t Nam. 




Appendix 4 – Samples of interview records 
Interview with G1 
Question: “According to a recent survey of major issues affecting the efficient use of 
public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam, a number of issues were identified 
from infrastructure planning and delivery, including: institutional weaknesses in 
planning; corruption in funded infrastructure projects; land acquisition problems; 
shortages of local firms’ capabilities and resources; bureaucracy in infrastructure 
construction; transparency and accountability problems. From your experience, would 
you please give me some thoughts on these issues and how are these problems 
affecting the efficient use of public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam?” 
Answer: “Although it is called Ministry of Planning and Investments, more than 80% 
of the MPI’s work involves allocating investment budget. The MPI’s development 
planning function only accounts for a small part. In other countries, development 
plans are made before allocating investment budget to various sectors and regions. In 
Vietnam, the ability to gather capital from state budget, loans and aids from 
international organizations would be taken into consideration before needs and 
interests of line ministries and local governments would be taken into account. As a 
result, the budget allocations never match the investment plans.   
Development plans require a long term vision, e.g. for 5 years, 10 years. But, 
what planners mostly do is to allocate the investment budget on a yearly basis. For 
example, development plan to 2015 exists in paper only as there is no plan for budget 
allocation until 2015. Or for example, there are plans to build the road connecting 
Hanoi and Hai Phong, the National Assembly House, or some hydroelectric power 
plants (in 2015); but there is no confirmation whether there is enough capital for these 
projects in 2015. Meanwhile, capital available in 2012 would be allocated for other 
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needs first. Thus, the five-year development plan to 2015 would never be delivered as 
planned. The plan would then be modified and budget allocation of Vietnam would 
never match the investment plans. Investment budget to be available in the coming 
fiscal year would be allocated to short-term needs arising at the time of decision 
making, rather than being linked to the long-term goals specified in development 
plans. Long-term development plans are prepared just for the sake of planning. Many 
investments were planned and approved by various government levels even though 
there is no corresponding plan of allocating capital investments. 
The decision making by the National Assembly on whether the high-speed 
train connecting Hanoi and Ho-Chi-Minh City should be built is a good example. On 
the one hand, there are arguments that taking advantages of resources from Japan and 
international organizations, Vietnam should build the train, thus setting development 
direction of the national transportation system. Others argued that there are other 
short-term needs and thus resources should be allocated for these needs first, and the 
high-speed train could be built later. As a result, although public investments in 
Vietnam are long-term plans on the record, in reality they are short-term plans. 
The next problem comes from the process of planning. In Vietnam, planning 
controls all investments and MPI becomes the leading advisor of the central and local 
governments. However, lack of competent and qualified planners and the short-term 
vision resulted in such case as: for example, the construction of a 10km road would 
take 5 years to be completed. This year, due to lack of capital and with short-term 
vision, planners would decide to build the road with 10.5m width. But two years later, 
when there was heavy traffic on the road and after going abroad to visit some similar 
projects, they would think that a 10.5m wide road was not enough, the road should be 
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built with 30.5m width. As a result, the road would be completed with some parts 
wider and some narrower. 
In Hai Duong province, the construction of Ngo Quyen road is the same case. 
In Hanoi and other areas, construction of roads faces the same situation. Besides, due 
to the lack of state capital in the beginning, first parts of the roads would be built by 
the public. As a result, after the road is completed, the first parts of the roads would be 
narrow and the later parts would be wide. This is a typical problem in public 
investments in Vietnam. This affects the development of infrastructure and is difficult 
to be solved. Besides, due to lack of capital, roads may be completed without 
pavements and drainage systems. So, roads can be built without any plans for 
pavements, drainage systems, lighting systems and greenery. Land for these auxiliary 
structures thus would not be set aside. Instead, the locals would use the land along the 
roadsides for housing. So, when these auxiliary structures needed to be built after that, 
excavation on the site would be very costly and the execution would be very difficult. 
The next problem is the lack of accountability. Many meetings would be held 
before a project proposal was approved. Attending these meetings were a number of 
representatives from various government agencies. But, no single government official 
had to take the responsibility for the decisions made. For instance, a number of 
committees would be set up to study project proposals. When a project was completed, 
a committee, whose chairman would have never been to the project site, was also 
responsible for the issuance of the official acceptance of work. Whether the quality of 
work is acceptable is not the responsibility of the chairman. For example, the issuance 
of the official acceptance of the Can Tho Bridge would require the approval of the 
MoC. Representing the MoC would be some doctors and professors whose have never 
been to the site. That is because the issuance is merely a formality. No government 
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official is held accountable for their decisions and actions, which are intertwined with 
each others throughout the feasibility study, design appraisal and approval, and 
payment procedures. It is difficult to make the complicated and bureaucratic 
administrative system accountable. There are laws and regulations but there is a lack 
of law enforcement. This is one of major weaknesses that make public investments in 
Vietnam inefficient. 
As a result, investments were scattered and incomplete, and things that must 
have been done first were done later, and vice versa. A good example is the case of 
the Thanh Tri Bridge. Because the design of Thanh Tri Bridge (the largest among 7 
bridges across the Red River in Hanoi) was done within the transportation sector, it 
was quickly readied at the time of decision making. The construction of the bridge 
started in 2002. A lot of money thus had been invested in building it. However, the 
access roads to the bridge were not put on the table because of the difficulties in land 
acquisition, which involved sectors and the local government other than the 
transportation sector. As a result, after the bridge had been completed for more than 2 
years, the access roads to the bridge were still under construction, and the bridge 
could not be opened for use. 
And the last problem is land acquisition. The thinking behind land acquisition 
executed in Vietnam is not right. The resolution no. 5 has just been issued by the 
Central Committee (the Politburo) to canvass the public opinion to amend the Land 
Law. However, if we don’t change our thinking we would never solve the issue 
entirely. Since the issuance of the Decree No. 22, the execution of land acquisition 
and compensation has been mixed together. But the execution of land compensation 
would involve negotiation with land users. In public projects, the negotiation would 
make land acquisition very difficult. Land acquisition and compensation should not 
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have been mixed together. Land acquisition should be implemented first. And land 
compensation deals for related land users should be settled later. But in current 
procedures, land compensation is carried out first and followed by land acquisition. 
The decision to acquire land is only a formal decision because land could not be 
acquired (until land compensation deals are settled). The procedures have been mixed 
up. Land acquisition and compensation should be separated in which land should be 
acquired first for project development, and compensation deals would be settled later. 
The current procedures, in which compensation deals are settled first, make land 
acquisition more and more difficult. Difficulty in land acquisition is the main cause 
for time delay because if land could not be acquired, the construction work could not 
be started. So the execution of many infrastructure projects has been fragmented. 
Construction would start first in the area where the land acquisition was settled. 
Construction of other parts where the land areas have not been acquired would be 
delayed. As a result, it would be very difficult for project scheduling in Vietnam. For 
example, if you plan to complete the project on 31st December but you are not sure 
whether land acquisition would be completed on 31st December, how could you 
prepare the project schedule? As a result, project scheduling would be full of 
uncertainties. 
So public investments would not be efficient with planning and scheduling full 
of uncertainties and lack of accountability among parties involved. It is necessary to 
revisit the public investments in Vietnam. There could be no growth if the current use 
of public investments is not improved”. 
Question: “So what kind of changes would you recommend?” 
Answer: “Firstly, there should be changes in the institutional capacity and the 
methodology behind the decision making. Investment planning should be one-step 
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ahead (of budget allocation). Investment planning (of MPI) should really focus on the 
planning function. Currently, investment planning and budget allocation functions are 
mixed together in Vietnam. However, planners only focus on the budget allocation, 
and ignore the planning function. Successful investments depend on good planning 
and resource allocation. You can have long-term or short-term plans, but capital 
resources have to be mobilized accordingly. Only after you have a good plan, you can 
start to mobilize capital resources. This can help match investment plans and budget 
allocation plans and the two types of plans can work together. 
Secondly, the centrally produced plans are the formal documents setting 
directions and strategies to use public investments. These plans in reality are often 
ignored. The current use of public investments in fact is based on political leaders’ 
will and serves in the interests of a small group of political leaders and government 
bureaucrats.  
The next thing is the (functional and fiscal) decentralization associated with 
public investments in infrastructure. At lower levels, infrastructure investments 
require approval from local governments. At higher levels, infrastructure investments 
require approval from the National Assembly. But most members of the National 
Assembly actually have a limited knowledge of infrastructure investments. To make 
the right decisions, members of the National Assembly must have a reasonable level 
of competence in infrastructure investments. But among 500 members of the National 
Assembly, only a few are competent at infrastructure investments. The remaining 99% 
without the required competence could not be able to make the right decisions. 
The next problem is in the execution of infrastructure projects. There are three 
main parties involved in public funded infrastructure projects, including clients 
(developers), consultants (designers, engineers, supervision consultants, etc.) and 
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contractors. The tripartite model makes it easier for the government to manage the 
state budget. However, the problem is most clients and developers of public 
investments are not competent at their jobs.  For example, a principal of a school with 
50 teachers was assigned to build a new school. Currently, the yearly operation cost of 
the school was about VND 1 million. However, the new project was a VND 50 
million investment. He thus did not have the experience and capability to manage the 
50 million dong investment. Despite the incompetence, he would still be appointed as 
the developer of the new development. Moreover, developers of public projects 
without the required competence would still want to undertake the jobs since this is 
the opportunity for them to abuse public funds. As a result, clients and developers of 
public projects often do not have the required capacity and level of professionalism. 
Lacking the required capacity, clients in public projects employ consultants. In 
private projects, clients without the required competence would still have to employ 
consultants, but they would closely supervise the quality of their work. Meanwhile, in 
public projects, since clients do not have to spend their own money, they do not really 
care about the quality of their work. They would leave all the work to their 
consultants. The quality of concrete, grade of bricks, prices of materials, etc. all would 
be supervised by their consultants. 
But, there are a lot of issues with local consultants. Although I am the director 
of the Construction Department of a province, I am not sure how many consultants 
are there in the province. There are too many consultants because local consultants 
just need to register for any consultancy services that they can think of, and then they 
would be licensed to provide the services. The next problem is that an architect can be 
an official employee of several consultants. He may work somewhere else but his 
name still exist in others’ list of employees. In other cases, drawings issued by a 
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consultant would be stamped by a professor in the Civil Engineering Department of 
the University through a contract, which may expire tomorrow. Or for example, a 
professor was responsible for preparing the drawings, but he would ask his fresh 
graduate students to do the job for him. That’s the current state of local consultants. 
The same problems can be found in supervision consultants and project management 
consultants. It is very difficult to find an experienced and highly qualified consultant 
in the industry. As a result, the quality of consultancy services is very low. That is a 
common problem. 
Next is about contractors. If you look at local contractors’ bidding documents, 
you would think that they have the required human, equipment and financial 
resources. However, these resources appear on paper only. For example, a tower crane 
can be found in the list of equipment of a bidding firm, but its exact whereabouts was 
a mystery because the firm had no equipment rental contract. Or several leading 
experts were listed in the firm’s project team members, but they would have never 
been seen on site. Contractors have very poor quality management systems. Most in-
house quality management systems are removed because contractors themselves do 
not have long-term development plans, thus they do not want to spend their resources 
maintaining such a system. Even large firms hire informal labor forces. So the first 
problem with contractors is that their human resources have low level of 
professionalism. The second problem is that their in-house quality management is 
overlooked; they often depend on other parties including designers, supervision 
consultants and related government agencies for quality management. The last very 
important problem is about contractors’ fraudulent practices, which affect the quality 
of infrastructure facilities, especially the underground structures. Since contractors 
often have to bribe clients and consultants to get the jobs, they want to compensate for 
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the bribe expenses through material (concrete, steel, etc.) theft. If clients are really 
diligent in managing the projects and consultants are experienced, the projects can be 
effectively executed and the contractors can do their jobs effectively as well. But both 
clients and consultants have low level of professionalism and contractors also could 
not do their jobs effectively. Most contractors increase their profits through material 
theft. Rarely do contractors focus on accelerating construction progress and saving 
construction costs. As a result, most projects are delayed and contractors would bribe 
government officials to cover their poor quality construction practices and outcomes. 
If contractors focus on accelerating construction progress, they can get their payments 
early, which ease all financial problems. For example, getting paid early, they don’t 
have to get bank loans and pay interests, they can buy materials early on, and they can 
pay salaries and hire best workers, which in turn accelerate project progress. But, 
most contractors care about how much they can spend on the projects rather than 
about how they can deliver the projects effectively. It is really a wasteful way.  
All these problems affect the quality of public projects from feasibility study, 
design appraisal and approval to execution. Even in projects that involved some form 
of partnership with the private sector such as exchange private land development 
approval for financing of public infrastructure, ultimately these problems would waste 
national resources. Investment decisions are made in the interests of a small group of 
people. The laws on canvassing the public opinion are under consideration. However, 
the actual decision making process is complex and opaque to the general public. In 
fact, decisions are made by authorized government agencies regardless the public 
opinion. For example, an infrastructure investment would have been approved by the 
Prime Minister, but the government would still canvass the public opinion for show. 
Since the public knows that they have no say in the decision, the public also shows 
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little interest in the decision making. The public only cares about their private 
interests. Even political leaders and government bureaucrats pursue their self-interests 
as oppose to national interests. As a result, national resources are wasted in a lot of 
public investments. The pursuit of personal, sectoral or regional interests of 
politicians and government bureaucrats and the lack of coordination result in 
excessively spread investments in seaports, airports, industrial zones and urban areas. 
Meanwhile, budget allocation is scattered. Every year, state budget would be allocated 
to every region from Hanoi, Ho-Chi-Minh City, Hai Phong, etc., rather than being 
gathered to complete some key projects. This is one of the major issues that make 
infrastructure development incomplete and delayed”. 
Question: “As far as I know, the relevant authorities are assigned as clients or 
developers of public investments in infrastructure? 
Answer: “Yes, that’s right. For example, the role of a developer of a national high way 
would be assigned to the Ministry of Transport. For example, Project Management 
Unit Number X is one of the representatives of the MoT in the development of some 
transport infrastructure projects. But, they only do three things:  first, spending public 
funds allocated; second, selecting consultants and contractors (bidding is just for show, 
they can manipulate the process to select firms they want); and third, making 
decisions when and how to develop the infrastructure. They leave all the remaining 
jobs to their consultants. And they are not held any liability for the project 
performance”. 
Question: “So what would you recommend to change the situation?” 
Answer: “Several changes can be made. First, when being assigned as clients or 
developers of a public investment in infrastructure, the developers or PMUs should 
have the required capability and a clear action plan. PMUs have to be able to make 
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strategic decisions about the project performance and they have to be accountable for 
their actions. If PMUs have the capability to manage project effectively, the project 
quality and progress would be improved. 
Since the current mechanism does not tie any specific liability to the 
performance of the assigned clients and developers, they fulfil their tasks with poor 
diligence. Moreover, selected developers might not be those who have the 
professional competence, but those who have the same personal interests. The poorly 
selected developers only focus on abusing the state budget allocated. For example, in 
order to get more money to spend, they might approve a construction method whose 
cost would be three times more than material and manpower costs”. 
Question: “So, there are issues with both government agencies and local firms?” 
Answer: “That’s right. You should combine issues from both sides. First, that’s right. 
There are a lot of issues with local firms. Because the current mechanism lacks 
transparency and accountability, firms often exploit tax loopholes and involve 
fraudulent practices to increase their profits. For example, the standard concrete 
thickness of the underground structure of a road should be 25cm, the actual concrete 
thickness can be only 20cm. Firms would then bribe related authorities to cover the 
poor quality. Since there is a lack of accountability in current infrastructure 
development, firms can maximize their profits by lowering the quality standards. 
Besides, the lack of competent and qualified government officials constrains 
the government’s ability to formulate development strategies and set clear laws and 
regulations. Lawmakers copied laws and regulations from different countries without 
considering specific conditions of Vietnam. Laws and regulations are consistently 
changed and inconsistent. Moreover, the slow issuance of circulars describing the 
duties of relevant parties to comply with regulations would also diminish their 
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effectiveness. For example, increased salaries for workers came into effect since the 
first of July. But there was no guidance about how the increased salaries would be 
claimed until December (in public projects, workers can claim the increased salaries). 
A lot of workers would already leave their employers by December. As a result, the 
increased salaries claimed after December would go into the employers’ pocket rather 
than the workers. 
So, it all comes down to the institutional capacity of the government, including 
the law, the planning process and the vision of top leaders. The planning process 
should be more transparent. Development plans should be made with clear objectives 
and priorities. Once the planning and decision making were carefully done, the 
implementation of the development plans would be more efficient”. 
 
Interview with G4 
Question: “According to several surveys conducted by international organizations, the 
quality of Vietnam’s infrastructure has been identified as the biggest hindrance to the 
growth of the economy in general and the trade sector in particular. Would you please 
give me some thoughts on the current use of public investments in infrastructure to 
support trade and economic development in Vietnam?” 
Answer: “Since infrastructure is the backbone of the country’s economy, the 
government of Vietnam has put a lot of effort into infrastructure development over the 
years. Although there was some growth, the economy has been held back by the 
inadequacies of the infrastructure system. Recognizing the issues, the government has 
taken action to deal with the issues. In order to accelerate infrastructure development, 
the government has been getting loans to finance infrastructure investments. Over the 
years, loans from international organizations such as IMF, WB or ADB or from donor 
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countries through bilateral assistance in the form of ODA have been mainly spent on 
infrastructure development. Annually, investments in infrastructure account for about 
40% of total public investments. Large loans are mainly used to finance infrastructure 
investments. Major projects around the country are all in the infrastructure sector. 
Among them, the first major project was the national high way No. 1, the most 
important route connecting North and South Vietnam. The project was funded by 
loans from WB. After that there have been a lot of roads and bridges financed by such 
loans. Contributions of these projects in the development have been considerable. 
Using loans from international organizations, Vietnam has to follow international 
rules. Using these loans thus has brought about two important changes/benefits in our 
country. Firstly, new technologies such as new technologies in building bridges or 
tunnels that we could never dream of have been transferred to Vietnam. For example, 
the building technology of the My Thuan Bridge, the first stayed-cable bridge, has 
been transferred to Vietnam with the support from Australia. We had studied the 
technology for years, but we were never successful. With technology transfer, we 
have been able to use the technology by ourselves. For example, the building 
technologies for the Thanh Tri Bridge or the Song Gianh Bridge are very difficult. 
Since the 1960s, Vietnam had studied these technologies. But the largest span we 
could build was only 60m. Now, we can build bridges with 120-135m spans. So 
besides providing the physical facilities for the economy, infrastructure development 
has brought about an improvement in building capacity. 
The second benefit of using foreign loans for these projects is that we have 
also been able to improve our management capability and professionalism. For 
example, many procurement procedures and regulations have been improved under 
the direction of the international organizations such as criteria for assessing design, 
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construction methods, monitoring, auditing, etc., which in turn improve the 
transparency and accountability in the sector. 
With several decades of work experience in public investments in 
infrastructure, I think that these are the two important changes. Besides, infrastructure 
development has been able to support our economic growth. For example, previously 
it would take us half a day to go to Quang Ninh. Now it only takes us 2 hours. Newly 
built airports help integrate the national market and connecting it to markets in other 
countries. The upgraded seaport system improves our capacity of sea transport for 
international trade. 
So, achievements of public investments in infrastructure have been 
considerable. However, there have been issues with the efficiency in public 
investments in infrastructure. Since there have been high demand for infrastructure 
development during periods of rapid growth, we built too many seaports, airports, etc. 
As a result, investments have been spread thinly across these projects, thus 
compromising their efficiency. For example, local governments of every province 
want to have airports. Seaside provinces want to have seaports. Thus, investment 
planning in Vietnam lacks a long-term vision. For example, the newly built Can Tho 
International Airport was expected to open for international flights. However, we 
have not prepared any plans on how to attract international flights to the airport. So 
the problem with public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam is that although 
these investments were able to support economic growth, the excessively thinly 
spread investments have reduced their efficiency. 
The second problem is the lack of coordination in investments. Some large 
seaports have been built without any passage leading to the ports. For example, there 
is a very large seaport in Ho Chi Minh City, which was expected to accommodate 
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large ships. However, ships larger than 15,000 DWT could not go into the seaport 
because the passage leading to the port is very shallow. Some bridges have been built 
without access roads to the bridges. For example, the newly built Phu My Bridge in 
Ho Chi Minh City could not connect District No. 2 and District No. 7 because the 
construction of access roads has been delayed by land acquisition issues. 
The third problem is about the poor quality of infrastructure facilities. For 
example, the Phap Van-Cau Gie Road was expected to be a first class road. However, 
the quality of the newly built road is only enough to be qualified for a third class road. 
So, quality is an important issue. The causal factors of the poor quality can be found 
in various stages from soil investigation, design, and construction. The most recent 
quality incident was the settlement in the Sai Gon-Trung Luong highway. The weak 
soil foundation had not been handled very well, thus making the project inefficient. 
So quality is the third problem. 
The fourth problem is the lack of coordination in land acquisition. Many 
projects have been delayed because time delay has not been considered an important 
issue. Time is an important factor behind the investment efficiency. For example, 
investment efficiency of a road can be improved significantly by completing the road 
just one day earlier. But the issue seems to be unnoticeable in Vietnam. Delay in land 
acquisition is an important factor causing the inefficiency in Vietnam. The lack of 
coordination between centrally planned investments and land use policy at the local 
government level is the major cause of the delay. For example, in a 100km road 
project, construction of only the first 80km can be executed; construction of the 
remaining 20km could not be started because land acquisition for the area had not 




Besides, if there is one more setback in infrastructure development in Vietnam, 
it is the rising cost of infrastructure development compared to other countries. For 
example, development cost for roads located whether in urban areas or not is very 
high. There are two causes of the rising cost. Firstly, the cost can be naturally high 
because of the project complexities. For example, dealing with the weak soil 
foundation of the Sai Gon-Trung Luong highway could cost from USD 5 to 10 
million per km, which is very high compared to that in other countries. But the cost 
can be artificially high. For example, several modern roads in Hanoi are considered 
the most expensive roads built in the world. Construction of these roads may cost half 
the cost for land acquisition. For example, construction cost for the transport 
infrastructure at Kim Lien (Hanoi), the key loop in the city, was about VND 21 
million, but land acquisition cost more than VND 80 million. These serve to push up 
the price artificially”. 
Question: “Yes, you are right. These issues can have major effects on the efficiency of 
public investments in infrastructure in Vietnam. You mentioned that the thinly spread 
and uncoordinated investments is one of the major issues. What kind of changes 
would you recommend to improve the quality of development planning?” 
Answer: “It is important to review the master plan for infrastructure development, e.g. 
master plan for seaports and airports. Of course, there should be a leading agency to 
review development plans and strategies. Investments are scattered because local 
governments have their own master plans for building airports and seaports in the 
local area to support local economic growth, securing political positions or competing 
for scarce funds, etc. The problem requires the government to re-examine the 
development plans (for seaports, airports and roads) and make necessary adjustment 
to improve the efficiency”. 
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Question: “As far as I know, the national development plans (both short-term and 
long-term) are prepared based on balancing the needs and interests of different sectors 
and local governments. Why do you think there is a lack of coordination in planning?” 
Answer: “That’s right. Planning is based on the needs and interests of line ministries 
and local governments. However, planners lack a long-term vision of developing the 
economy as a whole. For example, every province wants to have a seaport. However, 
local needs are not coordinated and prioritized to achieve national goals. As a result, 
plans adopted by individual regions can be unnecessarily duplicated and contradictory. 
Besides, with many needs, capital resources have to be allocated too thinly for many 
projects. The lack of capital in turn delays project progress”. 
Question: “Earlier, you mentioned the quality issues of infrastructure construction. In 
your opinion, how can the quality be improved?” 
Answer: “The poor quality of infrastructure construction can be found in several 
aspects. Firstly, there is a lack of professional capacity for design coordination, 
review and checks. For example, the topography surveys are not sufficiently carried 
out to provide accurate and detailed data for design. During the construction phases, 
the data are often not checked by additional topography surveys as well. However, 
budget for topographical surveys is often limited. It is safe to say that 60% of quality 
incidents are caused by inadequate data from topographical surveys. The current 
government regulation of topographical surveys requires that additional surveys 
should be carried out in the design or construction phases if there is any doubt about 
the data provided in previous phases. So besides inadequate professional capacity, 
financial issue is also a cause of the poor quality in infrastructure construction. 
In addition, inadequate supervision also affects the quality of infrastructure 
construction. Workmanship, material quality and construction methods all require 
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close supervision. However, supervision in Vietnam hasn’t been done professionally. 
Even when foreign supervision consultants were employed, they would hire local 
engineers who did not have the required capability. Capacity of local supervision 
consultants is one of the major concerns. If close supervision was carried out, the 
project efficiency would be very high. For example, in the construction of the Sai Gon 
– Trung Luong road, asphalt coating requires supervision of the standard temperature 
of the asphalt when being poured and standard conditions for coating. If it is raining, 
it would not be recommended to proceed with the coating. However, if the 
supervision was poor, asphalt coating would still proceed. So, developers’ supervision 
consultants play an important role in preventing contractors from lowering quality 
standards”. 
Question: “So what would you recommend to improve the supervision?” 
Answer: “There are two aspects. Firstly, supervision staff should be trained 
professionally. Foreign developers often hire foreign supervision consultants with 
international prestige. The quality of these projects is very high. Meanwhile, local 
supervision consultants hired by local developers often lack the required professional 
and ethical capability. It is common in Vietnam that local supervision consultants 
accept bribes from contractors to cover their poor quality works. The collusion 
between supervision consultants and contractors to overlook poor quality materials 
and works is one of the major issues affecting project quality. Although local 
supervision consultants were able to provide supervision staff in quantity, they lack 
highly qualified and ethical professionals in their workforce. It has been difficult to 
mobilize and retain skilled staff in the supervision consultancy profession. Low 
income is considered the major cause of the issue. Despite its important role in quality 
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assurance, the supervision consultancy profession has not received adequate attention 
in the industry”. 
Question: “You also mentioned that land acquisition is one of major factors affecting 
the quality of infrastructure construction. What would you recommend to address the 
issue and to accelerate land acquisition?” 
Answer: “In order to have an effective land acquisition, the government should 
prepare a clear spatial plan for infrastructure development, based on which land 
would be set aside in advance for future infrastructure development. This way we can 
manage land resources for infrastructure development effectively, and land resources 
for infrastructure would not be disturbed by other projects. Secondly, in the case 
where infrastructure development would have to involve in resettlement, we need to 
do two things. 
Firstly, because of the public purpose of national infrastructure projects, the 
government should promote citizens’ obligations to serve national interests. Secondly, 
the government should provide adequate compensation packages for displaced land 
users. For example, the government regulations indicate that displaced land users 
would be relocated to resettlement sites with conditions at least equal to the previous 
one. But there is no mechanism to ensure that adequate compensation is provided. 
Plans for transition to a new way of life should be prepared as well. For example, 
living in a 6m2 house in central Hanoi, a family’s business is so good that they have 
been able to afford to send their kids to study abroad. But, if they were relocated to a 
60m2 apartment, which is 10 times bigger than the current one, but located far from 
the business area, they would lose their business and their income. It is clear that the 
government should have a policy to maintain the livelihood for displaced land users. 
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The current mechanism has recently created much dissatisfaction among displaced 
land users. 
Finally, land acquisition should be done consistently over entire sites. 
Currently, the acquisition of a new site can be inconsistent. The acquisition of the area 
with compliant land users can be completed quickly. But the acquisition of the 
remaining areas can be delayed. The inconsistent acquisition can cause social 
inequality among displaced land users, and affect the efficiency of infrastructure 
development. Providing readily available sites for infrastructure development is thus 
important. 
Some local governments have been able to solve land acquisition issues. For 
example, the local government of Da Nang has been able to provide readily available 
sites for infrastructure development. When there are infrastructure improvements, 
land value in surrounding areas often increases. The local government of Da Nang has 
taken an initiative to capture the increased land value to accelerate land acquisition. 
For example, if a road was planned to be widened by 50m, the local government 
would acquire not only the 50m but also another 50m along the site, which would 
then be sold to compensate the sitting tenants and finance the road improvement 
project. Everyone would thus benefit from the revenue, creating social equality. 
However, the method might not be applicable to Hanoi where the acquisition would 
involve houses of many political leaders”. 
Question: “Are there any other factors affecting the quality of infrastructure 
construction?” 
Answer: “About the resources of local firms, most firms involving infrastructure 
projects have financial difficulties. Secondly, the poor quality of infrastructure 
construction is also a result of the weaknesses in laws and regulations, especially the 
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Tendering Law. A number of selection criteria specified by the Tendering Law are 
qualitative. The only quantitative criterion is the tender price. As a result, firms with 
the lowest tender price are often selected. Many Chinese firms took advantage of the 
regulation to get their jobs in Vietnam. But as I often said, the cheapness and top 
quality of projects could never come together. Projects executed by Chinese firms are 
often delayed. In many cases, Chinese firms could not complete their contracts and 
have abandoned their projects. 
So, the most important factor affecting the efficiency is development planning, 
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